ments, the government of Buonaparte; against whom, not any principle of respect for the rights of legitimate monarchy, but his own ungovernable ambition, finally brought combined Europe into the field? There is no use in endeavouring to give a specious colouring to facts which are now the property of history. The undersigned is therefore compelled to add, that Great Britain herself cannot justly accept the praise which M. Zea is willing to ascribe to her in this respect, nor can she claim to be altogether exempted from the general charge of having treated with the powers of the French revolution. It is true, indeed, that up to the year 1796, she abstained from treating with revolutionary France, long after other powers of Europe had set her the example. But the reasons alleged in parliament and in state papers for that abstinence was the unsettled state of the French government. And it cannot be denied that both in 1796 and 1797 Great Britain opened a negotiation for peace with the directory of France-a negotiation, the favourable conclusion of which would have implied a recognition of that form of government; that in 1801 she made peace with the consulate; that if in 1806 she did not conclude a treaty with Buonaparte, emperor of France, the negotiation was broken off merely on a question of terms; and that if from 1808 to 1814, she steadily refused to listen to any overtures from France, she did so declaredly and notoriously on account of Spain alone, whom Buonaparte pertinaciously refused to admit as party to the negotiation. Nay, further, it cannot be denied that even in 1814, the year in which the Bourbon dynasty was eventually restored, peace would have been made by Great Britain with Buonaparte if he had not been unreasonable in his demands; and Spain cannot be ignorant that even after Buonaparte was set aside, there was question among the allies of the possible expediency of placing some other than a Bourbon on the throne of France. The appeal, therefore, to the conduct of the powers of Europe and even to that of Great Britain herself, with respect to the French revolution, does but recal abundant instances of the recognition of de facto governments by Great Britain, perhaps later and more reluctantly than by others, but by Great Britain herself, however reluctant, after the example set to her by the other powers of Europe, and especially by Spain. There are two other points in M. Zea's note which appear to call for particular attention. M. Zea declares that the king of Spain will never recognize the new states of South America, and that his majesty will never cease to employ the force of arms against his rebellious subjects in that part of the world. We have neither the pretension nor the desire to control his Catholic majesty's conduct; but this declaration of M. Zea comprises a complete justification of our conduct in having taken the opportunity, which to us seemed ripe, for placing our relations with the new states of America on a definite footing. For this declaration plainly shows that the complaint against us is not merely as to the mode or the time of our advances towards those states; it shows that the dispute between us and Spain is not merely as to the question of fact, whether the internal condition of any of those states be such as to justify the entering into definite relations with them; that it was not merely a reasonable delay for the purpose of verifying contradictory reports, and of affording opportunity for friendly negotiation that was required of us: it shows that no extent of forbearance on our part would have satisfied Spain, and that, defer our advances towards the new states as long as we might, we should still have had to make them without the consent of Spain; for that Spain is determined against all compromise, under any circumstances, and at any time, and is resolved upon interminable war with her late colonies in America. M. Zea concludes with declaring that his Catholic majesty will protest, in the most solemn manner, against the measures announced by the British government as violating existing treaties, and the imprescriptible rights of the throne of Spain. Against what will Spain protest? It has been proved that no treaties are violated by us; and we admit that no question of right is decided by our recognition of the new states of America. But if the argument on which this declaration is founded be true, it is eternal; and the offence of which we are guilty in placing our intercourse with those countries under the protection of treaties is one of which no time and circumstance could, in the view of Spain, have mitigated the character. Having thus entered with great pain and unwillingness into the several topics of M. Zea's note, the undersigned is directed, in conclusion, to express the anxious hope of his government that a discussion, now wholly without object, may be allowed here to close. The undersigned is directed to declare to the Spanish minister, that no feeling of ill-will or even of indifference to the interests of his Catholic majesty has prompted the steps which his majesty's government has taken-that his majesty still cherishes an anxious wish for the welfare of Spain-and that his majesty still retains the disposition, and commands the