he expressly disclaimed this excuse, and was therefore bound to answer
the questions, or he was liable to be punished for contempt. Maxwell
v. Rives, 214.
5. CONTEMPT OF COURT-PENAL STATUTE.-The statute concerning contempts
is a penal statute, and must be strictly construed in favor of those ac-
cused of violating its prohibitions. Id.
6. IDEM JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE SENTENCE.-Petitioner was asked a num-
ber of questions, all being addressed to the same point, which he re-
fused to answer. The court found him guilty of a separate contempt for
every question that he refused to answer: Held, that in refusing to an-
swer, the petitioner was guilty of but one contempt, and that the court
had jurisdiction to impose but one sentence. Id.
1. CONTINUANCE OF CRIMINAL CASE FOR THE TERM-SECTION 2207 COMPILED
LAWS.--In construing section 582 of the criminal practice act: Held,
that the fact that a disastrous fire had occurred destroying the court-
house, and so much of the city of Virginia as to render it impossible for
the court to find a suitable room in which to meet was sufficient to
authorize the court to continue the trial of causes for the term. Ex
parte Larkin, 90.
2. IDEM.--Courts usually require, and ordinarily should require, a showing
to be made by affidavits, in order to continue causes for the term, when
such continuance is objected to by either party; but when a condition
of affairs exists that is notorious, and about which, from its very nature,
there could be no conflict, the court is authorized, of its own motion,
to continue the causes for the term. (Ex parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 116,
affirmed.) Id.
1. VERBAL CONTRACT AT STIPULATED PRICE PER DAY, PAYABLE MONTHLY,
CONSTRUED. Where a foreman of a mine is employed at a stipulated
price per day, to be paid monthly, and when he continues work for more
than one year after his employment without any new agreement being
made: Held, a contract from month to month that might have been ter-
minated by either party at the end of the month without incurring any
liability. Capron v. Strout, 304.
2. IDEM-RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE-NOTICE OF LIEN HOLDER.-Where the
mine-owner mortgaged the property subsequent to the contract with the
foreman for labor: Held, that all the work done by the foreman subse-
quent to the execution of the mortgage, after the expiration of his then
current month, was done under contracts made by him after legal no-
tice of the mortgage, and his lien for such work is subordinate to the
mortgage. Id.
POWER OF SECRETARY TO AFFIX CORPORATE SEAL.--The secretary of a cor-
poration is the proper custodian of the corporate seal, and when the
secretary affixes it to a mortgage, or other instrument, the presumption
is, he did it by the direction of the corporation, and it devolves upon
those who dispute the validity of the deed, to prove that he acted with-
out authority. Lee v. Evans, 194.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, ACT OF MARCH 3, 1869, CONSTRUED. (See Evidence,
5-7.) 194.
POWERS OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. (See Municipal Corporation, 1–5.)
CORPORATION LIABLE FOR THE WANTON ACTS OF ITS AGENTS. (See Railroad,
1.) 350.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES TO FEDERAL COURT BY A FOREIGN CORPORATION. (See
Removal of Causes.) 350.
CONTESTED ELECTIONS. (See Election, 3-4.) 382.
COUNTER-CLAIM-HOW ESTABLISHED.--The defendant, alleging a counter-
claim, must establish it to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponder-
ance of evidence. Margaroli v. Milligan, 96.
HAVE NO POWER TO RELEASE PROPERTY FROM TAXATION. (Se: Taxes, 6.) 223.
AMENDMENT OF RECORDS AFTER ADJOURNMENT OF TERM. (See Amendments,
1.) 76.
REMARKS OF THE COURT WHEN NOT EXCEPTED TO. (See Charge, 5.) 149.
SUPREME COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE COMMITMENTS IN CERTAIN CASES.
(See Habeas Corpus, 3.) 287.
DUTY OF COURTS TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF JURISDICTION. (See Jurisdiction,
1.) 187.
1. VERDICT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.-A verdict in a criminal case will not be
reversed where there is any evidence to support it. State v. Huff, 17.
2. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT.-When a defendant in a criminal
case offers himself as a witness in his own behalf, he subjects himself to
the same cross-examination that would be proper in the case of any other
witness.
3. IDEM.-Questions may be asked the witness which relate to his conduct
and legitimately affect his credit for veracity. The defendant may, how-
ever, refuse to answer such questions. Id.
