SENATE.] The Bank Veto. the application to renew the charter is premature, and thinks we ought not to be chided by him for acting on the subject, as he had directed the attention of the nation and of Congress to this subject, in his Message of 1829, and in two succeeding Messages. [JULY, 1832. to be disposed of at their discretion, against this I enter my solemn protest. The honorable Senator next adverts to what the President says on the constitutionality of this act, and animadverts on what is stated in relation to there being two precedents in Congress, where this power is asserted, and two in which it was denied; and then asserts that since the year 1791, when the first bank was chartered, Congress has never denied this power. Mr. President, to me it is obvious that the notice taken of the bank in those Messages was not to recommend to Congress to act upon the subject, at either of the sessions when those Messages were delivered; but, as the subject was esteemed of vital interest to the community, Mr. President, it appears to me that, whether to turn the attention of all to it, at an early the President can show any recorded vote, deperiod, so that the opinion might be well ma-nying this power or not, the Senator ought not tured upon it, when the charter was about to expire, and when it would become necessary to act upon it. But if Congress ought now to act upon it, because the subject is brought before us by those Messages, why was it not acted on at the sessions when these Messages were delivered? Why not at the session in 1829? The Senator has answered the question with frankness. He has told us it is material that it should be known before the Presidential election, whether the President would sign the act renewing the charter or not; because, if he would not, he ought to be turned out, and another put in his place, who will; and as the election is to take place the succeeding fall, application for the renewal could not be longer delayed. to be too severe upon the Executive for this mistake, if it be one. When a renewal of the charter was applied for in 1811, its constitutionality was argued, and ably argued, by those opposed to it, and the application was rejected. The bank then applied for time to wind up its business; the petition was referred to a committee who reported against the application, alleging that it was unconstitutional, and this report was concurred in. Afterwards, in 1815, when a bank charter was under consideration in the House of Representatives, a member from Massachusetts, in his place, then acting under the same high obligations which the President acts under, arguing against the charter, states expressly that the renewal of the charter had been refused because it was unconstitutional. The President, without doubt, has read this argument, and seen this resolution; and if he re I thank the Senator for the candid avowal, that unless the President will sign such a charter as will suit the directors, they intend to in-posed confidence in these statements, and was terfere in the election, and endeavor to displace him. With the same candor I state that, after this declaration, this charter shall never be renewed with my consent. thereby misled, which I suppose he was not, I submit to the honorable Senator whether, under such circumstances, he would not have been entitled to milder treatment from him, than he has received. The attention of the Senate has been next called to that part of the Message found in page six, in which the decisions of the Supreme Court are spoken of. Let us look at this matter as it is. Immediately before the election, the directors apply for a charter, which they think the President at any other time will not sign, for the express purpose of compelling him to sign contrary to his judgment, or of encountering all their hos- The honorable Senator argues that the constitility in the canvass, and at the polls. Suppose tution has constituted the Supreme Court a trithis attempt to have succeeded, and the Presi-bunal to decide great constitutional questions, dent, through fear of his election, had signed this charter, although he conscientiously believes it will be destructive of the liberty of the people who have elected him to preside over them, and preserve their liberties, so far as in his power. What next? Why, whenever the charter is likely to expire hereafter, they will come, as they do now, on the eve of the election, and compel the Chief Magistrate to sign such a charter as they may dictate, on pain of being turned out and disgraced. Would it not be far better to gratify this moneyed aristocracy, to the whole extent at once, and renew their charter forever? The temptation to a periodical interference in our elections would then be taken away. Sir, if, under these circumstances, the charter is renewed, the elective franchise is destroyed, and the liberties and prosperity of the people are delivered over to this moneyed institution, such as this, and that, when they have done so, the question is put at rest, and every other department of the Government must acquiesce. This doctrine I deny. The constitution vests "the judicial power in a Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Whenever a suit is commenced and prosecuted in the courts of the United States, of which they have jurisdiction, and such suit is decided by the Supreme Court, as that is the court of the last resort, its decision is final and conclusive between the parties. But as an authority, it does not bind either the Congress or the President of the United States. If either of these co-ordinate departments is afterwards called upon to perform an official act, and conscientiously believe the performance of that act would be a violation of the constitution, they are not bound to perform it, but, on the contrary, are as much JULY, 1832.] The Bank Veto. [SENATE at liberty to decline acting, as if no such deci- | the others; and this I incline to think is the sion had been made. In examining the extent correct constitutional view of the subject. The of their constitutional power, the opinion of so honorable Senator thinks the President entireenlightened a tribunal as our Supreme Court ly mistaken when he supposes Congress cannot has been, and I hope ever will be, will always deprive itself of some of its legislative powers. be entitled to great weight; and, without Let us for a few minutes attend to the view doubt, either Congress or the President would of this part of the subject presented by the always be disposed, in a doubtful case, to think Message, and then examine its correctness. its decisions correct; but I hope neither will ever view them as authority binding upon them. They ought to examine the extent of their constitutional powers for themselves; and when they have had access to all sources of information within their reach, and given to every thing its due weight, if they are satisfied the constitution has not given a power to do the act required, I insist they ought to refrain from doing it. The Congress is vested with exclusive legislative powers over the District of Columbia. It therefore has an undoubted power to establish, within the District, as many banks, with as much capital to each, as it chooses. By this charter, it is stipulated that Congress shall not establish any bank within the District, nor shall it increase the capital of existing banks. This the President thinks is unconstitutional. By this agreement, the present Congress, and its successors, are deprived of the powers of establishing any bank, no matter how pressingly the public interest may require one. Congress by this agreement will have stripped itself of all power to legislate upon a subject during the existence of the charter, when the constitution had vested the most ample powers Is this constitutional? Ought we to be bound by such an agreement for fifteen or twenty years, and permit the best interests of society to be sacrificed for the want of a power which the constitution has conferred, but which we have bartered away? The Message supposes we are not at liberty to dispose of our legislative powers in this manner, and therefore this act is unconstitutional. This is certainly a very important point. If we make such an agreement, we ought to be bound by it; and yet I think cases might occur, in which we ought not to be, nor would we be, bound by any such agreement. The public safety, the public interest, might, long before the expiration of the charter, imperiously demand the establishment of one or more banks within the District, and I do not believe we can constitutionally deprive ourselves or our successors of the power to do so. Suppose the House of Representatives to have passed an act on a given subject for a number of successive sessions, and from want of time the Senate had not acted on it, and the constitutionality of such an act to come before the Senate, would any member think those opinions of the House authorities by which he was bound? Certainly not. They would have due weight, and be respectfully considered, but disregarded in the decision made by the Senate, if shown to be incorrect. In principle there can be no difference between such cases and the judicial decisions. Suppose the President to recommend, never so often, the passage of an act which he may think constitutional, would the Senate, the House of Representatives, or the courts, feel themselves bound by his opinions? I think not. Each co-ordinate department, within its appropriate sphere of action, must judge of its own powers, when called upon to do its official duties; and if either blindly follow the others, without forming an opinion for itself, an essential check against the exercise of unconstitutional power is destroyed. A mistake by Congress in passing an act, inconsistent with the constitution, followed by a like mistake by the Supreme Court, in de- Mr. President, we must remember that, in ciding such act to be constitutional, might be case of a war, this bank, if in existence, must attended with the most fatal consequences. be our main dependence for raising money; and Let each department judge for itself, and we yet there is no provision by which it is bound are safe. If different interpretations are put to loan us one cent. Now, suppose it to have upon the constitution by the different depart- existed during the last war, and the stock to ments, the people are the tribunal to settle the have been owned by British subjects and a few dispute. Each of the departments is the agent of our own citizens, and those citizens to have of the people, doing their business according to belonged to that sect in politics who were seekthe powers conferred; and where there is a dis- ing to change our federal rulers-who thought agreement as to the extent of these powers, the it wicked to thank God for our victories upon people themselves, through the ballot boxes, either land or water-who had sent an embassy inust settle it. The Senator, if I heard him to this city to request the then President to correctly, has said that the President has as-resign: does any man believe the Administraserted that the Supreme Court has no power to decide upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress. The gentleman has not attended to the Message with his usual accuracy. No such opinion is advanced, but the contrary, that each department within its appropriate sphere of action has the right to judge for itself, and is not bound by the opinion of both, or either of tion could have procured a loan for one cent? Those politicians, I am willing to suppose, were acting honestly; that they believed the war impolitic, unjust, and wicked, so much so that they would not aid it with their good wishes. Does any one suppose that they would not have held it treason against good morals to have loaned pecuniary