Germany, and the Austrians derived no advantage from their successes in Italy, "because Napoleon, victorious on the "Danube, was advancing towards the "heart of Austria. Diversions on the "part of the army of Italy, by way of the "Tyrol, were twice relied on at Vienna, "and twice they were found impossible. "In order to move by Innsbruck towards "the basin of the Danube, the Austrians "would have been obliged to remove, "further from their base, but could they "hazard this manoeuvre? They saw them"selves on the contrary forced to promptly "evacuate Italy, to cross the mountains, "between the Isonzo and the Drave, to 'gain the Lower Danube, and at last to "take up a position less perilous, inas"much as it replaced them on a base "parallel to that of the French."

It may seem superfluous to support the views of the Archduke by those of writers of less strategical authority. But we will just refer to what is said on the subject by M. Thiers, because he is not only a writer of history, but has been more than once Minister of France, and must be perfectly acquainted with the views of the ablest men in the French army, as to the defensive systems of all the great European powers. "Napoleon and the Archduke Charles," says M. Thiers,1 "have proved, the "first by great examples, the second by "profound arguments, that a quarrel "between Austria and France ought to "be settled on the Danube." Sir A. Alison expresses views to the same effect, and points out the importance to an invading army of the means of transport furnished by a great navigable river an advantage wholly wanting to an army invading Austria by way of Venetia.

But it is not only by the reasonings of strategical writers that the alleged importance of the Quadrilateral to Austria for defensive purposes is confuted. The practical experience of all former wars is equally conclusive. During all the many wars between France and Austria

1 "History of the French Revolution," translated by F. Shoberl, vol. v. p. 299.

before the time of Napoleon, Venetia was an independent Italian state; and, for some centuries before her fall, she was a weak state. weak state. Yet France, though her armies often appeared in Lombardy, never, in the course of these wars, attempted to invade the territories of Austria by way of Venetia.

The various French invasions of Austria in the time of Napoleon have been briefly enumerated in the last passage we have quoted from the writings of the Archduke Charles. We have seen that Napoleon once only led an army to the attack of Austria by way of Venetia. But the circumstances under which he took this course, in 1797, deprive it of all value as a strategical precedent. Napoleon had then just prostrated the power of Austria by his celebrated campaign of 1796. But he was still only the general of the French Republic commanding in Italy. Though his extraordinary exploits had gone far to render him practically independent within the limits of his own command, he had no control whatever over the French armies

beyond those limits. He could not direct the movements, or even obtain the co-operation, of the army of the Rhine under Moreau. He could only follow up his victories by means of such operations as lay within the scope of his own command. He must invade Austria from Northern Italy, or be reduced to inactivity, while others reaped the fruits of his victories. It was not in the character of the man to hesitate between alternatives such as these. He advanced through Venetia into the territories of Austria; and, after finding himself, as may be seen both from his own correspondence with the Directory and the remarks of the Archduke Charles, in a position of considerable danger, he took upon himself, though a mere general, without diplomatic powers, to conclude, on his own responsibility, at Leoben,, amidst the mountains of Styria, those, preliminaries of peace which were afterwards with some modifications embodied in the treaty of Campo Formio.

But, from the time Napoleon acquired control over all the military operations

who desires to pursue this subject, an attentive examination of the work itself; and with extracting from it a few sentences stating the general results arrived at on the points material for our purpose. To make these extracts intelligible, we must premise that the author had previously described Southern Germany and the valley of the Danube as the Northern Division; the mountain districts of Switzerland and the Tyrol as the Middle Division; and Northern Italy as the Southern Division; of the general theatre of war. The italics are our own, employed to indicate the passages bearing most strongly on the question under discussion.

After pointing out that military operations by way of Northern Italy must necessarily be circuitous, and explaining the strategical danger of operating on a curve between two points, while the enemy can act on the straight line between the same points, the author proceeds: 1

"Let us suppose that the design be "to move armies on Vienna, starting "from Strasburg, and from Milan; the "march on the curved line from Milan "through the Venetian country and the "interior of Austria, will offer no hope of success, as long as the enemy holds the defile of the Danube between Ulm and "Ratisbon, and has the command of the "straight line."

After pronouncing any operation by either belligerent from the south, by way of the Tyrol or of Switzerland, to be inconsistent with strategical principles, and pointing out that there is more military facility in entering these mountain districts from the north, the author proceeds:

"It results from these reflections, "that the key of all the operations is to be "found in the Northern Division of the "theatre of war, and that, once master of "that, it is easy to penetrate into the "other divisions with safety and confi"dence. The conquest of this division

1 Translated from the "Histoire de la Campagne de 1799 en Allemagne et en Suisse traduit de l'Allemand, par un Officier Autrichien."

"If the French were to succeed in conquering the valley of the Danube, an operation on the right bank of this "stream, and skirting the foot of the "mountains, would offer them the great"est number of advantages; the frontiers "of Austria being deprived of means of "defence, the possibility of penetrating "into the interior of that state by the "shortest and least difficult route, and of "necessitating at once the evacuation of "the Tyrol and of Italy, would leave "them no doubt as to the choice or as "to the success of their operations."

