bounded in other respects may be the development of his intelligence, however rude and inferior may be his condition, they will appear to him as truths at once sublime and common, which are applicable to all the details of his earthly existence, and open for him those high regions, and those treasures of intellectual life, which, without their light, he would never have known: they exercise over him the charm of truth the most pure, and the empire of interest the most powerful. Can we be astonished that, as soon as they exist, their passage to the state of faith should be so rapid, and so general?

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There is yet another reason more hidden, but not less decisive, and which I regret I can only refer to ;-the object of religious beliefs is, in a certain and large measure, inaccessible to human science. It can verify their reality; it can reach even to the limits of this mysterious world, and assure itself that there are facts to which the destiny of man infallibly attaches itself; but it is not permitted to reach these facts themselves, so as to submit them to its examination. Struck by this impossibility, more than one philosopher has concluded that there was nothing in them, since reason could perceive nothing, and that religious beliefs address themselves but to the fancy. Others, blinded by their impotence, have tardily sprung forward towards the sphere of superhuman things, and, as though they had succeeded in trating into it, have described facts, solved problems, and assigned laws. It is difficult to say which mind is the most foolishly proud, that which maintains that what it cannot know, is not, or that which pretends to be capable of knowing all that is. Whatever may be the case, neither the one nor the other assertion has ever obtained for a single day the avowal of the human race; its instinct and practices have constantly disavowed the nothing of the incredulous, and the confidence of theologians. In spite of the first, it has persisted in believing in the existence of an unknown world, and in the reality of those relations which hold mankind united to it; and notwithstanding the power of the second, it has refused to admit that they have attained the object, and lifted the veil; and it has continued to agitate the same problems, and to pursue the same truths, as ardently and laboriously as at the first day, and as if nothing had yet been done.

See, then, what, in this respect, is the situation of man. Natural and spontaneous religious beliefs are produced in him, which, by reason of their object, tend at once towards the state of faith. They can arrive at it by means foreign to reasoning and science-by the emotions and by practices; and the transition is often thus actually brought about. One other way appears open

before man; religious beliefs naturally awaken within him the want of science, which not only desires to render an account of them, but aspires to go much further than they can conduct it, to know truly this world of mysteries, of which they afford it glimpses. Oftentimes, though, if I mistake not, wrongly, it flatters itself it has succeeded; and thus theology, or the science of divine things, is formed, which is the origin of that rational and learned faith, of which so many illustrious examples do not permit us to contest the reality. Often, also, man, by his own confession, fails in his enterprise; the science which he has pursued after resists his most skilful endeavours, and then he falls into doubt and confusion-he sees those natural and irreflective beliefs darkened, which served him for his starting-point; or, in fact, despairing of the variety of his attempts, and always tormented by the want of that faith which he has promised himself to establish by science, he returns to his early beliefs, and requires of them to conduct him to faith, without the help of science; that is to say, by the exaltation of his sensuous faculties, or by submission to a legal power, the depository of the truth, which his reason cannot

seize.

Theology itself, from the moment when it announces itself as a science of the relations of God with man and the world, and presents to the human mind its solutions of the religious problems which besiege it, proclaims nothing less than that these problems are impenetrable mysteries, and that this science is interdicted to human reason; and that faith, born of love, submission, or grace, is alone able to open the understanding to truths, which, however, theologians undertake to reduce to systematic doctrine, in order to be able to teach, or demonstrate them to the reason. To such an extent does a feeling of the powerlessness of human science, in this matter, remain imprinted upon him in fact; although every where man appears to boast himself of having escaped it.

Thus, also, is explained that obscure physiognomy, if I may so express myself, which appears to be inherent in the word faith, and which has so often made it an object of a kind of distrust and dislike to strict and free minds. Frequent above all within the religious domain, and there oftentimes invoked by the powerful and learned, sometimes for the purpose of making up for the silence of the reason, and sometimes for the purpose of constraining the reason to be silent, faith has not been considered but under this point of view, nor judged but for the employment to which it lends itself on this occasion. People have concluded that this belief was essentially irrational, blind, and the fruit of ungoverned imaginations; or else imposed by force, or fraud, on the weakness or servility of the mind. If I have truly observed and described

