Opinion of the Court-Beatty, J.

the defendant's objections; but in the view we entertain of the case it becomes unnecessary to decide them, and as they have not been very fully argued, we prefer not to do so. Disregarding the certificate of acknowledgment of the execution of the two mortgages, altogether there is still sufficient evidence to prove, prima facie, that they are the deeds of the corporation. An act of the legislature of this state, approved March 3, 1869, (Stats. of 1869, p. 115,) requires all foreign corporations to file, in the office of the county recorder, of each county, in the state wherein they are engaged in carrying on any kind of business, a properly authenticated copy of their certificate or act of incorporation, with a duly certified list of its officers appended. The intention of this act was obviously to compel foreign corporations, doing business in this state, to furnish easily accessible evidence of their existence, and of the names of their officers. The pleadings in this case establish, as against the defendant, the existence of the Nevada Land and Mining Co., Limited, and the fact that it is transacting business in Washoe county. It is, therefore, to be presumed that it has filed in the recorder's office of. Washoe county, the papers which it is required to file by the law above cited.

On the trial, the plaintiff offered in evidence a paper, which, it was proved, had been filed by the acting superintendent of the company in this state, in attempted compliance with the law. This paper was not such a document as the law required, and was not properly authenticated; but the evidence showed that the filing of it was the corporate act of the company, and we are satisfied that it is a safe and proper rule to hold that the corporation, and those claiming under it, are precluded from objecting to the contents of that paper as at least prima facie evidence, upon the ground that it does not come up to the requirements of the law. Taking it then for evidence of what it contains, it proves, among other things, that in August, 1869, John Able Robertson was secretary of the company, and, as it bears the impression of the corporate seal, it proves the seal of the company. The testimony of the witness, Fish, proves that a fac simile of that

Points decided.

seal was affixed to the two mortgages above referred to, the originals of which he had seen and recorded; and altogether the proof amounts to this: That Robertson, the secretary of the company, put its seal to the first mortgage. If the law of England is the same as our own (and we can presume nothing else), Robertson was the proper custodian of the corporate seal, and when he affixed it to the mortgage the presumption is, he did it by the direction of the company, and it devolves upon those who dispute the validity of the deed, to prove that he acted without authority. Our conclusion is, that the plaintiff proved the execution of the first mortgage; that the trustees therein named had power to sell without foreclosure; they empowered Story to sell, and he conveyed to the plaintiff.

The judgment of nonsuit was therefore erroneous, and it is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

[No. 726.]

SOL WEILL, APPELLANT, v. LUCERNE MINING COMRESPONDENT.

PANY ET AL.,

CHALLENGE TO JUROR-MAIN QUESTION INVOLVED IN THE CASE.-Where a juror stated that he had formed and expressed an unqualified opinion as to the course and direction of one of the mining lodes in controversy in the suit, and it was claimed that the direction of the lode was one of the main questions at issue: Held, that as it was impossible for the court to determine from the pleadings or facts before it whether this was one of the main questions involved, it was the duty of the appellant to have at least offered to prove, by some competent evidence, that it was one of the main questions involved in the case.

IDEM.-Held, that upon the facts of this case, it is not shown that the juror challenged had either formed or expressed any unqualified opinion prejudicial to appellant.

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NOTICE OF MINING LOCATION, CONSTRUED.-Where a notice reads that the locators have taken and claim "for mining purposes 1200 feet of ground on the face of this hill, running north 1200 feet from stake, with all its dips, angles and spurs, from thence to the centre of the hill:" Held, that the words "with all its dips, angles and spurs " refer to a lode, not to surface or hill claims.

DEED OF MINING GROUND-DESIGNATION OF THE NAME OF THE CLAIM.— Where a party conveys all his right, title and interest in and to certain

Argument for Appellant.

mining ground and quartz lode described in the deed, and it appears as a fact that his interest was derived from two different notices of location which were posted upon and claimed the same lode: Held, that the conveyance of his interest in the lode necessarily conveyed his interest under both locations, and it was immaterial by what particular name he designated it. (Phillpots v. Blasdel, 8 Nev. 61, affirmed.) IDEM-HOW CONSTRUED.—Where the language of a deed admits of but one construction, and the location of the lode or premises intended to be conveyed is clearly ascertained by a sufficient description of the ground in the deed, by courses, distances, or monuments, it cannot be controlled by any different exposition derived from the acts of the parties in locating the premises, or from the failure of the grantor to designate the various names by which the ground conveyed was at different times known. SECOND LOCATION OF MINING GROUND WHEN NOT AN ABANDONMENT OF THE FIRST-Where one or more of the parties first locating mining ground afterwards make a second location upon the same lode, with the names of other parties added to the notice of location, it appearing that at the time of the second location the ground was undeveloped, and it was not known that both notices were upon the same lode, and it further appearing that the second notice was posted for the express purpose of protecting the original location: Ileld, that the second location did not of itself constitute an abandonment of the first location. IDEM. The question of abandonment is one of intention. Whether it was the intention of the locators in the first notice to abandon their interest in the ground derived from said first notice of location, was a question of fact for the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case.

APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District, Storey County.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Lewis & Deal, for Appellant.

EC

I. The court erred in disallowing the challenge to the juror, Mathewson. The law guarantees to all persons not only impartial jurors, but also jurors who have not prejudged the case: in other words, jurors who have not formed or expressed an opinion as to the material issue in the case. The statute says a person is disqualified who has formed or expressed an opinion as to the merits of the action or the main question involved. (Sec. 1225, Comp. Laws.) This language is very clear and hardly calls for construction. What then is the merits of the action, or the main question

Argument for Appellant.

involved? It is not, certainly, as contended by counsel in the court below, that one party or the other is absolutely entitled to recover in the suit. If such be the law, no man is disqualified unless he has formed an opinion as to the law of the case as well as the facts. He might have a fixed opinion as to the facts in a case and still not be disqualified if he had not such an opinion as to the law to govern the facts. Such, certainly, cannot be the law. The object of the statute, as well as the common law, is to give every man a jury who will decide, not according to an opinion already formed, but according to the evidence which may be adduced at the time; and to secure this right, it esteems no man qualified to act according to the evidence who has a fixed opinion before he hears it. So there may be many main questions in a case. Any question of fact which may determine the issue is clearly a main question. A defendant may have many defenses to one action brought against him, either one of which may go to the whole merit of the case, and if found in his favor, may entitle him to a verdict. Can it be said that any one of such defenses does not constitute the main question involved? If a jury should be impaneled with a fixed opinion as to any of such defenses, surely such jury would not be capable of deciding according to the evidence. We contend, then, that a juror is disqualified who has formed an unqualified opinion as to any main fact constituting the cause of action, or the defense.

II. The court erred in refusing to give our instruction to the effect that the title to the Boston ground did not pass, unless the grantor intended to convey, and the grantee to take that ground. This instruction was pertinent to the issue, because the deed under which the defendant claims title, did not mention the Boston ground as that intended to be conveyed, but refers only to the Lucerne location; and the defendant, for the purpose of claiming that ground under the deed, put in evidence to show that the Lucerne location covered the Boston. To rebut this evidence, and to show that the locators themselves had treated the claims as separate and distinct, we introduced deeds from various locators in the Boston, which clearly showed that the two

Argument for Appellant.

claims were not identical; one of these deeds describing the Boston as being bounded on the north by the Lucerne, a thing that could not be if the claims were the same. Now, such being the case, it was quite proper to submit the question of intention to the jury; for, surely, if the grantor did not intend to convey ground not mentioned, nor the grantee to purchase, then, surely, such ground did not pass, for the intention of parties is the very life of all contracts, and must always govern. (2 Parsons on Cont. 6 Ed. 494-note; 9 Wallace, 50; 1 Greenleaf, sec. 287; 1 Greenleaf on Evd., sec. 286-7 288,-note.

If proof of the intention of parties was admissible at all, it was then certainly necessary to give the instruction; for, in all cases where extraneous evidence is admissible to determine what is intended to be conveyed, the jury should pass on the question. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 288, note b; Merrill v. Firth, 3 M. & W. 402; Moore v. Sarwood, 4 Ex. 681, 5 Ex. 163-4; Foster v. Mutual Life Ass. Co. 3 E. & B. 48; Macbeth v. Haldeman, 1 Tenn. 182; Smith v. Thompson, 8 Com. Bench, 44, 17 Penn. 514; Merrill v. Weymouth, 28 Vt. 824.)

III. The court erred in refusing our instruction to the effect that the Surrhyne deed did not carry the Boston ground. The Boston was simply and solely a hill location. The notice itself is conclusive on this point. It claims upon the face of the hill, twelve hundred feet, and in to the center of the hill. No mention whatever is made of a ledge; and it is known that such locations were common both here and in California. The fact that no ledge location is mentioned in the notice is very strong evidence that it was not intended; but it would seem conclusive that no such intention existed, when it is seen that the location was upon the face of the hill, and in the center. Certainly, no man, intending to make a location of a ledge, would have used any such language as that employed in this notice. Again, when the same parties afterwards desired to locate a ledge, that is, the Lucerne, they expressly mentioned the ledge as the location made. So, too, the fact that the same parties who located the Boston afterwards located the Lucerne, with no