was not able to conclude its labors, and make a report after an investigation of a whole session, it was the strongest proof which could be adduced of the necessity of appointing this committee at the present session of Congress. As to the Committee on the Expenditures of the Executive Departments taking charge of this subject of the expenditures made in this service, he took it to be entirely out of the province of their duties, as their business, so far as he understood, was merely to take charge of the expenditures connected with the administration of the Departments. When he had the honor of being at the bead of one of those Departments, reports on expenditures related merely to the expenditures connected with the Department, and no notice was ever taken of the expenditures connected with our foreign affairs. Of late years, however, he believed these committees seldom took upon themselves to make any inquiries into the condition of the Departments at all; and, in support of this, he instanced that the chairman of one of those committees, at a late session, had asserted on the floor than he did not even know who were members of the committee, it never having been called together.

Mr. A. then proceeded to make some comments upon the composition of the military committee, as regarded its political and geographical organization. He could not account for the fact of there being eight members on that committee from the southern and western States, while there was but one from the northern and eastern States, unless it was because the whole benefits of the army of the United States accrued to the people of the South and West. The whole military array of the United States was not of the slightest pecuniary benefit to his constituents, and he did not know how the gentleman from South Carolina, in his eye, (Mr. Thompson,) could reconcile this expenditure of seven or eight millions of dollars in Florida with the frequent asserti ns he had made on this floor that the whole expenditures of the Government flowed to the North and East.

At this stage of the proceedings, on motion of Mr. CAMBRELENG, the House proceeded to the orders of the day.

The Senate "bill to regulate the fees of district attorneys in certain cases" was taken up, ordered to a third reading, and then read a third time and passed.

DIVORCE BANKS BILL.

On motion of Mr. CAMBRELENG, the House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, (Mr. SMITH in the Chair.)

The first business in order, being the "bill for adjusting the remaining claims upon the late deposite banks."

Mr. PICKENS said he felt bound to move that the committee resume the consideration of the "divorce bill," which was agreed to-ayes 105, noes 35.

The bill was then taken up, the question pending being on the amendment or substitute for the whole bill submitted by Mr. GARLAND of Virginia.

Mr. HOFFMAN gave his reasons at length against the bill.

Mr. HUNTER, of Virginia, followed in reply, and in support of the bill.

Mr. MASON, of Virginia, gave the reasons which would constrain him to vote against the bill, regarding it, as he did, as an entire departure from those principles which were put forth by the late administration, and eagerly and warmly advocated by the people of the country, before whom those principles were promulged.

Mr. M. spoke till the time arrived for the House to take its usual recess, from half past two till four o'clock, p. m.

like gentlemen who advocated this bill to say what they would next resort to, in case it failed, for fail it must. In his opinion, it could never be carried out. In that case, he did not know to what they could resort, unless they went to the Treasury to make a circulation, or threw themselves into the arms of a national bank. It was for that reason he wished to oppose the present bill, for he was convinced that if an issue of Treasury notes did not effect relief, nothing else would.

Mr. ROBERTSON gave notice, that at a proper time he would offer an amendment, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to deposite the public money in such banks as chose to receive it, for a fair compensation, as a special deposite, and without discounting on or using the same.

Mr. R. made some remarks in support of his proposed amendment. He contended that the fatal objection to the bill was, the temptation public officers would be under to speculate on the money in their possession.

Mr. GARLAND thought it his duty to make some remarks on the amendment he had proposed. After replying to some arguments of his colleague in relation to the Virginia banks, he adverted to the present bill. He was sure the Government would never prosper when divorced from the banks, between whom and the people there still existed a matrimonial connection. It was his opinion that, in less than eighteen months after the passage of this measure, the Government would seek to re-unite itself with the banks. The relief now proposed to the people in lieu of the State banks, reminded him of a certain criminal, who, when on his way to the gallows, was offered a reprieve on condition of his marrying an ugly, wrinkled old woman. The man, after a moment's reflection, exclaimed:

"A sentence hard you do impart;

The woman's worse-drive on the cart." And thus prefered hanging to a wedding on such terms. So the sentence was more preferable to the people than the system now proposed. The object of the divorce bill was to take the money from banks and to deposite it with sub-agents. But in his opinion, taking into consideration the frailties of human nature, it would be a dangerous scheme. He did not mean to say that the officers of Government had less integrity than other men; but when the lamentable instances were called to mind where individuals of high standing had sacrificed an unblemished character for a mere paltry amount, it ought to teach a lesson to guide them in the present instance. He would repeat the words of his colleague this morning, who had said even the words of our Savior were, "lead us not into temptation." He advocated the plan of keeping the money in the vaults of the banks, as more secure, and particularly if the amendment last offered were adopted, which provides that the banks shall receive the money as a special deposite, and without using it in any way whatever. He denied that the banks were insolvent, as had been stated. He had been informed on unquestionable authority, that they were as sound now as before they suspended specie payment. As regarded the proposed separation, he had always understood that our system of Government, although necessarily divided into many branches, was all one. But now they talked of a separation from those institutions of which the States had laid the foundation, and which they had cherished to this time. How fearful would be that time, should it ever occur, when this Government should consider it as its duty to make its action in lependent of the States! He did not say that gentlemen designed this, but he would entreat them to reflect whether the present measure would not pave the way for such a state of things. The true policy of Government was to cement itself more closely with the States, and he had no doubt, but that the issue of Treasury notes would speedily afford relief, and enable the banks to resume specie payments. It had been said that these notes would lay the foundation of a Treasury bank, but he had no apprehension of that kind, for the restrictions to that bill would render such a result impossible. He contended that the bank note system had not had a fair trial, and referred to the Bank of France, and other institu

tions, in support of his position. At the conclusion of his remarks,

On motion of Mr. HAYNES, the committee rose and reported the bill to the House, without coming to any resolution thereon; when,

On notion of Mr. BRIGGS, the House adjourned.

IN SENATE.

THURSDAY, October 12, 1837.

Mr. WEBSTER presented a large number of memorials from several of the eastern States, in relation to the annexation of Texas, which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. WILLIMS presented memorials relating to the same.

