want of food and surgical relief, and the list of mortality must ascend to a truly fearful amount!

There was little more manoeuvring at Waterloo than there had been at Toulouse. It was all a battle of hard, direct fighting, consisting, until nearly the close of the day, of furious attacks on the one side, and of indomitable defences on the other. Our success can be justly referred only to the admirable system of resistance formed by our great commander, and to the stamina and enduring valour of the soldiers whom he commanded. Chance had no effect upon results; Wellington's sure game was to act only on the defensive. Having thoroughly matured his arrangements with Blücher, for mutual support, he knew that, at the latest, before night, the Prussians must be on the field. Bad weather and bad roads, swollen streams, together with the conflagration of a town on the line of march, which, to save the Prussian tumbrils from explosion, rendered necessary a circuitous movement, all these incidents, while they, of necessity, protracted the struggle on the actual battle-field for several hours beyond what might have been reasonably computed, only go to prove that the Duke, in accepting battle, under a well-founded belief that he should be supported by the foremost columns of the Prussians in four hours (whereas singlehanded he had to maintain the combat and hold his ground during the space of eight hours), had left nothing dependent upon accident, but, providing for the worst contingencies, had formed his calculations with admirable skill, and with a justifiable confidence in the tenacity of his troops, and in what they would do for him if put to it. For hours the mass of our forces had only to stand still and act on the de fensive, or to repel the assaults made upon them. In this long interval everything depended on their coolness, fortitude, powers of endurance and patience, in the face of such a carnage as mortal man had rarely witnessed. Every moment they stood brought Blücher and his Prussians nearer to them. At one turn of the battle, when some of our squares were battered and reduced by his artillery, Bonaparte said to Marshal Soult-" How beautifully that English infantry fights, but it must give way!" When some English officers advised Wellington to withdraw the exhausted regi ments, the Duke coolly said, "Will they stand?"—"Till

they perish!" was the reply. "Then let them stand, and we will stand with them till the last, for the position must not be weakened," said the Duke.

To screen the fame of their Emperor and the glory of their veteran army, the French threw a heavy load of blame upon Marshal Ney, and a still heavier one upon General Grouchy. But at Ligny Ney had done his best, and had been foiled or beaten, and at Waterloo it was not he but the Emperor who commanded. As for Grouchy, he could not, as we have shown, be present in the fight. Had he disobeyed the orders which his master had put upon him, and made a movement by his left, he would have effected nothing beyond the delay of Napoleon's overthrow for a night. Had he come up in the afternoon, the day would probably have ended in a drawn battle, and Wellington might have been obliged to retire before nightfall into the forest of Soignies. But in a very short time after Grouchy, Blücher, unimpeded and unwatched, would have been up also; by dawn on the next morning the Anglo-Prussian army, issuing from the cover of the woods, would have become the assailant, "and with numbers far superior to his own, who will pretend to say that Napoleon's defeat on the 19th would not have been as certain and as signal as his déroute on the 18th-upon that fatal evening which closed upon a fallen empire and a

lost field?"

At Waterloo, in the 47th year of his age, the Duke of Wellington sheathed his sword never to draw it again on a field of battle. He won his last and crowning victory when full of health and vigour, and but little past the prime of matured manhood.

* Maxwell.

NEPAULESE WAR-BATTLE OF MUKWANPOOR. A. D. 1816-February 27.

WITH Waterloo our armies had done fighting in Europe. In Asia our immense and constantly extending dominions continued to call upon our courage and skill, and to find employment, year after year, for many of our troops. Whenever we tried the pacific and non-aggrandizement system we were attacked by some of our neighbours or by some of our dependents, who, mistaking forbearance and a pacific disposition for weakness, raised the standard of revolt, and endeavoured to form great hostile leagues against us.

Lord Minto, who assumed the governor-generalship in 1807, and retained it to the close of 1813, was bound by his instructions, and inclined by his own disposition, to eschew conquest and avoid war in continental India. His tranquil attitude only emboldened the Nepaulese, the Burmese, and other turbulent people, to insult and even invade and ravage our frontiers, while other tribes in the heart of our territories began to form hostile combinations and to arm themselves. If his lordship's government had lasted only six months longer he must-in spite, or rather in consequence, of his pacific policy-have found himself involved in extensive wars. His successor, the Marquis of Hastings, a brave old soldier, was compelled to draw the sword at once, for the Gorkhas, who domineered in Nepaul, retained that passion for war and conquest to which they owed their recently established dominion, and, except in the neighbourhood of our strong military stations on that frontier, it was found impossible to check their border forays. While some negotiations were opening, these Gorkhas of Nepaul attacked and murdered all our police officers stationed in Bootwul.

