the time of filing the bill, was Mr. H. Bull, but in Aug. 1868 Mr. C. Fiddey was substituted for him. William Frost submitted to reconvey the reversion on being repaid his purchase-money and receiving his costs of the suit, and the property was accordingly reconveyed and the bill dismissed by consent. In Aug. 1869 Mr. and Mrs. Jones sold their reversion for £1000 to S. G. Martin, who again sold it to J. L. Heinrich for £1700; and J. L. Heinrich afterwards instituted the suit of Heinrich v. Sutton before Malins, V.C., against some other persons interested in the property. On the termination of the suit of Jones v. Frost, Messrs. Wilkinson and Howlett became the solicitors for Mr. and Mrs. Jones, and they also acted as solicitors for Heinrich in the purchase of this property. Mr. Fiddey had his bill of costs in Jones v. Frost taxed at £129, and he took out a summons in Jones v. Frost, in the chambers of the Master of the Rolls, asking for a charge upon the property recovered, under the 28th section of the Solicitors' Act 1860. The chief clerk refused the application, on the ground, as was stated, that the summons was not entitled in Re Fiddey (a solicitor), and that the suit of Jones v. Frost no longer existed. Mr. Fiddey then took out a summons in the suit of Heinrich v. Sutton to the same effect in the chambers of Malins, V.C., and the chief clerk made the order asked for. The Vice-Chancellor refused an application to discharge this order, and on appeal to the Lords Justices, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor was reversed, the court being of opinion that the order ought to have been made, if at all, in the court of the Master of the Rolls, being that branch of the court to which the suit of Jones v. Frost was attached. Mr. Fiddey now presented a petition to the Master of the Rolls praying that it might be declared that he was entitled to a charge on the property for the amount of his costs. Southgate, Q.C. and C. Dale for the petitioner. Ramadge objected that there was no suit in which the application could be made, the suit of Jones v. Frost being extinct, and also that this was res judicta. Lord ROMILLY said the only question was whether Heinrich purchased the property with notice of the proceedings in the suit of Jones v. Frost, and his Lordship being of opinion that he had such notice, declared Mr. Fiddey to be entitled to a lien on the property. Solicitors: C. Fiddey; Wilkinson and Howlett. Monday, June 24. CROSSEY V. CROSSBY. Agreement. V.C. MALINS' COURT. Friday, June 21. Re ALCHIN'S TRUSTS; Ex parte FURLEY; Ex parte THE EARL OF ROMNEY AND OTHERS. Charitable gift-Insufficient description-Latent | Grimble and Co. In that year he sold the business ambiguity. RICHARD THOMAS ALCHIN, of the Grand Parade, Brighton, by his will dated the 25th Oct. 1869, bequeathed a legacy of £500 "to the treasurer for the time being of the Kent County Hospital, in aid of that institution." The testator died in 1871. The executors paid the above legacy into court under the provisions of the Trustee Relief Act, stating in their affidavit that as far as they were able to ascertain there was no hospital so designated, and that the only institutions with any similarity of name were, "The Kent and Canterbury Hospital," situate at Canterbury; "The Royal Kent Dispensary," situate at Greenwich; "The West Kent General Hospital," and "The Kent County Ophthalmic Hospital," both situate at Maidstone. Petitions claiming the legacy were presented by George Furley, as treasurer of the Kent and Canterbury hospital, and by the Earl of Romney and others, as treasurers of the West Kent General Hospital. It appeared from an affidavit filed on behalf of the Kent County Ophthalmic Hospital, that in a former suit Stuart, V.C., had decided that the Kent County Ophthalmic Hospital was entitled to a legacy bequeathed "to the Kent County Hospital." In that case, however, the testatrix had suffered from diseased eyes, and had been attended by one of the surgeons of the Kent County Ophthalmic Hospital. It also appeared from the evidence that Richard Thomas Alchin possessed some land in the neighbourhood of Greenwich. Freeman for the Kent and Canterbury Hospital. Cutler for the West Kent General Hospital. Waller for the Kent County Ophthalmic Hospital. Oswald for the Royal Kent Dispensary. Batten for the executors. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the legacy must be divided equally between the Kent and Canterbury Hospital and the West Kent General Hospital. Solicitors: Bristow; Evans. V.C. BACON'S COURT. Trade mark-Exclusive right of user-Injury to trade reputation. THIS was a bill praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants from selling cloths under Will-Construction-Trust or absolute interest-particular fancy names invented by the plaintiff, and in particular under the names of "Turin,' "Sefton,' Leopold," and "Liverpool," to which the plaintiff claimed an exclusive right of user. The facts relied upon were that the defendants had given these names to cloths manufactured by themselves, and also that they had used tickets similar in appearance to those used by the plaintiff, and having numbers and colours on them also similar to those used by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff contended that these names, numbers, and colours were adopted with the express intention of deceiving the public. The plaintiff also asserted that defendant's goods were inferior to his, and that his reputation was injured by these imitations. The defendants on the other hand contended that these names were common property, that they were as the terms "Melton" Tweed," simply descriptive of a particular class of goods, and did not indicate the manufacturer of such goods. JOHN CROSSBY, by his will, dated the 3rd June 1868, gave, devised, and bequeathed unto his wife Margaret Crossby £2000 for her own sole and separate use," and then to be divided between her son Richard Thomas Watson and Margaret Jane Archer, if she thinks proper and right to do so." Margaret Crossby claimed this legacy as an absolute gift to her. A further question arose in this suit. On the 9th Nov. 1843 the testator, being then a widower with six children, married the said Margaret Crossby, who was a widow with three children. It was alleged that previously to such marriage the testator promised Margaret Crossby, then Margaret Watson, that her children should be made equal in every respect with his at his death. On the proposed marriage of Margaret Jane Watson, one her children, the testator wrote a letter to John Archer, the intended husband, which contained the following passage; "I may as well remark, not to deceive you, that I will not be able to give her any fortune at present, but when I am called away I trust to a better world, she will have a share with the rest; and, should it please the Almighty to spare me a few years longer, I may be able to increase the principal to the advantage of the whole." The testator made no provision by his will for the children of his wife by her first husband, but gave the residue of his estate equally amongst his six children, and Mr. and Mrs. Archer now claimed to be entitled to a share in the residue of the estate equally with the children of the testator. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Baily for the plaintiff. Southgate, Q.C. and Haddan for Mr. and Mrs. Archer. Oswald for Margaret Crossby. Fry, Q.C., Chitty, and W. C. Druce for other parties. Lord ROMILLY held that the widow took the legacy of £2000 absolutely, but that Mr. and Mrs. Archer were not entitled to share in the residue, the words used being too vague. His Lord. ship added that in those cases where such a promise had been held to be binding, it had been made in respect of a child of the person making the promise, and not of a mere stranger. Solicitors: Underwood and Colman; Johnson and Weatheralls. or Kay, Q.C., Aston, Q.C., and Davey, for plaintiff. Eddis, Q.C. and Bayshawe, for defendants. Druce watched the case on behalf of other manufacturers. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the cases from the earliest to the present time had been consistent in deciding that when a manufacturer has produced an article to which he has attached a spe cial name and which he is accustomed to sell under a particular trade-mark, he has acquired an exclusive right to the use of such name and trademark, and further that if this name or trademark is infringed the first inventor is entitled at common law to recover damages, and in this court to obtain an injunction. He, therefore, granted the injunction prayed for by the bill and restrained the defendants from using the names and trademarks invented by the plaintiff in such a way as to injure him. Solicitors for plaintiff, Van Sandau and Cumming, for Brook, Freeman, and Batley, Huddersfield. Solicitors for defendants, Learoyd and Learoyd, for Learoyd and Learoyd, of Huddersfield. Saturday, June 22. MOTION v. MOOJEN. Uncertificated bankrupt-Right to file a bill in equity-Fraud and conspiracy. THIS was a suit to set aside the sale of the share of the plaintiff in a business, as having been made under circumstances of fraud and conspiracy. Up to the year 1863, Wm. Hay had carried on a distillery business, trading under the title of to Burdett, who again assigned the contract to the plaintiff, and the latter arranged to carry on the business in conjunction with John Hay the brother of Wm. Hay, and Briggs. Soon after Wm. Hay filed a bill to compel Burdett and the three partners to realise certain book debts, and in this suit an order was made for payment of £6000. This order, though in terms made against Burdett, Briggs, and the plaintiff, was never attempted to be enforced except against the plaintiff. On the advice of Moojen, who was then acting as solicitor to Mr. Briggs and the plaintiff, the latter left the business for eight months, but on his return he was put into Whitecross-street prison for nonpayment of this debt, and was detained there for four months, and until he was made a bankrupt. In the bankruptcy an order was made for the sale by auction of plaintiff's share in the distillery, but owing, as was alleged, to delays and other contrivances of Moojen, acting in the interest of John Hay and Briggs, this sale was never carried into effect, and the plaintiff's share was ultimately purchased from his assignee, by his co-partners, without any sale by auction, and at a price much below its real value. Various other charges of fraud and conspiracy in connec tion with these transactions were made by the plaintiff. The defendants contended that the plaintiff being an uncertificated bankrupt, could not file a bill in this court, or at all events could not do so except with the consent or in the name of his assignee. They also denied the charges of fraud and conspiracy. Kay, Q.C. and Chitty, for the plaintiff. De Gex, Q.C. for Staunton (plaintiff's assignee). The VICE-CHANCELLOR considered that the one important point was as to the right of the plaintiff, being a bankrupt, to maintain this suit. Although there were one or two cases in which this right had been accorded to a bankrupt, still there was a long string of cases on the other side; and the distinction between the two classes of cases was, that in the former the bankrupt had always been without any other remedy. This, he thought, was not the case here, and he therefore was compelled to dismiss the bill. On the ques tion of costs, however, it was clear that each of the defendants might have demurred. This they had not done, but had preferred to go into evidence and to meet the charges of conspiracy, After a careful review of the facts, he was of opinion that they had entirely failed to meet these charges; and though he dismissed the bill, because the law was not made for the plaintiff's hard case, he decided that each of the defendants must bear his own costs. Solicitors: W. E. Parron; Walter and Moojen; J. J. Cridland; James, Curtis, and James; J. R. Chidley. Tuesday, June 25. ASPLIN v. ROSE. Construction of will-Nephews and nieces, whether great nephews and great nieces included. MARY FULCHER, who died in 1866, by her will dated shortly before her death, gave a legacy to her nephew, and also several other legacies, and proceeded as follows: "To my nieces, Ellen Mary and Elizabeth, £5 each, and the above bequests to my nephew and nieces to be in addition to their respective shares of my residuary estate. I direct the residue of my property to be sold, and the net proceeds divided between all my nephews and nieces in equal shares." The testatrix left several nephews, nieces, and also several great nephews and great nieces. It appeared that Ellen Mary and Elizabeth, though described in the will as nieces, were in fact great nieces of the testatrix. It was, thereupon, contended that the testatrix meant to include in the residuary bequest all her great nephews and great nieces under the description of nephews and nieces. Wood for the plaintiff. E. Cooper Willis, Horsey and W. W. Barry for other parties. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that Ellen Mary and Elizabeth being named as nieces were entitled to share in the residue, but not the other great nephews and great nieces. Solicitors: Scard, Poole, and Hughes. V.C. WICKENS' COURT. Thursday, June 20th. COULSON v. TYRELL. Will-Construction-Lithographed form-Blanks not filled up. IN this case a gentleman named Coulson, being desirous of making his will, purchased a litho graphed form in Chancery-lane, and executed it ! on the 6th March 1871. After giving all his real Greene, Q.C. and W. W. Karslake, for the plaintiffs. Dickinson Q.C., and W. Cooper, Karslake Q.C., Bagnall and Dauney for the various defendants. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the will must be construed as if the blanks were not in it. The blanks showed an undoubted intention on the part of the testator of giving other legacies, which intention was never carried into effect. The declaration would be that one moiety must be given to Mr. Coulson, and the other among the four parties named as joint tenants. The costs of all parties must come out of the fund. Solicitors: Wood, Street, and Hayter; Sismey; W. C. Hall. tion. STOTT v. FLADGATE. Succession duty-Foreign property—AdministraTHE question in this case turned upon the succession duty payable on foreign property. The suit was instituted for the administration of the estate of a testator, a part of whose property was at the time of his death in France. Since his death, however, it had been withdrawn from France, without any provision having been made for payment of duty, and was now distributable in this suit. The chief clerk had decided that the property was by the French law liable to succession duty, and this was an appeal on behalf of the persons entitled to the property against that decision. HAWKINS v. HAWKINS. Demurrer-Bill of discovery against trusteesWant of equity. THIS was a demurrer. The plaintiff in the suit was the eldest surviving son of C. S. Hawkins, and tenant for life, subject to his father's and late brother's, C. J. S. Hawkins, life interests in certain settled freeholds and copyholds, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail. The defendants were the plaintiff's father, and the trustees of the settlement. The bill prayed that the defendants might be ordered to produce the settlement, and all other deeds and documents relating to the property comprised therein, which might be necessary to enable the plaintiff to effect a proposed transfer of certain securities created by him, as in the bill mentioned; that the defendants might set forth a full and true statement of the property comprised in or subject to the uses and trusts of the said settlement; that the defendant, C. S. Hawkins, might be ordered to declare upon oath, whether he and his said son, C. J. S. Hawkins, had executed any and what appointments in pursuance of a power in that behalf contained in the said settlement; that the defendant C. S. Hawkins might pay the costs of the suit; and that the plaintiff might have such further or other relief as the nature of the case might require. To this bill the defendants the trustees demurred for want of equity. Dickenson, Q. C. and T. Stevens (for Cracknall) for the demurrer. Joshua Williams, Q. C. and Cust for the bill. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. The COURT (Kelly, C.B., Bramwell, and Channell, B.B.), held that none of the authorities cited went to the extent contended for, and refused tho rule. Rule refused. Attorney for defendant, H. M. Daniel. EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. ERRORS FROM THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Thursday, June 20. TOWERSON v. THE ASPATRIA AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY (LIMITED). Sale of guano by sample-" Guaranteed analysis sent with sample-Bulk differing from sampleVariance between bulk and analysis — Meaning of "guaranteed analysis"-Warranty-Breach of contract. 66 injuries sustained by the plaintiff from the flooding Cur, adv. vult. June 12-BRAMWELL, B. now delivered the considered judgment of the court (Martin, Bramwell, and Channell, BB.) discharging the defendants' rule and holding the ruling of Lush, J. to be correct. Following the decision of the House of Lords in Rylands and another v. Fletcher (19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 220; L. Rep. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 330; 37 L. J. 161, Ex.) they held that the defendants, having for their own purposes made this artificial cut or hollow, which acted as a reservoir for water which would not otherwise have so accumulated, were liable for the escape of such water to the prejudice of the plaintiff; and that as to the overflow from the brook, it was no answer for them to say that there would have been an equal overflow, doing equal damage, had the stream remained in its original and natural course. 66 On the argument of this rule, the Court of Exchequer (Martin, Channell, and Pigott, BB.) held the correspondence amounted to a warranty that the bulk was equal to the sample, but none that it was equal to the analysis. The term "guaranteed analysis" merely meant that the analysis was fairly made in the usual manner according to the custom of the Attorneys for the defendants, Gregory, Row-trade: (See report of the case below, 25 L. T. cliffe, Rowcliffe, and Rawle, 1, Bedford-row, W.C. Rep. N. S. 207.) From that decision the defendants appealed. Rule discharged. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Helder and Roberts, 10, Gray's Inn-square, W.C., agent for Brockbank and Helder, Whitehaven. Thursday, June 6. LONG v. WILLIAMS. H. Giffard, Q. C. (with C. Crompton) argued for the defendants appealing. below. Holker, Q. C. (with Baylis) for the plaintiff, DEFENDANT mortgaged the advowson of Camber-contra, in support of the judgment of the court afterwards recovered judgment against him for well, of which he was incumbent, to plaintiff, who breach of covenants of mortgage, and thereupon a writ of sequestration issued against the benefice. Plaintiff died and his representatives afterwards sold the advowson, but for a sum less than the judgment debt. Poynter now moved on behalf of defendant for a rule calling on plaintiff's representatives to show cause why the writ of sequestration should Trespass-Adjoining mines-Overflow of water not be set aside on the ground that the sale of the from one mine to the other-Artificial reservoir-advowson was a satisfaction of the judgment, and Liability of mine owner for escape of water-cited Tooke v. Hartley (2 Brown Ch. Cas. 125); Negligence-Use of own property-Consequential Lockhart v. Hardy (9 Beav. 349; 15 L. J. N. S. damage. 347, Chan.); Palmer v. Hendrie (27 Beav. 349); ACTION of trespass and to recover damages for Perry v. Barker (8 Ves. 527, and 13 Ves. 198). The COURT (Willes, Byles, Blackburn, Keating, Mellor, Lush, and Brett, JJ.) held that the court below had put too narrow a construction on the correspondence, and that the term "guaranteed analysis" entitled the defendants to have a guano the bulk of which corresponded in its constituent proportions with the analysis sent. To that extent, therefore, the judgment of the Court of Exchequer would be reversed. Judgment reversed. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Helder and Roberts, 10, Gray's-inn-square, W.C. Attorneys for the defendants, Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, 9, Bow Church-yard, E.C., agents for Carrick, Wigton. Friday, June 21. JAMES V. THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. -Prohibition. Admiralty court-Jurisdiction of 24 Vict. c. 10, s. 13-Collision-Personal injury-Loss of goods PLAINTIFF was a passenger in a steamer of the defendants', which, coming into contact with another vessel, sank, whereby he was injured and his luggage lost. He brought an action for the damage so caused. Cross causes were subsequently instituted in the Court of Admiralty between the defendants and the owners of the colliding vessel, and £5000 was paid into that court in lieu of bail. Thereupon a suit was commenced by the defendants for the limitation of their liability to £15 per ton, under the Admiralty Court Act (24 Vict. c. 10), s. 13, which enacts that "when a vessel or the proceeds thereof are under arrest, the Court of Admiralty may entertain a suit for limitation of liability," and the Merchant Shipping Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 4), s. 514, of which, read with the last section, enacts that in cases where any liability has been or is alleged to have been incurred by any owner in respect of loss of life, personal injury, or loss of or damage to ships, boats, or goods, and several claims are made or apprehended in respect of such liability, it shall be lawful for the Court of Admiralty to entertain the suit of any owner for the purpose of determining the amount of such liability, and for the distribution of such amount rateably among the several claimants, with power to the court to stop all actions and suits pending in any other court in relation to the same subject matter. A judge's order was granted ordering a stay of all actions arising out of the collision, the London and South-Western Railway Company undertaking to admit their liability if judgment should be given against them in the damage suits. Judg. ment was given that they were entitled to limited liability, at the rate of £15 per ton, on the registered tonnage of the steamer. The defendants paid into court the sum to which, on that calculation, they might be liable, and admitted their liability unconditionally. An application was then made to the Court of Admiralty by the defendants for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from bringing his action for the loss and injury he had sustained. The plaintiffs declared in prohibition to prevent the injunction. On demurrer the Court of Exchequer held that the Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for limited liability, or to grant the injunction, inasmuch as neither the ship nor the proceeds, nor anything equivalent to the proceeds, were under arrest at the time of the institution of the suit, and that the prohibition must issue. On error brought. Sir John Karslake, Q. C. (with him Wood, Q. C. and Cohen) for the defendants below. W. G. Harrison (with him Manisty, Q. C.) for the plaintiffs. The COURT (Willes, Byles, Keating, Blackburn, Lush, and Brett, JJ.) held that as the money paid into court was not paid in to save the ship from arrest, and could not in any sense be said to be the ship or the proceeds thereof, that the Court of Admiralty had not jurisdiction. Judgment affirmed. Saturday, June 22. MOUFFLET v. COLE. Covenant not to set up a trade within a certain distance-Breach of-Mode of measuring such distance. ACTION to recover damages for the breach of an agreement upon the sale of the goodwill of a public house. The declaration charged that by a deed dated 10th Feb. 1871, made between the plaintiff and defendant, after reciting a contract between them for the purchase by the plaintiff of the goodwill of a business carried on by the defendant at the Lord Holland public house, the defendant covenanted that in case he, the defendant, should take, keep, or in any way be concerned in the trade or business of a licensed public house, &c., within the distance of one half of a mile of the said premises, so called the Lord Holland, the defendant should pay to the plaintiff £500 as liquidated damages. It then alleged a breach by the defendant keeping a place and being concerned in the trade or business of a licensed victualler within the distance of one half of a mile of the said premises; to which the defendant pleaded that he did not keep and was not concerned in the said trade, &c., within the distance of one half of a mile of the said premises. At the trial, before Martin, B., it appeared the public house recently taken by the defendant, was, according to certain modes of measurement, within the prescribed distance. The evidence was that according to actual measurement, taking the nearest walking distance between the two houses, and cutting off corners, &c., it was 25 yards short of half a mile; that, taking a straight line "as the crow flies," the distance was the same; but that, taking the centre of the road, and following the course a carriage would take, the distance was 19 yards over the half-mile. The learned Baron expressed an opinion that the distance should be measured in a straight line, "as the crow flies," whereupon a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs with £500 damages, with leave to move to set aside the verdict upon the ground that, on the true construction of the covenant the defendant, was entitled to have it entered for him, subject to the award of the arbitrator agreed on between the parties, the court to determine the principle on which the arbitrator is to proceed. Upon the argument of this rule the Court of Exchequer were divided in opinion. Martin and Channell, BB., holding in favour of the plaintiff, that the distance should be measured as by a straight line upon a horizontal plane, or as the crow flies, whilst Cleasby, B., on the other hand, was of opinion that in such a case as the present the distance should be measured as a travelled distance from the one house to the other. The defendant's rule was accordingly discharged. (See report of the case below, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 839; L. Rep. 7 Ex. 70; 41 L. J. 28, Ex.). The defendant appealed from that decision of the majority of the court to the Exchequer Chamber, and now Garth, Q.C. (with him was A. L. Smith), argued for the defendant that the proper mode of measuring the distance in such a case was to take the nearest available mode of access between the two houses. Parry, Serjt. (with Francis Turner), for the plaintiff, contended that the mode of measurement pointed out and sanctioned by the majority of the court below, viz., the shortest or straightest line between the two places, was the best and most correct way of ascertaining the distance. The same cases that were cited below were again cited and commented on by both sides. WILLES, J. (after consulting with the other members of the court, Byles, Blackburn, Keating, Lush, and Brett, JJ., at the conclusion of the arguments), said, "This case raises a question of very general application, and we have to lay down a rule on the subject for the first time in a court of error. We will, therefore, take time to consider our judgment." Cur, adv. vult. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Stileman and Neate, 16, Southampton-street, Bloomsbury-square, W.C. Attorneys for the defendant, Shum and Crossman, 3, King's-road, Bedford-row, W.C. BUXTON v. Rust. Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 17-Sale of goods-Note or memorandum in writing-What amounts to a binding one. ACTION for the non-delivery of a quantity of wool. At the trial before Pigott, B., in Middlesex, it appeared that the plaintiff, a wool dealer, on the 11th Jan. 1871 had a deal with the defendant, a farmer, for the purchase of a quantity of wool for a price above the sum of £10, and at that time the plaintiff signed and handed to the defendant the following memorandum or bought note: "Bought Mr. E. J. Rust's wool as examined, at 15d. net cash, to be weighed and paid for on the premises one half, and the whole to be cleared in about twenty one days. The wool to be delivered at Chelmsford railway station free of charge, net weight. By cheque, to hold till paid if required. Little Leighs' wool to be sent on receipt of cash, and the other to follow after paid for.-W. Buxton." The plaintiff not having completed his bargain within the twenty-one days, the defendant, on the 8th Feb., wrote to him that as it was now "twenty-eight days" since they had a deal for the wool, which the plaintiff was to have taken away in twenty-one days, the defendant considered the deal off, as the plaintiff had not completed his part of the contract, and that he (the defendant) should now sell the wool to the plaintiff again at a different price, or to someone else. On the following day (9th Feb.) the plaintiff and defendant met, and the plaintiff then asked the defendant for a copy of his (the plaintiff's) letter of the 11th Jan. (being the above-mentioned bought note), and on the same day the defendant sent to the plaintiff a copy of the document in question, inclosed in a letter, as follows: "9th Feb. 1871.' Dear Sir,-I beg to inclose a copy of your letter of the 11th June 1871." The defendant refused to deliver the wool, and at the trial it was contended by defendant's counsel that there was no note or memorandum in writing of the bargain under the Statute of Frauds to bind the defendant, but Martin, B., declined to nonsuit the plaintiff, but reserved leave to the defendant to move. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with £150 damages. Upon the argument of the rule subsequently obtained pursuant to leave as above-mentioned, the Court of Exchequer (Martin, Channell, and Cleasby, BB.), were of opinion that there was a sufficient memorandum of the bargain signed by the defendant within sect. 17 of the Statute of Frauds, and discharged the defendant's rule. (See report of the case below, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 502; L. Rep. 7, Ex. 1; 41 L. J. 1, Ex.) The de Garth, Q.C. (with him was Shaw), for the defendant appealed from that decision to this court. fendant, contended that so far from there being any admission there was a distinct repudiation of any contract on the part of the defendant. The letter of the 9th, sending a copy of the contract, was after his letter of the 8th in which he dis tinctly treats the contract as at an end. Powell, Q.C. (with W. G. Harrison), contra, was not called on to argue on the part of the plaintiff. The COURT (Willes, Byles, Blackburn, Keating, Lush, and Brett, JJ.), delivered judgment seriatim affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer. Judgment affirmed. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Ray and Cartwright, 4, Lothbury, E.C. Attorney for the defendant, Edward Woodard, 2, Ingram-court, Fenchurch-street, E.C. Monday, June 24. ANTHONY V. THE BRECON MARKET COMPANY Slaughter house-Licence to erect-Brecon Market Act 1862-Consent of corporation-Towns Improvement Act 1847-Licence to use. DECLARATION alleged that the defendants agreed to let to the plaintiff" the tolls, rents, and tollage payable by the Brecon Markets Act 1862," including the tolls of the "new slaughter house" for a year, on condition that the lessee should "comply with and fulfil the bye-laws, and regulations of the board of health." Breache, that by reason of the defendants' want of title the plaintiff had not the receipt and enjoyment of the tolls. Plea, traverse of the breache. Issue thereon. At the trial, before Pigott, B., it was proved that the defendants had let to the plaintiff the tolls of a slaughter house in Brecon, erected by them under 25 & 26 Vict. c. clxxxvi. A licence for its use was, however, refused by the local board of health. By sect. 65 of the above Act the company were empowered, with the consent of the corporation, to provide and maintain slaughter houses upon such sites as they should think expedient. The defendants proved that before erecting the slaughter house they had obtained the written consent of the corporation. The corporation of Brecon is also the local board for that town, and the defendants, therefore, contended that the consent given was, in fact, a licence from the board of health, under the Towns Improvement Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 34), s. 126. The learned judge being of opinion that the written consent rendered any further licence unnecessary, directed a verdict for the defendants, with leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict. A rule ob tained accordingly was made absolute by the Court of Exchequer, on the ground that the cor poration intended to grant consent only as corporation, and did not contemplate any act what ever in their capacity of the board of health. On appeal, Dowdeswell, Q.C. (G. B. Hughes with him), for the defendants below. Gijard, Q. C. and Rees, for the plaintiffs below. The COURT (Willes, Byles, Keating, Blackburn, Mellor, and Brett, JJ.), held, the result of a com parison between the Towns Improvement Act 1947 and sect. 65 of the Brecon Market Act was that the consent under the latter section included a licence under the former one, and that therefore the judgment of the Court of Exchequer must be reversed. Judgment reversed. Attorneys for plaintiffs, Dobinson and Geare, for Cobb, Brecon. Attorney for defendant, R. Fowke, for Games, Brecon. Tuesday, June 25. WHITECHURCH AND OTHERS V. THE EAST LONDON RAILWAY COMPANY. Poor-rate-Railway company-Rating of lands taken under compulsory powers-Liability of company to make good deficiency in rate-East London Railway Act 1865 (28 Vict. c. 4, s. 128)Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 49 Vict. c. 18, s. 133.) SPECIAL Case. The plaintiffs are churchwardens, &c., of St. Mary, Rotherhithe, and brought this action to recover £310 deficiency in the rates of the parish, caused by the taking of lands by the defendants under their Act for the purposes of their railway. The defendants were empowered by their Act to make certain railways, the principal one being a line from Bethnal Green to New Cross, passing through the parish of St. Mary, Rotherhithe. By the 128th section of the defendant's Act (corresponding to sect. 133 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845) it is enacted that "if and while the company are possessed under this Act of any land assessable or liable to be assessed to any sewer-rate, consolidated-rate, poor-rate... or other parochial or ward-rate, they shall from time to time, until the railway or the works thereof are completed and assessed, or liable to be assessed, be liable to make good the deficiency the assessment for such rates by reason of those lands being taken or used for the purposes of the railway or works, and the deficiency shall be computed according to the rental at which those lands with any building thereon are now rated." At the time the deficiency now sought to be recovered, occurred, the part of the railway in the parish of St. Mary, Rotherhithe was finished, and was worked by the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, to whom it was leased by the defendants. The remainder of the line was not yet finished. The question for the opinion of the court was whether the East London Railway Company were liable to make good the deficiency until such time as the whole line was completed, or only till the whole of the line in the parish was completed. Upon argument of the case below, the Court of Exchequer were divided in opinion; Kelly, C.B. and Bramwell and Cleasby, BB., held (distinguishing Reg. v. Metropolitan District Railway in the Queen's Bench, L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 608; 40 L. J. 113, M. C.), that the liability of the defendants to make good the deficiency in the rates ceased as soon as such portion of the railway and works thereof as was situated in the plaintiffs' parish was completed and opened for traffic, and had thereby become rateable property. On the other hand, Martin, B., was of a contrary opinion, and thought that the case in the Queen's Bench was in point, and governed the present case. Judgment was entered for the defendants, whereupon the plaintiffs brought error. Prentice, Q.C. (with Morgan Howard), argued for the plaintiff's. Sir J. Karslake, Q.C. (with Poland), for the defendants. Prentice, Q.C., replied. The COURT, after consulting together for some time at the conclusion of the arguments, were divided in opinion, and delivered their judgments seriatim. Blackburn and Mellor, JJ., were of opinion that the decision in the case in the Queen's Bench was wrong, and that the judgment of the majority of the court below was right, and should be affirmed. Willes, Keating, Lush, and Brett, JJ., were of a contrary opinion, and held that the judgment of the court below was wrong, and must be reversed. Byles, J., having been absent during the greater part of the argument, expressed_no opinion on the case. Judgment reversed. Attorneys for the plaintiffs, Hawks, Willmott, and Stokes, 101, High-street, Southwark, and 61, Paradise-row, Rotherhithe, E.C. Attorneys for the defendants, Wilson, Bristows, and Carpmael, 1 Copthall-buildings, E.C., and 22, Parliament-street, Westminster, S.W. LEGISLATION AND JURIS- BILL. HOUSE OF LORDS. Friday, June 21. PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS THE report of amendments having, on the motion of the Marquis of RIPON, been received. Lord REDESDALE asked whether provision was made for the case of an equality of votes at an election where the returning officer was not an elector, and, therefore, could not give the casting vote. -The Marquis of RIPON thought this contingency was sufficiently provided for.--The Duke of RICHMOND could not conceive how it could be discovered who had the majority of votes unless provision was made for a scrutiny.The Marquis of RIPON proposed an amendment in Clause 3, rendering a returning officer or clerk guilty of improper practices with regard to nomination and ballot-papers liable to a maximum punishment of two years' hard labour.-This was agreed to.The Marquis of RIPON next moved an amendment in Clause 16, providing that the poll should close at 7 p.m. between the last day of March and the 1st Oct., and at 5 p.m. during the rest of the year. This would not only extend the hours of polling without incurring the danger of carrying on elections in the dark, but would render the hours uniform in all boroughs and counties in the United Kingdom. At present borough elections in England and Scotland closed at four, and in Ireland at five, the latter being the hour in all counties.-The Earl of SHAFTESBURY was ready to accept this modification of his proposal. It was not indeed all that he wished for, but he was thankful for small mercies. The amendment was agreed to.--The Earl of SHAFTESBURY rose to propose, with certain modifications, the clause which he brought forward in committee, and which was then rejected:-"That on any day fixed for polling at any contested election for any borough or borough county in England or Wales after the passing of this Act, it shall not be lawful for any licensed victualler or person licensed to sell beer by retail to be drunk on the premises or not to be drunk on the premises, or any person licensed or authorised to sell any fermented or distilled liquors in any part of England or Wales, to open or keep open his house in any borough where a polling place is situated for the sale of HOUSE OF COMMONS. LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN. law reform was to be brought in, it must be either by the Attorney or Solicitor General. Again, they were the legal advisers of the Government a position involving most important duties. If an old treaty was to be interpreted the Government had to rely on the advice of their law officers; if a new treaty was to be framed, the Government had to depend on their law officers to point out its exact legal bearings. If certain acts had to be done which might vitally affect the future of this country, and might perhaps decide whether or not we should go to war, the law officers of the Crown were constantly ready to give advice to the Government as to the legality or illegality of these acts. Further, they had to be the legal advisers not only of the Government, but also of that House. It very often happened that measures were introduced involving difficult questions of legal interpretation. On legal points-with which men like himself felt themselves incompetent to deal-they wanted an authortative decision; and to whom were they to look for it but to the legal advisers of that House? The law officers of the Crown had likewise to perform the duties of public prosecutors; they had to determine for the Government, for instance, if a great commercial fraud had been committed, whether it was the duty of the Government to undertake a prosecution or not; and probably also the Government had to appeal to them for assistance when it had to decide whether or not it was wise to exercise the prerogative of pardon. Those were some-perhaps not all-of the public duties which the law officers of the Crown had to discharge; and he asserted that there was no head of a great department, no Secretary of State, who had to perform duties which more taxed the capacity of the most able, or were more engrossing of the time, the thought, and the energy even of the most gifted man who ever occupied a public position in this country. Not only, however, had they to discharge those heavy duties, but they had to appear in court as advocates whenever the Government had any contentious business; and they also generally filled, as far as private practice was concerned, a leading position in a profession which was admitted to be one of the most onerous and exhausting in which a man could engage. What would the On the order of the day for going into Committee public think if the Home Secretary, the Chanof Supply,- Mr. FAWCETT rose to bring for- cellor of the Exchequer, or the Secretary of State ward the motion of which he had given notice, to for War were at the head of some great commercall attention to the Treasury minute recently cial establishment, and if the only time they issued relating to the remuneration of the Law devoted to their public duties was the few occaOfficers of the Crown, and to move the following sional hours which they could squeeze out of resolution: "Considering the inconvenience which their absorbing private concerns? He was not results from there being in Parliament no Minister blaming the Attorney or the Solicitor General, of Justice or other official who should be able to but complaining of the system; and he was only give his undivided attention to law reform, and to astonished that those gentlemen could give up the various legal questions affecting the adminis- the part of their time to the public which they tration of public business, this House is of did. For himself, even as a private member only, opinion that it would be inexpedient for the Trea- he found that the work he had to do was suffi sury minute to continue in operation beyond the ciently absorbing of his time; and if had a pritime when the present law officers of the Crown vate practice he should scarcely have a spare hour should remain in office." He believed he was ex- to bestow upon it. The practical inconveniences pressing the very general wish of the House when of that system were patent to them all. During he said that he hoped what had happened on pro- the last fortnight the country had been passing vious occasions when the question of law reform through a great crisis in connection with the was discussed would not occur to-night. He had negotiations respecting the Washington Treaty. observed that when any hon. member felt it his At such a period it seemed to him that the Governduty to call attention to the relations that existed ment required to have constantly at their service between those who were responsible for law re- the assistance of their law officers, and those in form and tendering legal advice to Her Majesty's the Government who had the highest legal knowGovernment, the question was instantly dragged ledge should have had sufficient leisure to condown into a personal discussion as trivial as it was centrate their whole thoughts upon the bearing fruitless. If any one pointed out the inconveni- of any new proposal or any new clause which ence resulting to the public from there being no might be inserted in the treaty. But what was Minister of Justice or other official who could give the fact? Why, that just at that very time when his undivided attention to law reform and legal the Government required all the aid of their legal questions affecting the administration of public advisers, those gentlemen were absorbed in their business, the issue, though important, was never private practice. Again, certain distinguished memfairly and openly met, but what happened was bers of that House had laboured during the last this-the Attorney and Solicitor General used three years to introduce that important measure of a great deal of exalted talk about belong-law reform earnestly demanded by the country, the ing to a noble profession and the great sacrifices Public Prosecutors Bill. That Bill was discussed they had made of their private interests in order last Wednesday for four hours, but during the to serve the public when they took office. He did whole of that discussion the Attorney and Solinot pretend to inquire into the amount of these citor General were both absent. The law reports personal sacrifices; the greater they were the of the following morning told them that the more his case was strengthened. The system was Attorney-General had been engaged in a private then not only detrimental to public interest, but suit-a great will case. If an advocate spent six deprived them of the small modicum of comfort hours a day in court, how many more must he that it was accompanied with great private advan- spend in getting up evidence, reading his briefs, tage to certain individuals. Nothing was farther and otherwise preparing himself to do his duty from his intention than to assert that the present towards his client? And how was it possible for Attorney or Solicitor General had done anything him to find sufficient time to attend to his public which had not been done by their predecessors, or duties? The only chance of carrying any systewould not be done by their sucessors; his object matic measures of law reform through the House was to direct attention to a great administrative was by those who had charge of them devoting to reform. He did not raise the question in a their preparation great, continuous, and anxious spirit of pettifogging economy. The present labour. It might be alleged that the House itself system was as inefficient as it was disastrous to the was the great obstacle to law reform, because it public and costly to the taxpayers, and to secure refused to assist in passing such a measure. But an efficient system no public money which could the shortest experience in the House of Commons be suggested could be spent more advantageously showed that those Bills passed most quickly or beneficially to the public. Let the House con- which were introduced by members having the sider what the law officers of the Crown had to do. confidence of the House, and nothing inspired Taking first their public functions, they were confidence so much as a belief that the measure primarily responsible for introducing measures of introduced was the result of careful, anxious, and law reform into that house. If a great measure of continuous labour. But the present system was not only inconvenient, it was extremely costly. Perhaps the House had not sufficiently taken to heart the recent Treasury Minute on this subject, by which it was proposed to give £7000 a year to the Attorney-General and £6000 to the SolicitorGeneral, or £30 and £20 per cent. more than the Prime Minister received. But this was not all, They were to be paid ordinary fees for all contentious work, and were not to refrain from private practice. The sum was not extravagant in itself, but it was monstrously extravagant if no guarantee were to be taken that the duties would be discharged. As a remedy, he suggested the appointment of a Minister of Justice, whose duties should be administrative and legislative, who should draught bills, control the law reports, and devote himself systematically to law reform; who should represent the Government in Parliament, discharge the duty of public prosecutor, and control provincial subordinates in that respect. To him, also, should be intrusted the prerogative of pardon. Such a position would gratify the ambition of most capable men. It was not neces sarily the fact that the best advocate, having the largest private practice, would fill the post with most advantage to the public. The necessary qualifications might co-exist with great rhetorical powers, but this would be an exception. Such an officer as the legal member of the Council of the Governor-General of India was what was neededa position which had been filled by the most eminent jurists of our own country, Lord Macaulay and Sir Henry Maine, neither of whom had prac tised in the courts. The salary attached to this office was £8000 a year without pension, and in cases where the person holding the office had retired from ill-health, he had invariably returned to his practice. A salary of £12,000 or £15,000 would be ample for the post in this country, with a claim to some easier position on retirement, or a position such as was held by an ex-Lord Chancellor. But the position of a Minister of Justice in this House might he strengthened if there were a permanent commission sitting outside which should assist him and render him services analogous to those rendered to the heads of departments by their permanent secretaries. If that were done, members of the House might be able to refer their Bills to this commission to have their opinion, not upon the policy of those Bills, but upon their legal bearings, and in that way we might be saved from one of the greatest opprobriums of Parliament, namely, the passing of Acts which were at variance with other Acts, the consequence of which was that unfortunate liti gants found themselves involved in additional doubts and difficulties. If we had such a minister of justice there would not be the smallest reason why the Government, when they wished to appear in court, should not retain for the conduct of their cases the most able counsel. The Government then would not be represented by the Attorney or Solicitor General, who might be the ablest lawyers in the House or the ablest lawyers who had not sacrificed their claims to office by too much independence. The Government would have an unlimited choice. They would be represented by the ablest men at the Bar, and it was a simple truism to say that the ablest men at the Bar might not be able to find a seat in this House. There would be another collateral advantage connected with the scheme. Nothing seemed so anomalous or mischievous, or produced such a bad impression on the public mind, as that the Attorney or Solicitor General had sometimes to combine what appeared to be the two perfectly contradictory offices of advocate and public prosecutor. The Attorney or Solicitor General might be retained in a case which, in its progress, might assume an entirely different phase, and then they might be called upon by the Government to decide whether the State should or should not carry on a prosecution. The House might ask what he intended to do with his motion. He would certainly ask members to express their opinion upon it. If the Government approved the motion it would be extremely useful to have that motion upon the records of the House. If they disapproved it, of course the House would hear their reasons, and also the reasons of those who would give it their support, and they would be able to judge between the two. He had arrived at the conclusion that nothing could be done by a private member unless he steadily persevered. He had tried his very best, and he had been defeated by a combination of unfortunate circumstances in never having had an opportunity before this evening of geting the House to express an opinion on the subject. But as he had escaped shipwreck to-night, he would certainly take advantage of his good fortune, and would not let the occasion slip. His hon. and gallant friend (Colonel Barttelot) said the other night that we were having a great deal too much legislation in this House. We should soon be worried out of our lives by meddlesome and mischievous Government intervention, and people would shortly begin to say, "We won't be Conservatives or Liberals, but we shall join a party that will leave people alone." Whenever such a party was formed he should be a member of it. (Cheers for the occasion, but where acquaintance with and laughter.) But, though he said this, there private and confidential matters is required is it was one field of legislative activity in which all not better to have the same advisers and might unite their efforts. The staunchest Con- advocates than to separate the two functions? servative and the most advanced Liberal, the The hon. gentleman proposes a Minister of stoutest advocate of Government intervention and Justice, who is to be something a little lower the most devoted disciple of laissez faire, might than the angels-(a laugh)-and another set combine in carrying out a scheme of law reform of men to defend our cases; but private litigants which would give to the free energy of this country find it expedient to take advice from the men they a better chance of developing itself. They might employ, and if it is expedient in private life, is it wish to see the transfer of land rendered cheaper not probable that the experience of so many hunand more expeditious, they might desire to see dred years during which the Government has had justice rendered less costly and less complicated, law officers points to the same conclusion? The and punishment brought home with greater cer- proposal would deprive us of the best legal assis tainty to the offender, in whatever rank of life tance, and condemn us to the assistance of men of he might be, these and a countless number comparatively mediocre talent. Moreover, the of instances which he might enumerate, would hon. gentleman seems to have passed by the quessuffice to show what bountiful blessings a tion how the chief seats on the judicial bench are great law reformer might confer on this country. filled. They are filled by gentlemen who have Believing that if he had failed to do so had seats in this House and filled the offices of there were others to follow in the debate who Attorney and Solicitor General, and what has would abundantly point out the evils of the pre- been the effect? Gentlemen promoted to those sent system, he would ask the House with some high offices have not always been superior in confidence to accept the motion which he now knowledge of the details of law to the puisne begged to make. (Hear, hear.)--The CHAN- judges, but by experience in this House, interCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER.-The connection be- course with the Government, and participation in tween the speech of the hon. gentleman and the important affairs, they have acquired an insight motion he has submitted is so exceedingly slight into affairs and a wideness of view which have that I think it necessary to remind the House of tempered the narrow and restrictive tendency of what they are asked to vote. The substantial the law. A liberality and wideness of view have proposition of the hon. gentleman is that the been thus obtained in our courts (hear, hear), and recent Treasury minute should not continue in no greater blow could be struck at the administra operation beyond the time when the present law tion of justice than to separate promotion to the officers of the Crown remain in office; but he higher offices of the law from seats in this House couples with it a statement that inconvenience and from political life. The hon. gentleman comresults from the absence of a minister of justice plains that the law officers are absorbed in their able to give his undivided attention to law private practice, and he gave an illustration of reform and the legal questions affecting the ad- great force. He says the affairs of this House are ministration of public business. From that so absorbing to himself, that he cannot conceive assertion the hon. member, by some process of how the law officers can find time to devote both logic best known to himself, deduces that the to their parliamentary duties and to their priTreasury minute should be cancelled. That vate practice. Now I will not push the remark minute makes an arrangement by which in the further than to say that every day's experience salaries of future law officers we save £12,000 a shows us there are things which one man can do year, yet the first and only step which the hon. and another man cannot. (Cheers and laughter.) gentleman asks us to take in law reform is to It is just possible that men selected by the keenest undo it and re-impose the £12,000 a year on the competition from the highest ranks of a high and public. He does he justify this extraordinary laborious profession may be capable of exertions proposition? He says the present system is at which some of us would find difficult, if not imonce inefficient and costly, and he enumerates possible. The hon. gentleman referred to the the duties of the law officers. He says it labours of the legal members of the Council of is, in the first place, their duty to intro- India. I have nothing to say against those dis duce measures of law reform; secondly, to ad- tinguished gentlemen, but perhaps he will allow vise the Crown; and, thirdly, to act as public me, as a former Secretary of the Board of Control, prosecutors. Now the hon. gentleman has left to say that the measures carried there-a less out the principal duty, and mentioned others difficult task than carrying measures through the which are either not the duties of the law officers House of Commons-were not all prepared by at all or their duties in a very subordinate degree. them, but by persons of whose services we hear What is their primary object? Any other member little, but which were not inconsiderable. Again, would, I think, have said that it is the duty of a has the hon. gentleman considered how a Minister law officer of the Crown to be the advocate of the of Justice, to advise the Cabinet, would square Government, to defend it in all the law suits with the present position of the Lord Chancellor? which, owing to the vast quantity of property He complains of legislation being pushed on which they administer and the immense number of trans- is not particularly wanted, yet he proposes to actions in which they are engaged, they are con- appoint an officer, with £18,000 a year, to occupy cerned in, or in all the suits or prosecutions they himself with law reforms. Now, being a very may think it necessary to institute. The main able man, he would naturally find out a number object of a law officer is that there should be at of defects not obvious to other people, which he the command of the Government the very best would press on the consideration of the Govern legal advice that can be procured. No wonder ment in season and out of season, and then, I the hon. gentleman's conclusion is unsound when suppose, the hon. gentleman would get up and his premisses are so faulty. It is desirable, no complain of legislation being forced upon us doubt, that the law officers of the Crown should which was not wanted. (A laugh.) attend to measures of law reform, but have they ever may be the hon. gentleman's opinion as ever been found otherwise than able and willing to the demand for law reform, it is a demand to do so? Let anyone look through the scanty list which might very easily be exceeded by the of law reforms which have been passed-(ironical supply. As to this paragon of a Minister, cheers); whatever the cause of their failure, of whether the inability of the Government or any other cause, had they not the assistance of the law officers of the Crown? Who carried through Parliament the Bankruptcy Bill, or what measure of law reform was carried without the assistance of the law officers? Considering their main and primary function, it is far more important for the Govern ment to command the highest legal ability than to be able to command the whole time of any person. It is easy to get persons to give their whole time, men, too, of ability, honour, and very fair professional standing; but we want, not moderate ability, but the very best ability. We can afford to pay for it, and we have a right to have it. The hon. gentleman has sketched some sort of plan, but is there any certainty of obtaining the best legal ability in any way as well as in the present Suppose we were to require the whole time of the law officers and call upon them to give up their private practice, we could no doubt find gentlemen at the Bar for the purpose, but they would be gentlemen who had no private practice to give up. (A laugh.) What gentleman in large practice, and with all the emoluments and prospects of such practice, would, for the precarious tenure the Government could offer him, throw up all his connections, sever himself from his professional and political associations, and resign all the prospects they opened to him? They would not be first, second, or even third rate men who would do so. The hon. gentleman says we might engage counsel ? a What a man boundless erudition, knowledge, and capacity, where are we to find him, and, having found him, what are we to do with him? (A laugh.) He is to receive a salary equal to about three of the rest of us. When he goes away, his pension would, course, be calculated on that salary, and how can the hon. member ask the country to meet that ex pense unless he thinks an additional charge of £12,000 is a step towards economy? But, in truth, there would be no person of any weight who would impair his position at the Bar by accepting such an office. The only chance of filling the office efficiently would be to take some old Judge, probably from the House of Lords, who had served his time, and who would be willing to occupy his time in the preparation of Bills to be sent down to this House, where no doubt they would be treated with the degree of attention which we usually bestow on such measures. (A laugh.) The hon. member for Brighton has not shown that the present system fails in its object of providing the Government with the very best assistance and advice. Indeed, the hon. gentleman does not seem to have grappled in his own mind with the insuperable ob fection to any other scheme-namely, that the best ability can only be obtained by allowing gentlemen to retain their practice at the Bar. Again, I do not think the hon gentleman has shown any reason why we should have a Minister of Justice, at least for the purpose of preparing measures of law reform, for, though perhaps have no right to speak on the subject, I am per* I |