tagious or infectious disease, he is liable to a penalty (s. 103); and by sec. 58, that any person keeping on any common or uninclosed land, or in any field insufficiently fenced, or on the side of a highway, any animal so affected, is liable to a similar penalty, unless, in either case, he did not, and could not reasonably have known that the animals were diseased (r). 8 Wrong without damage.-There may, on the other hand, be a wrong done to another, but if it has not caused what the law terms actual legal damage to the plaintiff, there is no tort in respect of which an action is maintainable. Thus, in cases of slander by word of mouth, where the words do not convey any imputation of an indictable offence, there is no cause of action in respect of them, unless the injured party has sustained some pecuniary loss, or has been deprived of some gainful occupation and employment, or has been injured in his trade, occupation, or profession, or means of livelihood, or has lost a marriage by reason of the slander(s). An imputation, for example, by words, however gross, and on an occasion however public, upon the chastity of a modest matron or a pure virgin is not actionable, without proof that it has actually produced special temporal damage to her(t); neither is it actionable to call a man a swindler or a cheat, a blackguard or a rogue, or to say that he is a low fellow, a disgrace to the town, and unfit for decent society, unless it can be proved that actual legal damage has resulted to the plaintiff from the slander(u).

(r) Very extensive powers are also given by the Act to the Privy Council as to the importaation, etc., of foreign animals (ss. 16-21, and schedule 4). See Cullen v. Trimble, L. R., 7 Q. B. 416. But where the owner of sheep having an infectious disease, turns them into his own lot, and thus causes the disease to be communicated to a neighbor's sheep, pastured in an adjoining lot, this will not be deemed such an act of wrong or negligence as to give the latter a legal cause of action for the injury sustained. Fisher v. Clark, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 329. (8) Post, ch. 17, s. 2.

(t) Ld. Wensleydale, Lynch v. Knight, 8 Jur., N. S. (H. L.) 724). 9 H. of L. Ca. 577, S. C. Wilby. Elston, 8 C. B. 142. McQueen v. Fulgham, 27 Texas, 463. Linney v. Meaton, 13 Texas, 449. Underhill v. Welton, 32 Vt. (3 Shaw) 40. See Davies v. Solomon, L. R., 7 Q. B. 112. The rule requiring proof of special damage to support an action of slander for words imputing a want of chastity to a female has never been recognized in some of the States, and has been changed by express statute in most of the others. By the common law of Connecticut, words imputing a want of chastity to a female are actionable per se. Frisbie v. Fowler, 2 Conn. 707. In New York it is provided by statute that an action may be maintained by a female, whether married or single, to recover damages for words spoken imputing unchastity to her, and that it shall not be necessary to allege or prove special damages in order to maintain the action. Laws of New York (1871), ch. 219. A similar rule exists in Alabama. Sidgreaves v. Myatt, 22 Ala. 617; Downing v. Wilson, 36 Ala. 717. In Kentucky, Smalley v. Anderson, 2 Monroe, 56. In Illinois, Spencer v. McMasters, 16 Ill. 405. In Missouri, Moberly v. Preston, 8 Mo. 462; Stieber v. Wensel, 19 Mo. 513. In Ohio, Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio, 319. In Maryland, Terry v. Bright, 4 Md. 430. In Indiana, Shields v. Cunningham, 1 Blackf. 86; Rodgers v. Lacey, 23 Ind. 507. In North Carolina, Snow v. Witcher, 9 Ired. 346. In South Carolina, Freeman v. Price, 2 Bailey, 115. In Iowa, Beardsley v. Bridgman, 17 Iowa, 290; Smith v. Silence, 4 Iowa, 321; Truman v. Taylor, 4 Iowa, 424; Dailey v. Reynolds, 4 Greene (Iowa), 354. In Wisconsin, Ranger v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; and in Georgia, Richardson v. Roberts, 23 Ga. 215.

(u) Savile v. Jardine, Hopwood v. Thorn, Barnett v. Allen, post, ch. 17, s. 2.. Artieta v.

9 If instructions for an action are given, and through the mistake of the attorney a wrong person is sued, and the latter fails to appear and plead, and judgment goes against him by default, and he is imprisoned, or his goods are seized in execution, this is" damnum absque injuriâ,” and no action is maintainable. If he defends the action, and incurs costs which he cannot recover, he is in no better situation(x). 10 Damage too remote to give rise to a cause of action.-If the wrong and the legal damage are not known by common experience to be usually in sequence, and the damage does not, according to the ordinary course of events, follow from the wrong, the wrong and the damage are not sufficiently conjoined or "concatenated as cause and effect to support an action"(y). Thus, a defendant has been held not to be liable either for the wrongful act of a third party, or the arbitrary choice of a fourth party, detrimental to the plaintiff, but not proximately caused by the defendant's wrong(2).

