ACT INCORPORATING CARSON CITY CONSTRUED. (See Constitution, 2-7.) 128.
CASES CITED AS AUTHORITY.
State v. Anderson, 4 Nev. 274, in State v. Huff, 20.
State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179, in State v. Huff, 27.
State v. O'Flaherty, 7 Nev. 157; State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 189.
Ex parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 116, in State v. McClear, 39.
Harper v. Mallory, 4 Nev. 448, and Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 105, in
Evans v. Cook, 69.
Killip v. Empire Mill Co., 2 Nev. 34; Lobdell v. Hall, 3 Nev. 523; State v.
First National Bank, 4 Nev. 358; Whiteman v. Shiverick, 3 Nev. 299, in
Clark v. Strouse, 76.
Guardianship of Mary Winkleman, 9 Nev. 303, in Badenhoof v. Johnson, 88.
Ex parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 116, in Ex parte Larkin, 94.
Treadway v. Wilder, 9 Nev. 70, in Margaroli v. Milligan, 97.
State v. Stewart, 9 Nev. 131; State v. Ferguson, 9 Nev. 118; State v. Mc-
Clear, 11 Nev. 39; State v. Squaires, 2 Nev. 230; Estes v. Richardson,
6 Nev. 128; Fleeson v. Savage Silver M. Co., 3 Nev. 163; State v. Mc-
Ginnis, 6 Nev. 111; State v. Ah Tom, 8 Nev. 214; State v. Glovery, 10
Nev. 24, in State v. Raymond, 98.
Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. 108; Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212; Brown v. Davis,
1 Nev. 413; Lewis v. Doran, 5 Nev. 411; Virginia and Truckee R. R.
Co. v. Commissioners of Lyon County, 6 Nev. 73; Hess v. Commis-
sioners of Washoe County, 6 Nev. 107; Fitch v. Elko County, 8 Nev.
274, in Old Fellows' Saving and Commercial Bank v. Quillen, 109.
State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39; and State v. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265, in State
v. Borowsky, 119.
Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Evans v. Job, 8 Nev.
323; City of Virginia v. The Chollar Potosi G. & S. M. Co., 2 Nev. 86,
in State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 128,
State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39, in State v. Johnson, 148.
State v. Watkins, 11 Nev. 30; Clute v. Steele, 6 Nev, 335; Robinson v. The
Imperial S. M. Co., 5 Nev. 78, in Gaudette v. Travis, 149.
Conley v. Chedic, 6 Nev. 223, in Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Dayton, 166.
McFarland v. Culbertson, 2 Nev. 282; Sankey v. Noyes, 1 Nev. 71; Stainin-
ger v. Andrews, 4 Nev. 66; Robinson v. The Imperial Silver M. Co, 5
Nev. 66; and Kraft v. Carlow, 9 Nev. 21, in Eureka M. & S. Co. v.
Way, 171.
Phillpotts v. Blasdel, 8 Nev. 61, in Weill v. Lucerne M. Co., 210.
Curtis v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 202, in State ex rel. Piper v. Gracey et al. 232.
Sherwood v. Sissa, 5 Nev. 354-5, in Jones, Admr. of Estate of Jessup v.
Thorpe v. Schooling, 7 Nev. 17; and Hawthorne v. Smith, 3 Nev. 182, in Es-
tate of Walley, 260.
Lamburth v. Dalton, 9 Nev. 66; and Dean v. Pritchard, 9 Nev. 232, in
Thomas v. Sullivan, 282.
Ex parte Deny, 10 Nev. 213, in Ex parte Isbell, 299.
Skyrme v. Occidental M. & M. Co., 8 Nev. 219, in Capron v. Strout, 310,
314.
State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17; State v. Kelly, 1 Nev. 227; State v. Raymond, 11
Nev. 98; Jones v. Gammons, 11 Nev. 249, in State v. Larkin, 314.
State v. Ferguson, 9 Nev. 118, in State v. Nelson, 342.
State v. Forsha, 8 Nev. 137; State v. Burns, 8 Nev. 251; State v. Pierce, 8
Nev. 302; State v. Keith, 9 Nev. 17, in State v. Rover, 343.
McWilliams v. Herschman, 5 Nev. 363; and Gray v. Sullivan, 10 Nev. 382,
in Twist v. Kelly, 377.
Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 333, in Dayton G. & S. M. Co. v. Seawell, 412.
