Venetia by Austria, and her consequent acquiescence in the new order of things in Italy, would remove all substantial cause of antagonism between the two countries. We do not mean to say that personal antipathies, or old national heartburnings, could be made at once to disappear; but that, politically speaking, and looking at the question, as such questions are, in the long run, looked at by statesmen and cabinets, it would be the interest of Austria and Italy to maintain friendly relations. No real conflict of interest would exist between them, and both would have the strongest motives for avoiding unnecessary complications abroad. Austria has assuredly enough to do at home, and Italy must be long engrossed by the task of blending together, into one homogeneous kingdom, so many provinces but recently delivered from the deteriorating influence of prolonged misgovernment.

We are aware that it has been said that Italy, if possessed of Venetia, might form designs upon the southern portion of the Tyrol, or the eastern coast of the Adriatic. But no rational ground has been pointed out for giving credit to these suggestions, which involve, it will be remembered, an encroachment upon the territory of the Germanic Confederation; and, at all events, if Austria were in earnest in apprehending anything of this nature, it would be easy for her to require, as part of the arrangement for the cession of Venetia, obligations and guarantees, which would effectually prevent King Victor Emmanuel and his successors from attempting further encroachments on her dominions.

The termination of the antagonism between Italy and Austria, by the liberation of Venetia, would not only remove all those powerful motives by which the Italians would now be led to assist, with all their energies, in an attack by France on Austria or Germany; it would make it, in the highest degree, their interest to hold aloof from such a contest. For if the new Italian kingdom had once acquired Venetia, and Northern Italy were once fairly cleared of foreigners, it is

so alarming to any Italian statesman as the re-entry into Northern Italy of the armies of either of the great military powers of France or Austria. There could be no one object so important to Italy as to avoid anything which could lead to such a result. From participation in a war between France and Austria, Italy, once possessed of Venetia, would have nothing to gain and everything to lose. Victory could not extend her frontiers beyond the Alps; defeat might lead once more to her dismemberment. When the giants of modern warfare arrange their differences, it is not always done with perfect good faith towards less powerful allies. If France

should be victorious on the Rhine, and Italy sustain reverses on the Tagliamento, a peace on the principle of uti possidetis might once more, as in 1797, indemnify Germany in Italy for provinces lost on the frontiers of France.

There is, then, every reason to believe that, if the liberation of Venetia were once accomplished, France could no longer look to Italy for assistance in any attack on Germany; that the efforts of Italian statesmen must necessarily be directed to the maintenance of peace in Europe. But we will not stop here. We will admit it to be possible, however improbable, that Italy, though possessed of Venetia, and having no further quarrel with Austria, though her geographical position and military strength would obviously enable her to maintain a respected neu trality-though she would have everything to lose and nothing to gain by warmight be led, or forced into lending her assistance to an attack by France on GerWe will then consider whether the possession by Italy under such cir cumstances, of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, would constitute a source of such danger to Germany, that the remote and improbable contingency, that Italy, possessed of Venetia, should gratuitously take part in an attack on Germany, is worth guarding against, at the expense of the present and urgent evil, that Italy, deprived of Venetia, is necessarily under the control of France, and is actuated

many.

vation and patriotism to assist, with all her energies, in any contest taking place in Europe which may have for its result the humiliation of Austria.

On the part of Austria it is alleged (and, as before observed, the allegation has obtained much credit in Germany, and some credit even in England) that her possession of the Quadrilateral is essential for the protection of her federal territories against invasion; that, if the Quadrilateral were in hostile hands, the southern frontiers of Germany would no longer be secure. The importance of these statements, if substantiated, would be undeniable. At the same time, the assertion of a potentate desiring to retain a certain territory, that it is necessary to him for purposes of defence, is open to some suspicion. It has not been without incredulity that Europe has lately heard that the possession of Savoy is necessary to France for her protection against the new Italian kingdom. In examining the allegations of Austria respecting the Quadrilateral, we shall not impute to the Germanic Confederation, with its armies of many hundred thousands of men, the same fear of invasion by King Victor Emmanuel, or his successors, which actuated the French Emperor in the Savoy transaction; but shall come at once to the point by assuming an attack upon Germany by France, in concert with an Italian power in possession of Venetia.

We propose, without entering into any military discussion of our own, to do what may be permitted to civilians-to test the politico-strategical theories of Austria respecting the Quadrilateral by the opinions of strategical writers of the highest authority; by the history of former wars between France and Austria, especially of the campaigns of the first Napoleon; and lastly by some obvious geographical considerations.

It is a singular circumstance that the most complete confutation of the politico-strategical doctrines, put forward by Austria at the present time, on the subject of Venetia, is to be found in the writings of the greatest strategical authority ever produced by Austria

himself a member of the House of Hapsburg.

