act of moral turpitude. Yet this court, those of all the other states in the Union, and those in England, hold, that a charge of having taken a false oath, in a case in which the law neither requires or authorizes an oath to be taken, is not such an act of turpitude that the charge of it is actionable in itself. It is meet that while we administer justice to the parties who litigate their rights in this court, the rest of the community may, as much as possible find in our judgments a fixed and certain rule on which they may rest assured that, in future, similar cases will be decided. WESTERN Dist. MILLER vs. HOLSTEIN. My humble efforts have been united with those of my former colleagues, and we have concurred with great unanimity in a number of decisions which form an almost complete system of jurisprudence in regard to the action of slander. In most of these cases I had the honor of being the organ of the court. I am not dissatisfied with the decisions given in any of them, and I regret that a portion of the charge of the judge a quo, in the present case, is about to overthrow the established system, and leave the people of the state without any rule or guide in the action of slander; and the opinion of the jury, unaided and uncontrolled by the courts, is to be the sole criterion and standard of their rights. I conclude, that we ought to reverse the judgment of the court, set the verdict aside, and direct the case to be remand- to instruct the ed, with directions to the judge a quo, to abstain from instruct-ing the plaintiff jury, that "charg ing the jury "that if the words charged the plaintiff falsely falsely and maliciously, with and maliciously with moral turpitude, so as to injure his moral turpitude, character and standing in society, they might find for the plaintiff, without showing any special damages;" and that the plaintiff and appellee pay the costs of this appeal. But the majority of the court being of a different opinion, it is, nevertheless, ordered and decreed, that the former judgment of this court, remain undisturbed. The judgment should be reversed, and the with directions case remanded, to the judge, not so as to injure his character and standing in soci ety, they should find damages for him, without any special damage being proved." WESTERN DIST. PEARCE ET AL. vs. FRANTUM. 16L 414 PEARCE ET AL. VS. FRANTUM. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR THE PARISH 44 389 116L 414 46 1246 16L 414 50 735 51 1706 51 1707 In an action to recover the rents and profits in a separate suit after eviction, and the defendant pleads in compensation and reconvention, of the plaintiffs' demand, the enhanced value of the land of which he was evicted, he cannot afterwards avail himself of the plea of res judicata. Under the Civil Code of 1808, the party evicted, who was even in good faith, was bound to restore the fruits which he reaped, after the demand or institution of suit. Where a party has been in peaceable possession of land without title, in the hope of getting a pre-emption right, he will not be liable to account for the rents and profits previously to the inception of the suit evicting him. The right of a party evicted to be paid the value of his improvements, rests on the broad principles of equity, that no man ought to enrich himself at the expense of another. In regard to the right of being reimbursed for useful improvements and expenses put on land, by which the property has been made more valuable to the owner, the code or law makes little or no distinction between a possessor in good or bad faith. But the sum to be repaid, can in no case exceed the increased value of the property. This is an action to recover, from the defendant, damages for the fruits, rents and profits of 400 arpents of land, which it is alleged he occupied, used and possessed, without title, from the year 1818, until the year 1833, when he was finally evicted from the land, by a decision of the Supreme Court. See case of Brown vs. Frantum, 6 Louisiana Reports, 39. The plaintiffs allege, that the defendant took illegal possession of said tract of land without shadow of title, and constantly kept the possession until evicted; that in 1821, the husband of one of the present plaintiffs (Brown,) instituted suit for the recovery of the land, but that no damages were claimed, or if claimed, it was expressly understood and agreed that they should be waived, and reserved for a future action WESTern Dsit. after the question of title should be settled. October, 1840. vs. FRANTUM, They allege that the defendant, notwithstanding he had PEARCE et al. no title and was fully notified, and had full knowledge of their claim and title, unjustly withheld the land, and kept them out of possession, to their damage fifteen thousand dollars. That he has had the use of the land from 1818 to 1833, and made large crops thereon, worth fifteen thousand dollars, and which they claim as the just value for the use of the land, and for which they pray judgment. The defendant pleaded a general denial, and admitted his eviction from the land in question, but averred that he was formerly in possession, and possessed in good faith, and with a conscientious belief that it was