Where the manager of a theatre brought an action against the defendant for a libel on an opera-singer, who had been engaged by him to sing at his theatre, and who had been deterred from singing by reason of the publication of the libel, whereby the plaintiff lost the benefit of her services, it was held that the damage was too remote, and was not recoverable by the plaintiff, for the opera-singer was deterred from singing, not directly in consequence of anything done by the defendant, but in consequence of her fear that what he did might induce somebody else to assault and ill-treat her(a).

11 If the wrong would not have been followed by the damage, if other circumstances had not intervened, for which circumstances the defendant is not responsible, the damage is not the proximate result of the wrong, and is not sufficiently "concatenated" therewith(b). Thus, where the defendant's servant, in breach of an Act of Parliament (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54), washed a carriage in a public street, and allowed the waste water to run down a gutter towards a grating leading to a sewer, but in consequence of the grating being stopped up,. without the knowledge of the defendant, the water flowed over the

Artieta, 15 La. An. 43. Ford v. Johnson, 21 Ga. 399. Chase v. Whitlock, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 139 Idol v. Jones, 2 Dev. 162. Caldwell v. Abby, Hardin, 529.

Acts showing an unlawful intent, but not occasioning actual damage, are no ground for a civil action. Morgan v. Bliss, 2 Mass. 111. Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49. Occum Co. v. Sprague, etc., Co., 34 Conn. 529.

(x) Rolfe, B., Davies v. Jenkins, 11 M. & W. 755.

(y) Ld. Campbell, Gerhard v. Bates, 2 Ell. & Bl. 490.

(z) Vicars v. Wilcox, post, ch. 17.

(a) Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 49.

(b) Hocy v. Felton, 11 C. B., N. S. 146; 31 Law J., C. P. 105; post, p. 18.

road and subsequently froze, and the plaintiff's horse slipped upon the ice and injured himself, it was held that this was a consequence too remote to be attributed to the wrongful act of the defendant. And in actions for slander, where a defendant is proved to have uttered slanderous words in respect of the plaintiff, not imputing to him any indictable offence, and creating a cause of action only in case the utterance of the slander has caused actual legal damage to the plaintiff, and no such damage has accrued to the plaintiff directly from the utterance of the words, and they would have failed to produce any injurious consequences to the plaintiff if they had not been repeated by another person, the injury resulting from the intervention of that other person cannot be visited upon the defendant(c).

12 Damage, though remote, sufficiently connected with the wrong.-The general rule of law, however, is, that whoever does an illegal or wrongful act is answerable for all the consequences that ensue in the ordinary and natural course of events, though those consequences be immediately and directly brought about by the intervening agency of others, provided the intervening agents were set in motion by the primary wrong-doer, or provided their acts, causing the damage, were the necessary or legal and natural consequence of the original wrongful act(cc). Thus, where the defendant threw a lighted squib into the market-house, in a market-place, during a fair, and the squib fell upon a ginger-bread stall, and the stall-keeper, to protect himself and his wares, threw the squib across the market-house, where it fell upon another stall, and was again thrown off and exploded near the plain; tiff's eye and blinded him, it was held that the original thrower was responsible in damages for the injury sustained by the plaintiff, through the intervening agency of the others. "All the injury," observes De Grey, C.J., "was done by the first act of the defendant. That, and all the intervening acts of throwing, must be considered as one single act. It is the same as if a cracker had been flung, which had bounded and rebounded again and again before it had struck out the plaintiff's eye"(d). So, where the defendant, having had a

(c) Ward v. Weeks, Parkins v. Scott, post, ch. 17, s. 2. Sharp v. Powell, L. R., 7 Exch. 253. Olmsted v. Brown, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 657. Slanderous words contained in a letter sent by the defendant to the plaintiff will not sustain an action in the absence of proof of publication. McIntosh v. Matherly, 9 B. Mon. 119.

(cc) Scott v. Hunter, 46 Penn. St. 192. Where an injury to one is caused by, and is the natural and probable result of the wrongful act or omission of another, such other is liable therefor, although other causes put in motion by the act and omission, which in the absence thereof, would not have produced the result, contribute to the injury. Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200.

(d) Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403; 2 W. Bl. 892.

quarrel with a boy in the street, took up a pickaxe, and pursued the boy, and the latter ran for safety into a wine-shop and upset a cask of wine, it was held that the defendant, the pursuer of the boy, was responsible in damages for the loss of the wine(e). "If I ride upon a horse, and J. S. whips the horse so that he runs away with me, and runs over any other person, he who whipped the horse is guilty of the assault and battery, and not I"(f).

