Major Broadfoot, the political agent, that the enemy was only three miles distant. The Sikh account is, that not knowing the strength of the column under the Commanderin-Chief, and thinking it was only the advance-guard of the British army, 12,000 of them, chiefly cavalry, and twentytwo guns, under the command of Lal Singh, left the camp at Ferozshuhr, early on the 18th, and had taken up their position before the arrival of the British army at Moodkee. This must have been the case, for when the British troops halted at Moodkee, there was no indication of any large body of men moving in the neighbourhood, and a force of 12,000 men, especially cavalry, could not move in that country without raising a column of dust, which would be seen at the distance of miles.

The alarm being sounded, the British troops hastily got under arms and moved to their positions: Sir Hugh Gough says:-"I immediately pushed forward the horse-artillery and cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles when we found the enemy in position.

"To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry, under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front, in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were_speedily followed by the five troops of horse-artillery under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his flanks.

"The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle and such undulations as the ground afforded; and whilst our twelve battalions formed from echellon of brigade into line, they opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse-artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyze that of the enemy; and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the

I I

cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank, if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd Light Dragoons, with the second brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body-guard and 5th Light Cavalry, with a portion of the 4th Lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th Lancers, the 9th Irregular Cavalry under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right.

"This manoeuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.

"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse-artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echellon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object."

The British force engaged consisted of 3,850 Europeans

and 8,500 natives, making a total of 12,350 rank and file, and forty-two guns. Sixteen officers were killed and 200 men. Forty-eight officers wounded and 609 men, of whom 153 died subsequently of their wounds, or were disabled. Amongst those who fell was the hero of Jellalabad, Sir Robert Sale; he had his left thigh shattered by grape-shot, and the wound proved mortal. Had there been more day light, the rout of the enemy would have been more complete; as it was, seventeen of their guns out of twenty were captured, and their loss in killed and wounded was very severe. Lal Singh, the commander, was among the wounded, and narrowly escaped being taken prisoner.

The Sikhs fled rapidly to their camp at Ferozshuhr, and the British troops returned to theirs at Moodkee about midnight.

BATTLE OF FEROZSHUHR.

A. D. 1845. December 21, 22.

On the 19th of December, two heavy guns reached Moodkee, escorted by Her Majesty's 29th, the 1st European Light Infantry, and two regiments of native infantry. Every possible care had been taken of these troops in their rapid advance by the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief. Elephants were despatched to Churruk, seven-and-twenty miles from Moodkee, to carry those who might be unable to walk. When near Moodkee, and almost overcome by fatigue and the terrible desert thirst, water was distributed to them, which had been brought out on elephants from head-quarters, Moodkee, where the Governor-General's band welcomed them with a joyous burst of music. This reinforcement did not reach camp till nine or ten o'clock at night, and it was determined, in order to give them rest, that the army should halt on the 20th. During this halt of two days, the wounded and sick were cared for, and secured in the mud fort at Moodkee. It was now that Sir H. Hardinge magnanimously offered his services to Sir Hugh Gough. He was appointed second in command of the army, and all officers were directed to obey any orders emanating from him, which they were not bound to do so long as he (although the head of the government) exercised only a civil authority.

Expresses were sent to Sir John Littler at Ferozpoor, apprising him of the victory at Moodkee, and directing him on the 21st to march with as large a force as he could, and effect a junction with the army under the Commander-in Chief. Arrangements were also made for leaving the wounded and the baggage at Moodkee when the army marched; a regiment and a half being told off to protect them. This decision was a wise one. Had the British

The 11th and 41st.

army on the night of the 21st been embarrassed with a column of baggage, great would have been the suffering of our own camp-followers and wouuded. Whereas, the fort at Moodkee, defended by a regiment and a half, was safe for a time against the enemy's cavalry and loose plunderers, which alone could penetrate the rear of our army. Early on the morning of the 21st, Sir John Littler, leaving 5,000 men to hold his position and watch Tej Singh, moved off quietly by his right, with 5,500 men and twenty-one guns, to join the Commander-in-Chief. The force from Moodkee marched at three o'clock in the morning, in two open columns of companies, left in front; the army had therefore only to wheel into line to be in position. The march for the head-quarter column was a distressing one, on account of the heat and dust and the scarcity of water, but was of no great length, certainly not more than twelve miles; and the columns arrived opposite the Sikh camp at half-past eleven, A.M. The junction with the force from Ferozpoor, was effected at a few minutes before one, near the village of Misriwala. Skirmishers were then thrown forward, and some considerable time elapsed before the attack was made.

The whole country is a dead flat, and studded with trees and jungle, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages. What with dust and trees, the movements of troops became very difficult to direct. The British now concentrated comprised 5,674 Europeans and 12,053 natives, making a total of 17,727 rank and file, and sixty-five guns. According to the Sikhs' account, their force at Ferozshuhr consisted of 25,000 regular troops and eighty-eight guns, exclusive of the Yazedarees and irregular soldiers, making their force in camp upwards of 35,000. Besides this force, Tej Singh, with 23,000 regulars and sixty-seven guns, was only ten miles distant. Had it been possible for the Commander-in-Chief to have delayed the attack on the Sikh camp till the next day, which it was not, the British force would not have been augmented by one man, whilst Tej Singh, who was opposite Ferozpoor, only ten miles distant, would have been able to bring at least 20,000 additional regular troops and sixty guns to the assistance of the enemy.

The Sikh intrenchment was in the form of a parallelogram