Every reader of military history is familiar with the character of the Archduke Charles. It seems hard to say whether he has derived more reputation from his career in the field, or from those strategical works to which he devoted himself on the termination of his active service. But we may remind our readers that he was at various times Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian armies on the Rhine, on the Danube, in Switzerland, and in Northern Italy; that both on the Danube and in Northern Italy he frequently contended, and always with credit, against Napoleon himself; and that such is the estimation in which he is held in Austria as a strategical author, that his principal work is officially published by the Government for the use of Austrian officers.

In the introductory chapter of his History of the Campaign of 1799, the Archduke Charles enters into an elaborate consideration of the various possible theatres of war between France and Austria. He describes their geographical characters, and discusses at length the advantages and disadvantages to each of the belligerents presented by each scene of operations. And he comes to the conclusion that the valley of the Danube is the vital point in every war between France and Austria. He lays down distinctly that a march from Milan through Venetia upon Vienna is hopeless so long as Austria holds the defiles of the Upper Danube, and he advises his countrymen, in every war with France, to devote without hesitation the bulk of their forces to the valley of the Danube. He refers to possible diversions on the side of Italy as little to be dreaded, and (what is not least important) he takes for granted that the advance of a French army on the Danube necessitates, as a matter of course, the evacuation by Austria of the Tyrol and of Northern Italy.

We wish our space permitted an attempt to give an outline of the reasonings by which these conclusions are established. But we must content ourselves with recommending to the reader

Venetia by Austria, and her consequent acquiescence in the new order of things in Italy, would remove all substantial cause of antagonism between the two countries. We do not mean to say that personal antipathies, or old national. heartburnings, could be made at once to disappear; but that, politically speaking, and looking at the question, as such questions are, in the long run, looked at by statesmen and cabinets, it would be the interest of Austria and Italy to maintain friendly relations. No real conflict of interest would exist between them, and both would have the strongest motives for avoiding unnecessary complications abroad. Austria has assuredly enough to do at home, and Italy must be long engrossed by the task of blending together, into one homogeneous kingdom, so many provinces but recently delivered from the deteriorating influence of prolonged misgovernment.

We are aware that it has been said that Italy, if possessed of Venetia, might form designs upon the southern portion of the Tyrol, or the eastern coast of the Adriatic. But no rational ground has been pointed out for giving credit to these suggestions, which involve, it will be remembered, an encroachment upon the territory of the Germanic Confederation; and, at all events, if Austria were in earnest in apprehending anything of this nature, it would be easy for her to require, as part of the arrangement for the cession of Venetia, obligations and guarantees, which would effectually prevent King Victor Emmanuel and his successors from attempting further encroachments on her dominions.

The termination of the antagonism between Italy and Austria, by the liberation of Venetia, would not only remove all those powerful motives by which the Italians would now be led to assist, with all their energies, in an attack by France on Austria or Germany; it would make it, in the highest degree, their interest to hold aloof from such a contest. For if the new Italian kingdom had once acquired Venetia, and Northern Italy were once fairly cleared of foreigners, it is

so alarming to any Italian statesman as the re-entry into Northern Italy of the armies of either of the great military powers of France or Austria. There could be no one object so important to Italy as to avoid anything which could lead to such a result. From participation in a war between France and Austria, Italy, once possessed of Venetia, would have nothing to gain and everything to lose. Victory could not extend her frontiers beyond the Alps; defeat might lead once more to her dismemberment. When the giants of modern warfare arrange their differences, it is not always done with perfect good faith towards less powerful allies. If France

should be victorious on the Rhine, and Italy sustain reverses on the Tagliamento, a peace on the principle of uti possidetis might once more, as in 1797, indemnify Germany in Italy for provinces lost on the frontiers of France.

There is, then, every reason to believe that, if the liberation of Venetia were once accomplished, France could no longer look to Italy for assistance in any attack on Germany; that the efforts of Italian statesmen must necessarily be directed to the maintenance of peace in Europe. But we will not stop here. We will admit it to be possible, however improbable, that Italy, though possessed of Venetia, and having no further quarrel with Austria, though her geographical position and military strength would obviously enable her to maintain a respected neu trality-though she would have everything to lose and nothing to gain by warmight be led, or forced into lending her assistance to an attack by France on Germany. We will then consider whether the possession by Italy under such circumstances, of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, would constitute a source of such danger to Germany, that the remote and improbable contingency, that Italy, possessed of Venetia, should gratuitously take part in an attack on Germany, is worth guarding against, at the expense of the present and urgent evil, that Italy, deprived of Venetia, is necessarily under the control of France, and is actuated

vation and patriotism to assist, with all her energies, in any contest taking place in Europe which may have for its result the humiliation of Austria.

