ance. Also, this same document contains a passage expressing the sympathetic interest of the American people in the Greek struggle for liberty then going on, from which it may be concluded that the Doctrine lays no paralyzing restriction upon the formation of public opinion in this country respecting happenings abroad which are calculated to arouse the moral sentiments. Yet again, how can it be said that a principle which—in the words of Jefferson-calls for "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations", hampers the development of national policy in the furtherance of any of these great interests of mankind, so long as the moral judgment of the American people is kept politically unentangled, as it was so fortunately in 1917?

The practical nub of criticism of the Doctrine is, of course, that we should enter the League of Nations. But the League Covenant itself recognizes in the Monroe Doctrine "a regional understanding for the maintenance of peace". The champions of the Doctrine, however, were not satisfied with this recognition, because they found other provisions in the Covenant which they thought tended to undermine the Doctrine as a guarantee of regional peace in an effort to obtain peace by agglomeration. The issue thus raised need not be debated here. It is sufficient

to say that the whole tendency in the League today is toward the theory of regional rather than general guarantees, and that this theory underlies the pending disarmament project.

And the principle of regionalism may also assist redefinition of our relationship to the outside world in harmony with our traditions in yet another way, since it is capable of meeting the principal difficulty in the way of adherence to the World Court. The basis of the World Court's decisions must, of course, be furnished by international law. Hence the question arises, whether there is any incompatibility between international law and the Monroe Doctrine, so that an application of the former would weaken the latter? All depends upon the scope of international law. If it is broad enough to take account of longstanding diversities of practice in the grand divisions of the globe, no fear need be entertained for the Monroe Doctrine. But if it is not broad enough, still the moral advantage rests with the Doctrine, inasmuch as it conflicts with international law only

in disallowing rights of exploitation in this hemisphere which some versions of international law would allow. That the Doctrine puts no obstacle in the way of an impartial determination of the interests which it protects, is proved by our demand in 1895 that the British-Venezuela boundary dispute be submitted to arbitration.

For the rest, the Doctrine still retains its validity in at least two respects: It is still true that Europe should not be permitted to recruit strength on American soil for the prosecution of its ancient vendettas, or to control the destinies of the American peoples by political means; it is also true that any durable settlement in Europe must rest on what the evolutionists call its own "resident forces"-not on an American prop. As to the interest of the United States in maintaining the Doctrine, that no longer arises from the presence of formidable neighbours-thanks in part to the Doctrine itself—nor even perhaps from a perception of distinctive destiny. Rather it arises from a distinctive problem, that of welding into one American nation peoples drawn from all nations, of creating in the breasts of these peoples a national tradition which will sever old allegiances. That the Doctrine of the Two Spheres is decidedly relevant to this problem was amply demonstrated in the late war.

All of which does not blink the fact that there is danger of making the Doctrine a fetish, entitled to exact worship on the score of alleged achievement regardless of present worth. The idea of having a doctrine with which foreign policy must be squared is one which is well calculated to appeal to American constitutionalism, but the parallel suggested must not be pressed unduly. A constitution in the American sense is a grant of powers not to be exceeded, while the Monroe Doctrine does not, and never did, establish a closed system of foreign relationship; nor does it disclose an end in itself, as do certain statements of constitutional liberty. In all our relations impartiality is to be our rule; and the objective of this course of conduct is the building up of a nation which shall be strong enough to illustrate in a field where they have usually been lacking, the virtues of magnanimity and benevolence.

EDWARD S. CORWIN.

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE

UNITED STATES-I

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

BY C. REINOLD NOYES

THE statement that the position and economic relations of the United States have been revolutionized by the Great War has already become a platitude. But, like many other important commonplaces, though the fact is recognized its implications are not. The changes have been so fundamental that our bearings have been lost and it will be only through a process of profound and general study, a complete revision of the accepted point of view, and a bold but experimental course, that we can meet the new problems which have been thrust on us by events beyond our control. It is one thing to accept a fact, another to comprehend it, and still a third to translate the thought into action fitting to the occasion. The people of the United States are now challenged to rouse themselves from the habits of economic thought accumulated through the experience of a period which is ended and to prepare for a career which may break new ground in the progress of mankind.

