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to my knowledge, ne seems to have been so hackney. ed in crime, so lost to all sense of honour and shaine, that while his faculties still enable him to continue his serdid pursuits, there will be no time for remorsa.

Arnold published at New-York, an address to tho inhabitants of America, and a proclamation to the offi. cers and soldiers of the American ariny. In these publications, he attempted to sow the seeds of disaffection to the governinent among the ritizens, and io al. lure, by the prospect of emolument and promotion, numbers from the ariny to the British standard ; but these publications met with universal indignation and contempt. During the whole period of the revolution. ary war, the infamous Arnold was the only American officer who deserted his banners, and turned his sword against the bosom of bis country.

On the discovery of the defection of Arnold, General Washington strengthened the garrison of West Point, and moved the army to a position to support it, should Sir Henry Clinton make an attempt to carry the post. But although he had acquired a correct knowledge of its works, and was assisted by the advice of Arnold, he was not inclined to hazard the as. sault unaided by plot and stratagem.

The state of tłe army lay perpetually upon thu mind of the Commander in Chief. Not wholly discouraged by former unsuccessful attempts to persuade ('ongress to adopt a permanent military establishment, he embraced the inactive period of this campaign once mor? to address that honourable body on this important subject.

* Colonel Hamilton in a private letter to a friend unfolled the practices to which General WASHINGTON here alludes. “ This man (Arpoid) is in every sense despicable. In addition to the scene of knavery and prostitution during his commaid in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers has un. folded, the history of his command at West Point is a history of little as well as great villanies. fle practised every dirty art of peculation and even stooped to connexions with the sur. lers of the garrison to defraud the publick.”

His letter was dated as early as August, while ex. erting himself to be in readiness

to co-operate with the French troops, and he observed,

“But while we are meditating offensive operations which may either not be undertaken at all, or being undertaken may fail, I am persuaded Congress are not inattentive to the present state of the army,

and wili view in th: same light with me the necessity of providing in time against a period (the first of Jar.uary) when one half of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army that will reinain, will have every motive, except mere patriotism, to abandon the service, without the hope, which has hitherto supported them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and certainiy will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds something more to rest upon. This is a truth of which every spectator of the distress of the army cannot help being convinced. Those at a distance may speculate differently ; but on the spot an opinion to the contrary, judging human nature on the usual scale, would be chimerical.

“ The honourable the Committee of Congress, who have seen and heard for themselves, will add their tes. timony to mine; and the wisdom and justice of Con. gress cannot fail to give it the most serious attention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either the temper or resources of the coun. try will not admit of an alteration, we may expect soon to be redueed to the humilia:ing condition of seoing the cause of America, in America, upheld by foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim to all our confidence, and all our gratitude; but it is neither for the honour of America, nor for the interest of the common cause, to leave the work en. irely to them.”

After assigning his reasons for the opinion thes Great Britain would continue the war he proceeds,

6. The inference from these reflections is, that we cannot count upon a specdy end to the war; and that it is the true policy of America not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give consistency and validity to her measures. An essential step to this will be immediately to devise a plan and put it in cxecution, for providing men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end of the year, ard for subsisting and for making a reasonablo allowance to the officers and soldiers.

“ The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation, and such as will execute itself. Experience has shown that a peremptory draught will be the only efl'ectual one. If a draught for the war or for three years can be effected, it ought to Le made on every ac. count; a shorter period than a year is inadmissible.

“ To one who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description; and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause.

“ Had we formed a permanent army in the begin. nirg, which, ky the continuance of the same men in service, liad been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of mer across the Delaware, in 1776, trembling for the state of Ame. rica, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordi. nary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us ; we should not have been under the necessity of fight. ing at Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall u prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the eno. my, destitute of every thing, in a situation neither to rezist nor to retire ; we should not have seen NewYork left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these states, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them ; we should not have found ourselves this epring so weak as to be insulted by five thousand nien, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance, and a want of enterprise in thu enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferiour to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting oppor. tunities to ruin them, pass unimproved for wart of a force which the country was completely able to afford; to see the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause.

“ There is ovury reason to believe the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, made the successes of the enemy greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes; and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some des cisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would, in all probability, have listened to terms long since. If the army is left in its present situation, it must continuean encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put in a respectable one, it must have a contrary erfect, and nothing i believe will tend more to give us peace the ensuing winter. It will be an interesting winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot, not only for another campaign, but for many campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacifick measures, and enable us to insist upon favourable terms in forcible language

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An army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim, that the surest way to make a good peace, is to be prepared for war."

Congress having at length resolved to new model the army, determined upon the number of regiments of infantry and cavalry, which shou'd compose their military establishment, and apportioned upon the sevoral states their respective quotas. The states were required to raise their men for the war, and to have them in the field by the first of the next January : but provision was made, that if any state should find it impracticable to raise its quota by the first of December, this state might supply the deficiency by men engaged to serve for a period not short of one year.

This arrangement of Congress was subini:ted to the Commander in Chics, and his opinion desired upon it. He in a respectful manner stated his objections to the plan. The number of men contemplated was, he conceived, too small, and he proposed that tne number of privates in each regiment should be increased. In. stead of distinct regiments of cavalry, he recommended legionary corps, that the horse might always be supported by the infantry attached to them. He de. plored the necessity of a dependence on state agency to recruit and support the army, and lamented that Congress had made provision for the deficiency of any state to procure men for the war, to be supplied by temporary draughts; because, he conceived that the states upon the urgent requisition of Congress, would have brought their respective quotas into the field for the war; but tho provision for deficiency being made, their exertions would be weak, and the alternativo generally embraced. He warmly recommended honourable provision for the officers.

The repeated remonstrances of General WashingTON, supportea by the chastisements of experience,

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