ravine, lie other heights, over which passes the road to Lourinham. The cavalry and Portuguese lay behind the village on a plain, upon a plateau, on a steep insulated height; the brigades of Anstruther and Fane, with six guns, were immediately in front of Vimeiro. The right of the latter rested upon one extremity of this hill just above the river Maceira, and the left of Anstruther occupied a church and churchyard at the other. Here passed a road leading to the village. On the mountain that, commencing at the coast, rose to the right and rear of this plateau, and which at long range commanded it, were placed eight guns and five brigades of infantry. The range of heights to the west having no water was only occupied by picquets; but the right of these also commanded the plateau, and the road passing over its extreme edge.

*

Some changes of position were made in the British army with admirable order and celerity. And, at ten o'clock on the morning of the not inglorious 21st of August, the battle began with a hot fire of French artillery. The principal attacks were made upon the British centre and left, with the view, according to a favourite French expression in those times, of driving the English into the sea, which was there rolling close in their rear. The attack was made with great bravery and impetuosity, but it was as gallantly repulsed by the British.

The 50th Regiment, reserving their fire till their foes were within twenty paces of them, poured forth a crushing volley, and then finished their work with the bayonet.

But for Wellesley's deficiency in cavalry, the battle would have been finished then, for Colonel Taylor, galloping among the confused, retreating French with the very few horsemen he commanded, scattered them with great execution. But Margaron's formidable squadrons of horse came down upon Taylor, killed him, and cut half of his feeble squadron to pieces.

General Kellerman, taking advantage of this check, threw part of his reserve into a pine-wood which flanked the line of retreat, and sent the rest of the reserve to reinforce the divisions that were repeating the attack. But again the assailants were repulsed at all points; General Major M. Sherer.

Solignac made a capital mistake; General Brennier was wounded and made prisoner; the British separated the French brigades from each other, and, pressing forward with the bayonet, they broke and scattered the enemy, who retreated in confusion, leaving many prisoners and fourteen cannon, with ammunition, etc., behind them. The loss of the French, in killed and wounded, in the battle of Vimeiro, was estimated at about 1,800; that of the British being exactly 720.

Only about one-half of the British force was actually engaged. Except the part of the reserve which Kellerman had thrown into the pine-wood, the whole of Junot's force was brought into action; but Junot's army, instead of being 20,000 strong, as reported by the German officer, was rather less than 15,000. It was only twelve o'clock when the affair was decided. The 4th and 8th British brigades had suffered very little; the Portuguese, the 5th, and the 1st British brigades, had not fired a shot; and the latter was two miles nearer to Torres Vedras than was any part of the French army; and the whole of that army, moreover, was in the greatest confusion. There was abundant time, and an admirable opportunity, to annihilate Junot; but Sir Harry Burrard had landed, and had brought with him the depressing, nightmare-like influences of senility and irresolution. Sir Harry had been present on the field during part of the engagement, but he had declined assuming the command, or in any way interfering with Sir Arthur Wellesley's dispositions till the enemy was repulsed. But then, when the French were running off, almost in a sauve qui peut disorder; when Major-General Ronald Ferguson, on the left, was close upon them; when General Hill was ready to spring forward by a shorter road than the French could take upon Torres Vedras (which must have cut them off from Lisbon, and perhaps have obliged them to lay down their arms); and when General Wellesley would have followed up his victory by a general and rapid movement forward, Sir Harry Burrard demurred-thought it unwise to hazard the fortune of the day upon what he considered a perilous throw-thought it advisable not to move any farther, especially on account of the superiority of the French * Wellington Despatches.

cavalry-thought it best of all to suspend offensive operations, and to wait in the position of Vimiero until the arrival of Sir John Moore. Accordingly, General Ferguson was ordered to desist from pursuit; General Hill was called in; and the French officers, to their great astonishment, were allowed to rally their men, and make good their retreat to the always admirable position of Torres Vedras. It is related that, to conceal the bitterness of his feeling, Sir Arthur turned round and said to some of the officers-" Well, gentlemen! we have now nothing to do but go and shoot red-legged partridges."