4. IDEM-FREQUENT ASSAULTS AND BATTERIES.-No legitimate inference of
the untruthfulness of a witness can be drawn from the fact that he has
been convicted of frequent assaults and batteries. It could be inferred
that he was a violent-tempered and perhaps a dangerous man, but not
that he was a liar. Id.
5. ERROR-WHEN PREJUDICIAL.-Held, that the defendant was prejudiced
by being compelled to answer questions addressed to him in relation to
his conviction of former assaults and batteries. Id.
6. SECTION 582 OF CRIMINAL PRACTICE ACT CONSTRUED.-Section 582 of
the criminal practice act (1 Comp L. 2207) is intended to prevent arbi-
trary, willful or oppressive delays; and whenever this appears to be the
case, the defendant is entitled to be discharged. Ex Purle Larkin, 90.
7. DEPOSITION OF PARTY CONFINED IN JAIL-ORDER OF JUDGE-SECTIONS
1459, 1460 AND 1461 CONSTRUED.-The law requiring an affidavit to be
made of certain facts before the court should make an order to have the
party in jail produced in court, was never designed for the protection of
the prisoner, but only to prevent improper and unnecessary interference
with the custody of prisoners. Maxwell v. Rives, 214.
8. IDEM. If the order for the prisoner's attendance in court was improv-
idently granted, it is no concern of the prisoner; being before the court,
he was bound to answer any question that he would have been required
to answer if the process for bringing him there had been strictly pur-
sued. Id.
9. PLEA OF FORMER ACQUITTAL WHEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED.-Where the
defendant interposed a plea of former acquittal in the exact form pre-
scribed by the statute (Comp. L. 1921): Ileld, that the court erred in
refusing to allow the plea to be entered of record. State v. Johnson, 273.
10. IDEM.-It was not for the court to decide in advance that the plea of
former acquittal could not be established. That issue was for the jury,
subject, of course, to the right of the court to decide upon the compe-
tency and relevancy of the evidence offered in support of the plea. Id.
11. PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY.--Пeld, that although the plea of former
jeopardy might have been superfluous, as the facts set out in it might
possibly have been given in evidence under the general issue, or if not,
then under the plea of former acquittal, it would have been better if the
facts disclosed by it amounted to a defense, to allow it to be entered. Id.
12. MOTIVE FOR COMMISSION OF CRIME.-The prosecution has the right to
offer any evidence tending to prove a motive for the commission of the
crime. State v. Larkin, 315.
13. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS.-Every defendant in a criminal case
is entitled to a full and perfect cross-examination of every witness who
testifies against him. Id.
14. IDEM. Where a witness for the prosecution had testified before a cor-
oner's jury tending to exculpate the defendant, and on the trial testified
to a different state of facts, and upon cross-examination refused to
answer some of the questions asked by counsel as to what she had sworn
to before the coroner's jury, giving as an excuse for not answering, that
she was so intoxicated at that time that she did not know what she tes-
tified to: Ield, that such refusal to answer did not authorize the court to
strike out her testimony. Id.
15. IDEM-REMARKS OF THE COURT.-The court, in refusing to strike out the
testimony, said in the presence of the jury: "I think the witness has
answered all the questions, with the exception of some few matters as
to her impeachment, and so far as that is concerned, I will relax the
rule whenever it is desired to impeach her:" Held, that these remarks
did not tend to prejudice the defendant. Id.
16. CRIMINATING CIRCUMSTANCE-WEAPONS BELONGING TO DEFENDANT.—
Where the pistol with w..ich the crime was committed belonged to de-
fendant, and was found in defendant's bed-room shortly after the homi-
cide: Held, that these facts tended to establish one link in the chain of
circumstantial ovidence, and the court was not authorized to withdraw
its consideration from the jury. Id.
17. IDEM.-The fact that other parties had access to defendant's bed-room
might have the tendency to weaken the force of this link in the chain of
evidence, but it would not, of itself, destroy it. Id.
18. EXCITEMENT AND PREJUDICE OF BYSTANDERS. - The defendant claimed
that his case was prejudiced by the action of the bystanders, during the
argument of the district attorney, by clapping their hands, stamping
the floor and benches, etc. The affidavits produced by the state show
that the spectators but once evinced a desire to applaud the district
attorney, and the court immediately suppressed the manifestation: Held,
that defendant's case was not improperly prejudiced, and that the court
did not err in refusing a new trial. Id.
19. INSTRUCTION AS TO CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE-DEGREE OF CERTAINTY.-
The court gave this instruction: "If you believe the evidence given in
this case, in order to convict the circumstances should be such as to
produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from
direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of innocence.
