hope will ever characterize and mark my conduct, have I complied with your request.

"The only concern I feel upon the occasion, finding how matters stand, is, that, in doing this, I have necessarily been obliged to name a gentleman, who, I am persuaded, (although I never exchanged a word with him upon the subject) thought he was rather doing an act of justice, than committing an act of infidelity; and sure I am, that until Lord Sterling's letter came to my hands, I never knew that General Conway, (whom I viewed in the light of a stranger to you) was a correspondent of yours, much less did I suspect that I was the subject of your confidential letters. Pardon me then for adding, that, so far from conceiving that the safety of the States can be affected, or in the smallest degree injured, by a discovery of this kind, or that I should be called upon in such solemn terms to point out the author, that I considered the information as coming from yourself, and given with a friendly view to forewarn and consequently forearm me, against a se cret enemy, or in other words, a dangerous incendiary, in which character, sooner or later, this country will know General Conway. But, in this, as well as other matters of late, I have found myself mistaken."

In the active period of the last campaign, the Penn sylvanians had been deficient in the support given to General WASHINGTON, yet sore at the loss of their capital, and at the depredation of the enemy in their towns, they murmured that he had not defended them against Sir William Howe, although his force was greatly inferiour to that of the enemy. General Mifflin was then a member of the Legislature of that State. This Legislature being informed that the American army was moving into winter quarters, presented a remonstrance to Congress against the measure, in which unequivocal complaints were contained against the Commander in Chief. This remonstrance was presented at the very time the discovery was

made, that the last rations in the Commissary's stores were issued to the soldiery. General WASHINGTON expressed the feelings of his patriotick and noble mind on this complaint, in a letter addressed to the President of Congress, and written in language which he used on no other occasion.

"Full as I was in my representations of the matters in the Commissary's department yesterday, fresh and more powerful reasons oblige me to add, that I am row convinced beyond a doubt, that unless some great and capital change suddenly takes place in that line, this army must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three things, to starve, dissolve, or disperse in order to obtain subsistence. Rest assured, sir, that this is not an exaggerated picture, and that I have abundant reason to suppose what I say.

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Saturday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy, in force, had left the city and were advancing towards Derby with apparent design to forage, and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I or dered the troops to be in readiness that I might give every opposition in my power; when, to my great mortification, I was not only informed, but convinced, that the men were unable to stir on account of a want of provisions; and that a dangerous mutiny, begun the night before, and which with difficulty was suppressed by the spirited exertions of some officers, was still much to be apprehended from the want of this article

"This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in this camp, and with him, this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not a single hoof of any kind to slaughter, and not more than twenty-five barrels of flour! From hence, form an opinion of our situation, when I add, that he could not tell when to expect any.

"All I could do under these circumstances, was to send out a few light parties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were instantly detached

different ways to collect, if possible, as much provision as would satisfy the present pressing wants of the soldiery; but will this answer? No, sir, three or four days of bad weather would prove our destruction What then is to become of the army this winter? And if we are now as often without provisions as with them, what is to become of us in the spring, when our force will be collected with the aid, perhaps of militia, to take advantage of an early campaign before the enemy can be reinforced?--These are considerations of great magnitude, meriting the closest attention, and will, when my own reputation is so intimately connected with, and to be affected by the event, justify my saying, that the present commissaries are by no means equal to the execution of their office, or that the disaffection of the people is past all belief. The misfortune, however, does in my opinion, proceed from both causes, and though I have been tender heretofore of giving any opinion, or of lodging complaints, as the change in that department took place contrary to my judgment, and the consequences thereof were predicted; yet finding that the inactivity of the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or other essentials, is charged to my account, not only by the common vulgar, but by those in power, it is time to speak plain, in exculpation of myself. With truth then I can declare, that no man, in my opinion, ever had his measures more impeded than I have, by every department of the army. Since the mouth of July, we have had o assistance from the Quarter Master General; and to want of assistance from this department, the Commissary General charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add, that notwithstanding it is a standing order (and often repeated) that the troops shall always have two days' provision by them, that they might be ready at any sudden call; yet scarcely any opportunity has ever offered of taking advantage of the enemy, that has not been either to

tally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this account: and this, the great and crying evil, is not all; soap, vinegar, and other articies allowed by Congress, we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit from a Clothier General, and, at the same time, as a further proof of the inability of an army under the circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of soldiers (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account) we have, by a field return this day made, no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men, now in camp, unfit for duty, because they are barefoot, and otherwise naked. By the same return, it appears, that our whole strength in continental troops (including the eastern brigades which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne) exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp, fit for duty; notwithstanding which, and that since the fourth instant, our number fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone, particularly from the want of blankets, have decreased near two thousand men, we find, gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter quarters or not, (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the remonstrance) reprobating the measure as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks, or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferiour army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which is by no means exaggerated, to confine a superiour one, in all respects well ap pointed, and provided for a winter's campaign, within

the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depreda tion and waste, the states of Pennsylvania, Jersey, &c. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my eyes is, that these very gentlemen, who were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops, from ocular demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than ours, and advised me, ncar a month ago, to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress, for seizing clothes, under strong assurances, that an ample supply would be collected in ten days, agreeably to a decree of the state, not one article of which, bye the bye, is yet come to hand, should think a winter's campaign, and the covering these states from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room, by a good fire side, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow without clothes or blankets: however, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soul, pity those miseries which it is not in my power either to relieve or to prevent."

All these efforts to displace the Commander in Chief were unavailing, and served only to expose their authors to the resentment of the community. He was too well established in the confidence of the army, and of the great body of the nation, to be moved from his elevated, but arduous trust. Even the victorious troops, which served under General Gates, indignantly noticed the attempt to raise him to the place of their beloved General. The resentment of the main army against those, who were known to be the active enemics of General WASHINGTON, was so great, that none of them dared appear in camp: General Conway found it necessary to resign his commission. He afterwards fought a duel with General Cadwallader, VOL. I.

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