13 Wherever a party is guilty of misconduct in leaving anything dangerous in a place, where he must know it to be extremely probable that some other person will unjustifiably set it in motion to the injury of a third person, and that injury is brought about, the sufferer may have redress by action against both the wrong-doers(g), unless he has himself been a co-operative cause of the injury of which he complains, under circumstances which deprive him of a claim to legal redress(h). 14 If the natural result of a wrongful act committed by a defendant has been to plunge the plaintiff into a chancery suit, and thereby to cause him to incur costs and expenses, whatever may be the event of the suit, there is that conjunction of wrong and damage which will give the plaintiff a good cause of action(i). If a seaman, or a passenger on board ship, engages in acts of smuggling, and thereby causes the vessel to be condemned and forfeited, the shipowner is entitled to recover the value of the vessel from the wrong-doer who has caused the loss; and it is no answer to the action to show that the plaintiff's servants on board participated in the illegal transaction(). 15 It is not necessary to show that actual pecuniary damage has been sustained in order to establish that conjunction of damage and wrong which is necessary to create a tort; for a party may be legally damnified although he has sustained no pecuniary loss. "The damage," observes Lord Holt, "is not merely pecuniary, for if a man gets a cuff on the ear from another, though it cost him nothing, no, not so much as a little diachylon, yet he shall have his action, for it is a personal damage." So, a man shall have an action against another for riding

(e) Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio, 464. So, where a person ascended in a balloon, and in descending became so entangled in a neighboring garden as to be obliged to call for help, it was held that he was answerable in trespass for damages done to the garden by persons rushing to his assistance. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 381.

(f) Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. Raym. 38.

(g) Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190. Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29. Thus where a horse left unhitched and unattended in a public street runs away and does damage to the person or property of others, the owner of the horse and the person who caused the animal to become frightened are liable for the damages. McCahil v. Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 413. Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437; post, pp. 23–24,

(h) Earhart v. Youngblood, 27 Penn. St. 331.
(i) Dixon v. Fawcus, 30 Law J., Q. B. 137.
(k) Blewitt v. Hill, 13 East, 14.

over his ground, though it do him no pecuniary injury, for it is an invasion of his property, and the other had no right to come there(l); and if the trespasser wilfully perseveres in trespassing after being warned off, exemplary damages will be recovered(m).

A landowner who starts a pheasant on his own land, and shoots the bird whilst it is flying over the adjoining land of his neighbor commits a trespass if he goes on such adjoining land to pick it up; and if he carries the dead bird away with him, he would now probably be held guilty of another tort, and liable to an action for the conversion to his own use of the dead bird as well as for the original trespass(n).

Every unauthorized interference by one man with the goods and chattles and personal property of another constitutes a tort, and gives rise to a cause of action, although no pecuniary damage may be sustained(o). If a man, without having any legal authority to excuse or justify the act, writes any remarks or observations upon a cab-driver's licence, or upon another man's certificate of character or good conduct, he is guilty of a tort, and is responsible in damages, although no pecuniary loss has been incurred(p).

Damages are recoverable from a person who takes up tombstones from a churchyard, and defaces the inscriptions, for although the freehold of the churchyard is in the parson, the property in the tombstones remains in the persons who erect them(q).

16 Every injury to a right imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing(r), for wherever the plaintiff establishes some legal right or title in himself which has been invaded, weakened, or destroyed by the unlawful or malicious act of the defendant, there is a wrong and damage in law resulting therefrom, in respect of which an

(7) Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955. Sears v. Lyons, 2 Stark, 318. It is no bar to an action for a constantly recurring wrongful act that present damages resulting therefrom may not be susceptible of proof. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Torrey, 33 Penn. St. 143. And it has been held that a person may maintain an action of trespass for an unauthorized entry upon his land, not only when the act constituting the trespass resulted in no actual damage, but even when it was positively beneficial. Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288. Post, ch. 6.

(m) Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 441. See Perkins v. Towle, 43 N. H. 220; Devaughn v. Heath, 37 Ala. 595; Wylie v. Smitherman, 8 Ired. 286; Mitchell v. Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391; Pierce v. Hall, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 142. Post, ch. 6, s. 3; ch. 22, s. 1, DAMAGES.

(n) Osbond v. Meadows, 12 C. B., N. S. 10; 31 Law J., C. P. 281; M. C. 238. Blades v. Higgs, 34 L. J., C. P. 286. See post, ch. 7, s. 3. Kenyon. Hart, 34 Law J., M. C. 87.

(0.) Post, ch. 7, s. 1. Wintringham v. Lafoy, 7 Cow. 735; Stevens v. Somerindyke, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 418; Dudley v. Tilton, 14 La. An. 283; Dexter v. Cole, 6 Wis. 319.

(p) Rogers v. Macnamara, 14 C. B. 37; 23 Law J., C. P. 1.

(g) Spooner v. Brewster, 3 Bing. 139. Frances v. Ley, Cro. Jac. 367. As to tombstones in a private cemetery, see Ashby v. Harris, L. R., 3 C. P. 523.

(r) Bonomi v. Backhouse, Ell. Bl. & Ell. 657. Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym.