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Venetia by Austria, and her consequent so alarming to any Italian statesman as acquiescence in the new order of things the re-entry into Northern Italy of the in Italy, would remove all substantial armies of either of the great military cause of antagonism between the two

powers of France or Austria. There countries. We do not mean to say that could be no one object so important to personal antipathies, or old national Italy as to avoid anything which could heartburnings, could be made at once to lead to such a result. From participadisappear; but that, politically speak- tion in a war between France and Ausing, and looking at the question, as such tria, Italy, once possessed of Venetia, questions are, in the long run, looked at would have nothing to gain and everyby statesmen and cabinets, it would be thing to lose. Victory could not extend the interest of Austria and Italy to main- her frontiers beyond the Alps ; defeat tain friendly relations. No real conflict might lead once more to her dismemberof interest would exist between them, ment. When the giants of modern and both would have the strongest mo- warfare arrange their differences, it is tives for avoiding unnecessary complica- not always done with perfect good faith tions abroad. Austria has assuredly towards less powerful allies. If France enough to do at home, and Italy must be should be victorious on the Rhine, and long engrossed by the task of blending Italy sustain reverses on the Tagliamento, together, into one homogeneous kingdom, a peace on the principle of uti possidetis so many provinces but recently deli- might once more, as in 1797, indemnify vered from the deteriorating influence of Germany in Italy for provinces lost on prolonged misgovernment.

the frontiers of France. We are aware that it has been said There is, then, every reason to believe that Italy, if possessed of Venetia, might that, if the liberation of Venetia were once form designs upon the southern portion accomplished, France could no longer of the Tyrol, or the eastern coast of the look to Italy for assistance in any attack Adriatic. But no rational ground has on Germany; that the efforts of Italian been pointed out for giving credit to statesmen must necessarily be directed these suggestions, which involve, it will to the maintenance of peace in Europe. be remembered, an encroachment upon But we will not stop here. We will admit the territory of the Germanic Confedera- it to be possible, however improbable, tion; and, at all events, if Austria were that Italy, though possessed of Venetia, in earnest in apprehending anything of and having no further quarrel with this nature, it would be easy for her to Austria, though her geographical position require, as part of the arrangement for and military strength would obviously the cession of Venetia, obligations and enable her to maintain a respected neu · guarantees, which would effectually pre- trality—though she would have everyvent King Victor Emmanuel and his thing to lose and nothing to gain by warsuccessors from attempting further en- might be led, or forced into lending her croachments on her dominions.

assistance to an attack by France on GerThe termination of the antagonism many. We will then consider whether between Italy and Austria, by the libera- the possession by Italy under such cirtion of Venetia, would not only remove cumstances, of the fortresses of the Quadall those powerful motives by which the rilateral, would constitute a source of Italians would now be led to assist, with such danger to Germany, that the remote all their energies, in an attack by France and improbable contingency, that Italy, on Austria or Germany; it would make possessed of Venetia, should gratuitously it, in the highest degree, their interest to take part in an attack on Germany, is hold aloof from such a contest. For if worth guarding against, at the expense the new Italian kingdom had once ac- of the present and urgent evil, that Italy, quired Venetia, and Northern Italy were deprived of Venetia, is necessarily under once fairly cleared of foreigners, it is the control of France, and is actuated obvious that there could be no one thing by the strongest motives of self-preser

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vation and patriotism to assist with all her himself a member of the House of energies, in any contest taking place in Hapsburg. Europe which may have for its result Every reader of military history is the humiliation of Austria.