We must confine ourselves to one extract more, in which the author briefly states, as attesting the truth of his conclusions, the events of the campaigns of Napoleon.

"The events of several campaigns "bear witness to the truth of these con"siderations.

"Germany, and the Austrians derived no "advantage from their successes in Italy, "because Napoleon, victorious on the Danube, was advancing towards the "heart of Austria. Diversions on the "part of the army of Italy, by way of the "Tyrol, were twice relied on at Vienna, "and twice they were found impossible. "In order to move by Innsbruck towards "the basin of the Danube, the Austrians "would have been obliged to remove, "further from their base, but could they "hazard this manoeuvre? They saw them"selves on the contrary forced to promptly "evacuate Italy, to cross the mountains, "between the Isonzo and the Drave, to

gain the Lower Danube, and at last to "take up a position less perilous, inas"much as it replaced them on a base "parallel to that of the French."

It may seem superfluous to support the views of the Archduke by those of writers of less strategical authority. But we will just refer to what is said on the subject by M. Thiers, because he is not only a writer of history, but has been more than once Minister of France, and must be perfectly acquainted with the views of the ablest men in the French army, as to the defensive systems of all the great European powers. "Napoleon and the Archduke Charles," says M. Thiers,1 "have proved, the "first by great examples, the second by "profound arguments, that a quarrel. "between Austria and France ought to "be settled on the Danube." Sir A. Alison expresses views to the same effect, and points out the importance to an invading army of the means of transport furnished by a great navigable river-an advantage wholly wanting to an army invading Austria by way of Venetia.

But it is not only by the reasonings of strategical writers that the alleged importance of the Quadrilateral to Austria for defensive purposes is confuted. The practical experience of all former wars is equally conclusive. During all the many wars between France and Austria

1 "History of the French Revolution," translated by F. Shoberl, vol. v. p. 299.

before the time of Napoleon, Venetia was an independent Italian state; and, for some centuries before her fall, she was a weak state. Yet France, though her armies often appeared in Lombardy, never, in the course of these wars, attempted to invade the territories of Austria by way of Venetia.

The various French invasions of Austria in the time of Napoleon have been briefly enumerated in the last passage we have quoted from the writings of the Archduke Charles. We have seen that Napoleon once only led an army to the attack of Austria by way of Venetia. But the circumstances under which he took this course, in 1797, deprive it of all value as a strategical precedent. Napoleon had then just prostrated the power of Austria by his celebrated campaign of 1796. But he was still only the general of the French Republic commanding in Italy. Though his extraordinary exploits had gone far to render him practically independent within the limits of his own command, he had no control whatever over the French armies beyond those limits. He could not direct the movements, or even obtain the co-operation, of the army of the Rhine under Moreau. He could only follow: up his victories by means of such operations as lay within the scope of his own command. He must invade Austria from Northern Italy, or be reduced to inactivity, while others reaped the fruits, of his victories. It was not in the character of the man to hesitate between alternatives such as these. He advanced through Venetia into the territories of Austria; and, after finding himself, as may be seen both from his own correspondence with the Directory and the. remarks of the Archduke Charles, in a position of considerable danger, he took upon himself, though a mere general, without diplomatic powers, to conclude on his own responsibility, at Leoben, amidst the mountains of Styria, those, preliminaries of peace which were afterwards with some modifications embodied in the treaty of Campo Formio.

But, from the time Napoleon acquired control over all the military operations

of France, every invasion of Austria took place, as has been pointed out by the Archduke, by the valley of the Danube. Nor was this for want of good opportunity for an attack by way of Venetia. In the campaign of 1800, Napoleon gained in Italy the battle of Marengo. He could have advanced on Venetia with all the prestige derived from that decisive victory. At the outset of the campaign of 1805, the right bank of the Adige, with Mantua and the greater part of Verona were in his hands. And at the outset of the campaign of 1809, not only all the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, but the whole territory now known as Venetia, and which is alleged to be essential to the defence of Austria, was actually part of the French Empire. Yet, in each of these two campaigns, this great master of the art of war, so far from regarding Austria as peculiarly vulnerable on the side of Venetia, "neglected Italy," as the Archduke expresses it; in each of them the Austrians were victorious in Italy, and established themselves on the Adige, while Napoleon was operating on the Danube; and in each, as he had foreseen, so soon as Austria sustained reverses on the Danube, her Italian armies abandoned, as untenable, their strong positions on the Adige, and hastened to effect the complete evacuation of Venetia.

We think, then, that the history of former wars proves, as far as anything can be proved by actual experience, that the Venetian frontier of Austria is not one of her vulnerable points; that consequently the Quadrilateral is not necessary to Austria for the purposes of defence; and, moreover, that, as was exemplified in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, if Austria meet with reverses on the Danube, her positions on the Adige, whether important or unimportant, become untenable, and consequently can no longer form an element in her defensive system.

