or popular sovereignty. The aim is the existence of a nation, not the aggrandisement of a dynasty; but the nation, mistress of herself, may still reward a prince who has aided in the struggle. There are some shades of opinion within the party, from Garibaldi, who, although democratic in principle and feeling, yet points out Victor Emmanuel to the people as the king for them to choose, to Mazzini, and those who hold more strictly with him, who, without repudiating their republican faith, profess their readiness to bow to the national will, and to accept the King of Piedmont. But these shades of difference constitute no real division, and all work together as the party of action. Let us now turn to contemplate the events of the last two years, viewing them by the light which this distinction of parties affords; only glancing first for a moment at the position of Piedmont before the war. For ten years the revolutionary fire had been kept smouldering under compression. Several attempts at insurrection had failed, crushed in their birth. Still it needed but a breath of air, a spark falling on the right spot at the right moment, to kindle a flame which might spread over the Peninsula ; and the position of Piedmont was becoming continually more perilous. The moderati, in order to prevent the people from acting for themselves, had fostered in them the hope that the Piedmontese Government would some day act for them. Thus the Piedmontese Government was menaced at once by the ever increasing hostility of Austria, and by the danger of being drawn into the vortex of Italian revolution, with all its risks, in case insurrection should make head for a time in any part of Italy. As a protection from these dangers, Cavour at length sought for or accepted the alliance of the Emperor of the French. While the war lasted the moderati were completely in the ascendant, and the multitude went with them, applauding the policy of Cavour, and hailing a foreign despot as the founder of Italian independence and nationality; began to reorganize itself, and gradually to regain its influence. Garibaldi and Mazzini-the latter of whom, while the faith in the French Emperor lasted, to use his own words, "did but look on and wait"-began once more to act together. The first effort of the party of action after the peace of Villafranca was to spread revolution throughout the Roman and Neapolitan States, by the passage of Garibaldi, at the head of his division, from the Legations southward, in October of last year. This was the project of Mazzini; and he prepared insurrection at Ancona and in Sicily, the signal for whose outbreak was to be the advance of Garibaldi. The Italian hero and his volunteers entered into the project with enthusiasm. Farini and Ricasoli, then ruling Central Italy, yielded a reluctant consent; but they required that Mazzini himself should not come forward, hoping thus to lessen the chance of immediate opposition from Louis-Napoleon. the eve of his advance, Garibaldi was stopped by an order from the king. After this, an attempt was made to form an association called "La Nazione Armata." Garibaldi also endeavoured to obtain the command of the national guard in Lombardy and Central Italy, with the intention of organizing it upon a broader basis. On But all these plans for arming the country were defeated by the Government through dread of popular action and subserviency to Louis-Napoleon. The party of action then turned to Sicily. It must not be supposed that the insurrection there was a spontaneous outbreak merely generated by oppression. Sicily was chosen as the scene for initiating a general movement, having Italian unity for its scope. Rosolino Pilo and Crispi were the principal agents in organizing the insurrection. They went to Sicily for the purpose, always in communication with Mazzini; and they were, in effect, the chiefs of the insurrection until Garibaldi arrived. The plan of the intended movement was this:-It was proposed that revolution, beginning the scene by the side of Mazzini—the one destined to be the armed apostle of unity in the field of battle, as the other was the warrior in the mental contest. It is remarkable how little this epoch was understood either by our statesmen or our press. They seemed to be blind to all except the visible facts that occurred. The hearts of the Italians were a sealed book to them; they knew nothing of the ideas, aspirations, and longings that were written there; and, even till within the last two years, judging the Italians still by their history in the middle ages, they have been accustomed to lament and condemn their incapacity for union among themselves. They regarded Mazzini only in one of his special aspects, as the chief of a republican party, instead of looking at him primarily in his more general character as the incarnation of the idea of Italian unity; in the Roman republic they saw only the local form of political liberty, the higher meaning which it represented in the national sense being invisible to them; and, if they alluded to the national