1827. GEILL v. JEREMY and off) till nine in the evening. ANOTHER. lage where he resided at six that evening, and the mail-bags were not made up at Chorley (two miles The plaintiff did not write by that post, which would have arrived in London, to which his letter was to be addressed, on Saturday; and, there being no post to London on the Friday, he did not write till the Saturday. Storks, for the defendants, contended that this notice was insufficient. In Darbishire v. Parker, 6 East, 3., it was doubted whether the notice should not always be sent by the very next post, if that were possible; and though subsequent cases (a) have laid down the rule that the post of the next day is in all cases sufficient, there is no instance in which it has been decided that the party is entitled to make a delay of two days, when he might, by ordinary diligence, avoid it. In this case he might, with perfect ease, have written on the Thursday, and was therefore not entitled to wait till the Saturday. LORD TENTERDEN C. J. In these cases it is of great importance to have a fixed rule, and not to resort to nice questions of the sufficiency, in each particular case, of a certain number of hours or minutes. The general rule is, that the party need not write on the very day that he receives the notice. If there be no post on the following day, (a) Scott v. Lifford, 9 East. 347. 1 Camp. 246. Langdale v. Trimmer, 15 East. 291. Bray v. Hadwen, 5 M. & S. 68. Williams v. Smith, 2 B. & A. 496. Wright v. Shawcross, 2 B. & A. 501, n. Bancroft v. Hall, 1 Holt, N. P. C. 476. it makes no difference: the next post after the day on which he receives the notice is soon enough. Verdict for the plaintiff. 1827. GEILL v. Marryatt and Chitty for the plaintiff. Storks for the defendant. SITTINGS AFTER TERM IN LONDON. JEREMY and ROGERS v. HUNTER. ASSUMPSIT for demurrage. GUILDHALL, a limited time from the ship's day his goods are so stowed as arrival, and con not to admit The plaintiff was master of the ship Thyrza; and If a bill of took on board, at Bremen, a consignment of corn late for the lading stipufor London, for which he signed bills of lading, payment of demurrage by containing the following clause as to the discharge the consignee of the cargo: "To be discharged within twelve of goods after running days after the vessel's arrival, or to pay 21. British sterling demurrage, for every longer detention." The defendant was the signee of the corn comprised in the bill of lading. The Thyrza arrived and was reported on the 11th December, 1826, and was ready to commence the discharge of her cargo on the 13th; and on the 14th the clearance of the cargo actually commenced. The defendant was at this time ready to take his corn; but the ship containing other consignments, which were stowed above his, his corn could not be got at till the 26th December, when he received notice that it could be got, and was de sired to remove it. He commenced the removal on of delivery imarrival, the mediately on consignee reasonable must have a charge them, and is not murrage till time to dis liable to de after such reasonable time, though the stipulated period has elapsed from the ship's being ready to deliver her cargo generally. But after such reasonable time, he is liable, though the stipulated period has not elapsed, if computed from the time when the discharge of his own goods might have commenced. 1827. ROGERS v. HUNTER. the 28th, and did not finish it till the 2d January, 1827, twenty days after the ship was ready to commence the delivery of the cargo. Marryatt, for the defendant, contended that the plaintiff could not recover any thing. The period from which the demurrage is to be computed is that when the ship is ready to discharge her cargo, (per Gibbs C. J., in Harman v. Mant, 4 Camp. 161.), not that of her actual arrival; and here, as far as the defendant was concerned, that period was not till December 26, for it was not till that day that his part of the cargo could be got at, and he has nothing to do with the arrival and delivery of the rest. Then, as he did actually clear away his corn within the stipulated period of twelve days from that time, he fulfilled his contract, and is not liable to this action. The Attorney General for the plaintiff. The argument for the defendant would have applied equally well in the case of Leer v. Yates, 3 Taunt. 387. (a) In that case the bill of lading contained a stipulation for the delivery, just like that in the present; and there also the goods in question could not be got till after the discharge of another part of the cargo, and that was not discharged in time; but the Court of Common Pleas held the consignee of the lower goods liable to demurrage for the whole time beyond the stipulated period. So here the plaintiff is entitled to 167., as demurrage for the eight days of excess above the stipulated twelve. (a) See also Harman v. Gandolph, 1 Holt. N. P. C. 35. LORD TENTERDEN C. J. According to the doctrine laid down in that case, he certainly is so; but I have great difficulty in saying that, when the consignee has had no opportunity of taking his goods within the time stipulated, he is bound by the contract to pay for not doing so; he cannot, I think, in that case, be said to detain the vessel. On the other hand, I do not agree to the proposition on the part of the defendant, that he has necessarily the stipulated time, to be computed from the period when the discharge of his own goods can be commenced; I think, after that period, he must use reasonable despatch. The true principle seems to be this: If the goods of the particular consignee are not ready for discharge at the time of the ship's arrival, he must have a reasonable time for removing them after they are so ; if, in such a case, using reasonable despatch, he cannot clear them within the stipulated period from the ship's being ready to discharge her cargo generally, he will not be liable for demurrage till the expiration of such a reasonable time; but when it is expired, he will be liable, though the stipulated period, if computed from the time when the discharge of his own goods could have commenced, is not at an end. In the present case the discharge of the defendant's goods might have begun on December 26th, and every day after that time was more than the stipulated twelve days from the time when the discharge of the cargo generally began. The question for the jury, therefore, will be, Whether the defendant, using reasonable despatch, might have removed his goods before the 2d of January? if he might, the plaintiff is entitled to F 1827. ROGERS D. HUNTER. 1827. ROGERS v. HUNTER. receive at the rate of 21. a day for the time unnecessarily consumed. Verdict for the plaintiff, damages 81. Scarlett A. G. and Platt for the plaintiff. GUILDHALL, BENTLEY and Another v. NORTHOUSE. A foreign note ASSUMPSIT by the indorsee against the maker of a is negotiable in England by promissory note. missible in evi dence under the money counts in an indorsement, The note was made in Scotland; and Chitty, for by virtue of the stat. & the defendant, contended that it was not negotiable 4 A. c. 9. (a) A promissory or transferable by indorsement. The power of note is not ad- transferring promissory notes, like bills of exchange, by indorsement, was created by the statute 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9., and has no existence independaction by the ently of that statute; and that statute having been passed before the Union, had no operation on notes made in Scotland. It is true that in some of the stamp-acts there have been clauses restraining the negotiability of foreign notes not stamped according to their provisions; but such clauses cannot create a power of negotiation not indorsee against the maker. (b) (a) S. P. Milne v. Graham, 1 B. & C. 192.; where, however, Carr v. Skaw does not appear to have been cited. Chitty on Bills, 7th edit. 327. (b) S. P. Waynam v. Bend, 1 Camp. 175. Contra, Kessebower v. Tims, Bayley on Bills, 4th edit. 288. n. See also Bayley on Bills, pp. 286—289., and Chitty on Bills, 7th edit. pp. 363–367., where the cases on this subject are collected. |