On the next day, the 22nd, Sir Hew Dalrymple arriving in a frigate from Gibraltar, landed in Maceira Bay, and superseded Sir Harry Burrard, as Sir Harry had superseded Sir Arthur Wellesley. Thus, owing to the unwise arrangements of our own Government, and to chances which they ought to have foreseen, the army, within twenty-four hours, had successively three commanders-in-chief. The time for prosecuting the victory was gone before Sir Hew Dalrymple came ashore; and popular clamour was guilty of great injustice towards Sir Hew, both with regard to the battle of Vimeiro and the convention (miscalled) of Cintra, which followed it.*

Writing to the Duke of York, the day after the battle, Sir Arthur said "I think, if General Hill's brigade and the advanced guard had moved forward, the enemy would have been cut off from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at Lisbon before him; if, indeed, any_French army had remained in Portugal. But Sir Harry Burrard, who was at this time upon the ground, still thought it advisable not to move from Vimeiro; and the enemy made good their retreat to Torres Vedras. Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived this morning, and has taken the command of the army."+

An English officer says-" The charm which had palsied the hearts and arms of all Europe was now doubly broken. In the Peninsula, Napoleon had found a people who hated without fearing him; and in the English his soldiers had encountered enemies who repelled their fiercest attacks, or assailed their strongest posts, with equal ardour and suc

Sir Hew Dalrymple. Memoir of his Proceedings, &c.; 1 vol. 8vo. ♦ Wellington Despatches.

cess.

We do not believe that the English soldiers ever feared, or for a single moment believed in, this French charm. From the first landing, their greatest anxiety was to fight if the French were kept in ignorance, our people well knew what had happened at Maida, and at Alexandria as well-they had officers and old sergeants with them, who had fought in both battles. All went on at Vimeiro with the confident expectation of victory. During the heat of the battle, when General Anstruther appeared to be overmatched, an aide-de-camp rode up to offer him the aid of another corps. "Sir," said Anstruther, "I am not pressed; I want no assistance; I am beating the French; and am able to beat them wherever I find them." The men shared in the conviction of their leader.

In his letter to the Duke of York, Sir Arthur was most warm in his praise of men and officers; and he bestowed upon them a rare compliment. "I cannot say too much in favour of the troops: their gallantry and their discipline were equally conspicuous; and I must add that this is the only action that I have ever been in, in which everything passed as it was directed; and no mistake was made by any of the officers charged with its conduct."+

* Sherer.

+ Wellington Despatches.

SIR JOHN MOORE'S CAMPAIGN.

1808-1809.

AFTER the battle of Vimeiro, where, by the faults of others, he was deprived of so many of the fruits of victory, Sir Arthur Wellesley gave up his command, and returned to England, to justify his own conduct before a Board of Inquiry; and General Sir John Moore, instead of being employed in Portugal, where little was left to do after the Convention of Cintra, and the evacuation of the country by the French, was sent to make a campaign in the heart of Spain, and to march, if possible, into Madrid.

It was calculated by those who planned the expedition, that our brave General would find organized, patriotic Spanish armies to co-operate with him, and such an amount of zeal and of preparation, on the part of the Spanish people, as would smooth all difficulties, and render his advance from the frontier to the capital quite an easy operation. Fatal miscalculations!

With a fine army of 20,000 men, Sir John Moore left Lisbon, marching by land. With 10,000 more men, General Sir David Baird was sent round by sea, to land at Coruña, and march thence across the country to join Moore. Sir John crossed the boundary between Portugal and Spain on the 11th of November, and on the 13th of that month he entered Salamanca. Instead of waiting for his arrival, the incurable Spanish generals had been fighting battles, and losing them. Instead of finding his advance covered by Spanish armies, which were to have made a total of 70,000 men, Sir John scarcely found so much as a Spanish piquet. As for zeal and preparation to assist him, he could see no signs of them. Sir David Baird, who had proceeded by sea, found every imaginable obstacle and mortification at Coruña,

T