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Graham on the 25th of March:-"I beg to congratulate you and the brave troops under your command on the signal victory which you gained on the 5th instant. I have no doubt whatever that their success would have had the effect of raising the siege of Cadiz, if the Spanish corps had made any effort to assist them; and I am equally certain, from your account of the ground, that if you had not decided with the utmost promptitude to attack the enemy, and if your attack had not been a most vigorous one, the whole allied army would have been lost. You have to regret that such a victory should not have been followed by all the consequences which might reasonably be expected from it; but you may console yourself with the reflection that you did your utmost, and, at all events, saved the allied army; and that the failure in the extent of benefit to be derived from your exertions is to be attributed to those who would have derived most advantage from them. The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They march the troops night and day, without provisions or rest, and abusing everybody who proposes to afford a moment's delay either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and then, when the moment of action arrives, they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal. I concur in the propriety of your withdrawing to the Isle on the 6th, as much as I admire the promptitude and determination of your attack of the 5th, and I most sincerely congratulate you and the brave troops under your command on your success.

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• Wellington Despatches.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

DURING the time he occupied winter quarters on the Coa, where Marmont had not been able to molest him, Lord Wellington made his preparations for sieges, and for another advance into Spain. He began active operations with the beginning of the year. Ciudad Rodrigo was stormed and taken on the 19th of January, before Marmont could believe in the possibility of our taking the field.

Having taken immediate measures to repair the works, and to put this fortress in a defensible state, his lordship, with suddenness and secrecy, moved southward, threw his army across the Tagus, and prepared to reduce Badajoz before Soult and Marmont should be able to take any effective measures for its relief. Badajoz was taken by assault on the 6th of April, and the whole of the garrison, amounting to nearly 4,000 men, were made prisoners. The French marshals were thunderstruck. Soult retraced his steps to Seville; Marmont hung between the Spanish city of Salamanca and the Portuguese frontier. Wellington determined at once to transfer the seat of war from that frontier to the interior provinces of Spain. Having received reinforcements, his lordship, in addition to 10,000 foot and 1,200 horse left in the south under General Hill, could muster for offensive operations on the north of the Tagus, about 40,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, including, of course, the Portuguese. With such a force, his lordship was fully equal to cope singly with either of the great armies of the French marshals; but it was calculated from the beginning that a retreat to the Portuguese frontier would be a movement of inevitable necessity if two or more of those armies should effect a junction. Every possible contingency was taken into consideration by our wise commander-in-chief. If, through the corps d'armée of General Hill, the various

Spanish generals commanding in the field, the operations of an Anglo-Sicilian army which was to land on the eastern coast of Spain, and the other co-operations and means more or less at his disposal, he could prevent the French junction, after crushing Marmont, he could not only enter but permanently hold Madrid; if his means failed, if the co-operation were badly managed (as it was, and most infamously), he could lead his army back to his old inexpugnable frontier positions.

His lordship, leaving Portugal behind him, on the 13th of June, advanced to the Tormes.

SALAMANCA.

A.D. 1812. July 22.

On the 16th of June, Wellington and the whole allied army arrived upon the Val Musa rivulet, about six miles from Salamanca.

The enemy showed some cavalry and a small body of infantry in front of the town of Salamanca, and manifested a design to hold the heights on the south side of the Tormes. But their cavalry was immediately driven in by ours, and Marmont evacuated Salamanca in the night, leaving a garrison of about 800 men in some forts constructed on the ruins of the colleges and convents which commanded the bridge that crosses the river Tormes.

But the river was fordable in several places above and below the bridge; and therefore on the following morning, the 17th of June, the allies forded the river, got into the rear of the French forts, and entered the town to the indescribable joy of the inhabitants. "They have now," writes Lord Wellington, "been suffering for more than three years, during which time the French, among other acts of violence and oppression, have destroyed thirteen of twenty-five convents, and twenty-two of twenty-five colleges, which existed in this celebrated seat of learning.' 19# The forts were immediately invested by the division of General Clinton, and, when they had been accurately reconnoitred, it was found necessary to break ground before them. This was done in the night of the 17th.

Marmont retired by the road leading to Toro, as if intending to collect his army on the Douro, between Toro and Zamora. Wellington followed him as far as St. Cristoval, a few miles beyond Salamanca, where he took up a good posi

• Despatches.

tion. The forts by the bridge, and within Salamanca, were found even stronger than had been anticipated; and MajorGeneral Bowes, and 120 men, fell in an attempt to carry them by escalade.

On the 20th, Marmont returned upon his steps, and, arriving in front of the position of St. Cristoval, made a demonstration with his cavalry in the plain. This brought on a pretty warm skirmish. The French cavalry were gallantly charged by our 12th Light Dragoons, commanded by the good and brave Colonel Frederick Ponsonby; and a troop of our horse artillery was ably manoeuvred by Captain Bull. The enemy soon retired, leaving twelve horses on the plain.

The French marshal remained in Wellington's front all that night and all the next day, and on the following night established a post on the British right flank; the possession of which would have deprived Wellington of an advantage which might eventually be of importance. Accordingly, on the next morning, the 22nd, that French post was attacked by the hero of Barrosa, General Sir Thomas Graham, who drove them from the ground immediately, with some loss. "Our troops conducted themselves remarkably well in this affair, which took place in the view of every man of both armies."

Marmont retired during that night, and on the following evening the French posted themselves with their right on some heights, their centre at Aldea Rubia, and their left on the Tormes. The object of the enemy in these movements being to endeavour to communicate with the garrisons in the forts at Salamanca, by the left bank of the Tormes, WelEngton changed his front, and extended his troops so as to cover Salamanca completely; retaining the power crossing and re-crossing the Tormes, and of concentrating his army at any point at a short notice. More than once Marmont. made a false movement, and exposed his army to attack; but, for the present, his prudent adversary did not think it advisable to avail himself of his opportunities, or risk a general

action.

Every effort that Marmont could make for the purpose of relieving the forts was completely baffled; those forts had all • Captain Hamilton, Annals of Peninsular Campaign.

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