against future attack by Germany are created and guaranteed. Among the safeguards would be the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland and, if possible, its detachment from Prussia (though not necessarily from Germany). Were it possible to earmark a proportion of the resources of the Ruhr as security for the payment of Reparations, under an international agreement in which Germany could join, and could the creation of a preponderatingly German coal and iron monopoly in the Centre of Europe be obviated by some form of international economic control over the Ruhr, Belgium would, I believe, regard her political and economic future with greater assurance. But, until Germany finds the courage and the wisdom to put forward reasonable proposals for a settlement, the memory of her misdeeds in Belgium will continue to make of the Belgian people a very pertinacious factor in the forces ranged against her. WICKHAM STEED.

London, May, 1923.

HUNGARY SINCE THE ARMISTICE

BY COUNT LÁSZLÓ SZÉCHÉNYI

Minister of Hungary to the United States

THE war ended for Hungary with the armistice concluded with the Italian General Diaz, acting on behalf of all the Allies, on November 3, 1918. It explicitly extended to all the fronts and merely provided that the Hungarian troops of the Austro-Hungarian army should be ordered back to the Hungarian border. While the Austro-Hungarian commanders signed the Diaz Armistice, the Government on whose behalf they acted no longer had authority behind the front. Demonstrations and riotssomewhat misleadingly termed a revolution'-had swept aside the constitutional government of Hungary and brought Count Michael Károlyi into power.

Count Károlyi, though a member of the Hungarian Parliament for years and belonging to the "Party of Independence", had never held a responsible position before. While he has stood now for one thing and then for another, he has been consistent in only one respect and that is that he has always been "ag'in the government", no matter who headed it. Thus he had also been an outspoken defaitiste during the war. this circumstance to make him appear the man of the hour who could bring about the radical change within and without for which the motley crowds in the streets were clamoring.

His friends utilized

Nothing is as characteristic of the confused minds of the people and of the reaction against the war in Hungary as the fact that Count Michael Károlyi could assume power at this critical juncture. Such eminent writers abroad as the French brothers Tharaud have been attracted by the strange contradiction of a tremendously wealthy aristocrat, of marked haughty manner, placing himself at the head of all the Radicals of his country, today swearing allegiance to the King appointing him Prime 1 The revolution in Hungary preceded similar efforts in Prague and Zagreb.

Minister, and tomorrow overthrowing him to assume supreme power himself.

To an outsider the Károlyi régime must have seemed the greatest of farces; to Hungarians it was a tragedy. If I dwell on Károlyi's career at some length, it is because of the fact that he and his friends have tried ever since to make his fate appear as the triumph and tragedy of democracy in Hungary. As a matter of fact, Hungary was perhaps never further removed from democracy than under his rule. How far this democratic "lip service" went is rather amusingly illustrated by the fact that the word "republic" was not considered democratic enough but Károlyi had to go America and France one better by calling it "The Hungarian People's Republic"; at first it was even officially styled "The Hungarian Popular Republic"!

The facts in the matter are, however, that the constitution of Hungary, which is the oldest on the Continent, dating back to 1222-seven years younger than the Magna Charta-was swept away, and Parliament was disbanded by a group of Károlyi's satellites who constituted themselves the National Council without being elected by any one. Not only did this alleged People's Government hold no elections for five months after its coup d'état, but it did not bother even to make any serious preparations therefor. The whole Károlyi "Government"-if this name is not in reality a misnomer-consisted of a group of people who had merely the personal wish to come to the forefront, without experience or ability in governmental matters. They were a motley crowd composed of extreme Radicals who had belonged to the last elected legislature, and of many more of this class who had not succeeded in being elected, and of Socialists and Communists of all the colors of the rainbow.