undersigned again to renew to his Catholic majesty's government the offer, to employ his majesty's good offices for the bringing about of any amicable arrangements which may yet be practicable between his Catholic majesty and the countries of America which have separated themselves from Spain. (Signed) GEO. CANNING. LETTER of M. RODIOS, in the Name of the PROVISIONAL GREEK GOVERNMENT, to Mr. CANNING. Napoli di Romania, Aug. 12 (24), 1824. Your Excellency;-For these four years past, the Greeks, in firm reliance in divine Providence, have defended, not without success, the land of their fathers. I say they defend the land, for they care little about the villages, houses, and private possessions. This has been sufficiently proved in the various incursions of the enemy, when it to break silence. This note has Greece for its object, and decides on its fate according to a will which is foreign to it. It is difficult to imagine that such a note can have come from a court like that of Russia. The Greeks, however, cannot be deceived respecting the existence of this note; and the Greek nation, as well as its government, whose organ I have the honour to be, in offering their homage to his Britannic Majesty, through your excellency, solemnly declare that they prefer a glorious death to the disgraceful lot intended to be imposed on them. It is not credible that his Britannic Majesty, who has shown such philanthropical sentiments towards the people of South America, will consent that the Greeks shall be so unworthily excluded from the list of civilized nations, and delivered up to the caprice of the one or the other, without having the power to constitute themselves as a nation. the Greeks, with equal courage and magnanimity, have sacrificed their most valuable and dearest property. They preferred freedom under their tents, in their valleys, or the tops of their mountains, to the most splendid dwellings in slavery. Must not this remarkable circumstance in the history of the defensive war of the Greeks convince all Christian minds, that when they began the contest for the recovery of their rights with shaking off an intolerable yoke, the sacred object was to deliver their faith, their country, their holy temples, the graves of their fathers, their wives, and their children, and that they were strangers to the political views which agitated Europe? Guided by these principles in the struggle they maintained, they have not failed to implore the compassion of their brethren in Christendom, and officially to solicit the monarchs of the Vienna Congress to take in sulted humanity under their proYet the Greeks are tection. But European policy, surely, with respect to their claims, entertaining other ideas on the in a more advantageous situation principles of our cause, and far than the South Americans. They from possessing a true knowledge have impressed the stamp of disof the Ottoman dynasty, would grace on the Turkish weakness; neither give credit to the writings they have proved that they are of the Greeks, nor hear their worthy to be free. They do not groans and complaints, but resolved contend against their mother counto abide by a mere neutrality, try, but against a foreign nation which has been in some instances that occupied their country, and fatal to the Greeks. As the Greeks treated their children as slaves. did not attain the object of their The Greeks, to the astonishment public applications, they were of all nations, shook off the yoke obliged to exert themselves with of the barbarians. They comconfidence, defending their sacred menced the war without means to cause alone, and leave it to time carry it on, convinced that they to set their motives and principles could not assert their independence in a clear light. The government, without innumerable sacrifices; in fact, continued in its system of they conquered fortresses, towns, silence, and would have persevered and a number of posts which were in it had not a note, proceeding in the hands of their ferocious from the north of Europe, obliged despot. In several actions they have defeated the numerous and formidable Turkish fleet with small merchantmen; they have established laws like those of civilized nations; they have formed a government, and submitted to its commands. Can it now be doubted that the Greeks are worthy of independence? It will doubtless not escape his Britannic Majesty, that Greece, when free, both by the spirit of its people and its geographical position, may promote the interests of Great Britain. Trade is the vital principle of civilized nations; and where can trade be more advantageously carried on than in Greece? What stronger barrier against the increase of a vast European power, what more favourable point for the maintenance of the balance of power, can England find than those natural compacts in the midst of which Greece is situated? These are indisputable truths which time will confirm. On these grounds, Greece, as I believe, has morally and politically the right to expect every kind of aid and protection from the humane English, and especially from his Britannic Majesty, whose honourable sentiments are universally known. It can no longer be doubted whether the independence of Greece coincides with the interests of the European