by the payment of specific sums severally to each of them.11 Several tire insurance companies were allowed to unite in a bill to set aside one award against them upon an arbitration of claims the same person under several policies; 12 and to enjoin prosecution of separate actions at law, brought by the same plaintiffs against them and other insurance companies to recover upon policies on the same property, which provided for a Proportional liability, where the same defense had been interposed to each action,13 but not where they had issued concurrent policies upon the same policy, the liability of each being independent of that of the rest.1 14 it.16 Plaintiffs with conflicting interests cannot so join.15 Such are, in a suit for the construction of a will, persons, each of whom is interested in having a different construction put upon Nor can two join in a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of land, of whom one claims the land as a creditor of the person who has made the conveyance, and the other as the purchaser of the land upon a sheriff's sale to satisfy a judgment hel d him.17 So, a bill was held to be multifarious which sought enforce a trust in land and also to give the title to one of complainants to the same property.18 But the interests of the complainants need not be co-extensive. 11 Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 253, 15 L. ed. 368. It has been held that this rule does not extend to a bill for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate in which the complainants hold distinct rights to separate lots. Marselis v. Morris & L. Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 31, 39. 12 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 11 L.R.A. 623, 44 Fed. 151. 13 Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., C. C. A., 113 Fed. 1. 14 Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, C. C. A., 175 Fed. 720. 15 Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245, 26 L. ed. 729; Saumarez v. Saumarez, 4 Mylne & Cr. 331, 336; Parsons v. Lyman, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 432; Bell v. Cureton, 2 M. & K. by to the Thus, a tenant for life and the remaindermen of an estate, either legal or equitable, may join in a suit to protect the estate. 19 Beneficiaries of a trust fund may join in a suit for an accounting, although their interests are several.20 Where either the corporation or its stockholders might have brought a suit, it was held that their joinder as complainants did not prejudice them.21 The buyer of a secret formula and the vendor who sold the same with a guarantee, may join in a suit to enjoin the unlawful use of the same.22 The owners of a patent and an exclusive licensee may join as complainants in a suit for its infringement.23 Three plaintiffs were allowed to unite in a bill to enjoin an infringement of three patents, one of which belonged to all the complainants and the others to two of them.24 Although usually there had to be some privity between the complainants in a bill, and a common interest in the questions involved could not alone lay the foundation for the joinder of parties; 25 yet in certain cases those between whom there was no privity were allowed to sue together when they sought to avert an injury which would affect them all alike.26 Thus persons with a common interest in trademarks and labels, as owners and selling agents of the goods upon which they were affixed, might join in a suit to prevent their imitation.27 Several persons who were injured by a statute regulating their separate business of the same character were permitted to unite in a suit to enjoin its enforcement.28 Several tenants or parishioners might unite in a bill of peace seeking to dispose of a disputed right claimed 19 Story's Eq. Pl., § 27a; Buckeridge v. Glasse, 1 Cr. & Phill, 126; Calvert on Parties (2d ed.), 99; Rainey v. Herbert, C. C. A., 55 Fed. 443. 20 Watson v. National Life & Tr. Co., C. C. A., 162 Fed. 7. 21 Bellevue Mills Co. v. Baltimore Trust Co., 214 Fed. 817. 22 James B. Sipe & Co. v. Columbia Refining Co., 171 Fed. 295. 23 Bellevue Mills Co. v. Baltimore Trust Co., 214 Fed. 817. 24 Low v. McMaster, 255 Fed. 235. Fed. Prac. Vol. I-50 25 Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, C. C. A., 175 Fed. 720; Watson v. Huntington, C. C. A., 215 Fed. 372. 26 See $$ 114, 116 supra. 27 Jewish Colonization Ass'n V. Solomon, 125 Fed. 994. 28 Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. 605; a trading stamp case. But in Ohio v. Cox, 257 Fed. 334, held that dif ferent taxpayers could not unite in a suit to enjoin the governor from transmitting to the legislature the amendment to the Constitution forbidding the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. 29 against them by the lord of the manor or the parson of the parish.30 The owners of several lots of land claiming under a common source of title might unite in a bill of peace against several other claimants to the same lots, who also relied upon a common source of title adverse to that of the complainant.31 Several owners of different lots of land who have a common interest in an easement derived from the same source may unite in a suit to enjoin the obstruction of the easement.32 Several claimants in possession of several parcels of land whose rights depend upon the same question of fact or law may unite in a bill of peace against the same defendant who claims title to all the land by reason of the same disputed facts or legal propositions.33 The owners of several mines might join in a suit to restrain different assayers from buying ore from laborers employed by the complainants, although there was no concert of action among the defendants in their various purchases.34 The owners of adjacent property might join in a bill in equity to enjoin smelters from injuring their crops,35 to enjoin a defendant from erecting 29 Annon., 1 Chan. Cas. 269; Smith v. Earl Brownlow, L. R. 9 Eq. 241. 30 Rudge v. Hopkins, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 70. 