At this most critical moment, when the Diaz Armistice had just been signed and it was necessary to make provisions for the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops to the lines assigned by the Allies, and for an orderly demobilization, the newly appointed Minister of War solved the difficult question by declaring that he did "not wish to see any more soldiers"-meaning that every one should go home as best he could. The result of course was a general pandemonium, and the army-which even according to

the intentions of the Allies ought to have been held together for some time and, if possible, utilized to break down Bolshevism, disappeared so to speak over night, infesting the country with roving bands of armed marauders. It can hardly be denied today that there was "method in the madness", for in order to make a Bolshevist coup successful, the first step had to be the disbanding of the army, the gendarmerie (country police), and the police. After the Socialist and Bolshevist element gained more and more ground in Károlyi's councils, the nucleus of a new army was created, consisting exclusively of trusty Socialists and Bolshevists.

In its foreign policy the Károlyi administration was characterized by the same amateurish happy-go-lucky-ness and childlike innocence. So much had been said during the war about militarism that Károlyi's advisers seemed to have felt that they would score by complete voluntary disarmament, entrusting the protection of the country's borders to the good will of its neighbours. The natural result was that every one of Hungary's neighbours occupied large tracts of her territory and established fait accomplis which were later sanctioned in the Treaty of Trianon.

The most fateful step taken by Károlyi, however, was the repudiation of the Diaz Armistice and his attempt to negotiate another armistice at Belgrade with the French Commander-inChief of the Balkan forces. This armistice was not concluded between soldiers, as had been the Diaz Armistice, but dictated by a victorious General to a motley crowd of politicians and agitators, of whom the French General expressed his opinion to Károlyi in the thereafter famous words, "vous êtés tombé bien bas". The Belgrade armistice provided for the first temporary occupations of Hungarian territory by its neighbours. The conclusion of the Belgrade armistice, in full knowledge of the Diaz Armistice and its more favourable terms, was the most flagrant act of high treason committed by Károlyi towards his country. It provided, among other things, for the entry of Roumanian troops into Transylvania, although Roumania was no longer one of the Allies, having concluded a separate peace against their wishes with Austria-Hungary.

The assassination of Count Stephen Tisza, the former Prime Minister who had vainly tried to avert the war in 1914, was the

first assassination of a statesman of any prominence in all Hungary's history. Thereafter there was no one to check the madness of the Károlyi administration.

The story of Bolshevism in Hungary is an interesting example of what Bolshevism means when left to take its course in a country of higher civilization than Russia; an example which to my mind has never been brought sufficiently to public attention abroad. People will be found who attempt to present Károlyi as a victim of the forces of reaction; and similar things have been said about Bolshevism in Hungary. Nothing is further removed from the truth. Károlyi had an unobstructed course, even as far as Conservatives were concerned. His failure was due to inherent weaknesses of his domestic and foreign policies, ending in his wilfully and formally abdicating in favor of Bolshevist leaders. As to Bolshevism in Hungary, it likewise came to an end, not due to a triumph of reaction (for the Nationalists were unable to obtain arms), but owing to the passive resistance of the Hungarian peasants and farmers, and the disillusionment of the working classes of the country.

Hungary is the only western country where Bolshevism reigned for any length of time-four months- and where it could subsequently be investigated on the spot. It broke out in a general state of apathy, people being so disgusted with the Károlyi régime that they could not see that anything worse would befall them. The Bolshevist leaders made the new order acceptable in national garb by claiming that the wrongs suffered by the country could be remedied only through the assistance of the International Brotherhood of the followers of Karl Marx.

The man who typified Hungarian Bolshevism at home and abroad was Bela Kun. "Before the war he was an obscure reporter who could be seen here and there in newspaper offices reporting on news of no consequence. One day he disappeared. He turns up in a country town where he is the secretary of a workingmen's union. Charged with having defrauded the union, he is soon chased away by the irate workers and is about to be indicted when the war breaks out. Joining the colours, he is taken prisoner in 1916. He rapidly learns Russian and gains the confidence of the famous propagandist Radek (Zobelsohn). He