familiar with the character of the ArchOn the partof Austria it is alleged (and, duke Charles. It seems hard to say as before observed, the allegation has whether he has derived more reputation obtained much credit in Germany, and from his career in the field, or from some credit even in England) that her those strategical works to which he depossession of the Quadrilateral is essential voted himself on the termination of his for the protection of her federal territo- active service. But we may remind our ries against invasion ; that, if the Quad- readers that he was at various times rilateral were in hostile hands, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian southern frontiers of Germany would no armies on the Rhine, on the Danube, longer be secure. The importance of in Switzerland, and in Northern Italy; these statements, if substantiated, would that both on the Danube and in Norbe undeniable. At the same time, the thern Italy he frequently contended, and assertion of a potentate desiring to re- always with credit, against Napoleon tain a certain territory, that it is necessary himself; and that such is the estimation to him for purposes of defence, is open in which he is held in Austria as a strato some suspicion. It has not been with- tegical author, that his principal work is out incredulity that Europe has lately officially published by the Government heard that the possession of Savoy is for the use of Austrian officers. necessary to France for her protection In the introductory chapter of his against the new Italian kingdom. In History of the Campaign of 1799, the examining the allegations of Austria Archduke Charles enters into an elaborespecting the Quadrilateral, we shall not rate consideration of the various possible impute to the Germanic Confederation, theatres of war between France and Auswith its armies of many hundred thou- tria. He describes their geographical

. sands of men, the same fear of invasion characters, and discusses at length the by King Victor Emmanuel, or his suc- advantages and disadvantages to each of cessors, which actuated the French Em- the belligerents presented by each scene peror in the Savoy transaction ; but shall of operations. And he comes to the come at once to the point by assuming an conclusion that the valley of the Danube attack upon Germany by France, in is the vital point in every war between concert with an Italian power in posses- France and Austria. He lays down dission of Venetia.

tinctly that a march from Milan through We propose, without entering into any Venetia upon Vienna is hopeless so long military discussion of our own, to do as Austria holds the defiles of the Upper what may be permitted to civilians—to Danube, and he advises his countrymen, test the politico-strategical theories of in every war with France, to devote Austria respecting the Quadrilateral by without hesitation the bulk of their the opinions of strategical writers of the forces to the valley of the Danube. He highest authority ; by the history of for- refers to possible diversions on the side mer wars between France and Austria, of Italy as little to be dreaded, and especially of the campaigns of the first (what is not least important) he takes Napoleon ; and lastly by some obvious for granted that the advance of a French geographical considerations.

army on the Danube necessitates, as a It is a singular circumstance that the

matter of course, the evacuation by Ausmost complete confutation of the poli- tria of the Tyrol and of Northern Italy. tico-strategical doctrines, put forward We wish our space permitted an atby Austria at the present time, on the tempt to give an outline of the reasonsubject of Venetia, is to be found in the ings by which these conclusions are writings of the greatest strategical au- established. But we must content ourthority ever produced by Austria— selves with recommending to the reader

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Venetia by Austria, and her consequent so alarming to any Italian statesman as acquiescence in the new order of things the re-entry into Northern Italy of the in Italy, would remove all substantial armies of either of the great military cause of antagonism between the two powers of France or Austria. There countries. We do not mean to say that could be no one object so important to personal antipathies, or old national Italy as to avoid anything which could heartburnings, could be made at once to lead to such a result. From participadisappear; but that, politically speak- tion in a war between France and Ausing, and looking at the question, as such tria, Italy, once possessed of Venetia, questions are, in the long run, looked at would have nothing to gain and everyby statesmen and cabinets, it would be thing to lose. Victory could not extend the interest of Austria and Italy to main- her frontiers beyond the Alps ; defeat tain friendly relations. No real conflict might lead once more to her dismemberof interest would exist between them, ment. When the giants of modern and both would have the strongest mo- warfare arrange their differences, it is tives for avoiding unnecessary complica- not always done with perfect good faith tions abroad. Austria has assuredly towards less powerful allies. If France enough to do at home, and Italy must be should be victorious on the Rhine, and long engrossed by the task of blending Italy sustain reverses on the Tagliamento, together, into one homogeneous kingdom, a peace on the principle of uti possidetis so many provinces but recently deli- might once more, as in 1797, indemnify vered from the deteriorating influence of Germany in Italy for provinces lost on prolonged misgovernment.

