should seek to discriminate and not to confound, and endeavour to repress that proneness consequent on limited faculties and researches, to lower the elevated things of nature down to the level of our present attainments. Instead of actively exerting ourselves to scale the yet unattempted heights, and to discover new facts and truths in a higher region of speculation, we grovel supinely among the acquirements already made, and vainly strive to expound by the things which are known, the things which are unknown. Instead of using our present knowledge as steps whereby to ascend to greater altitudes, we employ it in idle combinations and imaginative results, as a succedaneum for the arduous investigations attendant on original research: bence we assume to create for ourselves, and to make worlds of our own; we become cosmogonists and materialists, blend and confound physiology with psychology, and set up a self-intellectual idolatry, in place of sitting as humble disciples at the feet of nature. Such is the character of the opposite school of opinions from that which has previously been the subject of remark; such is the philosophy which the materialists would pass as genuine, under the guise of scientific generalisation.

The essence of materialism consists, I conceive, in making the most excellent and most exalted attributes and powers of nature, to arise from the action of the inferior powers, as though the results elicited could possibly be different in kind from the agency in operation. The conclusions that have been deduced from the doctrine of powers, are vindicated from the possibility of a charge of this kind, by the statement just made, that the several powers have an existence, as distinct and different endowments. But it may be objected by some, that as we are deprived by the doctrine in question of a knowledge of distinct and different substances, and as it is possible that all powers may inhere in one common substratum, a decided approach is made to materialism, not in the least, even on the supposition of what is here imagined possible, being actual. The common upholders of powers, it is to be observed, is unknown; we cannot conceive of its nature; no objection, therefore, on the ground of its incongruity for the support of spiritual attributes can be entertained. We are relieved from

the repuguance which is felt in associating mind with solid and extended parts. Materialism is, in fact, refuted and put down, inasmuch as matter, so to call it, is no longer the matter of the materialists. The unknown substance, although supporting the material powers, may be conceived of after the same manner we are accustomed to conceive of spirit, as, an individual unit, which may bear a relation to space, but of which space is not a constituent-neither is solidity. All the individuality, the intangibility the indivisibility-all the negations, in short, which are thought of in connexion with spirit, may be thought of in connexion with the unknown something which supports the material powers; for matter is rescued from the inert condition, which so lidity and extension, considered as essential qualities, imply, and is endowed with the energetic attribute of power. Activity becomes its very essence; its properties are no longer incongruous with spirit, and therefore the conjecture of their identity in substance may be entertained without disparagement to the latter. The conjecture does not degrade the spiritual essence by assigning to it solid extension, but it dignifies the material essence by withholding such quali ties from it. These views, therefore, of a oneness of substance for all powers, are as much opposed to materialism, as they are to the opposite doctrine; they lead, in short, not to the materialising of spirit, but to the spiritualising of matter. But, in truth, we have no concern with these topics, and conjectures in any direction are idle, and altogether gratuitous, for we possess no data from which to proceed. The point would not have been discussed, but that it is desirable to avoid opprobrium and to obviate misconception.

There is one other point which also requires a brief explanation. This doctrine of powers, distant as it is from materialism, is equally far removed from the idealism of Berkeley; for that philosopher, whilst he denied, as is here done, the existence of essential or primary qualities as different from secondary qualities, contended, that the powers external to us, designated by the termi matter, is in truth the immediate action of the Deity, regulated by laws, and manifested to us in the same manner, as though there existed an intervening sub stance in possession of those powers,

and governed by those laws. He thus dispensed with matter as a real existencë; but it should be observed, that he did so,only in reference to its substance or substratum. He did not imagine that we are perpetually the subject of mental illusions, as is coininonly supposed, but he considered that the powers of nature so called, have a real existence as the emanations of divine power, but unconnected with any intermediate substance. Such alleged substance being unknown; the supposition of its existence he thought to be unnecessary, if it were not allowed to possess any powers of its own. The acknowledged substance of spirit he admitted to be equally unknown; but then this class of powers, is allowed an existence distinct and separate from, though not independent of, the Deity; and hence arises a cogent reason for the existence of a substance in which they may inhere. His system of idealism, followed, therefore, very rationally and consistently from these premises that the substance of matter is not an object of knowledger; and that the powers of matter are manifestations of Divine energy. The first doctrine, if he did not originate it, he was the first most successfully to establish. The second doctrine was, and still is, the prevailing belief among philosophers. Could he have emancipated himself from the trammels of this belief, he would have acknowledged that substance, though unknown, exists as a support of material powers, as well as that substance though also unknown, exists as a support of spiritual power. He would then have stood on the very ground which is taken in this paper. Here then is the difference between idealism and the views now inculcated. But waving the argument in favour of the existence of the substance of matter, as arising from the necessity of a substratum to uphold powers which are not divine, let us refer to one more immediately based on induction and experience, to prove the reality of distinct and separate existences in the constitution of external agency.

