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respect to the power of God, as every thing that he can do, is possible to be done, though some things, which he could have done, he never will do. As for instance: He could have made more worlds, had he pleased; or have produced more men upon earth, or more species of creatures; or have given a greater degree of perfection to creatures, than he has done, or will do; for it is certain, that he never acted to the utmost of his power, accordingly he could have done many things that he will never do; and those things are said to be possible, but not future.

Moreover, things future are rendered so, by the will of God, or his having fore-ordained, or determined to produce them; this is what we call the decree of God, which respects the event, or determines whatever shall come to pass.

We are now to consider, what we are to understand by God's fore-ordaining all things, according to the counsel of his will; which is a mode of speaking used in scripture, in Eph. i. 11. Being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.

1. We are not hereby to understand that the decrees of God are the result of deliberation, or his debating matters within himself, as reasoning in his own mind about the expediency, or inexpediency of things, or calling in the advice of others, as creatures are said to do, when acting with counsel; for he must not be supposed to determine things in such a way, since that would argue an imperfection in the divine mind; With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the paths of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding? Isa. xl. 14. But,

2. It implies, that his decrees are infinitely wise. As what is done with counsel is said, according to human modes of speaking, to be done advisedly, in opposition to its being done rashly, or with precipitation; accordingly all the works of God are done with wisdom, therefore all his purposes and determinations to do what is done in time, are infinitely wise, which, according to our way of speaking, is called the counsel of his will: thus it is said, He is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working, chap. xxviii. 29.

We are now to consider the object of God's decree; This, as has been before observed, is every thing that has, or shall come to pass, and it may be considered in different respects. There are some things which he has determined to effect, namely, such as are the objects of his power; or all things, which have a natural or moral goodness in them, which are becoming an infinitely holy God to produce: and this includes in it every thing but sin, which God does not produce, it not being the object of power: Nevertheless, this must be supposed to be com

mitted by his permission, and therefore it is the consequence of his decree to permit, though not, as other things, of his decree to effect; it is one thing to suffer sin to be committed in the world, and another thing to be the author of it. But this we shall have occasion to enlarge on, under a following head.

II. We shall now proceed to prove the truth of what is laid down in this answer, namely, that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. This will evidently appear, if we consider the five following propositions in their due connexion.

1. Nothing comes to pass by chance, with respect to God, but by the direction of his providence, which we are bound to assert against the Deists, who speak of God, as though he were not the Governor of the world. This cannot be denied by any, who think, with any degree of modesty, concerning, or pay a due deference to the divine perfections, since God may as well be denied to be the Creator as the Governor of the world. (a.)

(a) "Certainly, it is not to be understood, in a literal or strict sense, that He does, all that is done. "Far be it from God," says Elihu, "that he should do wickedness: and from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity." Doing wickedness, and committing iniquity, are synonymous phrases: but to impute to the Most High, any thing like what is commonly meant by either of these phrases, is evident blasphemy,

Nor are we to imagine, certainly, that God makes his creatures do, whatever is done by them, in any such manner as is inconsistent with their own proper agency. Rational creatures certainly act; and act as freely, as if there were no being above them to direct their steps, or to govern their actions. When God works in men, to will and to do that which is good; they, nevertheless will and do it themselves; and are really praise-worthy. And he does not, surely, so influence any to evil, as to render them unactive, involuntary, or undeserving of blame.

Nor do I believe it true, literally and strictly speaking, that God creates, whatsoever comes to pass; particularly darkness, and moral evil.

But this must not be taken for granted, nor hastily passed over: because, however indisputable, it is disputed. There are some among us, and some who are deservedly in reputation for wisdom, and general soundness in the faith; who appear to be of opinion, that God is the direct Author-the immediate Causethe proper Creator, of all evil, as well as of all good-of all sin, as well as holiness, in heart and life-in thought, word, and deed.

This opinion, however, notwithstanding my high esteem and particular friend. ship for some of the holders of it, I am not yet ready to adopt, for several reasons. 1. To suppose that the actions of men, whether virtuous or vicious, are crea ted, seems to confound all distinction between creation and Providence; or rather, wholly to exclude the latter.

The work of creation, we used to think, was God's making creatures and things, at first; or giving the beginning of existence to matter and minds, with their various properties, instincts and organizations. And that God's works of Providence, were his preserving things already made, and governing all their operations. But according to this new philosophy, creation is all; Providence is nothing. For what preserving and governing of creatures or actions can there be, when every creature and every action, is every moment created anew? An action, a thought, or volition, whether good or evil, is a new and strange kind of creature, or created thing. But, in a theological view, the question before us is of chief importance, as it respects moral evil. I add, therefore;

2. It appears to me, that to suppose God the Creator of sin, whether in princi

2. It follows from hence, that nothing is done without the divine influence, or permission. The former (as was before observed) respects things that are good, which are the effects

ple or action, is hardly reconcilable with his perfect holiness. "Doth a fountain send forth, at the same place, sweet waters and bitter? Can darkness proceed from Him, as its proper source, in whom there is no darkness at all?