aspiration at all, it was rather as the visionary longing of a few enthusiastic dreamers than as the real living thing, the irresistible tendency, that agitated Italy. After this period the Italian movement entered upon a somewhat different phase, and a change took place in Italian parties. The "moderate" party seemed to give in to the irresistible attraction of the national idea, but they still condemned revolution, or the action of the people in their own cause; and thus the division of parties, ceasing in reference to the supreme end in view, soon reappeared in reference to the means of arriving at that end. In other words, the now all-inclusive national party consisted now of two sections -the moderati and the party of action; and this is the only real division of parties at the present day. The moderati still represent the conservative in contradistinction to the progressive element among the Italians themselves, and their chief strength lies in the ranks of the aris tional government, Victor Emmanuel separated his policy conspicuously from that system of forcible repression of the national agitation which represented the common interests of Italian rulers. Thus the moderati found a good standard round which to rally, and contended that no movement for nationality should take place except by the initiative of the Piedmontese Government. It was not, probably, that they really feared agitation for republican government; but they knew that, if Italy were created by popular action, the people would become powerful, gaining self-respect and selfreliance, and, although Victor Emmanuel might be accepted as king, the democratic tendency would remain. For the word "Unity"- which implied Italy self-created, its outward political organization as one nation, to be worked out by a force from within, arising from the consciousness in the people of national individuality as one collective life-they usually substituted the word, "Unification," which signified that Italy was to be made one, as if by some agency acting upon her; thus implying the exclusion of popular action, and pointing rather to the operation of regular armies. They seemed also to look upon their goal as something to be arrived at only in a distant future; and their immediate aim was rather the extension of Piedmont, little by little, as any combination in European politics might give help from without. After 1849, that constitutionalists and republicans might act together in the common cause, Mazzini proposed, as a programme for the entire national party, unity and independence for Italy, and submission by all to the form of government that might prove to be the will of the majority. The theoretical republicans of Italy generally have adhered to this; and, although almost every outbreak or revolutionary movement has emanated from them, never since 1849 has the cry "Viva la Republica !" been heard. The republican tone of this party of action, indeed, is less a precise determination on a particular form of govern or popular sovereignty. The aim is the existence of a nation, not the aggrandisement of a dynasty; but the nation, mistress of herself, may still reward a prince who has aided in the struggle. There are some shades of opinion within the party, from Garibaldi, who, although democratic in principle and feeling, yet points out Victor Emmanuel to the people as the king for them to choose, to Mazzini, and those who hold more strictly with him, who, without repudiating their republican faith, profess their readiness to bow to the national will, and to accept the King of Piedmont. But these shades of difference constitute no real division, and all work together as the party of action. Let us now turn to contemplate the events of the last two years, viewing them by the light which this distinction of parties affords; only glancing first for a moment at the position of Piedmont before the war. For ten years the revolutionary fire had been kept smouldering under compression. Several attempts at insurrection had failed, crushed in their birth. Still it needed but a breath of air, a spark falling on the right spot at the right moment, to kindle a flame which might spread over the Peninsula ; and the position of Piedmont was becoming continually more perilous. The moderati, in order to prevent the people from acting for themselves, had fostered in them the hope that the Piedmontese Government would some day act for them. Thus the Piedmontese Government was menaced at once by the ever increasing hostility of Austria, and by the danger of being drawn into the vortex of Italian revolution, with all its risks, in case insurrection should make head for a time in any part of Italy. As a protection from these dangers, Cavour at length sought for or accepted the alliance of the Emperor of the French. While the war lasted the moderati were completely in the ascendant, and the multitude went with them, applauding the policy of Cavour, and hailing a foreign despot as the founder of Italian independence and nationality; began to reorganize itself, and