*

That a substance knowable to finite creatures, that solid extended matter, is the support of divine power; that it is in any manner required to be in Connexion with it, is a hard proposition for philosophy to digest, and savours more of Spinozaism than is suspected.

It is impossible to divest ourselves of the consciousness that we exist as a substance, or as a something distinct from our powers, which ceases not to exist when those powers are inoperant, and which unites and comprehends them all in one active and sentient being. We thence argue, when brought by experi ence to perceive that there are in existence other numerous powers, or rather groups of powers, like unto our own, that they also must belong to substance and to individua! substances-I mean that those powers cannot be referred to only one originating cause. Herein I beg it to be observed, lies the gist of the further argument; the point is this that there is the same reason and the same certainty for referring those external powers to many causes, as there is to any. In short, we are entitled, with the utmost confi. dence, to infer the existence of other powerful beings like unto ourselves. Thus far Berkeley would also have pro ceeded. But may we not further argue, with the same certainty, because the self-same process of reasoning is adopted, that when brought by experience to per ceive, that other powers again, of a different and inferior kind, exist, which produce the impressions of heat, colour, solidity, &c., may we not infer, not only that these powers also must own an e ternal cause, but that they must belong to substances as individual existences, It is not enough to infer merely an external cause, for the idealist will retort; that he also makes such an inference, when he ascribes the production of those impressions to the immediate agency of the Deity; but we ought to infer, what we are equally warranted to do as in the former case that the external agency is many and individual, having respect to distinct substances; and this conclusion, carrying with it the necessity of a plurality of separate acting causes, precludes the idea of the sole agency of the Divine Being, which of course is one. Thus, our belief in the existence of matter, rests on the same ground whereon we persuade ourselves, that there are other intellectual beings in the world besides ourselves. This belief reposes not on the evidence of sense, for that carries us no further than the existence of the sensation; but on an inference, which is the dictate of intelligence, in

tuitively, or, if you please, instinctively, suggested.

By adopting the views which have been now unfolded, we shall cease to obtinde on either hand, those inagisterial dicta which distinguish the opposite schools of doginatism and assumption. We shall drop our pretensions to a knowledge of things which are beyond our reach for what purpose, or by what party soever, it may be taught, and humbly confess, that we ourselves and all things around us are shrouded in impenetrable mystery. We shall ingenuously acknowledge, that we know nothing of essence, and that our true province, indeed our only ability, is to thread the labyrinth of the complicated effects of modifying powers, and to trace those powers truly, until we may arrive at their primal and simple forms. There we must for ever stop. The history and the progress of philoso phy the direction which its successful inquiries have taken the analogies of science, its universal tendencies to quaytative results, and the peculiarities of the sensations themselves, all tend to create the belief, that the impressions referred to solidity, own no other cause than force. This conclusion would obtain a more ready assent, but that the mind clings to the notion that there is something else besides force, as being necessary to uphold it. Undoubtedly there is something, though it is impossible for us even to conjecture what it can be, for the vision, therefore, hath not impressed the sense, nor the similitude thereof entered the mind. It is, however, to that something we are prone to attribute the actions upon us, instead of attributing them to the forces which it acts; and the iniud, unsatisfied with the rude idea of force, eagerly avails itself of some of its own affections, wherewith to clothe that something to acquire a conception of i', to confer on it a substance and a form. But force, naked force, is all that by the present constitution of our nature, can pass from it to us. If the refined sensations of vision fail to disclose to us any thing of its essential nature, it is

I have here toned an argument, or rather have analysed an operation of the mind, which enables me, to reject with greater confidence the hypothesis of Berkeley, than I did in my former paper. I hope the argument will be found to be valid, notwithstanding that it has been often said by those who were not the friends of idealism, that it cannot be proved to be false.

in vain to imagine that the grosser sensations of touch will unfold to us more of its secrets. We are entitled to demand of a philosophy which shall teach us otherwise, its proof, that any of our sensations are coincident with, or characteristic of matter; we inquire, what right has it to turn these, our inental affections over to matter, and make them qualities thereof; and we require to know, what criterion it can point to, what guarantee it can offer; that as, in iegard to some of them, it has confessedly gone astray, it is in its conclusions respecting solidity and extension, infallible.

