as a measure of the Cabinet. The apologies which have been put forward, in the work already quoted, for Mr. Canning's acceptance of office in 1822, are so unanswerable, on this same subject,the Catholic question-and they apply so exactly to Mr. Huskisson's situation in 1828, that it would be vain to offer any other defence. It is there truly said;" Undoubtedly, the Administration stood in need of Mr. Canning's services, and so thought its most influential Members." "By accepting office he was enabled to give the question all the benefit of his own individual exertions, backed by the weight and authority which a high station in the Government necessarily confers upon the individual who holds it by refusing he would have left the weight and authority of that station in the hands of an adversary of Emancipation:"— that Mr. Canning could not have declined to join a divided Cabinet after he had repeatedly declared his conviction, that it was impossible to form an Administration united on this question :" -that "there was no example of a Cabinet concurring in opinion to grant these claims :"-" that the existing Government was as favourable as any, and more favourable than most, by which it had been preceded." Again, that " he could not have refused to serve under an anti-Catholic Premier, after he had been acting under Lord Liverpool :”— and again, that "no Government could be formed, which would be unanimous on that question, and upon every other of importance, and, in parti

cular, Reform, which Mr. Canning considered would more vitally affect the existence of the Constitution than the settlement of the Catholic Question." All these passages and many more might be mentioned-afford a conclusive defence of Mr. Huskisson's conduct, as far as the Catholics were concerned.

With respect to all those measures of domestic and commercial policy which had been sanctioned by Parliament of late years, to all those measures the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Peel had been parties. They had been equally parties to that system of Foreign Policy which had won for Mr. Canning the admiration and confidence of the nations of the world,--to the expedition to Portugal at the close of 1826, and to the acknowledgment of the new States of America. If the Treaty of the 6th of July were only a natural consequence of the preceding negotiations at St. Petersburg-as was most surely the fact,-of those negotiations the Duke of Wellington was not only cognizant, but he was actually the person who had conducted them, and his signature stood affixed to the Protocol of the 4th of April 1826, the foundation of all that subsequently took place. Let it be considered, in addition to all this, that no opportunity had been afforded for discussing the Foreign Policy of the country since the framing of Mr. Canning's Government, and it was only by unauthenticated rumours, that a departure from his measures could be antici

pated. But above all, let it be most particularly remembered, that Mr. Peel had unequivocally declared, that on all matters of domestic and general policy, with the exception of the Catholic Question, his opinion was in general accordance with that of Mr. Canning, and that, had he concurred with him upon that great topic, he should have been as ready to take office under him as under Lord Liverpool. If all this were true-if there were really no difference of opinion except on this one question-what becomes of the alleged inconsistency of Mr. Huskisson, and what need of justification or apology? If, on the contrary, there existed an apprehension (which the sequel proved to be well-founded), that the Duke of Wellington's inclination leaned secretly towards the less enlightened of those two great conflicting principles, which threatened to shake the general peace of Europe, that His Grace bowed rather before the malignant Arimanes, than to the beneficent Oromasdes,—in that supposition, it became more imperatively the duty of a patriotic statesman to weigh carefully and without prejudice what might be his means and what his chances-not of "mastering or circumventing" these unfortunate dispositions, but of removing or counteracting them, by the employment of fair influence and convincing argument. It was surely not calculating improperly upon the candour of the noble Duke to consider him accessible to such influences, or to believe that if once convinced which was "the

better part," he would not hesitate to adopt it. That his Grace was open to conviction has since, indeed, been proved beyond contradiction, both by the change which he sanctioned in the Corn Bill* passed in 1828, and by his conduct on the Catholic Relief Bill in the following year.

The next point is what were the means, and what were the chances which Mr. Huskisson might reasonably count upon. Let us briefly consider. In the first place, Mr. Canning's arrangement for Ireland was to be carried into execution. No longer framed on an absurd principle of affected neutrality, it exhibited, for the first time since the Viceroyalty of the Duke of Bedford, an executive Government whose opinions were in unison in favour of the Catholics. No change was made in the Foreign Department, or in Mr. Canning's diplomatic arrangements. His friends and relations remained at their posts. At St. Petersburgh -at Paris-at Constantinople-the same individuals conducted the negotiations of the British Cabinet. Was not this a virtual assurance, that the same policy would be persevered in? Were not Lord Anglesey and Mr. Lamb guarantees for fair play towards the Catholics? Were not Lord Dudley (who had signed the famous Treaty of the

• In regard to the Corn Bill, the Duke of Wellington stated, on the very first night of the meeting of Parliament, that the new Government intended "to propose a measure, early in the Session, for the regulation of the Corn Laws, founded on the principle of the measure proposed and rejected in the last year." His Grace further announced, that he had resigned the post of Commander in Chief.

6th of July), Lord Granville, and Sir Stratford Canning, guarantees for our Foreign Policy? Who had selected and appointed these noble persons? Whom did they represent in the eyes of the world? Were they not one and all bound in honour to suffer no departure from those principles, which had been laid down as the rule of their conduct, and of which they were the chosen instruments? What had made Mr. Grant so peculiarly eligible to preside over the Commercial Department? What had made the admission of Lord Palmerston to the Cabinet so desirable? Their abilities.-Certainly, their abilities,-but yet more the known liberality of their political principles. Were not these mighty instruments to work with? Were not these guarantees,—and the strongest which human ingenuity could devise? The only ones which could be offered or received between gentlemen.

Let us think, for a moment, what was the construction of the remainder of the Cabinet of the Duke of Wellington. Himself, the negotiator of the Protocol of April 1826-Lord Lyndhurst, called to his high office by Mr. Canning-Mr. Peel, the colleague and avowed supporter of all Mr. Canning's policy, the Catholic Question only excepted. Such were the influential Members of this Cabinet, the only ones who held departments which would give them weight in its Councils. Is there at this day any dispassionate person who will deny that here was sufficient-if not to justify