State v. O'Flaherty, 7 Nev. 157; State v. Rigg, 10 Nev. 288; State v. Bonds,
1 Nev. 35; and State v. Ferguson, 9 Nev. 118, in State v. O'Connor,
Wall v. Blasdel, 4 Nev. 246, in Layton v. Farrell, 455
State v. Stanley, 4 Nev. 76, in State v. Huff, 23.
Gregory v. Frothingham, 1 Nev. 260, in State v. Larkin, 321.
Meadow Valley Mining Co. v. Dodds, 7 Nev. 147, in Quigley v. Central
Pacific R. R. Co., 355.
Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 224, in Quigley v. Central Pacific R.
R. Co., 369.
Heydenfeldt v. Daney G. & S. M. Co., 10 Nev. 290, in Layton v. Farrell,
455.
State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 451, in State v. Rover, 343.
INQUIRY UPON CERTIORARI.-The inquiry upon certiorari must be confined
to the simple question whether the respondent exceeded his jurisdiction
in making the orders complained of. Maxwell v. Rives, 213.
RIGHT OF DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE TO CHALLENGE A JUROR FOR ACTUAL
OR IMPLIED BIAS. (See Jury, 4-7, 9, 10.) 39, 99.
CHALLENGE TO JUROR-MAIN QUESTION INVOLVED IN A CIVIL CASE.
ALLOWANCE OF CHALLENGE TO JURORS NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW.
17.) 314.
CHALLENGE TO GRAND JURORS. (See Grand Jury,-1, 2.) 314.
1. ENTIRE CHARGE OF THE COURT MUST BE CONSIDERED.-The entire charge
of the court must be considered, in determining the correctness of any
portion of it, and if it clearly appears therefrom that no error prejudicial
to defendant has been committed, the judgment will not be disturbed.
State v. Raymond, 98.
2. DEFINITION OF MALICE.—Where the court gave the general definition of
malice, instead of the legal definition: Held, that the legal definition is
more comprehensive, and that if any error occurred, it was against the
state and in favor of the defendant. Id.
3. CHARGE OF THE COURT-MURDER THE RESULT OF MALICE.-The court,
after giving the statutory definition of murder and manslaughter and
the general definition of malice, charged the jury as follows: "From the
foregoing, then, it will be seen that murder is the result of malice; man-
slaughter the result of sudden passion, heat of blood, anger, when the
defendant is supposed not to be master of his own understanding:" Held,
not erroneous. Id.
4. REASONABLE DOUBT.-Held, that the charge of the court and instructions
given in regard to reasonable doubt were as favorable to the defendant
as the law would warrant. Id.
5. REMARKS OF THE COURT NOT EXCEPTED TO.-Defendant claimed that the
remarks made by the judge, in connection with his ruling upon a certain
point, were erroneous: Held, that in order to present the question to this
court it must appear that the remarks were excepted to at the time. By
failing to make any objection, proceeding with the trial, and taking his
chances of a verdict, the defendant waived the exception. Gaudette v.
Travis, 149.
6. IDEM-ERROR-WHEN NOT IRREMEDIABLE.-If the ruling of the court is
correct, the fact that a bad reason is given will not, in general, be treated
as an error because it was uttered in the presence of the jury, and never
ought to be deemed an irremediable error. The remedy of the party
against whom the remarks are made, is by asking the court to give an
instruction containing a correct statement of the rule or principle of law
involved. Id.
7. CHARGE OF THE JUDGE UPON THE FACTS.-An instruction of the court, as-
suming as a fact that A. was a creditor of B., where this was a fact in
issue in the case, was clearly erroneous.
COMMITMENTS FOR EMBEZZLEMENT AND FOR OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE
PRETENSES. (See Habeas Corpus, 2.) 287.
SUPREME COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE COMMITMENT. (See Habeas Corpus,
3.) 287.
1. SECTION 3, ARTICLE I, OF THE CONSTITUTION CONSTRUED.-The provisions
of the Constitution that, The right of trial by jury shall be secured to
all, and remain inviolate forever, " refers to the right of trial by jury as
it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. State v. Mc-
Clear, 39.
2. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT INCORPORATING CARSON CITY.-The act in-
corporating Carson city (Stats. 1875, 87), is not in conflict with article
III, or section 1 or 8 of article V, or section 10 of article XV of the
Constitution. State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 128.
