NATO Enlargement: Illusions and RealityTed Galen Carpenter, Barbara Conry Cato Institute, 1998 - 283 Seiten The decision to expand NATO eastward is a fateful venture that has received surprisingly little public attention. Advocates of enlargement insist that the step will foster cooperation, consolidate democracy, and promote stability throughout Europe. But the contributors to this volume conclude that an expanded NATO is a dubious, potentially disastrous idea. Instead of healing the wounds of the Cold War, it threatens to create a new division of Europe and undermine friendly relations with Russia. Even worse, it will establish expensive, dangerous, and probably unsustainable security obligations for the United States. |
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Seite 1
... major drawbacks to NATO enlargement . One is that , if enlargement is not merely an empty political gesture but is intended to provide meaningful security to the new member states , it is certain to be expensive . A 1996 study by the ...
... major drawbacks to NATO enlargement . One is that , if enlargement is not merely an empty political gesture but is intended to provide meaningful security to the new member states , it is certain to be expensive . A 1996 study by the ...
Seite 7
... major powers . As long as those states remain at peace with one another , and no menacing would - be hegemonic power emerges , there is no credible danger to America's security . Events involving small countries in Central and Eastern ...
... major powers . As long as those states remain at peace with one another , and no menacing would - be hegemonic power emerges , there is no credible danger to America's security . Events involving small countries in Central and Eastern ...
Seite 8
... major war , since it will almost certainly exacerbate tensions with one European great power : Russia . The contributors to this volume hold a variety of views about future U.S. policy toward NATO . Some of them argue that the alli ...
... major war , since it will almost certainly exacerbate tensions with one European great power : Russia . The contributors to this volume hold a variety of views about future U.S. policy toward NATO . Some of them argue that the alli ...
Seite 9
... major hegemonic threat in Europe , there are no interests that merit risking U.S. blood and treasure . European security should instead be the province of the Europeans , Layne asserts . In chapter 5 , Benjamin Schwarz characterizes ...
... major hegemonic threat in Europe , there are no interests that merit risking U.S. blood and treasure . European security should instead be the province of the Europeans , Layne asserts . In chapter 5 , Benjamin Schwarz characterizes ...
Seite 12
... major threat to Europe today , and that expanding the alliance at this point is likely to redivide Europe and thereby create a threat that would otherwise not exist . Carroll warns that leaving Russia on the outside of a redivided ...
... major threat to Europe today , and that expanding the alliance at this point is likely to redivide Europe and thereby create a threat that would otherwise not exist . Carroll warns that leaving Russia on the outside of a redivided ...
Inhalt
1 | |
17 | |
31 | |
41 | |
4 Why Die for Gdansk? NATO Enlargement and American Security Interests | 53 |
5 NATO Enlargement and the Inevitable Costs of the American Empire | 71 |
Potential Conflicts Involving the Czech Republic Hungary and Poland | 85 |
7 The Perils of Victory | 103 |
12 A Strategy to Unite Rather Than Divide Europe | 177 |
13 The Errors of Expansive Realism | 187 |
To What End? | 199 |
15 Europes Unhealthy Security Dependence | 209 |
16 A Strong OSCE for a Secure Europe | 223 |
17 Political Alternatives to NATO Expansion | 233 |
18 Beyond NATO | 243 |
The Debate over Collective Security | 253 |
Coping with Act II | 121 |
9 Russias Search for Identity | 129 |
An Illusory Solution | 143 |
The Risks of Expansion | 159 |
Contributors | 267 |
Index | 273 |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality Ted Galen Carpenter,Barbara Conry Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 1998 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
affairs alliance's allies American April argues arms Atlantic Baltic Belarus bloc borders Bosnia Cato Institute Central and East Central and Eastern Central Europe China Clinton administration Cold Cold War collective security commitment conflict Cooperation costs countries create credible Czech Republic danger defense democracy democratic deterrence East European Eastern Europe economic enlargement ethnic Europe's European security European Union expansion forces foreign policy former Soviet Founding Act future Germany global Gorbachev hegemon Henry Kissinger Hungarian Hungary instability interests issue Kissinger leaders leadership Madeleine Albright membership ment military alliance mission Moscow NATO expansion NATO's nuclear weapons OSCE peace Poland policymakers political post-Cold potential President Press problems Quoted region relations risk role Romania Russia Secretary security guarantees security organization Slovakia Soviet Union stability strategic Ted Galen Carpenter threat tion treaty troops U.S. Department Ukraine United Václav Havel Warsaw Pact Washington Post West Western Yeltsin York
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 259 - The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist.
Seite 260 - A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.
Seite 189 - Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World.
Seite 86 - I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.
Seite 37 - NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason...
Seite 234 - Russian forces and nuclear weapons from newly independent states; negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and the evolution and strengthening of European security and economic institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union.
Seite 183 - policeman," by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.
Seite 187 - All mapmakers should place the Mississippi in the same location, and avoid originality. It may be boring, but one has to know where he is.
Seite 130 - We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies.
Seite 143 - Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed, which provided Russia with equal status with the Alliance in peacekeeping operations and enhanced its consultative rights.