aid? Surely they would. We must then have been without money, and without the means of obtaining any. Peace must have been made, and upon any terms dictated by the bank, or by the enemy. [JULY, 1832. make it. There is no objection, however unfounded, no argument, however unsound, which has been urged against this institution for years past, both in and out of this capitol, but are collected and thrown together here to make up this extraordinary paper. But its general merits have been already considered. The parts to which I would now more espethird page of the printed Message, in which, after saying that "all the objectionable principles of the existing corporation, and most of its odious features, are retained without alleviation " in the bill under consideration, proceeds: Mr. President, I have endeavored to expand my mind so as to take this enlarged view of the subject, and what I find is, that the advocates of this bank, upon the plea that the bank is necessary for the fiscal concerns of the Gov-cially invite your attention, are found on the ernment, wish, by construction, to acquire the power to create a bank; and, having thus possessed themselves of the power, wish to use it so as to confer powers not in any degree necessary for a bank to possess, to enable it to do all which the Government may wish to have done, but through which the stockholders may enrich themselves and their friends, and acquire an influence greater than the Government itself, and control all our political concerns in such manner as to gratify their ambition and promote their interests to any extent they may wish. In short, it appears to me that, in creating the bank, the pretence is, through it to do the public business; and as soon as created, the public business is a mere insignifi-legal privilege in the Bank of the United States, cant incident; and private emolument, without limit, is the main design. bills of the said corporation, although the same be "The fourth section provides 'that the notes or on the faces thereof respectively made payable at one place only, shall, nevertheless, be received by the said corporation at the bank, or at any of the offices of discount and deposit thereof, if tendered in liquidation or payment of any balance or balances due to said corporation, or to such office of discount and deposit, from any other incorporated bank.' This provision secures to the State banks a which is withheld from all private citizens. If a State bank in Philadelphia owe the Bank of the Louis branch, it can pay the debt with those notes; United States, and have notes issued by the St. but if a merchant, mechanic, or other private citi Mr. President, in submitting this Message, one of the highest duties of the Chief Magistrate has been performed. Under peculiar and trying circumstances he has given his senti-zen, be in like circumstances, he cannot, by law, ments, plainly and frankly, as he believed his duty required. pay his debt with those notes, but must sell them at a discount, or send them to St. Louis to be cashed. This boon conceded to the State banks, though not unjust in itself, is most odious; because it does not measure out equal justice to the high and the low, the rich and the poor. To the extent of its practical effect, it is a bond of union among the banking establishments of the nation, erecting them into an interest separate from that of the people; and its necessary tendency is to unite the Bank of the United States and the State banks in any measure which may be thought conducive to their common interests." When the excitement of the time in which we act shall have passed away, and the historian and biographer shall be employed in giving his account of the acts of our most distinguished public men, and comes to the name of Andrew Jackson; when he shall have recounted all the great and good deeds done by this man in the course of a long and eventful life, and the circumstances under which this Message was communicated shall have been stated, the conclusion will be, that, in doing this, he has shown And this is one prominent objection to the a willingness to risk more to promote the hap-bill extending the charter of the Bank of the piness of his fellow-men, and to secure their liberties, than by the doing of any other act whatever. United States, and one of the reasons for refusing it the sanction of the Executive. This bank, sir, with its present charter, has existed about fifteen years. During that period, its Mr. EWING took the floor. He said he had thus far been an attentive listener to the dicus-effects upon the country have been tried and sion which the subject had elicited. In the tested. The present charter has faults and improgress of that discussion, his own views had perfections. Men of business, pursuing the vabeen in many particulars anticipated. Some rious avocations of life in a state of society parts, however, of the Message, which, in his highly complicated, and in its various branches opinion, required examination, had been but connected and intertwined in a thousand forms briefly noticed, and others passed over in silence. of combination, have, in that long period of To such of them, said Mr. E., as I deem the time, felt all the good and all the evil it conmost important, I will now ask the attention tained; but with all its good and all its evil, of the Senate. But in this discussion I shall taken as a whole, it has proved highly benefibe brief-carefully avoiding, as far as may be,cial to our country. That it has so, is certain a repetition of the subjects already dwelt upon, and arguments already advanced. This Message contains the Executive condemnation of the Bank of the United States; a universal, unqualified, condemnation of all that it is. and all that Congress had proposed to from the united opinion of all men of business, and almost all the local banks in the United States, whose petitions for its renewal load your