The progress of knowledge has ever been in this direction-to narrow the bounds of legitimate inquiry, though, at the same time, to render investigations more definite and more exact. Already has philosophy moderated its pretensions to the point of acknowledging, that we know nothing concerning the efficiency of causes; and that our only object of discovery, is the invariable connexion of events. Why, then, should it persist any longer in the yet bolder pretension, that the nature of matter is open to observation, and that we do obtain an insight into the very source of the efficiency of causes, an access to the origin and fountain-head of power? Let us abandon this presumptuous thought, and thenceforward will cease those bitter animosities which have been engendered by differences of opinion on some points connected with this subject, and which it is lamentable to think, have arisen on both sides, from a misconception as to the limited extent of our reasoning and discerning powers. Doubtless the time will come, when we shall cease to insist that our knowlege of spirit and matter is so determinate, as to entitle us to decide, either on the one hand, that they are distinct and different essences; or, on the other hand, that the primary qualities of the latter, constitute the substance from which, in some of its modifications, result the attributes which are usually assigned to the former. In the day, when metaphysics shall have abandoned the high and long occupied ground of à priori reasoning-when it shall have come down from the region of pure intellect, and taken the fumbler wa k so successfully trod in physics-the walk of - observation and just inferences; in that

enlightened day of metaphysical discernment, we shall ingenuously acknowledge, that of aught beyond the effects and manifestations of power, we are in utter ignorance, and that the secret of its source and nature is inscrutable.

We have now taken a review of some of the consequences which logically and irresistably follow, from the doctrine involved in Mr. Exley's Theory of Physics," and in many other theories and statements besides. The reader must have perceived, particularly from the tone of my latter remarks, that my own opinion is decidedly in favour of that doctrine. The truth is, that it is coincident with propositions which I have myself advanced in my former paper. I there affirm that" properties or qualities are certainly only the different manifestations of power, as severally operating upon us through our senses; and it is of this power only, in its varied forms, as affecting us through the several mediums of access, of which we can be sensible or have any discernment." This is fully equivalent to Mr. Exley's assertion, that

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we know nothing of matter but by the forces which it exerts, and which, doubtless, constitute its nature," or rather its essential properties. The difference between us, lies in the circumstance merely that our respective premises have different conditions. The metaphysical truth is the same in both, and is, as I consider, absolutely certain, though its physical form is, I contend, only probable. Whilst, therefore, I am content to speak indefinitely of the primary powers of matter, because, confessedly, unacquainted with their form and law of action, Mr. Exley aspires to an exact knowledge of these arcana, and to give so definite a statement of the forces and their laws, as to be able to ground thereon a general theory of physics. Disagreeing as to the sufficiency of proof which he advances in behalf of his system, we agree in denying the validity of the distinction, between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, and in resolving all our knowledge of matter into a congnizance of its powers, as capable of impressing us with various sensations; or, in his own language, that "matter is perceptible to man by means of its powers acting on the senses, which evidently in infinite wisdom, are adapted to receive the im

pression of these powers." Mr. Exley considers the principles of his system to be undeniable, whilst I can only regard them as uncertain and hypothetical, though not devoid of some probability. Nevertheless, this theory has a useful bearing on the metaphysical propositions and inferences which have been advanced, inasmuch as it shows, even in a physical aspect, the probability in the possibility, that certain original powers of matter excite those sensations which we usually attribute to qualities in bodies; and this it does, by pointing out their sufficiency for that purpose, and the manner how such an effect may be brought about. By placing before us a physical modus operandi, it presents us with one conceivable form, by which such a state of things may result, which metaphisical considerations teach us does really obtain. I would therefore state, in further explanation, that I was desirous that the conclusions which I have drawn, especially those which render some long-cherished distinctions futile, should be deduced rather from the first principles of a physical theory, than from my own more metaphysical propositions, although in the present imperfect state of the former, the conclusions derived from the latter possess a higher authority; still, I thought it exceedingly desirable, to draw closer together, and to connect, if possible, though it should only be by a link of probable truth, the investigations of physics and metaphysics. Allow me to add, that though opinions adopted in earlier life, have, on this occasion, revived with augmented force, I have felt more disposed to affix them as consequences to another man's principles, than to advance them on my own unsheltered responsibility. I fear, however, that Mr. Exley will not feel flatter by this putative paternity, and that the new views of things, which his principles, when carried out, disclose to us, are not exactly those foreseen or contemplated by him.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.
BENJ. CHEVERTON.

