and purpose of man, he ignored the fact that the Constitution was in reality the natural growth and development of English law and colonial self-government. It was in fact an evolution out of the colonial experience of the thirteen States plus their experience under the Articles of Confederation. The construction, interpretation, and amendment of the Constitution have likewise been a part of an evolutionary process which is still going on. The result has demonstrated the genius of the Anglo-Saxon people for self-government. We must be a part of and direct the evolutionary process along right lines if we are to avoid revolutionary changes in the future.

MARVIN B. ROSENBERRY.

JAPAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES

IN ASIA

BY W. W. WILLOUGHBY

RECENT years have given great importance to the question of the right, as determined by international law or international comity, of one State to have access to or the use of the natural resources of other States. Especially is this a question of vital interest to Japan and China-to Japan because of her need to obtain supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials from abroad; and to China because of the danger lest other nations will be tempted to overstep the limits of international law and international comity in the effort to obtain for their own use the natural resources which China's soil supplies. The recent conference in Washington cast some sidelights upon this question which deserve careful consideration.

Japan finds herself in the following situation: The population of her homeland has already reached a considerable degree of density, and is still increasing. Just how rapid this increase is does not certainly appear from the authentic figures that are available, but it is probably in the neighborhood of half a million annually. The amount of additional land that it is practicable for Japan to bring under cultivation is not great, although it is probable that, if more scientific modes of irrigation were introduced, the food-producing capacity of the homelands could be somewhat increased. Also, if the Japanese could be trained or persuaded to rely less exclusively upon rice, their food problem would be rendered less perplexing to them. However, do what they will, the Japanese are undoubtedly confronted with an increasingly serious situation, unless their increase in numbers can be checked.

It now seems fairly clear that the Japanese themselves recognize that they cannot hope to solve their population problem by means of emigration. There is no reasonable hope that they

will be received in any considerable numbers by those countries, like the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, where they can successfully compete economically with the native populations. It is equally clear that the Japanese are not able to compete upon anything like equal terms with the natives of Asia or Polynesia. Even in Korea, despite the encouragement given them by colonization societies and the favoring aid of their own Government, they have had little success as settlers upon the soil. It is evident, therefore, that future increases in the Japanese population must be taken care of in Japan itself. This of course means that Japan must continue that process of industrialization and commercialization of her economic life which has already made such considerable progress. This in turn means that she must be able to import foodstuffs and raw materials in increasing quantities, for, unfortunately for her, she has within her own borders small supplies of coal and minerals.

This situation has led Japanese statesmen of recent years to lay great emphasis upon what they have termed Japan's "economic right to existence". This doctrine appears with significant emphasis in the correspondence leading up to the establishment, in 1920, of the new International Banking Consortium, as well as in certain declarations made by the Japanese delegation in the Washington conference. It has also found statement in a remarkable paper prepared by the late Premier of Japan, Takashi Hara only a few weeks before his most lamentable assassination. The importance of these declarations or statements of right justify a review and critical examination of them.

As is well known, Japan, in her correspondence with the British and American Governments, strove to have excepted from the activities of the proposed banking consortium for the making of foreign industrial loans to China, loans relating to Manchuria and Mongolia where, it was declared, Japan had "special interests". In its argument in support of this exception, the Japanese Government several times referred to the matter of Japan's national economic existence and asserted, in effect, that her interests in Manchuria and Mongolia were essential to her own economic existence and constituted, as it were, an integral part of that existence. Thus, in its memorandum of March 2,

1920, the Japanese Government declared that "from the nature of the case, the regions of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia which are contiguous to Korea stand in very close and special relation to Japan's national defense and her economic existence. Enterprises launched forth in these regions, therefore, often involve questions vital to the safety of the country. This is why Japan has special interests in these regions and has established there special rights of various kinds." This memorandum closed with a formula which the Powers participating in the consortium were asked to adopt, according to which "In matters relating to loans affecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, which in their opinion are calculated to create a serious impediment to the security of the economic life and national defense of Japan, the Japanese Government reserve the right to take the necessary steps to guarantee such security." This reservation, the memorandum declared, was indispensable to the existence of the Japanese State and people, and was based on the paramount importance of the economic existence and national security, coupled with a due regard for the general peace of the Far East."

The British Government declared, in its reply to this memorandum, that it clearly recognized the legitimate desire of the Japanese nation to be assured of the supplies of food and raw material necessary to her economic life and her justifiable wish strategically to protect and maintain the Korean frontier, but that they could not assent to a formula that seemed to imply the possession by Japan of a special sphere of interest in particular regions of China, nor could it be believed that, in order to meet Japan's legitimate needs, it was essential that Japan alone should construct and control certain railway lines west of the South Manchuria Railway, which the Japanese memorandum had referred to.

The American reply was even more emphatic. In its memorandum of March 16, it said that Japan's proposition could not be reconciled with the principle of the independence and territorial integrity of China; that, as to the proposed formula, the right of national self-preservation is one of universal acceptance in the relations between States and therefore does not require

formulation as to its application in any particular instance, and that the principle was implicit in the terms of the Lansing-Ishii notes of November 2, 1917. The Government of Japan, it added, had no occasion to apprehend on the part of the consortium any activities directed against the economic life or national defense of Japan, and that Japan could rely with entire assurance upon the good faith of the United States and of the other two Powers associated in the consortium to refuse their countenance to any operation inimical to the vital interests of Japan. The British Government gave substantially similar general assurances to the Japanese Government.

In its communication of April 3, the Japanese Government noted these assurances, and, in reliance thereupon, withdrew its proposed formula.

It will be observed that, in this correspondence, neither the British nor the American Government gave recognition to any right upon the part of Japan, in the exercise of its general right of self-preservation, to take any action within Manchuria or Mongolia that would be in derogation of the sovereign territorial rights of China, or that might be founded upon a general superiority of rights (to use a phrase later employed by Secretary Hughes) within any designated region of China. All that the British and American Governments did engage to do was to refuse their countenance to any enterprises directed against the economic existence or defense of Japan. Of course, aside from any express engagement, it is, under any circumstances, an unfriendly act for one nation to give its support to undertakings directed against the existence of another State. Thus the matter stood when the Washington conference convened.

It is clear enough that, in that conference, the Japanese Government made statements and signed agreements which, if carried out in good faith, will prevent it from again raising a claim to special rights or interests in China that will be in derogation of the rights or interests of other Powers, or which will in any wise be inconsistent with the sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity of China. In doing this, Japan is now precluded not only by the general principles of international law and comity but also by her own formally given undertakings.