the frontiers of France. We are aware that it has been said There is, then, every reason to believe that Italy, if possessed of Venetia, might that, if the liberation of Venetia were once form designs upon the southern portion accomplished, France could no longer of the Tyrol, or the eastern coast of the look to Italy for assistance in any attack Adriatic. But no rational ground has on Germany; that the efforts of Italian been pointed out for giving credit to statesmen must necessarily be directed these suggestions, which involve, it will to the maintenance of peace in Europe. be remembered, an encroachment upon But we will not stop here. We will admit the territory of the Germanic Confedera- it to be possible, however improbable, tion; and, at all events, if Austria were that Italy, though possessed of Venetia, in earnest in apprehending anything of and having no further quarrel with this nature, it would be easy for her to Austria, though her geographical position require, as part of the arrangement for and military strength would obviously the cession of Venetia, obligations and enable her to maintain a respected neu · guarantees, which would effectually pre- trality—though she would have everyvent King Victor Emmanuel and his thing to lose and nothing to gain by warsuccessors from attempting further en- might be led, or forced into lending her croachments on her dominions.

assistance to an attack by France on GerThe termination of the antagonism many. We will then consider whether between Italy and Austria, by the libera- the possession by Italy under such cirtion of Venetia, would not only remove cumstances, of the fortresses of the Quadall those powerful motives by which the rilateral, would constitute a source of Italians would now be led to assist, with such danger to Germany, that the remote all their energies, in an attack by France and improbable contingency, that Italy, on Austria or Germany; it would make possessed of Venetia, should gratuitously it, in the highest degree, their interest to take part in an attack on Germany, is hold aloof from such a contest. For if worth guarding against, at the expense the new Italian kingdom had once ac- of the present and urgent evil, that Italy, quired Venetia, and Northern Italy were deprived of Venetia, is necessarily under once fairly cleared of foreigners, it is the control of France, and is actuated obvious that there could be no one thing by the strongest motives of self-preservation and patriotism to assist with all her himself a member of the House of energies, in any contest taking place in Hapsburg. Europe which may have for its result Every reader of military history is the humiliation of Austria.

familiar with the character of the ArchOn the part of Austria it is alleged (and, duke Charles. It seems hard to say as before observed, the allegation has whether he has derived more reputation obtained much credit in Germany, and from his career in the field, or from some credit even in England) that her those strategical works to which he depossession of the Quadrilateral is essential voted himself on the termination of his for the protection of her federal territo- active service. But we may remind our ries against invasion ; that, if the Quad- readers that he was at various times rilateral were in hostile hands, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian southern frontiers of Germany would no armies on the Rhine, on the Danube, longer be secure. The importance of in Switzerland, and in Northern Italy ; these statements, if substantiated, would that both on the Danube and in Norbe undeniable. At the same time, the thern Italy he frequently contended, and assertion of a potentate desiring to re- always' with credit, against Napoleon tain a certain territory, that it is necessary himself; and that such is the estimation to him for purposes of defence, is open in which he is held in Austria as a strato some suspicion. It has not been with. tegical author, that his principal work is out incredulity that Europe has lately officially published by the Government heard that the possession of Savoy is for the use of Austrian officers. necessary to France for her protection In the introductory chapter of his against the new Italian kingdom. In History of the Campaign of 1799, the examining the allegations of Austria Archduke Charles enters into an elaborespecting the Quadrilateral, we shall not rate consideration of the various possible impute to the Germanic Confederation, theatres of war between France and Auswith its armies of many hundred thou- tria. He describes their geographical sands of men, the same fear of invasion characters, and discusses at length the by King Victor Emmanuel, or his suc- advantages and disadvantages to each of cessors, which actuated the French Em

the belligerents presented by each scene peror in the Savoy transaction ; but shall of operations.

And he comes to the come at once to the point by assuming an conclusion that the valley of the Danube attack upon Germany by France, in is the vital point in every war between concert with an Italian power in posses- France and Austria. He lays down dission of Venetia.

tinctly that a march from Milan through We propose, without entering into any Venetia upon Vienna is hopeless so long military discussion of our own, to do as Austria holds the defiles of the Upper what

may be permitted to civilians—to Danube, and he advises his countrymen, test the politico-strategical theories of in every war with France, to devote Austria respecting the Quadrilateral by without hesitation the bulk of their the opinions of strategical writers of the forces to the valley of the Danube. He highest authority ; by the history of for- refers to possible diversions on the side mer wars between France and Austria, of Italy as little to be dreaded, and especially of the campaigns of the first (what is not least important) he takes Napoleon ; and lastly by some obvious for granted that the advance of a French geographical considerations.

army on the Danube necessitates, as a It is a singular circumstance that the matter of course, the evacuation by Ausmost complete confutation of the poli- tria of the Tyrol and of Northern Italy. tico-strategical doctrines, put forward We wish our space permitted an atby Austria at the present time, on the tempt to give an outline of the reasonsubject of Venetia, is to be found in the ings by which these conclusions are writings of the greatest strategical au- established. But we must content ourthority ever produced by Austria— selves with recommending to the reader

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who desires to pursue this subject, an “should be then the first object of the attentive examination of the work itself; operations of the two belligerent powand with extracting from it a few sen- ers; and it is in the defile of the Danube tences stating the general results arrived " that the apple of discord lies, which at on the points material for our pur- “ must be carried off at any price. Let pose. To make these extracts intelli- “ there be no hesitation then in employgible, we must premise that the author “ing for this purpose the greatest part of had previously described Southern Ger- “ the army, whilst doing no more than many and the valley of the Danube as covering the frontiers of Switzerland the Northern Division; the mountain “and of Italy against diversions little to districts of Switzerland and the Tyrol “ be dreaded. as the Middle Division; and Northern “If the French were to succeed in Italy as the Southern Division; of the “conquering the valley of the Danube, general theatre of war. The italics are an operation on the right bank of this our own, employed to indicate the pas- stream, and skirting the foot of the sages bearing most strongly on the ques- “ mountains, would offer them the greattion under discussion.

“est number of advantages; the frontiers After pointing out that military opera- “ of Austria being deprived of means of tions by way of Northern Italy must defence, the possibility of penetrating necessarily be circuitous, and explaining “into the interior of that state by the the strategical danger of operating on "shortest and least difficult route, and of a curve between two points, while the necessitating at once the evacuation of enemy can act on the straight line be- the Tyrol and of Italy, would leave tween the same points, the author pro- “ them no doubt as to the choice or as ceeds: 1

“ to the success of their operations." “Let us suppose that the design be We must confine ourselves to one “to move armies on Vienna, starting extract more, in which the author briefly “from Strasburg, and from Milan; the states, as attesting the truth of his con“march on the curved line from Milan clusions, the events of the campaigns of through the Venetian country and the Napoleon. interior of Austria, will offer no hope of The events of several campaigns

success, as long as the enemy holds the “ bear witness to the truth of these condefile of the Danube between Ulm and “ siderations.

Ratisbon, and has the command of the “ In 1797 Buonaparte had penetrated straight line."

“ by way of Italy as far as Leoben. After pronouncing any operation by “Braving the arbitrary decrees and the either belligerent from the south, by “despotism of the Directory, he made way of the Tyrol or of Switzerland, to “haste to conclude a suspension of hosbe inconsistent with strategical princi- “ tilities, because the Austrians had a ples, and pointing out that there is “powerful army in Germany, and had more military facility in entering these “the power of entering Italy by the mountain districts from the north, the

“ Tyrol. author proceeds:

In 1800, the French Government, in *** It results from these reflections, “accordance with the judicious views of " that the key of all the operations is to be Moreau, reinforced the army of the found in the Northern Division of the “Rhine, in order to give it a decisive, " theatre of war, and that, once master of “superiority over that of the Germans ; " that, it is easy to penetrate into the “and Buonaparte only descended into “other divisions with safety and confi- “Italy, by Mount St. Bernard, when the “dence. The conquest of this division “enemy had been beaten at Engen,

“driven back upon Ulm, and paralyzed 1 Translated from the “Histoire de la Cam

“ in Germany. pagne de 1799 en Allemagne et en Suisse tra

"In 1805 and 1809 Napoleon neglected duit de l'Allemand, par un Officier Autrichien." Vienne et Paris, 1820, tom. i. p. 23, et seq.

Italy in order to concentrate his forces in

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