Mr. McKEAN presented memorials relating to the same.

Mr. SWIFT presented memorials relating to the same; these petitions were severally ordered to lic on the table.

Mr. WEBSTER introduced the following res›lution, which was agreed to:

Resolved, That the President be requested to communicate to the Senate, carly after the opening of the next session of Congress, copies of the instructions given to our Charge d'Affairs at the Hague, (if not inconsistent with the public interests,) relative to the seizure and sequestration, of the ship Mary and cargo belonging to Baltimore, by the Dutch Government at the island of Curracoa, during the year 1800, also, copies of communications which may have been received from our said Charge d'Affairs at the Hague, to the Secretary of State, which may show the reasons assigned by the Dutch Government for so long refusing to restore to citizens of the United States their lawful property.

BANKRUPT LAW AGAINST BANKS.

Mr. GRUNDY moved that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from the further consideration of so much of the President's Message as related to the bankrupt law.

On this motion:

Mr. BENTON rose and said: The recommendation of the President for a bankrupt law, applicable to banks and bankers, has been made the subject of repeated animadversion on this floor, and that while the subject was not before the Senate, but in the hands of a committee. I noticed these animadversions on a former occasion, not for argument, but for the purpose of exhibiting their unparliamentary character; to dissent from their justness; to express my own approbation of the recommendation; and to declare myself ready to support it, whenever it could be done in a parliamentary manner, and without obliquing into a discussion foreign to the subject in hand. The suitable occasion now presents itself; and I embrace it with pleasure, that the great remedial measure proposed by the Pres!❤ dent, and called for by the rights and interests of the people, and by the character of the country, may not be prejudiced by the unparliamentary and precocious assaults which have been made upon it.

At the head of those who have made the attack on this part of the Message, and whose objections cover all the ground which has since been occu⚫ pied by others, is the Senator from Massachusetts, who delivered his sentiments on the Treasury note bill, (Mr. Webster.) That Senator spoke briefly, but comprehensively, against this Executive recommendation. He presented all the points which others have since elaborated. In answering him, I answer all. His objections were particularly noted as he delivered them; but I find the substance of what he said so accurately condensed in one of the reports, that I think it the part of fairness to drop my own notes, and to have recourse to that report for the text of the observations which I propose to make. This is the report:

"Now, Mr President, it is certainly true that the Constitu tion authorizes Congress to establish uniform rules on the subject of bankruptcies; but it is equally true, and abundantly manifest, that this power was not granted with any reference to currency questions is a general power--a power to make uniform rules on the subjet. How is it possible that such a power can be fairly exercised by seizing on corporations and bankers, but excluding all the other usual subjects of bank rupt lairs? Besides, do such laws ordinarily extend to corpo rations at all? But suppose they might be so extended by a bankrupt law enacted for the usual purposes contemplated by

ench laws, how can a law be defended which embraces them and bankers alone?

"How do the President's suggestions conform to his notions of the Constitution? The object of bankrupt laws, sir, has no relation to currency It is simply to distribute the effects of insolvent debtors among their creditors; and I must say, it strikes me that it would be a great perversion of the power conferred on Congress, to exercise it upon corporations and bankers, with the leading and primary object of remedying a depreciated paper currency.

"And this appears the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the President is of opinion that the general subject of the currency is not within our province. Bankruptcy, in its common and just meaning, is within our province. Currency, says the Message, is not. But we have a bankruptcy power in the Constitution, and we will use this power, not for bankruptcy, indeed, but for currency. This, I confess, sir, appears to me to be the short statement of the matter. I would not do the Message, or its author, any intentional injustice, nor create any apparont where there was not a real inconsistency; but I declare, in all sincerity, that I cannot reconcile the proposed use of the bankrupt power with those opinions of the Message which respect the authority of Congress over the currency of the country."

These are the objections which the Senator from Massachusetts takes to the Executive recommendation. They are of a two-fold character: first; to the constitutional power of Congress to pass a bankrupt law, confined to moneyed corporations and bankers, and with a view to operate upon the paper currency; secondly, to the consistency of the President in having made such a recommendation.

I take up the second of these objections first, because it creates a prejudice against the whole recommendation of the President. The imputation of inconsistency creates a prejudice; and it is necessary to remove that prejudice. before the recommendation can be fairly considered. The inconsistency imputed, lies in the supposed disclaimer of the President of all federal authority over the currency, and then, an assumption of power to regulate that currency, and to regulate it by an unauthorized exercise of the power to pass bankrupt laws. This is the point of the imputed inConsistency. It all turns upon this word currency; and now, what currency does the Senator from Massachusetts mean? Certainly not the currency of the Constitution; for the President recites the power to coin that currency, and to regulate its value. It must be the paper currency-the local bank notes and the shin-plasters-which are intended; and, if so, I have to remark that the President very explicitly disclaims both the authority, and the expedieney, of having recourse to a national bank to regulate that species of currency. He disclaims that instrument of regulation; and in doing so, he stands upon the Constitution, which disowns its existence; upon the fact, which shows its impotency; and upon the ground which the authors of the first national bank occupied, and to whom the regulation of currency and of exchanges was wholly unknown as among the reasons for its creation. These reasons are of modern conception and recent date. They are an after-thought of the subsequent supporters of the second national bank. The President disclaims also a power to suppress the local banking institutions by federal legislation; but he no where disclaims the authority to prevent their paper issues from superseding and expelling the hard money currency of the Constitution. On the contrary, he claims that power, and points to the sources of its rightful exercise in the incidental effects of federal legislation in favor of hard money as necessarily improving the condition of paper currency; and then he points to the bankrupt power as furnishing the direct means of checking the issues of nonspecie paying banks, and giving a remedy to the holders of their unpaid notes. This is what the President does; and nothing can be further from his words than a disclaimer of all authority over the regulation of enrrency. And here let me remark upon a systematic error into which some Senators incessantly fall: they always speak of the federal authority, and the federal duties over "the currency," meaning all the while, not gold and silver, but bank notes and shin-plasters. Now, sir, I repeat, for about the thousandth time, that the word currency is not in the Constitution, nor any word whatsover which can mean what these speakers intend by it. The n'arest approach to the term which the Constitution contains, is the word current, and that is coupled with the word coin; so that the thing which gentlemen have constantly in their minds, and which they use an equivocal term

to express, exists no where in the Constitution, and is not in any way known to that instrument, either by expression, or intendiment. I think it right, on this occasion, thus to allude to the equivocal use of this phrase; for upon this equivocation there is built up, in these United States, an immensity of erroneous speaking, erroneous writing, and erroneons legisla ion. Vast is the number of persons who are mystified by the use of an equivocal term; and in nothing does the rhetorician show the perfection of his art in a higher degree, than in making a del ate turn upon one of them.

