union. until he was taken therefrom on the 19th Nov. 1870, under the circumstances hereinafterset forth. The father of the said pauper died shortly after the said pauper's birth. No evidence was given as to the place of settlement of the said father, except that at the time of his marriage on the 30th May 1853, and from then until his death, he was continuously resident in the appellants' Elizabeth Lee, the mother of the said pauper, was the illegitimate daughter of one Elizabeth Stroud, and was born about forty years ago in the poor law union of St. Thomas, in the county of Devon. Her marriage with the said pauper's father took place on the 30th May 1863, within the appellants' union, where she was then resident, and she lived with her husband, the said pauper's father, in the appellants' union, until her said husband's death; and after that event she continued to live, together with the said pauper, in the same place until the 9th Nov. 1870, when she also died. The said Elizabeth Strond was in or near Exeter at the time of the said marriage of Elizabeth Lee, but shortly after that event she went to London, and lived with the father and mother of the said pauper during the latter part of the said father's life. After the said father's death she continued to live with the said Elizabeth Lee and the said pauper within the appellants' union until the death of the said Elizabeth Lee. The said Elizabeth Stroud was called as a witness on the hear ing of the appeal, and stated that she never heard that the said pauper had any relation except herself. Upon the death of the said Elizabeth Lee, on the 9th Nov. 1870, the said Elizabeth Stroud, without any authority in that behalf, sold off all the furniture and effects left by the said pauper's deceased father and mother, and took possession of the proceeds of the sale, and she also, without any authority in that behalf, took possession of the said pauper; and on the 19th Nov. 1870 she removed herself and the said pauper to Exeter, where, however, she has not and never had any settlement. From that date until the 8th Feb. 1871, the said pauper lived with the said Elizabeth Stroud, within the respondents' union. On the 5th Jan. 1871, the said Elizabeth Stroud became chargeable to the funds of the respondents' union, and on the 8th Feb. 1861 the said Elizabeth Stroud obtained relief for the said pauper from, and the said pauper became chargeable to, the respondents' union; and the respondents then, for the first time, became aware that the said pauper had been brought within their union. The said Elizabeth Stroud was soon afterwards removed by the respondents' union to the place of her last legal settlement. On the 3rd April 1871, upon application by the respondents, an order of removal of the said pauper to the appellants' union was duly made by two justices. This was the order against which this appeal was brought. The following were, amongst others, the grounds of appeal:-First, that the said order is bad, and defective on the face thereof; thirdly, that the said I. J. Lee had not acquired from his parents, or one of them, a status of irremovability in the said Strand union, and is not now legally irremovable therefrom; sixthly, that the said pauper, at the time the said order was made, was not legally settled in any parish in the said Strand union; eighthly, that the said pauper, I. J. Lee, is the son of the said Elizabeth Lee, deceased; ninthly, that the said Elizabeth Lee, whose maiden name was Elizabeth Stroud, was born about forty years ago, a'bastard of the body of Elizabeth Stroud, in the parish of Ide, in the county of Devon. Arundel Rogers and G. Lewis appeared on behalf of the respondents in support of the order of removal. Although the derivative settlement in the mother's birlace, if raised by the grounds of appeal, may be superior to the pauper s birth settlement, the residence of the pauper which was sufficient to confer a status of irremovability in the Strand Union was equivalent to a settlement by residence there, and justified the order of removal. The pauper had in Nov. 1871 acquired a status of irremovability in the Strand Union, and any attempt by the appellants to obtain an order of removal from that union whilst the pauper was there would clearly have failed. Elizabeth Stroud improperly, and contrary to law, took the child away without any consent or intention on his part, and could not in consequence affect his status. Although actually at Exeter the pauper continued to be constructively resident in the appellants' union. If Elizabeth Stroud had taken him back, there would have been no break of residence which could have destroyed his status of irremovability. He was too young to entertain any intention either to go away or to return, and his position at Exeter was analogous to that of a lunatic, bodily carried away from the parish which was liable for his maintenance, but still chargeable to that p-rish (Reg. v. Eivet, 29 L. J. 17, M. C.; Reg. v. Whitby U ion, L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 325; Reg. v. Abingdon Union, L. Rep. Q. B. 406.) Mckellar contended, for the appellants, first, that the said pauper appeared to have a settlement in the said St. Thomas's Union, and that such settlement was a better settlement than his birth settlement in the appellants' union, and that the order of removal was therefore bad, and was not supported by proof of a status of irremovability in the appellants' union (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, 8. 5); secondly, that even if the order might otherwise be supported, there was a break of residence sufficient to destroy the said pauper's status of irremovability in the appellants' union; and thirdly, that if the removal of the said pauper were justitied upon these facts, the said order of removal was bad, in that it was thereby adjudged that the place of the said pauper's last legal settlement was within the appellants' union. The learned RECORDER confirmed the said order with costs against the appellants, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench upon all the points raised by the appellants. The special case agreed upon by the parties, left the question to be decided in these words :"If the court shall be of opinion that either one of the points contended for by the appellants was a good objection to the said order of removal, and that point could be raised upon the said grounds of appeal, then the said orders of removal and of quarter sessions shall both be quashed. But if the court shall be of opinion that all the appellants' said objections were bad or could not be raised upon the said grounds of appeal, then the said orders of removal and of quarter sessions shall stand confirmed.' April 24, 1872.-The rule nisi to quash the order of sessions came on to be argued before Blackburn, Hannen, and Quain, JJ. Rogers and Lewis, for the respondents, showed cause. Poland and McKellar, for the appellants, in support. Upon the case being read, BLACKBURN, J., called upon the appellants to state why, upon these facts, the Strand Union was not the place of the last legal settlement of the pauper. Poland. The birthplace is the worst kind of settlement, and by R. v. St. Mary's, Leicester (3 A. &. E. 644). a prima facie case of settlement by evidence of the place of birth of the pauper, may be answered by proof of the maiden settlement of his mother, without showing that his father had no settlement. St. Thomas's Union is therefore the place of this pauper's last legal settlement, unless the order of removal could be based upon his previous irremovability from the appellants union. By the first statute concerning irremovability (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 5), it is "provided always, that no person hereby exempted from liability to be removed shall by reason of such exemption acquire any settlement in any parish." [BLACKBURN, J.-That case (R. v. St. Mary's, Leicester) is exactly in point, and until it is over ruled, the pauper's last legal settlement under these circumstances, must be that of the mother. I hope to live long enough to see not only that decision, but the whole law of removal to places of settlement abolished by the Legislature. We must now hear the respondents.] Rogers. A status of irremovability created by a residence from birth is equivalent to a settlement. [BLACKBURN, J.-That is directly opposed to the provision in the 5th section of the Irremovability Act.] By 21 & 25 Vict. c. 55, s. 2, "Where a child under the age of sixteen years, residing with its surviving parent, shall be left an orphan, and such parent shall at the time of death have acquired an exemption from removal by reason of a continued residence, such orphan shall, if not otherwise irremovable, be exempt from removal in like manner, and to the same extent, as if it had then acquired for itself an exemption from removal by residence." There is a further question whether the grounds of appeal raise the appellants' contention. [BLACKBURN, J.-The 8th and 9th clearly raise the derivative settlement, and the 3rd and 6th are suflicient to give notice of their objection to a settlement upon the other grounds.] BLACKBURN, J.-Right or wrong we must follow the authorities. The case cited exactly governs this settlement; and in the face of 9 & 10 Viet c. 66, s. 5, it is impossible to uphold the order of removal upon the other ground suggested. HANNEN and QUAIN, JJ., concurred. Rule absolute to quash the order of sessions; and order of removal quashed. Attorney for appellants, Elward Jennings. Attorneys for respondents, J. E. Fox, agent for Hooper, Exeter. COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. ADVANCE ON AUTHORITY OF RAILWAY DIRECTORS-ULTRA VIRES-LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS.-If a person, acting on behalf of a effect, his acts amount to a representation that he company, so acts, that, without any words to that has authority to enter into a contract, he incurs a personal liability to make good that representa tion. Three directors of a railway company, by a to honour the cheques of the company signed by letter to the company's bankers, requested them two of the directors, and countersigned by the signed in the above manner and paid by the bank: secretary. Cheques were accordingly drawn and Held, that in rospect of all advances so made by the bank after the date of the letter, the directors to the question whether the company could validly were personally liable to the bank, without regard the means of satisfying the debt. contract a debt, or whether the company had Persons dealing in matters of direct personal interest, and making representations upon the faith of which others are induced to advance moneys or to forbear the enforcement of just demands or sentations. The manager of a bank to which a otherwise to act, are bound to fulfil such reprerailway company was indebted in a large amount, applied to the directors of the company for an undertaking to hand over to the bank such preference shares and debentures as they might obtain anthority to raise in the ensuing session of Parliament. By a subsequent Act the company were empowered to raise £30,000 by the creation of new shares, and (after obtaining a certain certifi cate) to borrow £10,000 on mortgage. Legal proceedings having been threatened by the bank, the secretary of the company proposed that certain of the unissued shares and debentures of the company should be placed in the possession of the bank as collateral security for the debt, and this offer was accepted by the bank. Accordingly two thousand preference shares of £10 each were issued and registered in the names of two directors, and by them transferred to trustee for the bank. Ten debentures of £1000 each were also issued and transferred in the same way. No money was paid by these directors for the shares or the debentures; and (the above certificate not having been obtained) the company had no power to issue the debentures. Held, that the directors must be taken to have represented to the bank that in consideration of the bank forbearing to sue, they would transfer to the bank valid securi ties; that the directors were bound to make good this representation, and were personally liable to pay to the bank the amount of the debt. Held, also, that the trustees for the bank were entitled to have their names removed from the company's register, inasmuch as existed between them and the company: (Beattie V. Lord Ebury, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 350. V.C. B.) no valid contract ever WINDING-UP-CONTRIBUTORY-COMPROMISE. -A contributory, who was unable to pay the calls made in respect of her shares in a company which was in liquidation, took out a summons in the winding-up to compel the official liquidator to accept a certain sum in satisfaction of the claim against her: Held (reversing the decision of Malins, V.C.), that the court had no jurisdiction to compel the liquidator to accept the proposed compromise. The 160th section of the Companies Act 1862 empowers the court to sanction a compromise with a contributory, only when such compromise is assented to by the liquidator: (Pearson's Case, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 379. L.JJ.). WINDING-UP-TRUSTEE OF LEASE-INDEMNITY. The lessee in trust for a company, after the commencement of the winding-up, entered into an arrangement with S., by which S., in consideration of a sum of money paid to him, agreed to accept an assignment of the lease, and to indemnify the trustee against further liability: Held, that the trustee was entitled to prove in the winding-up for such sum, if on inquiry it should be found a fit and proper sum to be paid for the purpose: (Hunt's Claim, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 384. M.R.). CONTRIBUTORY-SECRETARY-CANCELLATION. -The directors of a company passed a resolution that for the purpose of providing money for the working of the undertaking, the offer of T., the secretary, to take up 1000 shares, should be accepted, and that the terms should be that T. should take up at least fifty shares a month. T took up 850 shares, when it was arranged that in order to lessen the expenses of the company, he EPPS'S CHOCOLATE." Nous n'avons en France qu'une should resign his secretaryship, and in consideramatériel et un personnel aussi considérables que ceux be released from liability to take up the 150 seule usine où la préparation du Cacao emploie un tion of his so doing it was resolved that he should que nous avons vus dans l'usine de Messieurs Epps shares remaining. By the articles of the associa C'est une véritable curiosité dans son geure que cette tion, it was provided that the directors might immense fabrique."-La Situation (the Imperialist organ). The wrapper of each cake of Chocolate is alter, rescind, or abandon contracts in such labelled "JAMES EPPS & Co., Homeopathic Chemists, manner as they thought fit: Held, that the direcLondon." Also, makers of Epps's Milky Chocolate tors had power to release T. from his obligation Chocolate and Condensed Milk). to take up the remaining shares on his resigning the secretaryship, and that his name ought not to be retained on the list of contributories: (Thomas's Case, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 386. Rolls.) MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COLLISION INEVITABLE ACCIDENT-PRACTICE.-Inevitable accident in point of law is that which the party charged with the offence could not possibly prevent by the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and maritime skill. The Virgil (2 W. Rob. 201) followed and approved. Where, in a cause of collision, the defence of inevitable accident is raised, the onus of proof lies in the first instance upon the plaintiffs, who must establish that blame does attach to the vessel proceeded against. The onus attaches to the defendants only after a prima facie case of negligence and want of due seamanship has been shown against them. The Boling (3 Notes of Cases, 210), followed and approved. If a party to a collision suit intends to rely upon a particular act of negligence, he is bound to set out that act in his pleadings, and it is not sufficient that the act may be included in an allegation in the pleadings which does not clearly express their intention, as the not having stated it is likely to mislead the other party and prevent him coming to meet that case. Two sailing vessels were meeting end on in a dense fog and sighted each other at a distance of about 200 yards. The defendants' vessel having been close hauled on the port tack was then preparing to go about, and had eased off her head sheets. Both vessels immediately ported, but came into collision. The plaintiffs' petition alleged that the defendants' vessel neglected to port, and it was proved in answer to a question by the Judge of the Admiralty Court that the head sheets of the defendants were not again hauled aft. On this evidence the vessel was found to blame, on the ground that she had not executed all the proper manoeuvres which she might have executed after sighting the other versel. Only one minute elapsed between the time of sighting and the collision. Held (reversing the decision of the court below), that the collision was the result of an inevitable accident, the defendants' vessel having done all that could be effected by ordinary care, caution, or maritime skill in the short space of time that elapsed; and that the plaintiffs, if they meant to rely upon the head sheets not having again been hauled back, onght to have alleged that fact in their petition, the allegation of the neglect to port not sufficiently indicating the nature of the charge. The rule of the Admiralty Court in cases where a collision is found to be the result of inevitable accident, is to make no order as to costs, unless it can be shown that the suit was brought unreasonably and without sufficient prima facie grounds, and this rule is followed by the Court of Appeal. The London (Bro. & Lush. 82; 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 348; 1 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 398), followed: (The Marpesia, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 333. Priv. Co.) and that the steamer should be delivered up at PRACTICE-SOLICITOR'S LIEN-NECESSARIES COUNTY COURTS. -- BRADFORD COUNTY COURT. (Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Esq., Q. C., Judge.) FOWLER AND ANOTHER v. WHITLEY. Power of County Court judge to add a plea at the hearing in action in Superior Court sent for trial by consent-Rennison v. Walker (L. Rep. 7 Ex. 143)-19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, ss. 23, 57-Right to light and air not subject of grant, gained by occupancy-Protected against interruption on ground of legal obligation resting on user for twenty years without interruption on contract erpress or implied Moon v. Rawson (3 B. & C. 340)-Under what circumstances contract not implied. the said obstruction. No objection was raised on the part of the plaintiff to the power of this court to authorise the addition of this plea, and Rennison v. Walker (L. Rep. 7 Ex. 143), and 18 & 19 Vict. c. 108, ss. 23, 57, may be referred to as authorities for the exercise of this power. The facts of the case out of which the question arose were as follows:-James Garnett was originally the owner in fee of the properties now possessed by the plaintiff and defendant. By deed, dated 29th Dec. 1849, James Garnett duly conveyed to Jacob Scott, as a purchaser for value, the fee simple of the plot of ground upon which the defendant's messuages have since been erected. In that conveyance the property is described as a plot of land containing 1318 square yards, bounded on west and south by other property of Garnett, and is conveyed subject to the obligation by Scott to make and maintain a road across the plot from east to west, 8 yards in width, with causeway on each side, and a drain down the centre of the road for the benefit of Garnett in respect of his land to the west; and there was a covenant by Scott not to place or put out any door or window in any building, now or hereafter to be erected on the said plot of land on the west end thereof, and there was a plan on the conveyance showing the plot of land with its boundaries, and the line and direction of the proposed street, and showing the property on the southern side as the property of Garnett, which is now the property in the possession of the plaintiffs. The portion of the plot which was bounded on the south by Garnett's land, now the plaintiff's, was, at the date of the conveyance in 1849, open and unbuilt upon. In June 1853, Scott completed the erection of five dwelling-houses on that plot, occupying the whole length from east to west, and at the west end there was no door or window put out in conformity with the covenant. The houses so erected faced to the north, and their backs were brought up to the line of the southern boundary and abutted on the land now the plaintiff's. In the backs of these houses there were several windows, and these are the windows obstructed. In 1864 the present defendant purchased from the mortgagees and assignees of Scott all his rights, and became subject to all his liabilities in and to the property conveyed to Scott in 1849. James Garnett died in June 1850, having by his will devised all his property (including the property now in the possession of the plaintiffs) to certain persons in fee upon trust for sale. In 1865, Deborah Pearson contracted with the trustees under Garnett's will for the purchase of the fee simple of the property now in the plaintiff's possession, subject to any right or easements which might exist in or over the same. And by deed His HONOUR.-This was an action of tres. dated 4th Nov. 1868, that contract was carried pass commenced in the Court of Common Pleas into effect by a conveyance duly executed, by at Westminster, and after pleas pleaded sent which the fee simple in that property was condown to this court by consent for trial under veyed to Deborah Pearson with all rights belong19 & 20 Vict, c. 108, sect. 23. The declara-ing thereto (except the right to the use of the tion was in trespass for breaking and entering a close of land of the plaintiffs, pulling up. prostrating, and destroying divers poles and boarding of the plaintiffs, standing and erected in the close, and carrying away and converting the same to defendant's use; damages £100. To the declaration the defendant pleaded five pleas. First. not guilty; secondly, that the close was not the plaintiffs'; thirdly, that the poles were not the plaintiffs'; fourthly, not guilty of trespass for the poles and boarding; fifthly, that at the time of the CHARTER-PARTY- -RESTRAINT OF PRINCES-alleged trespass the defendant was possessed of a BLOCKADE OF PORT OF DISCHARGE-IMPOSIBI- messuage, and that the poles and boarding were LITY OF PERFORMANCE.-To a declaration for a then wrongfully in the said messuage encumbreach of a charter-party, whereby the defendants bering the same and doing damage to defenagreed that their ship should, with all convenient dant. Whereupon he took the said goods and speed, proceed to a spout as directed by the plain- moved them from his said messuage to tiffs, and, having there loaded a cargo of coals, a small and convenient distance, and there should, as soon as wind and weather permitted, left them for plaintiffs' use, doing no more proceed to Hamburg, and there deliver the same, than was necessary for that purpose. The real restraints of princes and rulers" (amongst other question in controversy between the parties was things) excepted, the defendants pleaded, in the right of the defendant, to the enjoyment of various pleas, that before any breach war was light and air over the plaintiffs' land, and cer being carried on between Germany (wherein the tain windows in the defendant's manufactories. said port of Hamburg was situated) and France; This right the plaintiffs had obstructed by perthat Hamburg was blockaded by the French mitting the erection of poles and boarding on fleets; and that defendants were ready to perform their land. These the defendant had removed, their contract so far as they were not hindered treating them as a nuisance which he was justi. and prevented by any of the excepted causes. fied in abating, and insisting that he lawfully Held, on demurrer, that the blockade was a "re- entered the plaintiffs' land for that purpose. At straint of princes and rulers," and, therefore, that the close of the case on both sides, it appearing the defendants were justified in refusing to carry that the real question was as stated. I was of out the contract. The performance of the whole opinion that none of the pleas as pleaded properly undivided contract being rendered impossible by raised it. and therefore the defendant applied for one of the excepted causes, the defendants were leave to add a plea raising the question. Such leave not bound to perform a part of it, viz., the loading was given, and a plea added accordingly, which was of the ship: (Geipel v. Smith, 26 L. T. Rep. to this effect :-That before committing the alleged N. S. 361. Q. B.) grievances defendant was possessed of certain dwelling-honses adjoining the plaintiffs' land, and was entitled to have the light and air enter into certain windows therein; that the poles and boarding wrongfully and unlawfully obstructed the light and air and darkened the windows, wherefore defendant entered the plaintiffs' close and pulled down the poles and hoarding to remove MORTGAGE OF SHIP-RIGHT TO FREIGHTPRIORITY-NOTICE.-A. mortgaged a ship, then on her outward voyage, to B.. and the mortgage was duly registered. Three days before the mortgage of the ship. A. mortgaged the homeward freight to C., but C. omitted to give notice of such mortgage to B. Held, that B. was entitled to the hameward freight. Lindsay v. Gibbs (22 Beav. 522), observed upon : (Wilson v. Wilson, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 346. V.C. M.) SALVAGE CHARTERER AND OWNER-RIGHT TO REWARD-PRACTICE IN A CONSOLIDATED SUIT.-A charterer hired a ship from her owner under a charter-party, which stipulated that the charterer should bear all expenses, pay the wages of the crew, and all charges incidental to the running of the steamer, except marine insurance, Shaw, instructed by Taylor, Jeffery, and Little, water supplied to the dwelling houses, thereby conveyed by means of a pipe, which conducts the same from other premises of the vendors, and reserving the right of the vendors to cut off and remove the pipe when they might think proper. The plaintiffs are the tenants of Deborah Pearson, and the property is in their occupation as such tenants. Since the purchase of the property by Deborah Pearson, she has applied to the defendant to pay her an acknowledgment for the windows at the back of his dwelling house, which look immediately upon and into the yard occupied by the plaintiff. The defendant has refused to pay any acknowledgment, insisting that he is entitled to the light and air necessary for their use and enjoyment. In October last, in consequence of such refusal, the poles and hoarding in question were erected on the plaintiffs' land, with their permission and consent, by Deborah Pearson, for the purpose of obstructing the access of light and air to the defendant's window, and to prevent a right thereto being gained by lapse of time, and the defendant admitted he afterwards, by force, removed some of them, as being an obstruction. At the hearing, it was first contended for the defendant that the action was not maintainable by the plaintiffs because they had only an easement over the yard, and the poles and hoarding were really nut up by, and were the property of, Deborah Pearson, but I was of opinion that the yard was part of the premises demised to the plaintiffs in their occupation as tenants, and as the poles and hearding were upon the property in their possession with their consent, they had a sufficient right to the possession to maintain trespass against a wrong doer, and that the onus lay upon the defendant to justify the removal. It was then attempted to establish in evidence that the windows had been opened, and the light and air enjoyed without interruption for more than twenty years; that they were first opened in 1850, and not obstructed till 1871; but upon this point the evidence failed, and I was satisfied that the hoardings were not erected, nor the wind 80. opened, for the use and enjoyment of light and air before June 1858. Mr. Jordan, for the defendant, then insisted that upon the true effect of the conveyance of 1849 Garnett must be taken to have expressly granted the right to open the windows in question. The land, it is said, was plainly intended to be built upon, and as Garnett had expressly prohibited Scott from opening any door or window on his land to the west, the part abutting on his land to the south could not be built upon advantageously unless Scott could put out windows, as he afterwards did, and the contrary construction would be a grievous hardship. In a question of this nature any consideration of hardship cannot be entertained, the rights and liabilities of the parties must be defined and be decided upon the legal effect of the transaction. Mr. Jordan contended strongly that the case was one of express grant upon the construction of the deed of 1819, and that the case was governed by the decision in Pyer v. Carter (1 H. & N. 922). I have been unable to find in the deed any terms which amount to an express grant; what is claimed is a right to the uninterrupted enjoyment of light and air over the land of Garnett (now the plaintiffs'), in favour of buildings which were afterwards erected by Scott, and are now the defendant's, and to such a case that of Pyer v. Carter appears to me to have no application whatever. In Pyer v. Carter the owner of two houses, A. and B. constructed a set of drains commencing in A. and passing through A. and B. by which the drainage of both houses was carried into the common sewer. He sold A. to the plaintiff and B. to the defendant, not noticing in either conveyance the expense of the drains. The defendant made alterations in the drains under B. which interfered with the drainage; this drew off the drainage from A., and it was held that he could not lawfully do That in each case the property was conveyed as it existed. The defendant acquired B. with the burden of the servitude of the drain in favour of A., and the plaintiff acquired A. with the benefit of the servitude upon B., and this result was the legal effect of the conveyance of the respective properties, and not dependent in either case upon a grant or reservation, express or implied. It is plain such a case can have no application to the present. Mr. Jordan relied upon another ground, that of an implied grant arising from the character of the property and the purpose to which it was to be inferred from the deed the property was intended to be applied. No authority was cited, and I am not aware of any which would warrant the implication of such a grant. In truth the right to light and air is not the subject of grant; it is not an easement to be exercised over and upon the land of another, such as a right of common, or right of way, or the right to lateral support. Every owner of land has a right to the light and air as they descend naturally upon his land, and therefore each owner has by law a right to build up to the limit of his own land, although in doing so he obstructs his neighbours' windows, unless the neighbour has acquired a right to prevent such obstruction either by uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years and upwards, or by contract expressed or implied. The law is thus stated by Littledale, J., in Moore v. Rawson (3 B. & C.340)," Light and are not being to be used in the soil of the land of another are not the subject of actual grant. But the right to insist upon the non-obstruction or non-interruption of them, more properly arises by a covenant which the law would imply not to interrupt the free use of the light and air." This I take for my guide, as a correct statement and exposition of the law. Light and air are the subject merely of occupancy, not of grant, but the occupancy will be protected from obstruction or interruption in cases in which the law will recognise an obligation to abstain from obstruction or interruption. These cases are enjoyment for twenty years and upwards, or contract express or implied. In the present case, enjoyment for twenty years has not been proved, and there is no express contract. The question remains whether a contract not to obstruct or interrupt ought to be implied from the nature of the transaction, as evidenced by the deed of 1849. The subsequent dealings with the property have not, in my opinion, varied the rights and liabilities as created by that deed. The defendant now represents all the rights and liabilities thereby vested in Scott, and the plaintiff's, through their landlady, now represent the rights and liabilities of Garnett in respect of the matter in dispute. The deed conveyed the property to Scott, with certain special restrictions upon his ownership, amongst others, a restriction that on any building then or thereafter to be erected, he should not put out any door or window opening on Garnett's land on the west. Nothing is said as to Garnett's land on the south. Therefore, as to that, there is no restriction; and for anything expressly contained in the deed to the contrary, Scott would be free to build up to his southern boundary, and put out windows overlooking Garnett's land to the south. If complaint had been made by Garnett in his repre sentation that the defendant's windows, when put out in 1853, interfered with light and air to the windows in Garnett's houses (now the plaintiffs'), which, it appeared in the evidence, had been erected long previous to 1849, a fair question would have arisen whether Scott had not acquired the right to throw out those windows by the implication arising from the express restriction in the deed being construed to windows to the west, and from an application of the rule, Expressio unius exclusio alterius. Although this question might have been answered by say ing that as there were buildings on the south with windows which the law would protect without reservation, any reservation applicable to them was unnecessary; but there being no building with windows on the west, express reservation as to them was necessary. The claim, however, made by the defendant is cf a very different character, it is not a claim to protect himself in the enjoyment of his own rights of property, but it is a claim to prevent the plaintiffs, and through them Pearson, from exercising their rights of property. What has been done by the plaintiff, the erection of the poles and hoarding on their own land, is in itself a lawful act, and though its necessary effect and consequence be to cause damage to the defendant's windows, that is immaterial to the plaintiffs unless the defendant can show that the act was unlawful by reason of its interfering, through its effect and consequence, with a right which he had acquired as against the plaintiffs or those under whom they claim. How does the defendant show a right in him to prevent the plaintiffs exercising their right of property? During the argument I suggested the question whether the effect of the deed of 1849 was to prevent Garnett from building on his land up to the boundary of the land conveyed to Scott. The question did not raise an answer during the argument, but it seems to me that upon the true answer to that question the decision of this case must depend. How would the case have stood if there had been contained in the deed a covenant on the part of Scott with Garnett, to build on the land with the restriction not to put out any door or window to the west. It is not necessary to say there is no such covenant. Scott was under no liability to build, he might have left the land unbuilt upon for years, or he might have found he could have turned it to a more profitable account than building upon it, or if he built he might have found it to his interest to have erected a building which had no windows or opening toward the south. The rights and liabilities of Garnett and Scott depending upon the true construction of the deed of 1849 must be fixed at the time of its execution, and this construction could not be varied by subsequent events; and, as there was no liability on the part of Scott to build at any time or in any particular form, as affecting the land facing south, so there could be no liability on the part of Garnett to abstain from exercising his rights of property on his land in the meantime, and if immediately after the sale to Scott, Garnett had been minded to have pulled down the then existing houses, and covered the whole area with a warehouse or other building abutting up to the land sold to Scott, Scott could not, in my opinion, have prevented him, although, if he had been so foolish as to put out windows on the side facing Scott, Scott could, at any time within twenty years, have blocked them out, either by a permanent building of his own, or by erecting poles and hoarding against them, as the plaintiffs have done. The judgment will, therefore, be entered generally for the plaintiffs, with 1s. damages, and costs, and there will be the usual certificate that the right came in question, and the costs be taxed accord ingly. I presume the defendant will be entitled to appeal, as of right; but if my leave be required I give it, as the decision may seriously affect the value of his property. Hearfield appeared for the plaintiffs, and Lowe (Moss, Lowe, and Moss) for the defendants. His HONOUR, in delivering judgment, said the suit was instituted by Messrs. Barkworth and Spaldin, merchants, and owners of a cargo loaded on board the vessel Bertha, against the owner or owners of the ship, to recover damages consequent on the non-delivery of the said cargo within a reasonable time, and deterioration caused to the cargo by delay. The Bertha was a Prussian vessel, sailing under the flag of the North German Confederation, and her owners and master and crew were subjects of the Confederation. In the month of April 1870 the ship was lying at Shields, and on the 30th April 1870, a charter-party was entered into between her master and Messrs. Barkworth and Spaldin. By such charter-party, which was in the English language, the Bertha was to proceed to Hudiks wall (with liberty to take an outward cargo from the Tyne to Swinemunde), and there load from the agents of the said affreighters a full and complete cargo of deals, battens, &c., not exceeding in. boards, with necessary ends, 8ft. and under, for broken stowage only, and there with proceed to Hull, in dock, as ordered, on arrival, and deliver the same on being paid freight as therein mentioned (restraint of princes and rulers, the act of God, the Queen's enemies, fire, and all and every other damages and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigations of whatever nature and kind during the said voyage always mutually excepted). In pursuance of the said charterparty, and in accordance with the charterer's orders, the ship proceeded to Hudiks wall, and the said Messrs. Barkworth and Spaldin caused to be shipped on board a cargo of deals, battens, and boards, and the master of the Bertha signed and delivered a bill of lading, which bill of lading referred to the charter-party, and stated the goods were shipped in good order and condition, and agreed to deliver them in the like good order and condition at the port of Hull, according to the terms of the charter-party. On the 16th July the ship was cleared at the Custom-house at Hudikswall, and was ready to sail that day, but was prevented by adverse wind, which was south-east; on the 17th the wind remained in the south-east, and also on the 18th. On the 20th July it changed to the north. Being prevented sailing on the 16th July by adverse winds, the master went on shore in the evening, and was given to understand that war had broken out; subsequently a telegram was sent to the consul at Stockholm, and in consequence of his reply the Bertha and two other German ships remained at Hudikswall. On the 14th Aug. the master dismissed part of his crew, part of whom were liable to military service. Between the 16th July and 1st Oct. several telegrams passed between the master of the Bertha and the masters of the other two ships, and the consul at Stockholm; in consequence of the information received, the three ships remained at Hudiks wall. On the 1st Nov., the Bertha sailed for Swinemunde, a part of the men refusing to go on board or sign articles, except on the condition that they should go there, and no other men were obtainable, in consequence of the fear of capture. The Bertha arrived at Swinemunde on the 9th Nov. The crew which had been shipped at Hudiks. wall hearing at Swinemunde that the French cruisers had been burning ships in the North Sea, refused to continue their voyage to Hull, and the master was occupied in obtaining another crew and doing some repairs to his sails till the 10th Dec., when he sailed for Hull; but the wind came on to blow from the north-west, and he was compelled to return, but finally left on the 12th Dec., and arrived at Hull on the 23rd. It is contended on the part of the defendants, that the Bertha was justified in not sailing from Hudiks wall in consequence of the war between France and Prussia, and the case of the Teutonia (41 L. J. 4 Adm.) is relied on as a case in point. In that case it appeared that the Teutonia might have entered the port of Dunkirk, to which she was bound, between four o'clock on the 17th and the morning of the 19th July 1870, something like a day and a half before the formal declaration of war by the French Government, which was on the 19th. This was the principal contention of the plaintiffs on that part of the case, and on it the learned judge of the High Court of Admiralty said, "I think there can be no doubt that war may exist de facto so as to affect at least the subjects of the belligerent State, either without a declaration on either side, or before a declaration, or with a unilateral declaration only." On the 17th, instead of going to Dunkirk, the Teutonia went to the Downs to seek information about the On the following day, Monday, the 18th, the master telegraphed to his owner, and was ordered not to go to Dunkirk, and on the following day he was prevented going by the declaration war. of war. A to whether these circumstances did not justify the Teutonia in pausing and making further inquiries before she entered the port of Dunkirk, the learned judge said: "I am of opinion that they did justify her in so doing, and that she was entitled to take reasonable measures within a reasonable time for this purpose. The law would be most unrea sonable, I think, if it considered such a course to be a breach of contract." And he also decided that "the master of the Teutonia did not exceed a reasonable time in making inquiries respecting the war. Since the hearing of this suit in the High Court of Admiralty, the case has been taken on appeal before the Privy Council, and however strong my own opinion may have been, I was desirous of seeing the decision of the Privy Council before giving my judgment. The Judicial Com nittee of the Privy Council, in confirming the udgment of the High Court of Admiralty, say hat under the circumstances of the case the naster of the Teutonia "was entitled to pause and so take a reasonable time to make further inquiries, and that he did not exceed the limits of a reasonable time in making inquiries." It is curious that the time taken by the master of the Teutonia and the master of the Bertha was about the same in BANKRUPTCY LAW. LIVERPOOL BANKRUPTCY COURT. Thursday, May 9. (Before Mr. Serjeant WHEELER, LL.D., Judge.) Solicitor's bill of costs-Right of proof. TRINITY TERM.-In the Queen's Bench there are 92 matters, consisting of 43 rules for new trials and one for judgment, in the special paper three for judgment and 37 for argument, and of enlarged rules two for judgment and six for argument. In the Common Pleas there are 115 matters, the heaviest list for some time. There are nine enlarged rules, 81 in the special paper, nine cases standing for judgment, including two registration appeals and 16 rules for new trials. In the Exchequer there are of errors and appeals six, four new trial rules for judgment, and 20 for argument, ten in the special paper for judgment and 19 for argument, and in the peremptory paper five rules. The Courts will sit at the usual hour, as the Lord Chancellor does not receive the Judges on the first day of Trinity Term. SALE OF THE TRING PARK ESTATE. This duration, and was on the same days, viz., the 16th, 17th, and 18th July. According to these decisions it is quite clear the master of the Bertha had a right to pause to make inquiries, and did not exceed a reasonable time in making such inquiries. Suppose the vessel had sailed for Hull on the 16th, as it was contended (the ship being cleared) that she ought to have done, the declaration of war being made on the 19th, and the voyage from Hudikswall to Hull being fourteen days at the least, it is obvious that she would run great risk of capture. But the case of the Bertha differs from that of the Teutonia in this material fact, she was unable to sail on the 17th and 18th, in consequence of an adverse wind, which did not change until the formal declaration of war, and it is admitted that after that she was not bound to sail. This disposes of the case so far as the detention atHudiks wall. Then, it is contended that there was Ian unnecessary deviation in going to Swinemunde it. It appears that Messrs Lace and Co., acting Domesday Book, showing that it was granted by the master went to his own home for five or six of Mr. Blackburn. A MOTION in this case was made some weeks ago by Mr. Gill, representing his late firm of Lace and Co., for an order upon Mr. Bolland, the trustee of Messrs. Blackburn, Schofield, and Co., to admit a proof of debt for £900 against the separate estate important domain, comprising 3643 acres, with a noble mansion and deer park, situate in the The points raised in course of the arguments said to have been the abode of Royalty, was on county of Herts, within thirty miles of London, are fully discussed in the following judgment: His HONOUR.-This is an application to reverse Tuesday last week brought to the hammer, at the the decision of the trustee in bankruptcy, reAuction Mart, in the City of London, by Messrs. jecting the proof of debt of Messrs. Lace and Co. Chinnock, Galsworthy, and Chinnock, under the direction of the Court of Chancery. In a preface supported the application; Mr. Kenion opposed of this demesne is traced from its first entry in upon the separate estate of Blackburn. Mr. Gill to the illustrated particulars of sale, the history and also unnecessary detention there. In going parties, co-shareholders and co-adventurers with his only daughter and heiress, Matilda, who was as the attorneys for Blackburn and some other the Conqueror to Earl Eustace, and descended to from the Tyne to Hudikswall the charter-party him in a lead mining company, limited, instituted married to King Stephen. It was subsequently provided that the vessel should have liberty to a suit in Chancery against the promoters of the take an outward cargo to Swinemunde, and it company on the ground of fraud, and succeeded in granted to the Abbot of Faversham, but having appears to be a matter of not unfrequent occur- obtaining a decree for a large sum of money. With been exchanged with the King, became the rence that vessels touch at Swinemunde on their this adventure, and with the litigation flowing out property of Edward III., who granted it to voyages to the south; and, in confirmation of of it Blackburn's partners had nothing to do. The in the possession of the several archbishops to the the Archbishop of Canterbury, and it continued this, it is stated that the Bertha found the two other vessels there which had previously sailed has been unproductive by reason of the defendants of Parliament in the King, his heirs, and succesdecree in favour of Blackburn and his co-plaintiffs time of Henry VIII., when it was vested by Act from Hudikswall. As the season was advancing in the suit having become bankrupt. The bill of (1st Nov.) the master became anxious to proceed costs of Messrs. Lace and Co., which has not yet the Archbishop; then reconveyed to the Crown; sors for ever. It was regranted by Edward VI. to on his voyage, but a portion of the crew would been taxed, amounts to about 9001., and these not come on board unless they were to go to Swin emunde, and no other men were obtainable gentlemen seek to prove for the amount upon the granted by Queen Mary to Henry Peckham, who estate of Blackburn. The rejection by the trustee lost it on being attainted of treason, and it refrom fear of being captured at Hudikswall. Part of the proof has occasioned this appeal to me. verted to Queen Elizabeth; descended to James I.: It of the crew had shipped for Swinemunde and part is admitted that some of the co-adventurers for his second son Charles Prince of Wales, afterto his eldest son Henry Prince of Wales; then to - for Hull; but when the Bertha arrived at Swine- whom Messrs. Lace and Co., acted in the suit are munde they heard, as has been before stated, still solvent, and that recourse has not been had wards Charles I., by whom it was settled upon that the French cruisers had been burning to them for payment of the bill of costs. It is his Queen, Henrietta Maria. Having been conships in the North Sea, and the crew refused to also admitted that there is no joint fund or estate fiscated during the Commonwealth and sold, it continue the voyage. This compelled the master of the co-adventurers available for payment. It sented by him, after the restoration, to the Merry was purchased by a loyal subject, and preto look out for another crew, and he was so occupied till he sailed on the 10th Dec.; but in cases of joint liability by various co-contractors, was further admitted that, prior to the present act, Monarch, who granted it to Henry Guy, Esq., after putting to sea the wind began to blow from the right of proof upon the estate of a bank- subsequently Clerk to the Treasury during one of the grooms of the bedchamber and the north-west, which obliged him to put back. She finally sailed on the 12th, and arrived at Hull rupt co-contractor did not exist except for the four reigns. He built the mansion a little over on the 23rd. It appears that whilst at Swinemunde purposes of voting, so long as there was any 200 years since, and being a man of some consolvent co-contractor, or any joint estate, how-siderable importance and first favourite at court, state of things is altered by the present Act, and ever small. Mr. Gill, however, contends that this that under the 31st section the debt of his late firm is provable in its entirety upon the separate estate of Blackburn, and that under sect. 32 the right of proof carries with it the right to dividend concurrently with the other creditors, except in certain specified cases, of which this is not one. In support of this contention, reference was made to a recent case before the Lords Justices, ex parte The Lynvir Coal and Iron Com pany, Limited, re Hyde (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 609). There can be no doubt that the words of the 31st section are very comprehensive, and that they include as provable debts entitled to dividend debts and liabilities which before the statute were excluded. The question is whether, in the particular case before the court, any change has been made, either by the statute or by the rules the law of administration of the assets of a in pursuance of it, in what may be called bankrupt. Under the old law, when all the coadventurers were judicially insolvent, proof might have been made upon the estate of each for the whole debt. If all were not insolvent, then the solvent co-adventurer, having first paid the debt, for the bankrupts' proportion of it. After very was entitled to prove upon the bankrupts' estate carefully considering the question, it appears to me that this state of things has not been altered by the present statute, or by the rules made in pursuance of it, and that the case therefore ranges that section, be determined according to the prinunder the 78th section, and must, in the terms of ciples, practice, and rules which prevailed in courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy before the passing of the existing Act. In that view I must decline to disturb the conclusion to which the trustee has come in resisting the proof, on the ground that Messrs. Lace and Co. are not entitled to prove and receive dividend upon the separate estate of Blackburn for the amount of their bill of costs concurrently with his separate creditors. days, but that I think is not material, as it clearly was not the cause of his delay, and he stated it was to look for men. When the Bertha left Hudikswall, though it was in the mind of the master to proceed to Hull, yet he had determined first to go to Swinemunde under circumstances that compelled him to do so, viz., that part of his crew would not go on board unless he did so, and he could not obtain a sufficient crew without to man his ship. In this light his going to Swinemunde can scarcely be called a deviation. It was moving from one safe port to another safe port to reach his port of destination; but if it were a deviation, the damage to the cargo (which was damage, caused by the length of time it had been shipped) was not caused by it, for if he had not sailed there he would have remained at Hudiks wall, and damage must be caused by consequence of the deviation to make the parties liable: (Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716, Abbott on Shipping, 321; Thompson v. Hopper, 26 L. J. 18, Q. B.). Accord ing to the German law (Papers on Maritime Legislation, with a translation of mercantile law, by Ernst Emil Wendt, and second part of Article 631 and Article 636)-" when before the commencement of the voyage a war has been declared in consequence of which the vessel, or the goods to be shipped according to the contract of affreight ment, or both, can no longer be considered free, and would be liable to risk of capture," then "either party has a right to withdraw from the contract without being liable to damages." As in this case neither party thought proper to withdraw from the contract, each must remain liable to such consequences as the circumstances occurring during the continuance of the contract involve. The rumour of war current at Hudikswall on the evening of the 16th July justified the master pausing to make inquiries, and the war being declared on the 19th, I do not think the time was unreasonable for the master to delay the sailing of his vessel in order to make those inquiries, but whether or not the wind was adverse, and did not become favourable till the 20th, the day after the formal declaration of war, when he clearly was not bound to sail, and the war having continued from that time till long after the arrival of the vessel at Hull, I am of opinion that the Bertha was not bound to sail from either Hudikswall or Swinemunde, and therefore is not liable for the damages caused by the detention. Verdict for defendants. LEGAL NEWS. chambers occupied by the king being still known he entertained King Charles-one of the bedas King Charles's room. It afterwards became the property of Sir William Gore, who was Lord Mayor of London, and after being enjoyed by his son, grandson, and great grandson, came into passed from him to the family of the present venthe possession of Sir Drummond Smith, and dors. It will thus be seen that this noble domain has been personally owned by no less than twelve or thirteen kings and queens of England, and it may therefore be termed a right royal domain. One the auctioneer is the right of free warren and free important feature of the property as pointed out by chase. This was first granted by Edward I. in 1297, to Henry Guy, in 1680. It originally gave the exand is now held by a direct grant from the Crown clusive right of preserving game and sporting over the whole manor, embracing nearly 8000 acres, but, as now maintained, it gives, in addition to the exclusive right over the 3643 acres in the estate, a concurrent right with the freeholders over the other lands within the manor. The LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL. QUESTIONS FOR THE FINAL EXAMIÑA. TION. EASTER TERM, 1872.-FIRST DAY. I. PRELIMINARY. Questions 1 to 5 inclusive. II. COMMON AND STATUTE LAW AND PRACTICE 6. In an action brought under the "Bills of Mr. Justice KEOGH will give his decision on the Exchange Act," what steps must be taken by Galway election petition next Monday. LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' SOCIETY.-Mr. R. Y. D. Yelverton has resigned the Honorary Secretaryship of this Society. defendant previous to entering an appearance? 9. Summons to stay on payment of a sum named. and cost before the judge at chambers. Plaintiff claims more: defendant pays into court the sum named; plaintiff continues his suit, and fails to recover more. How will this affect the final costs? 10. By an authorised course of dealing, a servant was in the habit of ordering goods from a tradesman on his master's credit; certain goods were so ordered and supplied; and the servant was afterwards furnished by his master with the money to pay for them. The servant omitted to pay for the goods. Who is liable to the tradesman for the price of the goods? and why? 11. What is the provision of rule 174 (Hilary Term, 1853) as to reckoning days? 12. To what costs is a married woman entitled, who succeeds on a plea of coverture, pleaded by her in person? 13. Describe the actions of "Trover" and "Detinue;" and point out the distinction between the judgments in them respectively? 14. What counter-claims can be "set-off" in actions of contract, and what not? 15. When the recovery of a debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations, does a lien on goods or deeds held as a security for the debt remain in force, or is it determined? and why? 16. For what acts of a servant is a master responsible in law? 17. What are "general average" and "particular average?" 18. How can a judgment creditor take advantage of debts due to his judgment debtor from third parties? 19. Can the landlord of a house distrain the goods of a lodger for rent due from his own tenant? and how has this right been affected by, recent legislation? 20. State the mutual arrangements as to profit and loss which would create a partnership as between the members of a firm, or as affecting liability to strangers. III. CONVEYANCING. 21. A. bequeaths £50 to B., and appoints C. his executor. C. and the wife of B. are the two witnesses to the will. What effect has this on 42. How is a suit in equity instituted in the case of (1) infants, (2) lunatics, (3) married women, (4) paupers? 43. State the various modes of defence which can be adopted for the purpose of resisting the plaintiff's demand, describing and distinguishing each. 44. State some of the cases in which the assistance of the court of equity can be obtained without any bill filed. 45. What is the meaning and object of taking evidence "de bene esse"? 46. State the ground on which a court of equity consents to relieve against penalties. 47. Give briefly a few of the principal rules governing the discretion of a judge in equity in allowing or refusing costs of a suit. 48. Give instances of the principle acted upon by courts of equity, "that a trustee shall not profit by his trust.' 49. What acts are considered by a court of equity as insufficient acts of part performance: and what as sufficient to take a contract out of the Statute of Frands? 50. What is the doctrine of resulting trusts as applicable to a stranger advancing the consideration money for the nominal purchaser; and to a parent for a child? 51. What constitutes an infant a ward of Chancery: and what are some of the advantages of placing an infant in that position? 52. In what respect is a married woman liable for any contracts, debts, or charges created by her during her coverture? 53. When a trust estate devolves on an infant, 54. When a trustee or executor has stock of 74. What is embezzlement by a clerk or servant' under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96; and what is the punishment for it? 75. What is necessary to make a principal in the second degree in cases of felony? 76. In what cases is a wife a competent witness against her husband? 77. The book-keeper of a firm embezzles bank. notes, the private property of one of the partners. How can he be brought under the statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96? 78. How many counts may be included in the same indictment for larceny ? 79. What renders a person guilty of publishing a libel? 80. Define perjury at common law. 81. What must be proved to support an indictment for perjury? 82. What is the court of general quarter sessions: and what are the limits of its jurisdiction? 83. In what cases can a justice of the peace take bail? 84. What is the commission of oyer and ter miner and to whom is it directed? 85. What is the duty of a justice of the peace upon a prisoner being brought before him; and by what statute is it regulated? CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION. Nor-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free disenssion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or stateinents contained in it the validity of the will, on the bequest to B., and £50, are desirous of making their debtor bankrupt. Court, the fees to attorneys in which are in com on the appointment of C. as executor? 23. A widower makes a will, leaving all his real and personal estate to an only child, a daughter, and afterwards marries again. On his dying with out making any further will, and leaving the above daughter and his wife, and a son and daughter by her, him surviving, how do his real and personal estate go? treaty for sale of his freehold estate, what caution 24. If a client informed you that he was in should you give him; and why? 25. A. devises his freehold estate to his nephew B. for his life, and after his decease in fee to such so, what 57. When there are three respondents to a petition, and the court is of opinion that it fails as against one of the respondents, what is the effect on the case as against the other respondents? 58. May a creditor, to whom a bankrupt is indebted jointly with others, prove on the bankand receive a dividend in competition with separupt's estate, vote at the meetings of creditors, rate creditors? debts, and dealings, between a bankrupt and a THE MAYOR'S COURT LONDON.-I have read with much regret and surprise an article in the LAW TIMES of the 11th inst. on "The Mayor's Court of London." The tone of the article is very different from what I should have expected in a journal professedly devoted to the interest of attorneys, as the bulk of the business of the court represents clear gain to the Profession as it wonld otherwise go to the Court of Requests or Sheriffs' mon with all similar courts merely nominal. I should not, however, have addressed you on the subject had it not been evident that the writer of the article is, imperfectly acquainted with the facts, and where he has stated them correctly they are clearly in favour of the court; for instance, he says, "Court days are frequent, trials are speedy." partly for that purpose (how they have failed is I always thought these were desirable, and that the modern sinall debts courts were established known to all who wish to sue in courts where the courts are held at intervals of two months, as is the case, to my knowledge, in a court not forty miles from London); and as to the pleadings nothing can be simpler. The article says, "The fees are Ichild of B. as B. shall appoint. B. survives A. creditor may or may not claim the benefit thereof. low, the costs are high." The writer does not fifteen months, and appoints the estate to his eldest son C., who survives his father six months. How is succession duty payable on the interests of B. and C., and who is the predecessor in each case? 26. Can a freeholder constitute part of his estate a manor? Give the reason for your answer. 27. A lease contains a condition for re-entry on the tenant assigning or underletting without licence. The landlord gives a licence to underlet only. What effect has this on the condition for re-entry according to the present law? 28. If real estate is conveyed for a trustee in trust for the separate use of a married woman, can she, either by deed or will, dispose of her interest therein, or of the rent and profits, without her husband's consent? 29. State what leases can be made without a deed? 30. Where, by the ancient custom of a manor, the fines are arbitrary, is there any limit to the amount of fine which the lord can enforce? 31. Can an executor make an assignment of leasehold estates, and give a receipt for the pur 60. Define a "special" as distinguished from an the position of an execution creditor in cases of a tion? affected by the bankruptcy of his debtor after Bankruptcy Act for the appropriation of the pay, has been in the army, navy, or civil service, and 64. A bankrupt's rent is two years in arrear; bankrupt after the close of his bankruptcy? chase money, and compel a purchaser to pay keeping in his hands money belonging to a bank. before probate? 32. In examining an abstract, what should be seen to in the case of one of the deeds being executed under a power of attorney? 33. Has an alien any, and what, power to hold and dispose of real estate in England? 34. Is there any necessity to state in a deed all the facts and circumstances affecting its liability to duty, and would any penalty attach to the omission of any of such particulars? 35. To whom does the soil of a river presumptively belong when it runs between the lands of two different owners? and does it make any difference if the river is a tidal river? EASTER TERM, 1872.-SECOND DAY. IV. PRELIMINARY. Questions 36 to 40 inclusive. V. EQUITY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS. 41. Give a short outline of the peculiar powers and duties of a court of equity. rupt's estate? making of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870. in the scale 70. By what courts may the order of a County House of Lords? give figures to prove this. I will give figures to prove that both fees and costs aro low; in an undefended action between £10 and £20 the total with a small debt court, take the debt at £15, the costs to judgment ure £1 19s. 8d.; compare this exclusive of witnesses; on a fi. fa., attorney 55., court fees are £2 5s., attorney 15s., total £3, officer 10s., total 158.; in the small debts courts, £1 2s. 6d., just half as much again and nothing to N. S. E. S. the attorney. of such a court as the Lord Mayor's Court is of [It is a mistake to suppose that the maintenance advantage to the Profession at large. To the few City solicitors who practise there it is doubtless a good court-but the very fact that there are Mayor's Court practitioners is sufficient proof that the court is an unhealthy monopoly.-ED. L. T.] FARMING LEASES.-Notwithstanding the pub lication of more recent works upon "Landlord and Tenant" law, that of Woodfall, published origin by country solicitors. Mr. Clement Cadie, land ally, more than thirty years since, is yet esteemed surveyor, in his recent lecture, thus summed up landlord and tenant as against a yearly agreement: the avantages and disadvantages of a lease to a viz., the landlord's advantages consist in the security of a desirable tenant for a term of years, and the rental is certain to be increased at the is secured from investment in improvements, and commencement of a term. The landlord's capital he may, before the end of the term, resume the possession, from some cause re-enter, and derive benefit from the tenant's improvements. Tenants may be induced to invest money freely, and the landlord may be saved from repairs and expenses incidental to yearly tenancies, so that, in some cases, leases of detached farms were given with this object; yet the disposal of land by the landlord for a term may be inconvenient, especially in the case of a resident landlord, as he may be prevented from selling, exchanging, or carrying out improvements; and an undesirable tenant may harass his landlord for years without molestation. |