duct of the Committee, from what he could not but consider as an extremely severe réflection on the spirit of their proceedings. The same right honourable gentleman had complained, that the directors were not in all instances prepared for the questions put to them, and he seemed to insinuate as if the Committee had taken them by surprise; but so far from that being the case, he would assert, in the most positive manner, that ample time was given them for the consideration of every question; and that in cases where the difficulty was in any degree perplexing, they were permitted to take the questions away in writing, and answer them at some future time.

Thus much he had thought it right to state, in justice to the Committee. With regard to the question itself, he considered it quite impossible that things should continue much longer in their present state. Until something effectual was done to bring back the currency to its standard, the exportation of gold would go on, in spite of all the laws which they might devise to confine it to this country. For himself, he should be ready to support his Majesty's ministers in any measures which they might propose for that purpose, if they could state one solitary authority that the experiment would be effectual. And here he must beg leave to ask the right honourable gentlemen opposite, what it was they considered as the criterion of the depreciation of paper? Was it not the difference between the price of the currency and the standard value of the coin? If any honourable gentleman, in commenting upon such a state of currency as now existed in this country, as the currency of any foreign nation, had advanced the arguments and statements which the Committee had heard in the course of this discussion, every honourable member would have held up his hands in token of surprise, at hearing it gravely asserted, that, while the exchanges were as low as twenty

five per cent., and persons were under prosecution for buying up the coin at a price higher than its denomination, there was no depreciation of the currency in such a nation. It was his opinion, that there was no symptom of a depreciation of currency in any country, which did not at present exist in some degree in this. He would confidently put it to any practical man to say, whether it was not so?

In illustration of this point, he could refer to a very recent instance, which was yet scarcely known to the public in this country. He meant the measure resorted to by the government of Austria, for the liquidation of its debt. The edict issued on the subject by a beneficent sovereign must have proceeded from dire necessity; and every thing connected with it, and the circumstances of its publication, shewed that it had been resorted to with pain and regret, and that every care had been taken to render a measure, which amounted to a breach of public faith, as little injurious as possible. The edict he alluded to was that issued by the Emperor of Austria, for reducing the public debt of that country to the extent of four-fifths. By this edict it was provided, that for every five hundred florins due, one hundred should be paid to liquidate the debt. To the edict, however, was appended a table, which had been carefully prepared, shewing the rates at which the sums due, on transactions between individuals, should be liquidated; in which rates allowance was made for the depreciation of the currency at the time of the contract. These proportions had been arranged from month to month; so that debts contracted on or before the 1st of January 1809, were to be discharged at the rate of 100 for every 103 florins: in February, it continued 103; in March, it was 105; and so on till 1811, when it was 100 for 500 florins. Could any man doubt that this measure, severe as it was, had a tendency to lower prices generally, to raise the ex

change, and to equalize the market and the Mint prices of bullion?

No man who reflected upon this case, and considered what had taken place in this country, could possibly doubt that the currency was depreciated. Under such circumstances, then, it was the duty of the House to consider seriously of some remedy. He hoped and trusted that the Bank had a very considerable quantity of bullion in store; and this hope he entertained, not upon idle conjecture, but upon good grounds. It had been stated before the Committee of the Lords, in February 1797, that if the drain from the Bank had continued for a month, equal to what it had been during the preceding week, upon the average; or if it had continued for a single week, on the average of the two preceding days, the stock of bullion would not have been reduced as low as it had been in 1782. Besides, in October 1797, the Bank having, no doubt, made large purchases of bullion during the interval, communicated to Parliament, that it was prepared to resume cash payments. He could not be persuaded, therefore, that the Bank had not at present a considerable stock of bullion. And though the Bank had not regulated its conduct with a view to its profits, it was nevertheless obvious that it enjoyed large profits; and when he looked to those profits, he thought they afforded to it the means of re-opening its cash payments. In the suggestions which he had published upon this subject, he had not dealt out any hard measure to the Bank. He was aware, that, by the restriction, it had been enabled to enlarge its issues, whilst the suspension of cash payments rendered it unnecessary for it to keep constantly in its coffers a large deposit of unproductive capital to meet the demands for specie, which every bank of discount was compelled to keep always ready. Was it, then, too much to expect, that the Bank should provide bullion

even at its present price, when, considering the large profits it had made, that operation would not place it in a worse situation than it would have been in, if no restriction had taken place? The restriction was intended to protect the Bank from the drain of specie to which it had been exposed in 1797, and to secure the public against all the ill consequences of suspending payments generally, if that drain had been suffered to proceed. That was the specific object of the measure, and not any regard for the principles and opinions which had lately been broached upon this subject. When the Bank, by means of the restriction, had been enabled to make extra profits, it certainly could not be too much to call upon the directors to take the necessary. measures to place themselves in a situation to resume their payments. The House, therefore, was bound to adopt some specific remedy, and not content itself with a declaration, that it was expedient that cash payments should be resumed as soon as circumstances would permit. If the present system were to be continued, it would be cruel towards the Bank, it would be worse than cruel to the public, to compel them to return to cash payments six months after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace, with all the aggravated difficulties of procuring bullion, at the advanced price to which it must unavoidably rise

Much had been said of the erroneous views entertained by the Bullion Committee; but all he should say was, that if he was in error in the sentiments which he had ventured to deliver upon this subject, it was an error which he shared in common with Lord Burleigh, with Lord Bacon, with Mr. Locke, with Sir Isaac Newton. If he was in error, he was in error with Mr. Pitt. If gentlemen would refer to the debates in 1797 and 1798, on the policy and expediency of the original Bank Restriction act, they would find, that when the injurious consequences likely to

flow from it had been stated by members on the opposite side of the House, it had been admitted by Mr. Pitt, whilst he denied the probability of the result foretold, that if the effect of the measure should be to produce a difference between the price of the currency and the standard coin, it ought not to be adopted. If he were wrong, then, he was wrong in conjunction with high authorities; and if the right honourable gentlemen opposite were right, they were so with Mr. Law and Mr. Lowndes.* The report of this latter gentleman to the Treasury he earnestly intreated every honourable member to read, before he gave a vote upon this question. That report stated, that silver had risen to 6s. 5d. per ounce: but it also stated, that a similar rise had taken place at Amsterdam. The exchange was then as low as twenty-five per cent.; and then, as now, the depression was ascribed, not to depreciation, but to a scarcity of currency. Mr. Lowndes recommended to the Treasury to raise the crown to 6s. 3d., the shilling to 1s. 3d., and to issue shillings having only three-fourths of the standard. Then, as at present, it had been stated, that great public advantage would result from an increase of the currency; and it was added by Mr. Lowndes, that when trade should be restored, and the exchanges should be brought to a level, then they might return to their old standard.

It had been said, that the wealth of the country depended on the maintenance of the present system of the currency. Good God! that the wealth of any nation should be supposed to grow out of its currency! Why, if every shilling in the currency was to be of standard perfection in coin, the wealth of the nation could not depend upon the cur

Mr. Lowndes was Secretary to the Treasury in 1696; the year in which Parliament adopted Mr. Montagu's celebrated resolution respecting the standard of the coinage.