the nature of that, which bears the name of faith, the error is evident. On the contrary, faith is the aim and boundary of human knowledge, the definite state to which man aspires in his progress towards truth. He begins his intellectual career with spontaneous and irreflective beliefs; at its termination is faith. There is more than one way-but none certain-for leaping over this interval; but it is only when it has been leaped over, and when belief has become faith, that man feels his nature to be fully satisfied, and gives himself up wholly to his mission. Legitimate faith, that is to say, that which is not mistaken in its object, and addresses itself really to the truth, is then the most elevated and most perfect state to which, in its actual condition, the human mind can arrive. But faith may be illegitimate; it may be the state of mind which error has produced. The chance of error (experience at every step proves it) is here even much greater, as the paths which lead to it are more multiplied, and its effects more powerful. Man may be misled in his faith by feelings, habits, and the empire of the moral affections, or external circumstances, as well as by the insufficiency or the bad employment of his intellectual faculties; for faith can take its origin from these different sources. And, nevertheless, from the time of its existence, faith is hardy and ambitious; it aspires passionately to expand itself, to invade, to rule, and to become the law both of minds and facts. And not only is it ambitious, but bold; it possesses and displays, for the support of its pretensions and designs, an energy, address, and perseverance, which are wanting to almost all scientific opinions. So that there is in this mode of belief, far more than in any other, chance of error for the individual, and chance of oppression for society. For these perils there is but one remedy-liberty. Whether man believes, or acts, his nature is the same; and to avoid becoming absurd or guilty, his thoughts stand in need of constant opposition and constraint, as well as his will. Where faith is wanting, there power and moral dignity are equally wanting; where liberty is wanting, faith usurps, then misleads, and at length is lost. Let human beliefs pass into the state of faith; it is their natural state and their glory; and in their effort towards this object, and when they have reached it, let them constantly continue under the control of the free intelligences; it is the guarantee of society against tyranny, and the condition of their own legitimacy. In the coexistence and mutual respect of these two forces reside the beauty and the security of social order.

Hinderclay.

J. E. G.

THE FALL: WHO WAS THE TEMPTER?

IF we except the death of the Son of God, for man's redemption, the world has never been the scene of an event fraught with consequences so momentous as the fall of man. It is therefore matter for real regret, that the portion of Holy Writ which contains the narrative of this important transaction, has gathered around it so many difficulties, real or imaginary, that it is now no easy task to ascertain its real import.

It is not our intention, at present, to enter upon a discussion of the general subject of THE FALL itself. This would open up too many points of inquiry. All we propose doing is simply to inquire, Who was the tempter? Were there more beings than one concerned in that fearful event which

'brought death into the world and all our woe'?

In order to facilitate a reference to the language of the inspired history, we shall quote the whole narrative, so far as regards the serpent.

'Now the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden? And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden: but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die. And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.'Gen. iii. 1-5.

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"And the Lord God said unto the woman, What is this that thou hast done? And the woman said, The serpent beguiled me, and I did And the Lord God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life and I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.'-Gen. iii. 13–15.

With regard to the subject of our present inquiry, there are but three opinions which can with the slightest appearance of probability be maintained. The first is, that which attributes the fall to the agency of the serpent alone. The second is, that which considers the serpent to be only a name for the evil one. The last, which is the opinion commonly received, considers the serpent to have been merely the tool or instrument of a higher power, the Devil himself being the real author of the temptation which led to the fall.

Now it must be confessed, that the first view, which makes the serpent the only agent in the transaction, is that which the literal sense of the narrative obviously teaches. Throughout the whole history, we read of no other agent in the temptation but the serpent. The sacred writer simply says, 'The serpent said to the woman,' 'The woman said unto the serpent,' 'God said to the serpent,' etc. So far as the narrative itself is concerned, there is certainly no indication of any other being than the serpent being engaged in the temptation.

But, independently of the extreme improbability, or impossibility, that a mere brute creature should enter upon the work of tempting an intelligent being to the commission of sin, there are certain passages of Scripture which seem plainly to intimate, that the Devil was the real agent in this transaction. It can only be in reference to the temptation, we suppose, that he is called 'The tempter,'' a liar and the father of it,'-a murderer from the beginning.' And the connection of the evil one with the event appears still clearer from other passages, in which he is termed, in allusion to it, That old serpent, called the Devil and Satan (Rev. xii. 9); the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan. (Rev. xx. 1.) These passages evidently imply that the apostate angel, who throughout the Scriptures is represented as the great tempter of fallen humanity, was the real author of the temptation of Eve.

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It is probably this conviction, that the Devil must have been the tempter of our first parents, which has originated the second opinion, viz., that the arch-destroyer himself was the only being concerned in this transaction; and that the serpent is merely the name by which he is designated.

This theory, which has been advocated with considerable ability in a recent number of this Journal (No. 2, New Series), removes some of the principal objections which have been brought against the history of the Fall. A careful examination of the subject, however, has ended in the conviction, that the opinion so ably advocated, is quite untenable, and beset with difficulties which are altogether insuperable.

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First. In the narrative of the Fall, the serpent is classed amongst the beasts, as one of the same species. At the very commencement of the history, we are told the serpent was more subtil than beast of the field which the Lord God had made (Gen. iii. 1). Language which clearly implies that he was one of the beasts of the field.'

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The word 'n chayah, simply means animal, or creature, and is therefore improperly rendered beast, a word applicable rather to large quadrupeds.