nations, and this circumstance is a powerful reason that the Greek nation should not be stripped of its sacred rights, and that the English nation, whose weight in the political balance is so generally recognized, should be indifferent to the affecting sight of humanity so unjustly and so unworthily trampled under foot. I have the honour, &c. (Signed) P. I. RODIOS, Mr. Canning's answer to the Secretary-General of the Provisional Government of Greece. London, December 1, 1824. The letter which you did me the honour to write to me on the 24th of August, did not reach me till the 4th of November. It contains remarks of the provisional government of Greece on a document which has been inserted in the European journals, as a plan for the establishment of peace in Greece, proceeding from the cabinet of St. Petersburgh. It is beyond a doubt that the publication of this document was made without any authority. I am unable either to affirm or to deny that it was derived from an authentic source. The opinion of the British government, however, is, that any plan for the restoration of peace in the east, proceeding from the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, can be drawn up only with friendly intentions towards the Greeks: consequently that such a plan cannot have for its object either to prescribe laws to the Greeks, or to awe the Ottoman government, and that his Imperial Majesty of Russia, whatever might be his intention, would think it fit to communicate any plan of this kind to the other powers, his allies, before he proposed it to the contending parties. The emperor has in fact laid before the allied courts the plan, to propose at the same time to the Porte, and to the provisional government of Greece, to suspend hostilities, in order to gain time for amicable mediation; and the British government would not have hesitated to accede to this proposal, had it been made at a proper moment. It must not be overlooked that the very document which so greatly excited the displeasure of the Greek government awakened similar feelings in the Divan. While the Greeks express an invincible abhorrence of every agreement which should not pronounce their national independence, the divan repulses every kind of reconciliation which should not restore its sovereignty over Greece. In these dispositions of the parties, there is certainly but small hope of an acceptable and effectual mediation. If, before the extreme to which these opposite opinions were carried-if at the time when the varying chances of war seemed to give to both parties more than one rational motive for an amicable arrangement, Russia had proposed such an arrangement, no blame could have attached to it, or to those who might have been inclined to consider of such a plan. The document, considered as a Russian memorial, contains the elements of a treaty of peace, though these elements were probably not reduced into a form proper to communicate to the belligerent parties. If the sovereignty of the Turks should not be absolutely restored, if the independence of the Greeks should not be absolutely recognized (two extremes incompatible with a mediation), if the mediators could not express themselves without constituting themselves parties in the cause, no chance remained but in a manner and to a certain point to modify both the sovereignty of the Porte and the independence of the Greeks; and the form and the degree of these modifications seemed to form the question which was to be examined and solved. Each of the two parties might certainly defeat by its protest any plan for an arrangement, however reason able in its principles, or impartial in its terms; but we know that both parties are equally resolved to reject every conceiveable arrangement, and that the hope of a successful mediation is at the present moment absolutely inadmissible. With respect to that part of your letter in which you call on the British government to assist the Greeks in their struggle for independence, and compare their merits and their claims to such aid with those of the provinces of Spanish America which have separated from the mother country, I must observe, that Great Britain has declared and observed the strictest neutrality in the contest between Spain and those provinces; and that the same neutrality has been observed in the war which now desolates Greece. The rights of Greece, as a belligerent power, have been invariably respected; and if the British government was obliged, on a late occasion, to check the excesses that took place in the exercise of its rights, we hope that such a necessity will not again occur. The provisional government of Greece may depend on the continuation of this neutrality: it may be assured that Great Britain will take no part in any attempt to impose upon it by force a plan for the re-establishment of peace contrary to its wishes, if such a peace should ever be proposed; but should the Greeks ever think it advisable to ask our mediation, we will offer it to the Porte; and if it is accepted, we will neglect nothing to make it effectual in concert with the other powers whose intervention would facilitate the arrangement. This is, in our opinion, all that can be reasonably required of the British ministers. They have not to re« |