The Senator from Massachusetts, in taking his objections, declared that he would not do intentional injustice to the Message or to its author; but it is the same thing to the Message, and to the author, if injustice had been done without intention; and this I apprehend to have been the case. The Message says nothing about confining the bankrupt law to corpoations and bankers alone; it says nothing about excluding merchants and traders from the operation of the law; and it proposes something else to result from the law, besides an operation upon curJency; and that something else is a remedy to the disappointed creditors of the delinquent banks. This is his recommendation:

In the mean time, it is our duty to provide all the remedies. against a depreciated paner currency which the Constitution enables us to afford. The Treasury Department, on several former occasions, has suggested the propriety and importance of a uniform law concerning bankruptcies of corporations and other bankers. Through the instrumentality of such a law, a salutary check may doubtless he imposed on the issues of paper money, and an effectual remedy given to the citizen, in a way at once equal in all parts of the Union, and fully authorized by the Constitution."

This is the recommendation-the whole of it; and here is no proposition to exclude merchants and traders; and here is an actual proposition to give a remedy to the injured citizens against the delinquent banks; which remedy would naturally be a pro rata distribution of the effects of the bankrupt institutions. Here, then, is injustice to the Message, in not stating it as it is, but as it is not; and here, also, is injustice to the author, in representing him as opposed to the extension of the bankrupt law to merchants and traders, when the records of this Senate bear the evidence of the fact that he has been one of the most able and zealous supporters of such a law applicable to the trading part of the community. I speak of the bill of 1827, brought in by General Hayne, of South Carolina, and earnestly supported by the present Chief Magistrate, then a member of this body. It is unjust to suppose that the present Chief Magistrate would object to a bill which should include now those for whom he so strenuously contended when a member of this body: there is nothing in the recommendation to deter the friends of a general bankrupt law from coming forward to include the trading class with the banking class; on the contrary, there may be something to encourage them. A general bill to include banks, as well as traders, might combine more support than the bills for the latter class alone have heretofore received. Besides, if the President had expressly recommended the exclusion of other classes from the bill, it would have been no impediment to the action of Congress. His recommenda. tion would have been no prohibition upon their powers. They might have included what classes they pleased; and if they included those for which he contended in 1827 the bill might have become the more acceptable to him on that account.

The Senator from Massachusetts objects to our constitutional power to pass such a bankrupt law as the President recommends, qualifying that recommendation, as he does, with a limitation of the law to bankers and banking corporations, and with a primary view to the regulation of a paper money currency. I have shown that this qualification is an error and a mistake; and in doing that, I have sufficiently answered the Senator's objection; but I choose to go further, and to show not only the constitutional right, but the clear expediency, of passing such an act as the President recommends, whether merchants and traders shall be included in it or not.

The power of Congress to pass bankrupt laws is expressly given in our Constitution, and given without limitation or qualification. It is the fourth in the number of the enumerated powers, and rans

thus: "Congress shall have power-to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." This is a full and clear grant of power. Upon its face it admits of no question, and leaves Congress at full liberty to pass any kind of bankrupt laws they please, limited only by the condition, that whatever laws are passed, they are to be uniform in their operation throughout the United States. Upon the face of our own Constitution there is no question of our right to pass a bankrupt law, lin.ited to banks and bankers; but the Senator from Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster,) and others who have spoken on the same side with him, must carry us to England, and conduct us through the labyrinth of English statute law, and through the chaos of English judicial decisions, to learn what this word bankruptcies, in our Constitution, is intended to signify. In this he, and they, are true to the habits of the legal profession-those habits which, both in Great Britain and our America, have become a proverbial disqualification for the proper exercise of legislative duties. I know, Mr. President, that it is the fate of our lawyers and judges to have to run to British law books to find out the meaning of the phrases contained in our Constitution; but it is the business of the legislator, and of the statesman, to take a larger view-to consider the difference between the political institutions of the two countries-to ascend to first principles-to know the causes of events and to judge how far what was suitable and beneficial to one, might be prejudicial and inapplicable to the other. We stand here as legislators and statesmen, not as lawyers and judges; we have a grant of power to execute, not a statute to interpret; and our first duty is to look to that grant, and see what it is; and our next duty is to look over our country, and see whether there is any thing in it which requires the exercise of that grant of power. This is what our President has done, and what we ought to do. He has looked into the Constitution, and seen there an unlimited grant of power to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies; and he has looked over the United States, and seen what he believes to be fit subjects for the exercise of that power, namely, about a thousand banks in a state of bankruptcy, and no State possessed of authority to act beyond its own limits in remedying the evils of a mischief so vast and so frightful. Seeing these two things—a power to act, and a subject matter requiring action-the President has recommended the action which the Constitution permits, and which the subject requires; but the Senator from Massachusetts has risen in his place, and called upon us to shift our view; to transfer our contemplation-from the Consitution of the United States to the British statute book-from actual bankruptcy among ourselves to historical bankruptcy in England; and to confine our legislation to the characteristics of the English model.