On the part of Austria it is alleged (and, as before observed, the allegation has obtained much credit in Germany, and some credit even in England) that her possession of the Quadrilateral is essential for the protection of her federal territories against invasion; that, if the Quadrilateral were in hostile hands, the southern frontiers of Germany would no longer be secure. The importance of these statements, if substantiated, would be undeniable. At the same time, the assertion of a potentate desiring to retain a certain territory, that it is necessary to him for purposes of defence, is open to some suspicion. It has not been without incredulity that Europe has lately heard that the possession of Savoy is necessary to France for her protection against the new Italian kingdom. In examining the allegations of Austria respecting the Quadrilateral, we shall not impute to the Germanic Confederation, with its armies of many hundred thousands of men, the same fear of invasion by King Victor Emmanuel, or his successors, which actuated the French Emperor in the Savoy transaction; but shall come at once to the point by assuming an attack upon Germany by France, in concert with an Italian power in possession of Venetia.

We propose, without entering into any military discussion of our own, to do what may be permitted to civilians-to test the politico-strategical theories of Austria respecting the Quadrilateral by the opinions of strategical writers of the highest authority; by the history of former wars between France and Austria, especially of the campaigns of the first Napoleon; and lastly by some obvious. geographical considerations.

It is a singular circumstance that the most complete confutation of the politico-strategical doctrines, put forward. by Austria at the present time, on the subject of Venetia, is to be found in the writings of the greatest strategical authority ever produced by Austria

himself a member of the House of Hapsburg.

Every reader of military history is familiar with the character of the Archduke Charles. It seems hard to say whether he has derived more reputation from his career in the field, or from those strategical works to which he devoted himself on the termination of his active service. But we may remind our readers that he was at various times Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian armies on the Rhine, on the Danube, in Switzerland, and in Northern Italy; that both on the Danube and in Northern Italy he frequently contended, and always with credit, against Napoleon himself; and that such is the estimation in which he is held in Austria as a strategical author, that his principal work is officially published by the Government for the use of Austrian officers.

In the introductory chapter of his History of the Campaign of 1799, the Archduke Charles enters into an elaborate consideration of the various possible theatres of war between France and Austria. He describes their geographical characters, and discusses at length the advantages and disadvantages to each of the belligerents presented by each scene of operations. And he comes to the conclusion that the valley of the Danube is the vital point in every war between France and Austria. He lays down distinctly that a march from Milan through Venetia upon Vienna is hopeless so long as Austria holds the defiles of the Upper Danube, and he advises his countrymen, in every war with France, to devote without hesitation the bulk of their forces to the valley of the Danube. He refers to possible diversions on the side of Italy as little to be dreaded, and (what is not least important) he takes for granted that the advance of a French army on the Danube necessitates, as a matter of course, the evacuation by Austria of the Tyrol and of Northern Italy.

We wish our space permitted an attempt to give an outline of the reasonings by which these conclusions are established. But we must content ourselves with recommending to the reader

who desires to pursue this subject, an attentive examination of the work itself; and with extracting from it a few sentences stating the general results arrived at on the points material for our purpose. To make these extracts intelligible, we must premise that the author had previously described Southern Germany and the valley of the Danube as the Northern Division; the mountain districts of Switzerland and the Tyrol as the Middle Division; and Northern Italy as the Southern Division; of the general theatre of war. The italics are our own, employed to indicate the passages bearing most strongly on the question under discussion.

After pointing out that military operations by way of Northern Italy must necessarily be circuitous, and explaining the strategical danger of operating on a curve between two points, while the enemy can act on the straight line between the same points, the author proceeds: 1

"Let us suppose that the design be "to move armies on Vienna, starting "from Strasburg, and from Milan; the "march on the curved line from Milan "through the Venetian country and the "interior of Austria, will offer no hope of success, as long as the enemy holds the defile of the Danube between Ulm and Ratisbon, and has the command of the "straight line."

After pronouncing any operation by either belligerent from the south, by way of the Tyrol or of Switzerland, to be inconsistent with strategical principles, and pointing out that there is more military facility in entering these mountain districts from the north, the author proceeds:

It results from these reflections, "that the key of all the operations is to be "found in the Northern Division of the "theatre of war, and that, once master of "that, it is easy to penetrate into the "other divisions with safety and confi"dence. The conquest of this division

1 Translated from the "Histoire de la Campagne de 1799 en Allemagne et en Suisse traduit de l'Allemand, par un Officier Autrichien."

"If the French were to succeed in "conquering the valley of the Danube, an operation on the right bank of this stream, and skirting the foot of the mountains, would offer them the great"est number of advantages; the frontiers "of Austria being deprived of means of "defence, the possibility of penetrating "into the interior of that state by the "shortest and least difficult route, and of "necessitating at once the evacuation of "the Tyrol and of Italy, would leave "them no doubt as to the choice or as "to the success of their operations."

We must confine ourselves to one extract more, in which the author briefly states, as attesting the truth of his conclusions, the events of the campaigns of Napoleon.

The events of several campaigns "bear witness to the truth of these con"siderations.

"In 1797 Buonaparte had penetrated by way of Italy as far as Leoben. Braving the arbitrary decrees and the despotism of the Directory, he made "haste to conclude a suspension of hostilities, because the Austrians had a "powerful army in Germany, and had "the power of entering Italy by the "Tyrol.