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Opinion of the Court-Beatty, J.

they did, and decided that it was fatally defective, because it did not allege facts necessary to confer jurisdiction. It is evident, however, that this point was not necessarily in question, because the pleadings subsequent to the declaration showed affirmatively that the foreign court did not have jurisdiction.

The case of Thurber v. Blackbourne (1 N. H. 242), was also decided upon the ground that the record did not show jurisdiction in the foreign court. But I am inclined to infer, from the language of the opinion, that the judgment in that case had been pleaded with a profert, and set out upon oyer demanded, and that the record spoken of was not the pleadings in that case, but the exemplified judgment of the foreign court. But however this may be, there are no other cases that support the appellant, and the authority of these cases is very weak against the strong negative testimony in favor of the correctness of Chitty's forms.

The case of Newell v. Newton (10 Pick. 470), is not in point, for that involved the sufficiency of a plea in abatement, upon the ground of the pendency of another action for the same cause in another state. Pleas in abatement are judged by stricter rules than declarations; they must be certain to every intent, and defects in them may be reached by general demurrer, which in declarations can only be reached by special demurrer.

The case of Wheeler v. Raymond (8 Cowen, 311), also involved the sufficiency of the same plea, and it was sustained. A fortiori a declaration in substance the same would have been held good. Yet, in that case it was not alleged that the Vermont court was one of general jurisdiction; neither were all the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction alleged. This was one of the objections taken to the plea, and in reference to which the court says (p. 314): "In pleading the judgments of courts of limited jurisdiction, it is necessary to state the facts upon which the jurisdiction of such courts is founded; but with respect to courts of general jurisdiction, such averments are not necessary." From which it appears that in the absence of any allegation on the subject, the court in Vermont was presumed to be a

Opinion of the Court--Beatty, J.

court of general jurisdiction. This was certainly in conflict with the case of McLaughlin v. Nichol, supra. (See also 17 Wend. 485.)

My conclusion is, that the complaint in this case is sufficient, without reference to any of the provisions of our practice act. If section 59 applies to suits upon foreign judgments, as is held in Halstead v. Black (17 Abb. Pr. R. 227), and there is no decision to the contrary, it is sufficient, for the reason that it conforms to the provisions of that section.

Judgment affirmed.

REPORTS OF CASES

DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF NEVADA.

APRIL TERM, 187 0.

[No. 709.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE AND GUARDIANSHIP OF MARY WINKLEMAN, A MINOR. JOHN C. BADENHOOF, APPELLANT, v. J. R. JOHNSON,

RESPONDENT.

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN--INTEREST OF MINOR.--In the appointment of a guardian the interest of the minor is the paramount consideration. The parental request is entitled to great weight and ought to prevail unless good reason to the contrary be shown.

IDEM--HOW MADE.--The district judge has no authority to appoint any person guardian of the person or estate of a minor except upon a written petition in his behalf and after notice of his application.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Douglas County.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Robert M. Clarke, for Appellant.
G. P. Harding, for Respondent.

By the Court, BEATTY, J.:

Mary Winkleman, an infant, was left an orphan by the death of her father on the 5th of February, 1874. The respondent petitioned to be appointed guardian of her person and estate, and was so appointed on February 10, 1874. The order appointing him was reversed by this court

Opinion of the Court--Beatty, J.

on the appeal of the present appellant upon the ground that it had been made without notice to the relatives of the minor. (See 9 Nev. 303.)

Afterwards respondent and appellant each filed a petition in his own behalf to be appointed guardian, and notice to the relatives was given. The hearing of these petitions was continued from time to time, and finally both were heard together. At the hearing a large amount of testimony was offered by each of the applicants for the purpose of proving his own fitness for the trust and the unfitness of the other. The district judge thereupon appointed respondent guardian of the estate of the minor, and the respondent and appellant, jointly with a Mr. Frevert, guardian of her person. From these orders the appeal is taken. There is no properly authenticated statement on appeal, but by stipulation of the parties certain testimony embodied in the transcript, is to be considered by the coart for the purpose of determining whether the judgment and decision of the court was contrary to law in any respect.

It is contended in the first place that the court erred in refusing to appoint appellant, and in appointing respondent, because it was the dying request of the father of the minor that appellant should be appointed. But the law is, that the interest of the minor is the paramount consideration; and although the parental request is entitled to great weight, and ought to prevail in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, yet it is not conclusive, and must be disregarded when the interests of the ward plainly require it. (See 9 Nev. 303, and authorities cited by appellant in that case.) Whether the testimony in this case was sufficient to justify the district court in refusing to appoint the person designated by the dying request of the father, is a question which the condition of the record and the terms of the stipulation above mentioned preclude us from considering.

The only other point relied upon is that the court erred in appointing Frevert one of the joint guardians of the minor's person. Frevert had filed no petition to be appointed, and of course no notice of an application by him had been given to the relatives. It is argued that the pro

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