As a general proposition, I lay it down that Congress is not coufined, like jurists and judges, to the English statuory definitions, or the Nisi Prius, or King's Bench, construction of the phrases known to English legislation, and used in our Constitution. Such a limitation would not only narrow us down to a mere lawyer's view of a subject, but would limit us, in point of time, to English precedents, as they stood at the adoption of our Constitution, in the year 1789. I protest against this absurdity, and contend that we are to use our granted powers according to the circumstances of our own country, and according to the genius of our republican institutions, and according to the progress of events, and the expansion of light and knowledge among ourselves. If not, and if we are to be confined to the "usual objects," and the "usual subjects," and the "usual purposes" of British legislation at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, how could Congress ever make a law in relation to steamboats, or to railroad cars? both of which were unknown to British legislation in 1789, and, therefore, according to the idea that would send us to England to find out the meaning of our Constitution, would not fall within the limits of our legislative authority. Upon their face, the words of the Constitution are sufficient to justify the President's re

25TH CONG..........1ST SESS.

BY BLAIR & RIVES.

[Continued from No. 8.] commendation, even as understood by those who impugn that recommendation. The bankrupt clause is very peculiar in its phraseology, and the more strikingly so from its contrast with the phraseology of the naturalization clause which is coupled with it. Mark this difference: there is to be an uniform rule of naturalization; there are to he uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. One is in the singular, the other in the plural; one is to be a rule, the other are to be laws; one acts on individuals, the other on the subject; and it is bankruptcies that are, and not bankruptcy that is, to be the objects of these uniform laws.

As a proposition, now limited to this particular case, I lay it down that we are not confined to the modern English acceptation of this term bankrupt; for it is a term, not of English, but of Roman origin. It is a term of the civil law, and borrowed by the English from that code. They borrowed from Italy both the name, and the purpose of the law; and also the first objects to which the law was applicable, The English were borrowers of every thing connected with this code; and it is absurd in us to borrow from a borrower-to copy from a copyist-when we have the original lender, and the original text before us. Bancus and ruptus signifies a broken bank; and the word broken is not metaphorical but literal, and is descriptive of the ancient method of cashiering an insolvent, or fraudulent banker, by turning him out of the exchange, or market place, and breaking the table to pieces on which he kept his money and transacted his business. The term bankrupt, then, in the civil law from which the English borrowed it, not only applied to bankers, but was confined to them; and it is preposterous in us to limit ourselves to an English definition of a civil law term.

Upon this exposition of our own Constitution, and of the civil law derivation of this term bankrupt, I submit that the Congress of the United States is not limited to the English judicial or statutory acceptation of the term; and so I finish the first point which I took in the argument. The next point is more comprehensive, and makes a direct issue with the proposition of the Senator from Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster.) His proposition is, that we must confine our bankrupt legislation to the usual objects, the usual subjects, and the usual purposes of bankrupt laws in England; and that currency (meaning paper money, and shin-plasters of course,) and banks, and banking, are not within the scope of that legislation. I take issue, sir, upon all these points, and am ready to go with the Senator to England, and to contest them, one by one, on the evidences of English history, of English statute law, and of English judicial decision. I say English; for, although the Senator did not mention England, yet he could meau nothing else, in his reference to the usual objects, usual subjects, and usual purposes of bankrupt laws. He could mean nothing else. He must mean the English examples, and the English practice, or nothing; and he is not a person to speak, and mean nothing.

Protesting against this voyage across the high seas, I, nevertheless, will make it, and will ask the Senator on what act, out of the scores which Parliament has passed upon this subject, or on what period, out of the five hundred years that she has been legislating upon it, will he fix for his example? or, whether he will choose to view the whole together? and out of the vast chaotic and heterogeneous mass, extract a general power which Parliament possesses, and which he proposes for our exemplar? For myself, I am agreed to consider the question under the whole, or under either of these aspects, and, relying on the goodness of the cause, expect a safe deliverance from the contest, take it in any way.

And first, as to the acis passed upon this subject; great is their number, and most dissimilar their provisions. For the first two hundred years, these acts applied to none but aliens, and a single class f aliens, and only for a single act, that of flying

the realm to avoid their creditors. Then they were made to apply to all debtors, whether natives or foreigners, engaged in trade or not, and took effect for three acts: 1st. Flying the realm; 2d. Keeping the house to avoid creditors; 3d. taking sanctuary in a church to avoid arrest. For upwards of two hundred years to be precise, for two hundred and twenty-years-bankruptcy was only treated criminally, and directed against those who would not face their creditors, or abide the laws of the land; and the remedies against them were not civil, but criminal; it was not a distribution of the effects, but corporal punishment, to wit: imprisonment and outlawry.* The statute of Elizabeth was the first that confined the law to merchants and traders, took in the unfortunate as well as the criminal, extended the acts of bankruptcy to inability, as well as to disinclination to pay, discriminated between innocent and fraudulent bankruptcy, and gave to creditors the remedial right to a distribution of effects. This statute opened the door to judicial construction, and the judges went to work to define by decisions, who were traders, and what acts constituted the fact, or showed an intent, to delay or to defraud creditors. In making these decisions, the judges reached high enough to get hold of royal companies, and low enough to get hold of shoemakers; the latter up on the ground that they bought the leather out of which they made the shoes; and they even had a most learned consultation to decide whether a man who was a landlord for dogs, and bought dead horses for his four-legged boarders, and then sold the skins and bones of the horse carcases he had bought, was not a trader within the meaning of the act, and so subject to the statute of bankrupts. These decisions of the judges set the Parliament to work again to preclude judicial constructions by the precision, negatively and affirmatively, of legislative enactment. But, worse and worse! Out of the frying pan into the fire. The more legislation the more construction; the more statutes Parliament made, the more numerous and the more various the judicial decisions; until, besides merchants and traders, near forty other descriptions of persons were included, and the catalogue of bankruptcy acts, innocent or fraudulent, is swelled to a length which requires whole pages to contain it. Among those who are now included by statutory enactment in England, leaving out the great classes comprehended under the names of merchants and traders, are bankers, brokers, factors, and scriveners; insurers against perils by sea and land; warehousemen,, wharfingers, packers, builders, carpenters, shipwrights and victuallers; keepers of inns, hotels, taverns and coffee-houses; dyers, printers, bleachers, fullers, calenderers, sellers of cattle or sheep; commission merchants and consignees; and the agents of all these classes. These are the affirmative definitions of the classes liable to bankruptcy in England; then come the negative; and among these are farmers, graziers, and common laborers for hirc; the receivers general of the king's taxes, and members or subscribers to any incorporated companies established by charter of act of Parliament. And among these negative and affirmative exclusions and inclusions, there are many classes which have repeatedly changed position, and found themselves successively in and out of the bankrupt code. Now, in all this mass of variant and contradictory legislation, what part of it will the Senator from Massachusetts seleet for his model? The improved and approved parts, to be sure! But here a barrier presents itself -an impassable wall interposes-a veto power intervenes. For it so happens that the improvements in the British bankrupt code, those parts of it which are considered best, and most worthy of our imita