We will conclude this part of our subject by a few plain geographical considerations. A French army destined to invade Austria by way of Venetia, must

that purpose.

It must either effect the conquest of the Tyrol, or march for several hundred miles with its left flank in proximity to mountain ranges in possession of the enemy. And, long before quitting the territory of Venetia, such an army would be at a greater distance from France and Paris than any one of the armies of Germany, and would consequently be quite unavailable for the defence of France against a homethrust aimed at her by Germany.

Any ordinary topography will moreover shew that Austria possesses everywhere an excellent natural frontier on the side of Venetia. From Vienna to the frontier of Venetia is upwards of 250 miles, which is considerably more than the distance from Paris to the frontiers of Belgium, and about the same as the distance from Paris to the frontiers of the Rhenish provinces of Prussia. If, then, Vienna would not be secure without Venetia, there can be no answer to the proposition that Paris is not secure without Belgium, and the Rhenish provinces of Prussia. Indeed, Paris must be far less secure, while France retains her present frontiers, than Vienna would be, if Austria relinquished Venetia; for the provinces of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, which lie between Vienna and Venetia, differ widely in natural character from the rich plains of France. Traversed by the Julian and Noric Alps, barren, and with few roads, these provinces present serious natural difficulties to an invading force. Three successive mountain ranges intersect the road to Vienna, selected by Napoleon as most practicable in 1797. Close to the Venetian frontier is the Col de Tarwis, a pass of the Julian Alps, which was obstinately defended against the French. In that year "The combatants," says "M. Thiers, "fought above the clouds, "amidst snow, and upon plains of ice." After crossing the valley of the Drave, the road again ascends to the gorge of Neumarkt, the scene of another struggle in 1797, and described by Sir A. Alison,

1 "Thiers' History of the French Revolu

from personal observation, as "a terrific "defile, which even a traveller can hardly "traverse without awe," and as offering "the strongest position to a retreating 'army." Beyond this, in the valley of the Muhr, is the town of Leoben, where the preliminaries of peace were concluded by Napoleon in 1797. And between Leoben and the plains of Austria lies the range of the Noric Alps, which is crossed at the pass of the Semmering, where, as stated in Murray's Handbook of Southern Germany, the highest railway in the world is carried by a tunnel 4,600 feet long through the mountain, at a height of 2,893 feet above the sea, and the post-road attains a still higher elevation.1 The assertion that a frontier such as this is not amply sufficient for the defence of Vienna, is nothing short of an imposture. The natural difficulties of the country seem alone enough to deter an invader, and the expenditure of a smaller sum than a single year's occupation of Venetia must cost to Austria, upon the fortification of the mountain passes traversed by the few roads of these lonely regions, would render them impregnable to any enemy.

Nor is it only on the side of Vienna that Austria is protected by nature from attack from the Venetian territory. For on the north and west of Venetia, Austria holds the mountain ranges of the Tyrol; and, on the south-east, Trieste, though not far distant from the frontier, is covered partly by the Julian Alps, and partly by the line of the Isonzo.

Before concluding, we will briefly recapitulate the leading points to which we have directed our readers' attention. We have shown that the retention of Venetia by Austria places the new Italian Kingdom for many years to come, in a military point of view, at the mercy of Austria; and consequently in a state of dependence on the protection of France. We have pointed out that this protection must be paid for by Italy on such terms as

1 The Illustrated London News, of December 1, 1860, contains some views of this celebrated pass, which show at a glance its

France may exact-whether by cessions of territory and maritime positions in the Mediterranean, increasing the powers of aggression of the great aggressive state of Western Europe; or by co-operation in enterprises, by sea or land, injurious to the interests of Europe-and we have further pointed out the direct interest which Italy will have in aiding in, nay, even in exciting, a war between France and Germany, which would afford the best opportunity for the liberation of Venetia.

Entering then upon a consideration of the consequences of the relinquishment of Venetia by Austria, we have shown that such a step would remove all real cause of strife between Italy and Austria, and bring to a close that permanent enmity between those two countries, which at present constitutes a danger to Europe, and tends to encourage and facilitate an aggressive policy on the part of France. We have pointed out that, from the moment that Northern Italy is cleared of foreigners, the Italian Kingdom must be actuated by the strongest motives to avoid war herself, and to do her utmost for the preservation of the general peace. And, coming lastly to the supposition of a great war between France and Germany, we have examined the Austrian theory that her possession of the Quadrilateral is essential to the protection of Southern Germany. We have tested this theory by the opinions of the greatest of modern strategical writers, and by the practice of the greatest of modern conquerors, and we have found that the Austrian theory will not stand either of these tests that the reasonings of the Archduke Charles, the campaigns of Napoleon, and the geographical character of the whole frontier of the federal territories of Austria on the side of Northern Italy, combine to prove incontestably, that the Venetian frontier of Austria is not one of her vulnerable points, and consequently that the allegation that the Quadrilateral is necessary to Austria for purposes of defence is nothing better than a pretence and a delusion.