gradually to regain its influence. Garibaldi and Mazzini-the latter of whom, while the faith in the French Emperor lasted, to use his own words, "did but look on and wait"-began once more to act together. The first effort of the party of action after the peace of Villafranca was to spread revolution throughout the Roman and Neapolitan States, by the passage of Garibaldi, at the head of his division, from the Legations southward, in October of last year. This was the project of Mazzini; and he prepared insurrection at Ancona and in Sicily, the signal for whose outbreak was to be the advance of Garibaldi. The Italian hero and his volunteers entered into the project with enthusiasm. Farini and Ricasoli, then ruling Central Italy, yielded a reluctant consent; but they required that Mazzini himself should not come forward, hoping thus to lessen the chance of immediate opposition from Louis-Napoleon. the eve of his advance, Garibaldi was stopped by an order from the king. After this, an attempt was made to form an association called "La Nazione Armata." Garibaldi also endeavoured to obtain the command of the national guard in Lombardy and Central Italy, with the intention of organizing it upon a broader basis. On But all these plans for arming the country were defeated by the Government through dread of popular action and subserviency to Louis-Napoleon. The party of action then turned to Sicily. It must not be supposed that the insurrection there was a spontaneous outbreak merely generated by oppression. Sicily was chosen as the scene for initiating a general movement, having Italian unity for its scope. Rosolino Pilo and Crispi were the principal agents in organizing the insurrection. They went to Sicily for the purpose, always in communication with Mazzini; and they were, in effect, the chiefs of the insurrection until Garibaldi arrived. The plan of the intended movement was this:-It was proposed that revolution, beginning dom of Naples; all Southern Italy once gained over to the national cause through popular action, Venice would be attacked by sea and land, in concert with internal insurrection; it was hoped that Victor Emmanuel would be then forced to cast in his lot unreservedly with the Italian people, lest he should lose the prospect of the Italian crown; and the Italians of the North and South, thus united, would say to Louis-Napoleon, "Now deliver up to us our capital."The Sicilian insurrection succeeded. The immense difficulty of a first successful outbreak-the obstacle before which the plans of the party of action had so often failed-was overcome. The reader is familiar, through our press, with the series of successes by which Sicily and Naples have been revolutionized; and a portion of the programme, laid down for the movement from its commencement, is now fulfilled. At every step of its advance the party of action has encountered the opposition, more or less direct, of the moderati. When the insurrection first broke out in Sicily, they condemned it; but, when success seemed probable, they gave it their approval, for it is a necessity for them, whenever, in spite of their teaching, insurrection succeeds and some advance is made, that they should advance too in order to secure what is gained to the monarchical interest; then their opposition is directed against the next step. Thus the Piedmontese Government permitted volunteers to embark for Sicily, but endeavoured to prevent the flame of revolution from extending into the kingdom of Naples. La Farina was sent to Sicily by Cavour, to work in concert with the local moderate or aristocratic element, trying to hasten the vote of annexation, so as to deprive Garibaldi of Sicily as a point d'appui for further operations. The king also wrote to him to prevent his crossing to the mainland. But Garibaldi was firm; and, when it became certain that he would cross, the Piedmontese Government resolved at all events to prevent his advancing into Central Italy. All further enrolment or embarkation of arms or ammunition prohibited; and a force of volunteers which was collecting, partly in the island of Sardinia, partly on the Tuscan frontier, and intended to act in the Roman provinces and the Abruzzi, in concert with popular insurrection, was dispersed by order of the Government. But the population of Umbria and the Marches was ripe for insurrection; it might still rise even without assistance, and the Dictatorship of Garibaldi would extend into the Roman States. There was but one way of preventing this for the Piedmontese Government. The step seemed a bold one, but no doubt it had the sanction of Louis-Napoleon-to occupy the ground. itself. Hence the invasion and occupation of the Roman provinces. When Garibaldi found himself thus shut out from the advance towards Venice, his first idea seems to have been to turn to Rome. His proclamations clearly pointed to this, and he still refused immediate annexation. In a proclamation to the Palermitans on the 17th September, he said: "At Rome only we will proclaim "the Italian kingdom. . . . The