THE conclusion of the war gave a new direction to the public mind. Congress for a time withdrew its attention from a provision for the debt, and from the urgent claims of the army. A discussion of the merits and obligation of the provisional treaty, of the conduct of the commissioners, and of the measures consequent to it proper to be taken, chiefly occupied their care.

The influence exerted by Hamilton in determining the subsequent policy of the United States towards other nations, and the decisive bearing which that policy had both on the fortunes of this Republic, and upon his fortunes, indicate the necessity of a retrospect of some of the leading circumstances which mark the character of its early diplomacy.

It is a painful fact in the history of almost every struggle for national freedom, that the oppressed party has been compelled, as an equivalent for the aids it has received, to sacrifice a part of the independence for which it was contending, either by direct stipulations of advantage to its ally, or by the more injurious because more enduring consequences of popular feeling, in which hatred of an enemy produces too strong bias to a friend.

That which is not wrested from dependence, is claimed as the due concession of gratitude; a claim, which those

who aspire to lead the public sentiment are too ready to encourage, and which the friends of a lofty national character find it difficult to resist. This evil would be greater and more apparent in the history of the United States, as theirs was an alliance with an absolute government, which could feel no sympathies with the principles of the American controversy, against a nation in whose constitution, laws, and morals, those principles had their source and growth. The story is full of interest.

The eighteenth century opened with the throes that gave birth to this American empire.

The wise policy which maintained peace between England and France during thirty years, had given time to the commercial spirit to develop its power. The successes of Spain and the prosperity of the United Provinces had invited those great rival nations to more remote fields of enterprise, and each was seen occupied in rendering the continents of Asia and America tributary to its wealth. This spirit did not permit the interruption of that peace to be of long duration, and a promise of repose was given by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, concluded between France, England, Austria, Spain, Sardinia, the United Provinces, Modena, and Genoa, in seventeen hundred and forty-eight.

Comprehensive as were the terms of this pact, the claim of England to navigate the seas bounding South America, denied by Spain, though the cause of their recent hostilities, was not mentioned; and the disputed limits of England and France in Northern America were not settled.

France, seeing that the protracted debate of these limits must end in war, formed a defensive alliance with Austria, jealous of the designs of Prussia, on the first of May, seventeen hundred fifty-six, which was followed, VOL. II-26

eighteen days after, by a declaration of war against her on the part of England.

Mutual dangers and apprehensions gave rise to the "Family compact" between the different branches of the House of Bourbon in sixty-one, and two years later the Peace of Paris was made. France then renounced her title to Canada and New Scotland, ceding Louisiana to Spain, as a soothing equivalent for her cession of the Floridas to England, the more readily assented to because of the restoration of Cuba.

Worsted in arms and sore under her wounds, France now sought by her diplomacy to extend her influence, and to check that of her insular neighbor. England had, in the person of Poniatowski, placed in the hands of Russia an instrument to subject Poland to her views. France, disappointed in not raising the Prince of Conti to its throne, excited Turkey to a war with Russia. To make a diversion in favor of the Turks, she exerted her influence in Sweden, and by a revolution in its government, rescued it from the control of England and of Russia, and rejoiced in the increased power of Gustavus as an efficient ally. Russia prosecuted her designs, the policy of an hundred years, to the partition of Poland, for which France, failing to prevent it, consoled herself with the hope that it would prove a fruitful subject of contention between the despoiling powers.

Two years after this event, in seventeen hundred and seventy-four, Louis the Fifteenth died, and, in the midst of various intrigues, his successor ascended the throne of France, born with defects and virtues, to precipitate the ruin of her ancient massive monarchy.

In the selection of his cabinet, Louis the Sixteenth confided the charge of its foreign affairs to an individual who had been the most effective instrument of his prede

cessor in the mysteries of his complicated policy-Gravier de Vergennes.

The nominal chief of the cabinet was Philippeaux de Maurepas, who had served as Minister of Marine from seventeen hundred twenty-five to seventeen hundred forty-nine, when he was exiled on the suspicion of having satyrized the Marchioness de Pompadour.* Light and yielding, a politician and a man of pleasure, he had been indicated to Louis by his father as meriting especial confidence. Under this advice, Maurepas was appointed, at the age of sixty-three, Minister of State. His age and pliability commended him to the weakness of the monarch, not unwilling to be released from the fixed policy of his predecessors, while the levity of the minister gave him up to those who made a mockery of life. Thus Beaumarchais, a profligate wit, finally obtained possession of him. The actual conduct of the exterior affairs was in Vergennes. Paternal advice also prompted the selection. of him, as a man "loving order, wise, and capable in the conduct of affairs on good principles." A native of ‡ Dijon, he first gave proof of his talent in the family of his distinguished relation, Chavigny, the ambassador to Portugal. On the institution of a body of secret correspondence, he was numbered next in importance to the Prince of Conti and the Duke of Broglio. When George the Second sought at a congress convened at Hanover to elect a king of the Romans, Vergennes was commissioned to defeat him, in which he was successful, extorting the commendation of his discomfited opponents.

Choiseul, bold, impulsive, disinterested, whose vision was filled with the grandeur of France, and whose loss of power was owing to the arts of an abandoned woman,

* Flassan, vi. 110.

+ Capef. i. 184.

Ibid. 180.

and the not less insidious practice of the Jesuits, selected him to win and to guide the confidence of the Porte. Here he again succeeded. French officers were placed in command of its soldiers, and when recalled, the Divan declared their warm regrets, and the protected commerce of the French tendered him a sword of gold. “I have fulfilled the orders of my king," Vergennes told Choiseul. "War is declared against Russia. I return you the three millions of secret service money, of which I had no need."

After two years' retirement on his estates in Burgundy, he was again sought to perform an eminent service. Sweden was to be secured to France. He repaired to Stockholm, and when Gustavus hesitated, Vergennes told him "To-morrow-to-morrow, you must begin the revolution-to-morrow, sir, or all is lost." "To-morrow," answered Gustavus, and the revolution was accomplished. Such was the adroit and resolute minister before whom, on his entrance into the cabinet, opened the portentous beginnings of the American Revolution.

The force of public opinion, claiming freedom of commerce in the necessaries of life, an abolition of the privileged corporations of trade, and of the many various restrictions upon industry, placed by his side as Minister of Marine, Turgot-soon after appointed Comptrollergeneral, the leader of the new sect called, Economists. Favored by Maurepas, he was approved to Louis by the assurance that his system would insure to France “internal tranquillity-consideration abroad-the happiness of the nation." To promote these ends, he exerted his great abilities with little caution as to its domestic interests, and with much hesitation, lest it should affect his system, as to its external policy.

* Flassan, vi. 62, 63.