• Preamble to the act of 34th of HENRY VIII. "Whereas divers and sundry persons craftily obtained into their hands great substance of other inen's goods, do sudderly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any of their creditors, their debts and duties, but at their own wills and own pleasures consume the substance obtained by credit of other men, for their own pleasures and delicate living, against all reason, equi y, and good conscience."

tion, are of modern origin-the creations of the last fifty years-actually made since the date of our Constitution; and, therefore, not within the pale of its purview and meaning. Yes, sir, made since the establishment of our Constitution, and, therefore, not to be included within its contemplation, unless this doctrine of searching into British statutes for the meaning of our Constitution, is to make us search forwards to the end of the British empire, as well as search backwards to its beginning. Fact is, that the actual bankrupt code of Great Britain-the one that preserves all that is valuable, that consolidates all that is preserved, and improves all that is improvable, is an act of most recent date-of the reign of George the Fourth, and not yet a dozen years old. Here, then, in going back to England for a model, we are cut off from her improvements in the bankrupt code, and confined to take it as it stood under the reign of the Plantagenets, the Stuarts, and the earlier reigns of the Brunswick sovereigns. This should be a consideration, and sufficiently weighty to turn the scale in favor of looking to our own Constitution alone for the extent and circumscription of our powers.

But let us continue this discussion upon principles of British example and British legislation. We must go to England for one of two things; either for a case in point, to be found in some statute, or a general authority, to be extracted from a general practice. Take it either way, or both ways, and I am ready and able to vindicate, upon British precedents, our perfect right to enact a bankrupt law, limited in its application to banks and bankers. And first, for a case in point, that is to say, an English statute of bankruptcy, limited to these lords of the purse-strings: we have it at once, in the first act ever passed on the subjectthe act of the 30th year of the reign of Edward the Third, against the Lombard Jews. Every body knows that these Jews were bankers, usually formed into companies, who, issuing from Venice, Milan, and other parts of Italy, spread over the south and west of Europe, during the middle ages, and established themselves in every country and city in which the dawn of reviving civilization, and the germ of returning industry, gave employment to money, and laid the foundation of credit. They came to London as early as the thirteenth century, and gave their name to a street which still retains it, as well as it still retains the particular occupation, and the peculiar reputation, which the Lombard Jews established for it. The first law against bankrupts ever passed in England, was against the banking company composed of these Jews, and confined exclusively to them. It remained in force two hundred years, without an alteration whatever, and was nothing but the application of the law of their own country to these bankers in the country of their sojournment-the Italian law, founded upon the civil law, and called in Italy banco rotto, broken bank. It is in direct reference to these Jews, and this application of the exotic bankrupt law to them, that Sir Edward Coke, in his Institutes, takes occasion to say that both the name and the wickedness of bankruptcy were of foreign origin, and had been brought into England from foreign parts. It was enacted under the reign of one of the most glorious of the English princes-a reign as much distinguished for the beneficence of its civil administration as for the splendor of its military achievements. This act of itself is a full answer to the whole objection taken It shows by the Senator from Massachusetts. that, even in England, a bankrupt law has been confined to a single class of persons, and that class a banking company. And here I would be willing to close my speech upon a compromise-a compromise founded in reason and reciprocity, and invested with the equitable mantle of a mutual concession. It is this: if we must follow English precedents, let us follow them chronologically and orderly. Let us begin at the beginning, and take them as they rise. Give me a bankrupt law for

two hundred years against banks and bankers; and, after that, make another for merchants and traders.

The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) has emphatically demanded, how the bankrupt power cou'd be fairly excrcised by seizing on corporations and bankers, and exluding all the other usual subjects of bankrupt laws? I answer, by following the example of that England to which he has conducted us; by copying the act of the 30th of Edward the Third; by going back to that reign of heroism, patriotism, and wisdom; that reign in which the monarch acquired as much glory from his domestic policy as from his foreign conquests; that reign in which the acquisition of dyers and weavers from Flanders, the observance of law and justice, and the encouragement given to agriculture and manufactures, conferred more benefit upon the kingdom, and more glory upon the king, than the splendid victories of Poitiers, Agincourt, and Cressy.

But the Senator may not be willing to yield to this example-this case in point-drawn from his own fountain, and precisely up to the exigency of the occasion. He may want something more, and he shall have it. I will now take the question upon its broadest bottom, and fullest merits. I will go to the question of general power-the point of general authority--exemplified by the general practice of the British Parliament, for five hundred years, over the whole subject of bankruptcy. I will try the question upon this basis; and here I lay down the proposition, that this five hundred years of parliamentary legislation on bankruptcy, establishes the point of full authority in the British Parliament to act as it pleased on the entire subject of bankruptcies. This is my proposition; and when it is proved, I shall claim from those who carry me to England for authority, the same amount of power over the subject which the British Parliament has been in the habit of exercising. Now, what is the extent of that power? Happily for me, I, who have to speak, without any inclination for the task-still more happily for those who have to hear me, peradventure without profit or pleasure-happily for both parties, my proposition is already proved, partly by what I have previously advanced, and fully by what every Senator knows. I have already shown the pracfice of Parliament upon this subject-that it has altered and changed-contracted and enlargedput in and left out-abolished and created, precisely as it pleased. I have already shown, in my rapid view of English legislation on this subject, that the Parliament exercised plenary power, and unlimited authority, over every branch of the bankrupt question; that it confined the action of the bankrupt laws to a single class of persons, or extended it to many classes; that it was sometimes confined to foreigners, then applied to natives, and that now it comprehends natives, aliens, denizens and women; that at one time all debtors were subject to it; then none but merchants and traders; and now, besides inerchants and traders, a long list of persons who have nothing to do with trade; that at one time bankruptcy was treated criminally, and its object punished corporeally, while now it is a remedial mea-ure for the benefit of the creditors, and the relief of unfortunate debtors; and that the acts of the debtor which may Ponstitute him a bankrupt, have been enlarged from three or four glaring misdeeds, to so long a eatalogue of actions, divided into the heads of innocent and fraudulent-constructive and positiveintentional and unintentional-voluntary and forced