Continental Europe is decrepit, the Orient is awake, and the United States has emerged as the predominant World Power. Our manufactures have suddenly outdistanced our agriculture; we are threatened with an unprecedented influx of alien peoples; we are in possession of about half the world's gold supply; we have acquired the second largest fleet of merchant shipping; we have shifted from a debtor to a great creditor nation. Such changes in dynamic and static pressures, from within and without, have discovered new strains and stresses and have developed the inherent weaknesses of old institutions and practices, some of which managed to survive the ante-bellum period of peaceful stability though they were outworn, while others, adapted to the

needs of those days, are entirely unfit in these. To date we have treated ourselves to first aid only.

It is not enough to let nature take its course, nor to rely on the undisturbed operation of economic law to cure such maladjustments to a new environment. Men do not need to blunder blindly through each seismic epoch of history. What is required is wise and positive leadership. The politician with his ear to the ground must give place to the statesman with his eye to the future. As Sir James Stewart said of the Industrial Revolution in 1796, "It becomes the business of the statesman to interest himself so far in the consequences, as to provide a remedy for the inconveniences resulting from the sudden alteration.”

Yet at this very crisis in the history of the United States, the political parties are peculiarly adrift. Their platforms and their policies when in power are nearly indistinguishable, and they are divided within themselves by schisms and revolts. Their leaders have become followers whose principal purpose seems to be to perpetuate themselves in office, and to that end to take no decided stand nor decisive action, but to compromise among the demands of the most clamourous. The choice of the voters has been between men, not between principles. That this choice does not satisfy the people is clearly shown by the large number of established political reputations which have been suddenly upset and by the number of unknown and unqualified candidates who have taken the places of veterans. This turbulent condition is natural to times of discontent because many old representatives are found no longer to represent adequately their constituents. Ability and experience are too frequently not joined to alertness nor to a sincere sympathy with the desires and difficulties of the voters. The rebellion signifies only discontent, not revolution, and it is, as usual, fruitless at the beginning. No constructive programme nor real leadership results from such disorganized ebullitions. It is a period of little, untried men, petty politics, blocs, radical theories, old errors in new guises, and of a general lack of working unanimity.

Judging by the past these phenomena are the symptoms of a changing political alignment, of a period of solution from which new compounds will be precipitated. Habit, uncertainty and

inapprehensiveness delay the realignment. But the time must come and come soon when the new differentiation will appear, and the issues will again be sharply joined between two major parties.

Along what line will the new cleavage reappear? Will it be between sections or between classes? Is the future development of party government in this country to be based on the classic distinction between Conservative and Radical, or is it to be based on the clash of interest between the Agricultural and the Industrial sections? Hitherto it has tended more toward sectional lines, based originally upon opposed economic interests and perpetuated by the acrimony of a civil conflict.

Our country is almost a continent in itself. This fact has always threatened the possibility of a gradual disintegration such as has occurred in Europe. The interests of the sections are diverse far more so than is generally appreciated. Some have no resources except their man power; others have vast natural resources which they are wasting by too rapid private exploitation; while still others lack nothing so much as man power to exploit theirs. Some have a plethora of capital, while others starve for lack of it. There are the creditor sections and the debtor sections. Nature, man and the stage of development show almost as wide a range of diversity in the United States as is found on any other continent. Nevertheless, inured to the habit of unity and coöperation, broken only by one appeal to force, we have in the past managed to compromise our differences, or have allowed the densely populated to overrule the sparsely settled districts.

To a large extent this half century of internal peace has been due to conditions which are now rapidly passing away. The manner of settlement of the Trans-Mississippi territory defined for a time its political character. The South colonized with its poorest white population; the North with its best, combined with the most substantial and consanguineous of foreign immigrants. Sons of Southern planters stayed at home, as was suitable to a landed aristocracy. It was the "poor whites" and the mountaineers who settled the tier of Southwestern States across the Mississippi Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana-and who