The Nepaulese war was rendered remarkable by the spirit and hardihood of the Gorkhas, and by their rare skill and

rapidity in stockading positions. As they advanced they covered their front, day after day, by strong palisades, and in case of a retreat they fell back upon the works they had left in their rear-upon a long, continuous series of stockades and fortified positions, which were generally placed in the strongest parts of the country, and which were to be approached only through dense forests, or narrow, steep, perilous mountain passes. It appears that while their army was on the advance, these positions were leisurely strengthened by the Gorkhas, or by the other tribes who inhabited the country, and were in subjection to those fierce conquerors.

The Nepaulese frontier was about 600 miles in length, and for the most part exceedingly rugged; and the enemy had the command of all the passes of the mountains and forests. Very few parts of the country had ever been examined by Europeans. The Nepaulese were as jealous and vigilant, and as resolute in opposing the visits of strangers, as were the Chinese, from whom most of their tribes originally descended. *

Lord Moira, however, resolved that his forces should act offensively along the whole line of the frontier, and break into the country from different points. For the whole plan of the campaign-which was clearly defective through want of local information his lordship seems to be answerable. Major-General Marley, with the principal force, consisting of about 8,000 men, was to march upon Katmandoo, the capital; Major-General Wood was to overrun all Bootwul and to menace Gulpa; Major-General Gillespie was to seize the passes of the rivers Jumna and Ganges, in order to cut off the retreat of the enemy to the eastward; and Major-General Ochterlony, with the 4th corps, was to invade the western provinces of the Gorkhas. The Gorkhas alone had at this time, about 12,000 fighting men, dressed, armed, and disciplined, in imitation of the Company's sepoys, and if this imitation was not very perfect, the men were robust, active

*History of the Political and Military Transactions in India, during the Administration of the Marquis of Hastings, 1813-23. By Henry T. Prinsep, Esq. Walter Hamilton. Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul and of the Territories annexed to this Dominion by the House of Gorkha.

and courageous. The numbers of combatants collected from other tribes and disciplined only in the Nepaulese school, were high at some parts of the war. The strength of the country was great, being skirted and intersected by lofty mountains, and abounding in excellent defensive positions. As our forces advanced towards the frontiers, the Gorkha officers ordered that all the wells should be poisoned; but this is a threat which has often been used, and has never been carried extensively into practice. The Nepaulese mode of making stockades in excellent positions, and the stubbornness with which they defend them, proved more mischievous to the invaders. General Gillespie, who had had a narrow escape at the massacre of Vellore, fought his way well into the country, but was killed on the 30th of October, 1814, in a too hasty assault on the fort of Kalunga. General Wood failed completely in his operations, and General Marley failed so miserably, as to be taxed by the commander-in-chief with gross neglect and imbecility. The mistake common to all these commanders in the first Nepaul campaign, appears to have been a too great contempt for these new and untried enemies. But the whole campaign must be considered as a war of experiment-as a war in a novel field, where almost everything was yet to learn. "It must be allowed to the Gorkhas," says the historian of this war, "that they were an experienced as well as a brave enemy: they had been continually waging war in the mountains for more than fifty years, and knew well how to turn everything to the best advantage. Caution and judgment were, therefore, more required against them than boldness of action."* General Ochterlony, however, with his single division, gained brilliant successes in the western provinces of the Gorkhas, defeated the enemy in several battles, drove them into the fort of Maloun, and there forced them to capitulate. By these victories, the countries between the Jumna and Sutlej were effectually cleared, to the great satisfaction of the Seiks, and of the hill chieftains who were allied with the Company. But the war was not yet terminated, though it had already lasted more than a year. Those who held authority at Katmandoo, the capital of Nepaul, consented to a treaty, and then refused

H. T. Prinsep's excellent book.