It is true, God has created many things which are of a different nature from himself; as the bodies of men and beasts, and all parts of the world of matter: but nothing, I conceive, directly opposite to his own nature; as is sin. The sun is the immediate cause of the growth of vegetables; though these are essentially different from the sun itself: but it is not thus the cause of ice and darkness; which are no more of a contrary nature to it, than sin is to the nature of God.*

I am sensible it has been said, there is no more inconsistency with the holiness of God, in supposing him the efficient, immediate cause of sin, for necessary good purposes; than in supposing he only permits it, for wise ends, and so orders things that he knows it will be committed.

But these two ways of accounting for the existence of moral evil, appear to me materially different. There are supposable cases in which it would be right for a man, not to hinder another from sinning, when he could hinder him; and also to place him in circumstances of temptation, expecting that he would sin. For instance, a parent may leave money in the way of a child suspected of being given to theft; and may conceal himself and let the child steal it; with a view to correct him, in order to reclaim him, or as a warning to his other children. All this might be perfectly right in the parent; however certainly he might know, that the child would be guilty of the expected crime. But I question whether any case can be supposed in which it would not be wrong, directly to influence another to do evil, that good might come. Exciting one to sin by power or persuasion; and placing one in circumstances of trial, wherein he would be tempted to sin, without restraining him from it, are surely different things, although the certainty of his sinning may be the same.

3. I dare not think that God creates sin, and all kinds of evil, because this seems plainly contrary to the general current of the holy scriptures. In the first chapter of Genesis, it is said, "God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." Of his making two great lights, we are told; and that he made the stars also: but no account is there given of his creating darkness. Respecting our own species, the inspired historian particularly informs us, that "God created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them." Nor do we find in that book, or in all the Bible, that he hath since ever created them otherwise. Solomon three thousand years after the fall, having made diligent search among men and wo

There is a vast difference between the sun's being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and of the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost in the night, by its motion whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but not the proper cause, efficient, or producer of them.--No more is any action of the divine Being, the cause of the evil of men's wills. If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it might be justly infered that the sun itself is dark and cold: but from its being the cause of these, no otherwise than by its absence, no such thing can be infered, but the contrary. It may justly be argued that the sun is a bright and hot body, it cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment, and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, in as much as sin is not the fruit of any positive influence of the Most High, but on the contrary, arises from the withdrawment of his action and energy, and under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence, this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil; but on the contrary, that he and his agency are altogether holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing in. deed, because men never cominit sin, but only when God leaves them to themselves; and ne cessarily sin when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God: as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when he is present, that therefore darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must be black." Edwards on the Bill. Page 259. Boston Ed. 1751VOL. I.

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of his power; the latter, sin. That nothing comes to pass without the divine influence, or permission, is evident; for if any thing came to pass, which is the object of power, without the

men, to find out their true character, and the cause of their so universal depravity, says; "Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions." Wicked practices, and deceitful inventions to conceal their criminality, are ever ascribed in scripture to mankind themselves, or to other fallen creatures, and never to God, as their efficient cause.

In the New-Testament, christians are said to be "created unto good works :" and we read of " the new man, which after God, is created in righteousness and "true holiness." But no where do we read of any one that was created unto evil works; or after Satan in unrighteousness and sin. It is written, 1 Cor. xiv. 33, "God is not the author of confusion, but of peace." And James i. 13-17, "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is tempted when he is led away of his own lust and enticed.-Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights." Can any thing be more express to teach us, that a distinction ought carefully to be made between the origin of good and evil; and that we should not conceive them both alike to come from God?

For scripture proof that God is not the efficient author of sin, I will only add, that the fruits of the Spirit, and works of the flesh, are set in contrast and spoken of as diametrical opposites: whereas, did God create sinful propensities in men, or directly influence them to evil actions, the works of the flesh would be as real and immediate fruits of the divine Spirit, as the holiest exercises of the best saints. 4. I see no occasion for the supposition of God's being thus the author of all evil: nor any good ends that it can answer.