that uone but an attorney, with book in hand, can pretend to enumerate them. All this has been shown; and, from all this, it is incontestable that Parliament can do just what it pleases on the subject; and, therefore, our Congress, if referred to Eugland for its powers, can do just what it pleass also. And thus, whether we go by the words of our own Constitution, or by a particular Cxample in England, or deduce a general authority from the general practice of that country, the resuit is still the same: we have authority to limit, if we please, cur bankrupt law to the single class of banks and bankers.

The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster)

not.

demands whether bankrupt laws ordinarily extend to corporations, meaning moneyed corporations. am free to answer that, in point of fact, they do But why? because they ought not? or because these corporations have yet been powerful enough, or fortunate enough, to keep their necks out of that noose? Certainly the latter. It is the power of these moneyed corporations in England, and their good fortune in our America, which, enabling them to grasp all advantages on one hand, and to repulse all penalties on the other, has enabled them to obtain express statutory exemption from bankrupt liabilities in England, and to escape, thus far, from similar liabilities in the United States. This, sir, is history, and not invective; it is fact, and not assertion; and I will speedily refresh the Senator's memory, and bring him to recollect why it is, in point of fact, that bankrupt laws do not usually extend to these corporations. And, first, let us look to England, that great exemplar whose evil examples we are so prompt, whose good ones we are so slow, to imitate. How stands this question of corporation unliability there? By the judicial construction of the statute of Elizabeth, the partners in all incorporated companies were held subject to the bankrupt law; and under this construction, a commission of bankrupt was issued against Sir John Wolstenholme, a gentleman of large fortune, who had advanced a sum of money on an adventure in the East India Company's trade. The issue of this commission was affirmed by the Court of King's Bench; but this happened to take place in the reign of Charles the Second-that reign during which so little is found worthy of imitation in the government of Great Britain-and immediately two acts of Parliament were passed, one to annul the judg ment of the Court of King's Bench in the case of Sir John Wolstenholme, and the other to prevent any such judgments from being given in future. Here are copies of the two acts:

First act, to annul the judgment.

"Wh reas, a verdict and judgment was had in the Easter Term of the Kings Beach, whereby Sir John Wolstenholme knight, and adventurer in the East India company, was found liable to a commission of bankrupt only for, and by reason of, a share which he kad in the joint stock of said company: Now, &c. Be it enacted, that the said judgment be reversed, annulled, vacated, and for nought held," &c.

Second act, to prevent such judgments in future. "That whereas divers noblemen and gentlemen, and persons of quality no ways bred up to trade, do often put in great stocks of money into the East India and Guinea company: Be it enacted, that no persons adventurers for putting in money or merchandise into the said companies, or for venturing or managing the fishing trade, called the royal fishing trade, shall be reputed or taken to be a merchant or trader within any statute for bankrupts.”

Thus, and for those reasons, were chartered companies and their members exempted from the bankrupt penalties under the dissolute reign of Charles the Second. It was not the power of the corporations at that time-for the Bank of England was not then chartered, and the East India Company had not then conquered India-which occasioned this exemption; but it was to favor the dignified characters who engaged in the trade-noblemen, gentlemen, and persons of quality. But afterwards, when the Bank of England had become almost the Government of England, and when the East India Company had acquired the dominions of the Great Mogul, an act of Parliament expressly declared that no member of any incorporated company, chartered by act of Parliament, should be liable to become bankrupt. This act was passed in the reign of George the Fourth, when the Wellington ministry was in power, and when liberal principles and human rights were at the last gasp. So much for these corporation exemptions in England; and if the Senator from Massachuset's finds any thing in such instances worthy of imitation, let him stand forth and proclaim it.

But, sir, I am not yet done with my answer to this question, do such laws ordinarily extend to corporations at all? I answer, most decidedly, that they do! that they apply in England to all the corporations, except those specially excepted by the act of George the Fourth; and these are few in number, though great in power; powerful, but fewnothing but units to myriads, compared to those which are not excepted. The words of that act are: "Member of, or subscriber to any incorporated commercial, or trading companies, established by charter act of Parliament." These words cut off at

once the many ten thousand corporations in the British empire existing by prescription, or incorporated by letters patent frera the King; and then they cut off all those even chartered by act of Parliament, which are not commercial, or trading in their nature. This saves but a few out of the hundreds of thousands of corporations which abound in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. It saves, or rather confirms, the exemption of the Bank of England, which is a trader in money, and it confirms, also, the exemption of the East India Company, which is, in contemplation of law at least, a commercial company; and it saves or exempts a few others deriving charters of incorporation from Parliament; but it leaves subject to the law the whole wilderness of corporations, of which there are thousands in London alone, which derive from prescription, or letters patent; and it also leaves subject to the same laws all the corporations created by charter act of Parliament, which are not commercial or trading. The words of the act are very peculiar; "charter act of Parliament;" so that corporations by a general law, without a special charter act, are not included in the exempThis answer, added to what has been previously said, must be a sufficient reply to the Senator's question, whether bankrupt laws ordinarily extend to corporations? Sir, out of the myriad of corporations in Great Britain, the bankrupt law extends to the whole, except some half dozen, or dozen.