31 Crews v. Burcham, 1 Black, 352; Prentice v. Duluth S. & F. Co., C. C. A., 58 Fed. 437. It has been held that the pastor and some of the members of a religious association may unite in a suit to recover possession of the church and parsonage, to enjoin the trustees and the remainder of the congregation from interfering with each in his ecclesiastical rights; and also to compel an accounting for collections taken up, which are payable to the elder and pastor as salary. Fuchs v. Meisel, 113 Mich. 559; s. c., 60 N. W. R. 773. But see Douglas v. Boardman, 113 Mich. 618, s. c., 71 N. W. 1100. Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. 605; Everglades D. League v. Napoleon B. Broward D. Dist., 253 32 Norton v. Colusa Parrot Min. & Smelting Co., 167 Fed. 202. Springer v. Lawrence, 47 N. J. Eq. 461, s. c., 21 Atl. 41. See Union Mill & M. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 73; Osborne v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 43 Fed. 824; Cent. Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 1 Saw. 641; infra, § 141. Flint v. Russell, 5 Dill. 151; Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.), 341, 80 Am. Dec. 632. Contra, Hudson v. Madison, 12 Simons, 416. 33 Holst v. Savannah El. Co., 131 Fed. 931; Rafferty v. Central Tr. Co. 147 Pa. 579, 30 Am. St. Rep. 763, 23 Atl. 884. 34 Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Richardson, 194 Fed. 198, reversed C. C. A., 202 Fed. 637. 35 Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Godfrey, C. C. A., 158 Fed. 225, 89 C. C. A. 139. a livery-stable,36 an unauthorized street railroad 87 or other nuisance in their vicinity. But another case holds that different persons, each of whom will suffer a distinct injury from the levy of a tax, cannot unite in a bill to enjoin its levy on account of its alleged unconstitutionality.38 Several stockholders who had been compelled to pay corporate debts were allowed to join in a bill against another stockholder or compel him to contribute his proportion, and several persons who had been induced by identical fraudulent misrepresentations to subscribe to stock in a corporation were allowed in Virginia to join in a suit to cancel their subscriptions.39 It has been held: that several depositors may join in a suit against directors of their common bank, for loss through improper loans of the bank funds.40 But that several stockholders cannot unite in a bill against an officer of their corporation based upon his fraudulent acts by which some of the complainants were induced to buy their stock and others, who had previously bought, were otherwise injured. A stockholder might sue on his own behalf and on behalf of his corporation, in the same bill, when the same facts sustained the cause of action on behalf of both, such as an attempt to make a fraudulent consolidation between his company and another on terms unduly unfavorable to his corporation.42 But, it has been held, that a suit by a stockholder, who is indebted to a building and loan association, to cancel his loan contract for fraud, usury and incapacity of the association to do business within the State, who also prays, on behalf of himself and all other stockholders, to have a receiver of the property of the corporation within 36 Cutting v. Gilbert, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 259. See, however, Central Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 1 Saw. 641; Union Pac. R. Co. v. McShane, 3 Dill. 303; infra, § 141. 37 Allen v. Fairbanks, 45 Fed. 445. 38 Rader v. Bristol Land Co. 94 Va. 766, 27 S. E. 590. 39 Foster v. Abingdon, 88 Fed. 604; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 54 Am. St. Rep. 725, 24 S. E. 478. 40 Boyd v. Schneider, C. C. A., 131 Fed. 223. Several stockholders may unite in a suit to enjoin the directors of a corporation from issuing new stock without giving the complainants a reasonable opportunity to take their proportionate share and from allowing any holder thereof to vote at a corporate meeting. Snelling v. Richard, 166 Fed. 635. 41 Watson v. Huntington, C. C. A., 215 Fed. 472. 42 Jones v. Missouri-Edison EI. Co., C. C. A., 144 Fed. 765. the State appointed upon allegations of mismanagement and misappropriation by its officers, is multifarious; 43 that so is a suit by a corporation for a breach of contract, coupled with claims by individuals, to compel the delivery of stock of the same defendant.44 It has been said that the fact that separate decrees may be requisite in order to afford complete relief does not necessarily make the bill multifarious.45 § 141. Multifariousness by misjoinder of defendants. The Equity Rules of 1912 provide: "If there be more than one defendant the liability must be one asserted against all of the material defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting the causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration of justice."1 This seems to broaden the former rule, which was as follows: No persons could be joined as defendants to a bill in equity who had not a joint or common interest in opposing the relief prayed.2 Different relief might, however, be obtained against different defendants when the bill sought to prevent or annul the effect of acts in pursuance of a common scheme, or so connected with each other as to form part of the same transaction.3 The rule was thus stated by Sir John Leach: "In order to determine whether a suit is multifarious, or, in other words, contains distinct matters, the inquiry is not, as this defendant supposes, whether each defendant is connected with every branch of the cause, but whether the plaintiff's bill seeks relief in respect of matters which are in their nature separate and distinct. If the object of the suit be single, but it happens that different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which arise out of that single object, it necessarily follows that such different persons must be brought before the court, in order that the suit may conclude the whole object."4 43 Emmons v. National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of New York, C. C. A., 135 Fed. 689. 44 Backus v. Brooks, 189 Fed, 922. 45 Neal. v. Rathell, 70 Md. 592; S. C., 17 Atl. 566. $141. 1 Eq. Rule 26. 2 Calvert on Parties, Book I, ch. vii; U. S. v. Alexander, 4 Cranch, C. C. 311. 3 Calvert on Parties, Book I, ch. vii; Manners v. Rowley, 10 Simons, 470. 4 Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Maddock, 138, 146. |