Could it be seen how evils might be accounted for, without supposing them any part of the creation of God; and how God might have an absolute dominion over all events, without being the immediate cause of bad things; no good man, I conclude, would wish to conceive of Him as being thus the proper source of darkness and evil. And indeed, were it so, that our weak minds were unable, to comprehend how God can work all things after the counsel of his own will, or how natural and moral evil could ever have been, without believing that God is as much, and as immediately, the cause of evil as of good; yet it might be more modest, and more wise, to leave these among other incomprehensibles, than to have recourse to so bold an hypothesis for the solution of them. But, I apprehend, there is no need of this hypothesis in order to account lor the existence of evil, or in order to an understanding belief of the universal government of the Most High.

Evils, of most if not all kinds, are such negative things-such mere defects, in their origin at least, as do not need creation, or require a positive omnipotent cause. This is the case, evidently, with respect to natural darkness: it is only the want of light. This is the case, also, with respect to natural death: it is only the cessation, the loss, the want of life. And this may be the case, with repect to spiritual darkness, and spiritual death. It has heretofore been the orthodox opinion, that all moral evil consists radically in privation; or, that unho liness, at bottom, is the mere want of holiness. And, notwithstanding all the floods of light, from various quarters, which have come into the world in this age of new discoveries, possibly this one old opinion may yet be true. "God made man upright." That is, He formed him with a disposition impartially just and good: He created in him a principle of universal righteousness. When man fell, by eating the forbidding fruit, this principle had not been preserved in perfect strength and exercise. In consequence of that disobedience, the divine internal influence was so withdrawn, that this principle was entirely lost. But we are not told, nor need it be supposed, that any opposite principle was then created in him. Our first parents had, I believe, in their original formation, all the radical instincts of nature which they had after the fall; or which any of their posterity

divine influence, then the creature would be said to exist, or act independently on the power of God; and, if so, then it would follow, that it would exist, or act necessarily; but necessary existence is a perfection appropriate to God.

now have. Such as a principle of self-preservation, a desire of self-promotion, and a propensity to increase and multiply; together with all the more particular appetites and passions, subservient to these purposes. All these are innocent in themselves, though not in themselves virtuous. But these private instincts, when left to operate alone, without the governing influence of a public spirit, or a just regard for other beings, will naturally lead to all manner of iniquity, in heart and life. To avarice and ambition; to envy and malice; to intemperance and lewdness; to frauds and oppressions; to wars and fightings.

There is no need of supposing any other divine agency, than only to uphold in existence creatures that have lost their virtue, amidst surrounding temptations, in order to account for all the evil affections which we ever feel, and for all the external wickedness that is ever committed. Nor, in order to the holi est creatures losing their virtue, need any thing more be supposed on God's part, than only his leaving them to themselves; or not upholding in them, and constantly invigorating, a virtuous disposition.

And as, in this way, we can account for the existence of all manner of evil; so we can thus understand how it is possible for God to bring about whatsoever comes to pass, without his being the actor, or maker, or instigator, of any thing that is not perfectly good. When He does not cause light, there will be darkness. When He does not make peace, there will be evil. The darkness takes place according to his appointment, with the same exactness and certainty, as if He actually created it; and so does evil of every kind. What He determines to permit, knowing perfectly the circumstances and dispositions of every agent concerned, will as infallibly come to pass, as what he determines to do himself, or to effect by his own positive influence. The king's heart, and the rivers of water; the waves of the sea, and the tumults of the people, are in the hand of the Lord, to all important intents and purposes, if it be only true that He restrains them, or lets them run; stilleth them, or suffereth them to rage, just as he sees fit.

In this sense, I conceive, it is to be understood, that God forms the light, and creates darkness; makes peace, and creates evil. He has the absolute govern. ment-the perfect control-the entire superintendency, of all these things.

When any folly has been committed or any mischief has been done, some are ready to say, It was so ordered; as if therefore nobody was to be blamed. But this is a false inference, from just premises. True, it was so ordered of God; and ordered righteously and wisely: but it was so ordered by the doer of the mischief also; and ordered carelessly, perhaps, or wickedly. You will say, It must have been so, and the actor could not have done otherwise: but, I say, he might have done otherwise, if he would. It is true, there is a kind of necessity in the actions of men. They necessarily act according to their own choice; and they necessarily choose to act according to their own disposition. Under this kind of necessity God himself acts. It is impossible for him to do, because it is impossible for him to will that which is contrary to his own nature. He necessarily wills and does, what is agreeable to his moral perfections. But such a necessity as this, is so far from being inconsistent with freedom, that it is essential to all free agency. Actions which can and do take place, contrary to the inclination of the agent, are not his actions. He has no command over them; and therefore can deserve no praise or blame for them.

The necessity of acting according to our own minds, is all the necessity which need be supposed, when we suppose that all our actions were decreed, and are ordered of God. A creature that acts according to any laws of nature, and not at perfect random, without any self-government, acts in such a manner that He who knows what is in him, may fore-know all his actions; and in such a manner

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