CHAPTER IX

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN QUESTION

Rambures. That island of England breeds very valiant creatures; their mastiffs are of unmatchable courage.

Orleans. Foolish curs! that run winking into the mouth of a Russian bear, and have their heads crushed like rotten apples. You may as well say, that's a valiant flea that dare eat his breakfast on the lip of a lion.

SHAKSPEARE, Henry V., Act iii. Sc. vii.

It is a d -d big question, and I should be glad to think only two or three were gathered together to think it out; but no one seems to care a twopenny dam. It will not come in their day, but I think it will come in yours and mine, and I can't help seeing its magnitude and our carelessness.

Letter of SIR C. MACGREGOR to SIR F. ROBERTS, Aug. 13, 1883.

Existence of the problem-Personal impressions-Haphazard character of Russian foreign policy-Arising from form of government -Independence of frontier officers-Responsibility for Russian mala fides-Compulsory character of Russian advance--Russian conquest of India a chimera-Russian attack upon India a danger --Candid avowal of Skobeleff-Evidence of past history-Schemes of Russian invasion: (i.) 1791, (ii.) 1800, (iii.) 1807, (iv.) 1837, (v.) 1855-Gortchakoff-Granville agreement of 1872-73—(vi.) 1878-Skobeleff's plan for the invasion of India-Military operations-Later movements-Subsequent schemes-Civilian endorsement-M. Zinovieff-Reality of Anglo-Russian Question now universally admitted-Russian illusions about British rule in India-Evidence of Russian generals-Real feeling in India— Regrettable Russian ignorance-Russian lines of invasion: (i.) From the Pamir, (ii.) From Samarkand and the Oxus-New Russo-Afghan frontier-(iii.) Upon Herat-Corresponding Indian frontier- Diagram of the two railway systems-Comparison of the rival advantages-England's obligations to AfghanistanTheir right interpretation-Reductio ad absurdum-Counterobligations of Afghanistan-British relations with Afghanistan in the past-Synopsis of policy pursued-Character of Abdurrah

of the

problem

man Khan-His health and the future-Suggested partition of Afghanistan-The Afghan army-Sentiments of the Afghans towards Russia and England-The future of Afghan independence -Prestige of Russian numbers-Policy of appointing British officers in Afghanistan-Impending developments of the AngloRussian question—(i.) Balkh-Kabul line of advance—(ii.) The Persian question-Russian ascendency and Persian weakness— Real aim of Russian policy in Persia-An eye upon the Persian Gulf-British policy in rejoinder--Opening up of Seistan-Effects of a Seistan railway-Summary of this chapter.

Existence BUT perhaps it may be said that neither the construction of the Transcaspian Railway, nor the inimical pretensions with which some persons have credited it, can justify the expression of any real alarm as to the relations of Great Britain and Russia in the East, and that the theory of present danger or future complication is a dogmatist's dream. I proceed therefore to discuss the question whether there is, and, if so, why there is an Anglo-Russian Problem at all, to state the reasons for belief in its positive existence, to explain its present aspect, and to indicate its probable development in the near future. In so doing, I shall appeal for evidence to my own observations in the country, to the lessons of history, and to the published opinions of Russian officers and statesmen.

Personal impres

Haphazard

of Russian

foreign policy

In the first place let me say that I am prepared sions. to make large and perhaps uncommon concessions to character the Russophile hypothesis, not for argument's sake, but because they are demanded by truth, which has too often been distorted or lost sight of by both parties in the wordy conflict. I am not one of those who hold that Russian policy has, either for a century or for half a century, or for a less period, been animated by an unswerving and Machiavellian pur

pose, the object of which is the overthrow of British rule in India, and to which every forward movement is strictly subordinated. When I was in St. Petersburg there appeared an article in the English 'Standard' which drove the Russian papers into a fury, by likening their advance in Asia to that of a great glacier crushing everything before it with merciless persistence, and, though its vanguard may be broken off and destroyed, ever driven onward by the irresistible pressure of the snows-i.e. the Russian Foreign Office-behind. A more mistaken idea cannot, I believe, be entertained. So far from regarding the foreign policy of Russia as consistent, or remorseless, or profound, I believe it to be a hand-to-mouth policy, a policy of waiting upon events, of profiting by the blunders of others, and as often of committing the like herself. Her attitude, for instance, towards Bulgaria and the Christian nationalities emancipated by the Treaty of Berlin, has been one long series of unredeemed and almost inconceivable blunders. The sole advantages that she has so far reaped from the settlement of South-east Europe, to which she then consented, have been the abdications of the two sovereigns, Alexander of Bulgaria, and Milan of Servia, and it is not yet clear whether or to what extent she will ultimately be the gainer by either.

from form

ment

Nor can I imagine any other policy as possible Arising under a régime where there is no united counsel or of governplan of action; but where the independence of individual generals or governors is modified only by the

personal authority of the Emperor, whose will may