tion

So much for the exemption of these corporations in England; now for our America. We never had but one bankrupt law in the United States, and that for the short period of three or four years. It was passed under the administration of the elder Mr. Adams, and repealed under Mr. Jefferson. It copied the English acts in including among the subjects of bankruptcy, bankers, brokers, and factors. Corporations were not included; and it is probable that no question was raised about them, as, up to that time, their number was few, and their conduct generally good. But, at a later date, the enactment of a bankrupt law was again attempted in our Congress; and, at that period, the multiplication and the misconduct of banks presented them to the minds of many as proper subjects for the application of the law: I speak of the bill of 1827, brought into the Senate, and lost. That bill, like all previous laws since the time of George II, was made applicable to bankers, brokers, and factors. A Segator from North Carolina (Mr. Branch) moved to include banking corporations. The motion was lost, there being but twelve votes for it; but in this twelve there were some whose names must carry weight to any cause to which they are attached. The twelve were, Messrs. Barton, Benton, Branch, Cobb, Dickerson, Hendricks, Macon, Noble, Randolph, Reed, Smith of South Carolina, and White. The whole of the friends of the bill, twenty-one in number, voted against the proposition, (the present Chief Magistrate in the number,) and for the obvious reason, with some, of not encumbering the measure they were so anxious to carry, by putting into it a new and untried provision. And thus stands our own legislation on this subject. In point of fact, then, chartered corporations have thus far escaped bankrupt penalties, both in England, and in our America; but ought they to continue to escape? This is the question-this the true and important inquiry, which is now to occupy the public mind.

The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) says the object of bankrupt laws has no relation to currency; that their object is simply to distribute the effects of insolvent debtors among their creditors. So says the Senator, but what says history? What says the practice of Great Britain? I will show you what it says, and for that purpose will read a passage from McCulloch's notes on Smith's Wealth of Nations. He says:

"In 1814-'15—and '16, no fewer than 240 country banks stopped payments, and ninety-two commissions of bankruptcy were issued against these establishments, being at the rate of one commission against every seven and a half of the total number of country banks existing in 1813."

Two hundred and forty stopped payment at one dash, and ninety-two subjected to commissions of

bankruptcy. They were not, indeed chartered banks, for there are none such in England, except the Bank of England; but they were legalized establishments, existing under the first joint stock bank act of 1708, and they were banks of issue. Yet they were subjected to the bankrupt laws, ninety-two of them in a single season of bank catalepsy; their broken "promises to pay" were taken out of circulation; their doors closed; their directors and officers turned out; their whole effects, real and personal, their money, debts, books, papers, and every thing, put into the hands of assignees; and to these assignees, the holders of their notes forwarded their demands, and were paid, every one in equal proportion-as the debts of the bank were collected, and its effects converted into money; and this without expense or trouble to any one one of them. Ninety-two banks in England shared this fate in a single season of bank mortality; five hundred more could be enumerated in other seasons, many of them superior in real capital, credit, and circulation to our famous chartered banks, most of which are banks of moonshine, built upon each others paper, and the whole ready to fly sky-high the moment any one of the concern becomes sufficiently inflated to burst.

The immediate effect of this application of the bankrupt laws to banks in England, is twofold; first, to save the general currency from depreciation, by stopping the issue and circulation of irredeemable notes; secondly, to do equal justice to all creditors, high and low, rich and poor, present and absent, the widow and the orphan as well as the cunning and the powerful, by distributing their effects in proportionate amounts to all who hold demands. This is the operation of bankrupt laws upon banks in England, and all over the British empire; and it happens to be the precise check upon the issue of broken bank paper, and the precise reinedy for the injured holders of their dishonored paper, which the President recommends. Here is his recommendation: listen to it:

"In the mean time, it is our duty to provide all the remed es against a depreciated paper currency which the Constitution enables us to afford. The Treasury Department, on several former occasions, has suggested the propriety and importance of a uniform law concerning bankruptcies of corporations and other bankers. Through the instrumentality of such a law, a salutary check may doubtless be imposed on the issues of paper money, and an effectual remedy given to the citizen, in a way at once equal in all parts of the Union, and fully authorized by the Constitution."

The Senator from Massachusetts says he would not, intentionally, do injustice to the Message or its author; and doubtless he is not conscious of violating that benevolent determination; but here is injustice, both to the Message and to its author; injustice in not quoting the Message as it is, and showing that is proposes a remedy to the citizen, as well as a check upon insolvent issues; injustice to the author in denying that the object of bankrupt laws has any relation to currency, when history shows that these laws are the actual instrument for regulating and purifying the whole local paper currency of the entire British empire, and saving that country from the frauds, losses, impositions, and demoralization of an irredeemable paper money.

If

The Senator from Massachusetts says the object of bankrupt laws has no relation to currency. he means hard money currency, I agree with him; but if he means bank notes, as I am sure he does, then I point him to the British bankrupt code, which applies to every bank of issue in the British empire, except the Bank of England itself, and the few others, four or five in number, which are incorporated by charter acts. All the joint stock banks, all the private banks, all the bankers of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, are subject to the law of bankruptcy. Many of these establishments are of great capital and credit; some having hundreds, or even thousands of partners; and many of them having ten, or twenty, or thirty, and some even forty branches. They are almost the exclusive furnishers of the local and common bank note currency; the Bank of England notes being chiefly used in the great cities for large mercantile and Government payments. These joint stock banks, private companies, and individual bankers are, practically, in the British empire what the local banks are in the United States. They perform the same functions, and differ in name only; not in substance, nor in conduct. They

have no charters, but they have a legalized existence; they are not corporations, but they are allowed by law to act in a body; they furnish the actual paper currency of the great body of the people of the British empire, as much so as our local banks furnish the mass of paper currency to the people of the United States. They have had twenty-four millions sterling, one hundred and twenty millions of dollars, in circulation at one time; a sum nearly equal to the greatest issue ever known in the United States, and more than equal to the whole bank note circulation of the present day. They are all subject to the law of bankruptcy, and their twenty-four millions sterling of currency along with them; and five hundred of them have been shut up and wound up under commissions of bankruptcy in the last forty years; and yet the Senator from Massachusetts informs us that the object of bankrupt laws has no relation to currency!