3. IDEM-APPOINTING POWER ---Under the Constitution of this State, the nam-
ing in the act of incorporation of the persons who were to constitute the
provisional or initiary board of trustees was not the exercise of a power
intrinsically executive. Clarke v. Irwin (5 Nev. 111), affirmed. Id.
4. IDEM-COUNTY OFFICERS EX OFFICIO CITY OFFICERS.-The legislature, in
incorporating Carson city, had the power to constitute the designated
county officers city officers, and to impose upon them the executive or
ministerial duties of the municipality, corresponding to their respective
duties as county officers. Id.
5. SECTION THREE OF ARTICLE ELEVEN OF THE CONSTITUTION CONSTRUED.—
The provisions of section 3 of article XI of the Constitution providing
that all fines collected under the penal laws of the State shall be pledged
to educational purposes, has no application to fines recoverable for vio-
lations of city ordinances, but applies to fines recoverable under the
general laws of the State. Id., 129.
6. SECTION TWENTY-ONE OF ARTICLE FOUR OF THE CONSTITUTION.-The act in-
corporating Carson city is not in violation of the provisions of section
twenty-one of article four of the Constitution, which declares, “Where
a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general,
throughout the State." Evans v. Job (8 Nev. 323), affirmed. Id.
7. PART OF A STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-When part of a statute is uncon-
stitutional it will not authorize the court to declare the remainder void
unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter depending on
each other. Id.
BURGLARY-SECTION 2365 OF COMPILED LAWS CONSTRUED. (See Burglary,
1.) 30.
SECTION 3, ARTICLE I, OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONSTRUED. (See Constitution
1.) 39.
ACT INCORPORATING CARSON CITY CONSTRUED. (See Constitution, 2-7.) 128.
CONTEMPT OF COURT, WHEN PROCESS IS CIVIL OR CRIMINAL. (See Contempt,
1, 2.) 187.
PENAL STATUTES MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. (See Contempt, 5.) 214.
DOUBTFUL CONSTRUCTION OF LAWS. (See Eminent Domain, 3.) 394.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1869, CONSTRUED. (See Evidence,
5-7.) 194.
SECTIONS 581 AND 582 OF THE CRIMINAL PRACTICE ACT CONSTRUED. (See
Habeas Corpus, 4.) 295.
HOMESTEAD ACTS CONSTRUED. (See Homesteads, 1-3.) 260.
SIXTEENTH AND THIRTY-SIXTH SECTIONS--SECTION 7 OF THE ENABLING ACT
OF CONGRESS CONSTRUED. (See Lands, 1, 2.) 451.
FORECLOSURE OF MECHANICS' LIEN-SECTION 345 OF THE PRACTICE ACT CON-
(See Mechanics' Lien, 2, 3.) 285.
NOTICE OF MINING LOCATION CONSTRUED. (See Mining Claims, 1.) 200.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE TO FEDERAL COURT-ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 25, 1867,
CONSTRUED. (See Removal of Causes, 1.) 350.
ACT FUNDING INDEBTEDNESS OF LINCOLN COUNTY IS CONSTITUTIONAL. (See
Statute, 4.) 109.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. (See Statutes, 5, 7.) 109.
MINING AND MILLING ACT CONSTRUED. (See Statutes, 9.) 394.
SECTION 150 OF THE PROBATE ACT CONSTRUED. (S
(See Statutes, 10.) -442.
1. CONTEMPT OF COURT-WHEN PROCESS IS CIVIL.-If the contempt consists
in the refusal of a party to do something which he is ordered to do
for the benefit or advantage of the opposite party, the process is civil,
and he stands committed till he complies with the order. The order in
such case is not punitive, but coercive. Phillips v. Welch, 187.
2. IDEM WHEN PROCESS IS CRIMINAL.-If the contempt consists in the
doing of a forbidden act, injurious to the opposite party, the process is
criminal, and conviction is followed by a penalty of fine or imprison-
ment, or both, which is purely punitive. Id.
3. IDEM APPELLATE JURISDICTION.-This court has no appellate jurisdiction
in cases of contempt, where the proceeding is purely criminal. Id.
4. CONTEMPT OF COURT-REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.--If the witness re-
fused to answer questions when the court decided he should answer,
it was a contempt and punishable as such. The prisoner might have
put himself upon his privilege not to criminate or degrade himself, but
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