table-petitions, not of one place, or of one party, or one class of men, but of the people of all classes, all parties, and almost all sections JULY, 1832.] The Bank Veto. [SENATE. of the Union-and generally in those petitions | whole course of their business, and I presume they call for an extension of the charter of the they never will, unless their officers become bank, without suggesting either variation or insane, or an unexpected change in business modification. Others do suggest existing evils, should render it necessary for self-preservation. and ask for a modification which will remove But compel them by law to do that which they them; but in no one, and from no quarter, do now do voluntarily, and great mischief might we hear it urged as a complaint that the notes follow. In the fluctuations of trade there will of the bank, wherever payable, are not made a frequently be heavy drains upon the specie of tender at all places for the payment of individ- our great commercial cities. In those cities ual debts to the bank. Was it necessary, then, flows from every part of the Union the paper or was it proper, to insert such provision? of all the branches, brought there by traders as Certainly not, unless some evil was to be the funds easiest of transportation for the puravoided, or some good to be produced by it. chase of merchandise. There, too, the heaviest loans are made to individuals, and, the amount becoming due to the bank, in a single day, is sometimes immense. Now, in this state of things, suppose one of these sudden and heavy pressures upon the money market in New York, and the Bank of the United States and the other banks in that city are drawn on at once for one or two millions of dollars of specie, and this bank compelled to receive the paper of remote branches in payment of debts, is it not obvious at once that they would bear the whole pressure, in the first instance, at least to the ex The present charter of the bank permits them to pay out and put in circulation, at any one of their branches, bills payable at any other branch. The bill before us restricts them, and requires that no notes of a denomination which constitutes currency shall be paid out or put in circulation which are not made payable at the place where they are so issued. If, then, an individual borrow money at a branch, and agree to pay it at the same place, is it, I ask, necessary for his protection, or consistent with mercantile habits and principles, that he should be allowed as a legal right, to tender in pay-tent of all the notes of all the branches in the ment of this loan the notes of the person (or money market of the place? The Manhattan the bank) of whom he borrows, payable a Bank, for example, has $100,000 of the paper thousand miles off? It may be just enough, of the remote branches, and wishes to make it once adopted as a rule of law; but it would be available at once in specie:. that bank would, embarrassing in the extreme to the lender, and through the medium of brokers, bid up a small it would compel him to diminish the amount of premium in the bills on remote branches, for his loans in order to sustain his credit. But those payable at the branch in New York, and can any injury happen to the borrower by the the debtors who were about to pay the money want of such provision? Every individual on their own notes would make the exchange who borrows at a bank knows when pay-day and take the premium, and the Manhattan comes, and if he be provident, he prepares for Bank would return the notes of the branch in it. Should the bank hold him to the strict law, New York, and compel the payment of specie. and require him to pay in the notes of the Thus every sudden pressure would be cast branch, or specie, he has time to prepare him- wholly upon this institution, their business self with such funds as may suit his purpose, by would be cramped, and their discounts limited, exchanges, which are always easily effected. and no good or useful purpose whatever effectAs, for example, a trader or mechanic at Cin-ed by it. So much as to the propriety of this cinnati borrows money payable at that place, extension of the general privilege of tender to and he is required to pay in notes of that individuals. branch, or specie; now the notes that, under this charter, would circulate there, are those of Cincinnati, Louisville, and Pittsburg. If the debtor had one-third of the amount due in notes of each of those branches, and the bank at Cincinnati should refuse to receive any but its own notes, every man of business knows that an hour would be ample time to exchange to the amount of any moderate loan, and without a premium, for such funds as the branch could not refuse. But the supposition that this would ever be required by the bank, is perfectly idle. They have to deal with the people, and the good will of their customers is the source both of their convenience and their profit. It would be wanton folly in them to refuse notes of any of their branches in payment of the debts due them, whenever obtained by a borrower in the due course of business, and fairly offered for that purpose. They never have, that I have ever heard of, as yet, in the With respect to banks, the case is wholly different. They are the rivals, not the customers, of this institution. If their jealousy should ever be excited against any; if they should, from any cause, attempt the oppression or overthrow of any interest in the country, it would be the local institutions, the other chartered banks in the United States; and it is against the possibility of such oppression that this fourth section was intended to guard. But it is further said, and it is the last mischief discussed under this head, that the necessary tendency of this provision is "to unite the Bank of the United States and the State banks in any measure which may be thought conducive to their common interest." There is but one possible