The circumstances ought to be of such a nature as not to be reasonably
accounted for on the supposition of the prisoner's innocence, but per-
fectly reconcilable with the supposition of the prisoner's guilt." Held,
correct. State v. Nelson, 334.
20. REASONABLE DOUBT-ENTIRE SATISFACTION.—
.-The court in instructing the
jury in regard to reasonable doubt, uses the following language. “And
if the jury are satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant committed the crime charged against him, they are
not legally bound to acquit him because they may not be entirely satis-
fied that the defendant and no other person committed the alleged
offense:" Held, not erroneous. Id.
21. IDEM. If a man believes that a defendant may possibly be innocent,
he cannot be said to be "entirely satisfied" of his guilt, and yet he may
be satisfied of it beyond a reasonable doubt, and may convict. Id.
22. REASONABLE DOUBT.-Where the court, in defining reasonable doubt,
gave this instruction: "By reasonable doubt is ordinarily meant such a
one as would govern or control you in your business transactions or
usual pursuits of life:" Held, erroneous. State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 481,
overruled. State v. Rover, 343.
23. MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.-A motion in arrest of judgment can
only be sustained upon the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject of the indictment, or that the facts stated do not con-
stiute a public offense. (1 Comp. L., 1918.) State v. O'Connor, 416.
24. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL.
The statute of 1873 embraces the
crime of an assault with intent to kill in all cases where the killing, if
effected, would be unlawful. Id.
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. (See Bill of Exceptions, 3.) 314.
BURGLARY-SECTION 2365 OF COMPILED LAWS CONSTRUED. (See Burglary, 1.)
CORPUS DELICTI-PROOF OF, HOW ESTABLISHED.
ENTIRE CHARGE OF THE COURT MUST BE CONSIDERED.
DEFINITION OF MALICE-CHARGE OF THE COURT. (See Charge, 2, 3.) 98.
REASONABLE DOUBT. (See Charge, 4.) 98.
CONTEMPT OF COURT-WHEN PROCESS IS CRIMINAL. (See Contempts, 1, 2.)
187.
CONTINUANCE OF CRIMINAL CASE FOR THE TERM. (See Continuance, 1, 2.) 90.
DEPOSITION OF PARTY CONFINED IN JAIL. (See Deposition, 1.) 213.
DRUNKENNESS OF DEFENDANT. (See Drunkenness, 1.) 416.
EMBEZZLEMENT-SECTION 2380 COMPILED LAWS CONSTRUED-INDICTMENT AND
BURDEN OF PROOF. (See Embezzlement, 1-5.) 287.
CHALLENGE TO GRAND JURORS, RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT. (See Grand Jurors,
1, 2.) 314.
COMMITMENTS FOR EMBEZZLEMENT AND OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRE-
TENSES. (See Habeas Corpus, 2.) 287.
SUPREME COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE COMMITMENTS IN CERTAIN CASES.
(See Habeas Corpus, 3.) 287.
SECTIONS 581 AND 582 OF THE CRIMINAL PRACTICE ACT CONSTRUED. (See
Habeas Corpus, 4.) 295.
DISCHARGE OF DEFENDANT WHEN THERE HAS BEEN A LEGAL JEOPARDY. (See
Habeas Corpus, 11.) 429.
INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO HOMICIDE AND MURDER. (See Homicide, 1-5.)
98.
INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. (See Indictment, 1-4; 10-12.) 17, 98, 314, 416.
INDICTMENT FOR ROBBERY-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY. (See Indictment, 6, 7.)
334.
JEOPARDY-WHEN IT ATTACHES.
(See Jeopardy, 1-4.) 428.
JURY LAW OF 1875 HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (See Jury, 2, 14.) 39, 148.
CHALLENGE TO JURORS FOR ACTUAL AND IMPLIED BIAS. (See Jury, 4–7; 9–
12.) 39, 99.
DEFENDANT INDICTED FOR A MISDEMEANOR-WHEN MAY BE TRIED BY A LESS
JURY THAN 12. (See Jury, 11.) 119.
POWER OF COURT TO DISCHARGE A JURY BEFORE VERDICT. (See Jury, 22.)
429.
SUDDEN HEAT OF PASSION. (See Manslaughter, 1.) 98.
MISDEMEANOR IN OFFICE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR. (See Office and Officer,
1-3.) 119.
ATTEMPT TO COMMIT RAPE-CONSENT OF FEMALE. (See Rape.) 255.
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