But it is not necessary to go all the way to England to find bankrupt laws having relation to currency. The act passed in our own country, about forty years ago, applied to bankers; the bill brought into the House of Representatives about fifteen years ago by a gentleman then, and now, a representative from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Sergeant,) also applied to bankers; and the bill brought into this Senate ten years ago by a Senator from South Carolina, not now a member of this body (General Hayne) still applied to bankers. These bankers, of whom there were many in the United States, and of whom Girard in the East, and Yeatman and Woods in the West, were the most considerable-these bankers all issued paper moncy; they all issued currency. The act,

then, of 1798, if it had continued in force, or the two bills just referred to, if they had become law, would have operated upon these bankers and their banks-would have stopped their issues, and put their establishments into the hands of assignees, and distributed their effects among their creditors. This, certainly, would have been having some relation to currency: so that, even with our limited essays towards a bankrupt system, we have scaled the outworks of the banking empire; we have laid hold of bankers, but not of banks; we have reached the bank of Girard, but not the Girard bank; we have applied our law to the bank of Yeatman and Woods, but not to the rabble of petty corporations which have not the tithe of their capital and credit. We have gone as far as bankers, but not as far as banks; and now give me a reason for the difference. Give me a reason why the act of 1798, the bill of Mr. Sergeant in 1821, and the bill of Gen. Hayne in 1827, should not include banks as well as bankers. They both perform the same function-that of issuing paper currency. They both involve the same mischief when they stop payment-that of afflicting the country with a circulation of irredeemable and depreciated paper money. They are both culpable in the same mode, and in the same degree; for they are both violaters of their " promises to pay." They both exact a general credit from the community, and they both abuse that credit. They both have creditors and they both have effects; and these creditors have as much right to a pro rata distribution of the effects in one case as in the other. Why, then, a distinction in favor of the bank? Is it because corporate bodies are superior to natural bodies? because artificial beings are superior to natural beings? or, rather, is it not because corporations are assemblages of men, and assemblages are more powerful than single men; and, therefore, these corporations, in addition to all their vast privileges, are also to have the privilege of being bankrupt, and afflicting the country with the evils of bankruptcy, without themselves being subjected to the laws of bankruptcy? Be this as it may--be the cause what it will the decree has gone forth for the decision of the question-for the trial of the issue for the verdict and judgment upon the claim of the banks. They have many privileges and exemptions now, and they have the benefit of all laws against the community. They pay no taxes; the property of the stockholders is not liable for their debts; they sue their debtors, sell their property, and put their bodies in jail.

They

have the privilege of stamping paper money; the privilege of taking interest upon double, treble, and quadruple their actual money. They put up and put down the price of property, labor, and produce as they please. They have the monopoly of making the actual currency. They are strong enough to suppress the constitutional money, and to force their own paper upon the community, and then to redeem it or not as they please. And is it to be tolerated, that, in addition to all these privileges, and all these powers, they are to be exempted from the laws of bankruptcy? the only law of which they are afraid, and the only one which can protect the country against their insolvent issues, and give a fair chance for payment to the numerous holders of their violated "promises to pay!”

near.

I have discussed, Mr. President, the right of Congress to apply a bankrupt law to banking corporations; I have discussed it on the words of our own Constitution, on the practice of England, and on the general authority of Parliament, and on. each, and every ground, as I fully believe, vindicated our right to pass the law. The right is clear; the expediency is manifest and glaring. Of all the objects upon the earth, banks of circulation are the fittest subjects of bankrupt laws. They act in secret, and they exact a general credit. Nobody knows their means, yet every body must trust them. They send their "promises to pay" far and They push them into every body's hands; they make them small to go into small hands-into the hands of the laborer, the widow, the helpless, the ignorant. Suddenly the bank stops payment; all these helpless holders of their notes are without pay, and without remedy. A few on the spot get a little; those at a distance get nothing. For each to sue, is a vexatious and a losing business. The only adequate remedy--the only one that promises any justice to the body of the community, and the helpless holders of small notes, is the bankrupt remedy of assignees to distribute the effects. This makes the real effects available. When a bank stops, it has little or no specie, but it has, or ought to have, a good mass of solvent debts. At present, all these debts are unavailable to the community-they go to a few large and favored creditors; and those who are most in need get nothing. But a stronger view remains to be taken of these debts: the mass of them are due from the owners and managers of the banks-from the presidents, directors, cashiers, stockholders, attorneys; and these people do not make themselves pay. They do not sue themselves, nor protest themselves. They sue and protest others, and sell out their property, and put their bodies in jail; but, as for themselves, who are the main debtors, it is another affair! They take their time, and usually wait till the notes are heavily depreciated, and then square off, with a few cents in the dollar! a commission of bankruptcy is the remedy for this evil; assignees of the effects of the bank, are the persons to make these owners, and managers, and chief debtors to the institutions, pay up. Under the bankrupt law, every holder of a note, no matter how small in amount, nor how distant the holder may reside, on forwarding the note to the assignees, will receive his rateable proportion of the bank's effects,without expense, and without trouble to himself. It is a most potent, a nost proper, and most constitutional remedy against delinquent banks. It is utable and a brave remedy. It does honor to the President who recommended it, and is worthy of the successor of Jackson.

an

Senators upon this floor have ventured the expression of an opinion that there can be no resumption of specie payments in this country until a national bank shall be established, meaning, all the while, until the present miscalled Bank of the United States shall be rechartered. Such an opis nion is humiliating to this Government, and a reproach upon the memory of its founders. It is tantamount to a declaration that the Government, framed by the heroes and sages of the Revolution, is incapable of self preservation; that it is a miserable image of imbecility, and must take refuge in the embraces of a moneyed corporation to enable it to survive its infirmities. The humiliation of such a thought should expel it from the imagination of every patriotic mind. Nothing but a dire