honestly his property, and that this was his firm belief up to the hour of eviction. That he cleared on the land which was recovered from him, one hundred and fifty acres of a heavy forest, thereby rendering the same very valuable; and spent the most vigorous years of his life in making improvements, which are worth thirty dollars per acre for the cleared land, and erected a gin and dwelling house thereon, worth one thousand dollars; for all of which the plaintiffs are bound to pay and allow him for. He sets up a demand for the value of his improvements in reconvention, amounting to five thousand five hundred dollars, for which he prays judgment, and that the plaintiffs' demand be rejected. He also pleaded res judicata that all the matters now in contest were decided and finally passed upon in the suit evicting him from the land. Upon these pleadings and issues, the cause was tried. The witnessess stated there were about one hundred and fifty acres of land cleared, and a very ordinary dwelling house, gin house, and some few negro cabins, worth about five hundred dollars. The evidence showed that the father of the defendant settled on the land in question, in 1811 or 1812, when it was uncultivated. In 1821, the father having died, the whole of the improvements he had made, and on which he resided, PEARCE ET AL. vs. FRANTUM. WESTERN DIST. Were sold at probate sale without warranty, and adjudicated October, 1840. to William Frantum, the son and present defendant, for two hundred and thirty-one dollars. In 1829, the defendant made a purchase from Baldwin, which was to include the locus in quo. The land when Frantum, the father, settled on it, was supposed to belong to the United States, and the Frantums believed they had a right of pre-emption to it. It turned out, however, to be part of an Indian claim, purchased up by Wells, Fulton and Miller. Wells sold to Brown in 1818. Talbert, a witness for plaintiff, states he was present when Brown demanded the land from Frantum, and the latter replied, if Brown would let him have the use of the land for two years, he would give it up, which Brown refused. That Frantum admitted he had no legal title to the land, but said at the time, if the Indian claim failed, he would be entitled to a pre-emption right, &c. Upon all the evidence, the district judge gave judgment, charging the defendant with the use of one hundred acres of land for twelve years, And for the balance of the land $4200 00 262 50 From which deduct the value of the buildings, And it leaves a nett sum of $4462 50 500 00 $3962 50 for which judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed. Winn, for the plaintiff, contended that the defendant and his father before him, were possessors without the shadow of title, in bad faith, and owes rents and fruits, from the beginning of his possession, until his eviction and dispossession 7 Martin, N. S., 110. 2. The law distinctly recognizes two sorts of possessors, first, those who possess honestly, and as master of the thing; and second, those who possess knavishly, (de mauvaise foi,) without any title, or with a knowledge that their title is PEARCE ET AL. vicious. Civil Code, p. 478, article 21. In the first place, no WESTERN DIST. possessor can be truly master "whose possession is not accom- October, 1840. panied by title." We do not contend that this must be good against all the world, but must necessarily be a title good upon its face, and not a mere naked possession, unaccompanied by any manner of title. 3. The evidence in the present case, shows that the defendant had no title, and that he knew he had no title, but on the contrary, that he had a knowledge of the plaintiffs' title, and which should have put a prudent man upon an investigation of the true character of his situation, which must have resulted in the knowledge of the confirmation of the Indian title by congress in 1816, and of the plaintiffs' ancestor, (Brown's) purchase in 1818. From this latter period, the defendant owes rents and profits, and being a possessor in bad faith, without title, he is not entitled to any compensation for his improvements. Elgee, for the defendant, adverted to the suit of Brown against Frantum, the present defendant, in which he was evicted of the land from which this case arises, after a hard contest, decided ultimately by this court in 1833. It is evident, from this suit, that Frantum possessed the land under a very strong title, and one which he might well consider as good and valid. This made him a possessor in good faith, and entitled him to the fruits and revenues until the eviction, and to be paid for his improvements. Downes, on the same side, contended that the judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial, because the record did not show at what time the plaintiffs' demand for the fruits and revenues of the land commenced; for it is not enough to show that the defendant is liable to pay. It must be shown that the plaintiffs' right to claim the rents and profits began at a particular time. 2. It is shown from the evidence, the title under which he held and possessed, that the defendant was a possessor in good faith. This being the case, he owes no fruits or reve V8. FRANTUM. |