A NEW QUESTION. BY O. C. F.

It is well known, that if a person buy 120 eggs at 2 for a penny, and 120 more at 3 for a penny, and sell the whole

at 5 for twopence, he will lose fourpence by the transaction. Now, supposing he had bought 120 at 2 for a penny, how many must he buy at 3 for a penny, so that, selling the whole at 5 for twopence, he may neither gain nor lose? And, again, supposing 120 bought at 2 for a penny in each case, how many must be bought at 3 for a penny, so that on selling the whole at 5 for twopence, there may be gained 10 per cent., 15 per cent., and 19 per cent., respectively? And, lastly, is it possible, having bought 120 at 2 for a penny, to buy any number at 3 for a penny, to sell the whole at 5 for twopence, and gain twenty per cent.? If it is not possible, what is the reason?

This simple question is proposed in order to illustrate the nature and cause of a limit which sometimes occurs and excites surprise in inquiries relating to per centage gains.

THE ELECTRICAL THEORY OF THE UNI
VERSE.

Mr. Mackintosh remarked, that men had divided the physical sciences into several branches for the convenience of study; but if we desired to obtain a complete view of the subject, we must put all the parts together, and view nature as a whole in this sense, we should find that geology and astronomy were intimately connected, and that the study of the one would reflect light upon the other. In connexion with the electrical theory, there were two points to be esdtablishe-first, that the earth was contracting into solid rock; second, that solid matter in large masses has been deposited upon the surface. With respect to the first point nothing more was required than to state the fact that the hardest rocks contained remains of animals and plants, which once lived and died, and were deposited upon the surface of the earth, but their remains were now found hundreds of feet beneath the surface. It thus appeared, that the surface of the earth was raised in many places hundreds, and even thousands of feet above the original surface; and this fact, alone, was sufficient to convince us of the deposition of matter upon the earth; but if any further proof were wanted, we may find it in the additional fact, that the stratified rocks were found in positions into which it is impossible they could have been thrown by a force acting from beneath, they must have been deposited in a solid state upon the surface.

French Steamers,-A grand French enterprise of steamers in the Mediterranean is nearly completed, Ten of them, each 500 tons, and magnificently fitted up on English models, are in the port of Marseilles, ready to commence the service. There are to be two lines, one from Marseilles to Constantinople, the other from Athens to Alexandria, They will intersect each other at the little island of Syra, and exchange passengers and dispatches. Between Marseilles and Constantinople they will touch at Leghorn, Civita Vecchia, Naples, Mes. sina, Malta, Syra, and Smyrna, The departure will be so managed that three times per month three steamers, one coming from Marseilles, the second from Constantinople and Smyrna, and the third from Alexandria, will arrive at the central station at Syra; so that a person at Marseilles can receive on the 29th day an answer to a letter written to Constantinople or Alexandria; while at present forty-five or fifty days are employed in going and returning between Marseilles and either of those places.-Sunday Times.

Paddle-Wheel Experiment.-A recent experiment has proved that the supply of water to the paddle-wheels of steam-vessels does not come from the surface of the water, or from the sides of the space through which the wheel moves at each evo, lution of the water, but from beneath. It was proved as follows:-A steam-vessel was moored at deep water, which was strewed (it being calm weas ther,) with sawdust; the engine was then put in mo tion, and it was observed that the sawdust all around and every where, except immediately behind the paddle-wheels, remained undisturbed.-Times.

Transferring Plants.-An interesting improve ment in the mode of transferring plants which thrive best in a humid atmosphere has recently been communicated to the Society of Arts. They are merely planted in a box filled with moist earth, and covered with a glazed frame, rendered as airtight as possible. Captain Mallard, R.N., filled several cases with ferns and flowering plants at Sidney, some of which had not previously been introduced into England. The thermometer, when the plants and flowers were placed in the case at Sidney, stood at 90 and 100. In rounding Cape Horn, about two months after, the thermometer was observed as low as 20, at 8 p.m., and the decks were a foot-deep in snow. A fortnight after, they were in the harbour of Rio Janeiro. In crossing the Line, the thermometer rose to 120, and on the arrival of the ship in the British Channel the thermometer was as low as 50. The plants were not watered, and received no protection either by day or night, and yet were found in the most flourishing condition after eight months' confinement,

Rock-Blasting by Lightning.-Perhaps human ingenuity and daring were never more strongly