annexa"tion of Sicily was desired, in order to "prevent me from passing the Straits: "the annexation of Naples is now wished "for, that I may not pass the Volturno; "but while there are chains in Italy to "break, I will advance." He soon gave way, however, at the appearance of decided opposition from Piedmont. Perhaps he feared that, instead of drawing Piedmont and its army with him if he advanced, he might encounter open hostility. In a few weeks no doubt the annexation will take place, and thus the moderati will have succeeded in arresting the movement towards unity for a time. The prominent figure of the party of action lately on the scene has been Garibaldi. He has advanced irresistible, surrounded by the glorious aureole of the Italian idea, the gaze of the multitude, the theme of Europe; but those who see beyond the foreground of the picture, have beheld another figure-that of the teacher and apostle of the idea of Italian unity, who, yielding to the general im might excite hostility to the movement on the part of Louis-Napoleon, or alarm. those who fear the republican principle, has remained in the background, indifferent to his own position, and merging all thought of self in the great aim of his existence, but has still, nevertheless, inspired, projected, organized, and laboured on at his task. Within the struggle for Italian nationality we thus see the contest between the conservative and the progressive element among the Italians themselvesthe latter, from its nature as essentially connected with any truly national movement, having been the real power which has worked onwards towards its realization. The Piedmontese monarchy and the moderati float on the summit of the wave and advance with it; but they have not caused its motion. Those English writers who assume that Victor Emmanuel has for years encouraged the national aspiration, that he has led instead of following the movement, do but place him in an odious light, and confirm the charge brought against him by other Italian rulers of an unscrupulous ambition, and of deliberately seeking selfaggrandizement at their expense. But such a path was too full of danger to have tempted him. It is only within a few months that Cavour has ventured to declare the policy of Piedmont to be for unity. At the congress of Paris in 1856 he spoke of impending revolution in Italy, but said nothing of the national aspiration as its source, and even proposed a further division of the Peninsula by forming the Legations into an eighth Italian State. The terms of the alliance arranged at Plombières were undoubtedly a simple increase of territory for each ally-Piedmont to be aggrandized at the expense of Austria, France at that of Piedmont or Italy. Though Italian nationality was the war-cry against Austria, this meant only a federation of Italian States; and, whether Cavour did or did not hold out the prospect of a crown of Tuscany for Prince Napoleon as well as promise Savoy and Nice to France, his policy brought this danger upon Italy, of the population of Central Italy, where the national sentiment was thoroughly awakened, and who saw the path towards unity in annexation to Piedmont, that the danger was warded off. Thus the real advance that was made still came from the people. The party of action, when raising the Italian banner nearly thirty years ago, taught that a people of five-and-twenty millions can be independent and united if they resolutely will it; and they have striven both by precept and example to arouse the Italians to a new life of energy. When the brothers Bandiera, in 1844, said, "Italy "will live when the Italians know how to "die; and to teach them that, there is "nothing like example," they but expressed the spirit of self-sacrifice that has breathed since in tens of thousands who have been ready always to risk their lives to form the forlorn hope of any attempt at action. Before these pages are presented to the public, new events may have occurred, and it would be idle to speculate upon the future beyond the anticipation of certain general results. At the recent opening of the Piedmontese Chamber, Cavour declared that war against Austria would be displeasing to the great Powers, and that an advance to Rome would be "monstrous ingratitude" to Louis-Napoleon; but it may safely be predicted that, should he attempt to arrest the movement beyond the spring, he will fail. Even the attempt would endanger the monarchy. Victor Emmanuel must advance, or the revolution will advance without him. The party of action will still agitate. Their cry to the Government will be, "On, on, or else we come." The volunteers who have flocked to the side of Garibaldi have fought neither for gold, nor a decoration, nor the smile of a prince; they have but one aim-Italian unity and independence. On embarking at Genoa their cry was, "A Roma! A Roma!" nor can there be order or settled government in the south until all Italy be free. The revolution at Naples is not for annexation to Piedmont, but to merge with Piedmont in Italy; and there is no Italy without |