mode in which this provision of the charter would produce the effect proposed, and that is by removing a source of controversy and discord between them, preventing future collisions, and enabling them [JULY, 1832. tween kingdoms as States; a long-established principle of international law, never departed from in times of peace and amity: and even in war, confiscation, or the suspension of the rights of the creditor, and not taxation, is the usual resort against the credits of the alien enemy. There is another clause in the third page of the Message, to which I now ask the attention of the Senate: To acknowledge its force is to admit that the bank to pursue more harmoniously the general objects of their creation; for unless strife and discord prevent it, all men and all institutions who possess an ordinary share of wisdom and foresight, will pursue that which is conducive to their interest; and if the same object be conducive to the interest of the whole people, or a whole class of incorporated institutions, they will, unless the predominance of evil passions prevent it, unite in its pursuit. This provision might have had the effect of removing re-chartering the present bank, that the calling in "It has been urged as an argument in favor of causes of animosity between the national and its loans will produce great embarrassment and disState institutions, and have allayed or prevented tress. The time allowed to close its concerns is the occurrence of hostile or unkindly feelings be-ample: and if it has been well managed its pressure tween those who directed them, and thus have will be light, and heavy only in case its manageenabled them to pursue their common interest ment has been bad. If, therefore, it shall produce without jealousy or collision, and by their distress, the fault will be its own; and it would united means to advance the common interests furnish a reason against renewing a power which of our country. But I cannot, for myself, has been so obviously abused. But will there ever divine why the removal of a subject of discord be a time when this reason will be less powerful? between that and the State institutions should be made an objection fatal to the bill. This difficulty, if it be one, lies too deep for my intellect to fathom it. Surely the President did not intend to convey the idea that the Bank of the United States and the State banks would, by this provision, be induced "necessarily" to unite in oppressing the people. No man possessing ordinary intelligence could entertain an opinion of this kind, and, if not entertained, certainly it could not be intentionally advanced. Unite against the people! Why, sir, let this bank and the State bank settle their accounts with each other as they will, or let the law settle for them as it may, they are still, and always must be, rivals in trade, and their competition compels them, and must always compel them, to treat their customers not only with justice but with courtesy; and no man in this age and nation will believe, let it be insinuated from what quarter it may, that a law compelling the Bank of the United States to receive the paper of the branches in payment from the State banks, will form a bond of union between them, and unite them against the people, on whose good will they both depend. I have said that the States have an undoubted right to tax the stockholders residing within their limits for all the stock which they hold in the Bank of the United States. The right of taxation, as to debts, contracts, stocks, every thing which is of untangible nature, (not issuing out of real estate,) and is, therefore, of no place, is determined by the domicil of the owner; it is supposed to exist there, and, if taxed at all, it is in the State or kingdom in which its owner resides. Take, for example, the case of a man resident in Virginia, loaning money to a citizen of Ohio. Could Ohio tax the lender in consequence of the loan? Certainly not. But the money in the hands of the borrower, dispose of it however he might-whether he retained it on hand, or converted it into property, or loaned it again-would become at once a subject of taxation in Ohio. It is the same be This whole clause is assumption, without argument or proof to sustain it. The question whether the time to close the concern of the bank is or is not ample, is one which depends upon a variety of circumstances, of which the most important are the amount of its loans, and ability of the individuals and of the country to pay those loans without serious pressure upon business, and consequent individual and public distress; but the Message avers that if the management of the bank has been good, the pressure, on the withdrawal of its loans, will be light, and heavy only in case its management has been bad. It would seem, therefore, according to the ideas conveyed in the Message, that the bank ought to have made no loans except to individuals who were full-handed and always ready to pay; and that they should not have been liberal of their loans in any portion of the country where money was scarce, and the business and the enterprise of the people dependent on their capital to put it in motion. In other words, it were, according to the Message, good management to loan to the rich who are full of capital, and can always pay, and to refuse to the poorer and more enterprising sections and citizens of our country, who borrow to create capital from the proceeds of their industry, aided by their loans. In this I differ from the Message to the whole extent. This bank was little needed in that portion of our country where capital has been accumulating for ages, and therefore abounds. It was not wanted in Boston-they could do well enough without it in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore-but in the West, the younger sisters of our confederacy, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, where the whole wealth |