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constitute a contract. No promise or service is required
from the pensioner as a quid pro quo for the bounty which
you bestow.
But in this case you have required and re-
ceived the plighted faith of the State of New York to re-
ceive this money, keep it safely, and repay it in certain
proportions. Would any member of this House have the
hardihood to propose a bill to withhold the payment of
these pensions and then assign as a reason that there
is no valid contract for paying them? I presume not. Sir,
there is something of more value to a nation than money.
It is untarnished honor-unbroken faith. They should be
as spotless as female chastity.

"One false step in vain we may deplore;
We fall like stars that set to rise no more 39

The reason why every promise should be performed, is, that it has raised expectations which in justice ought not to be disappointed. The whole business of life is an endless chain of confidence growing out of these promises, express or implied. And frequently the breaking of one link sunders a thousand.

"Whatever link you strike,

Tenth or tenth thousandth, breaks the chain alike." Look at its effects, in this case, upon the single State of New York. That State, relying upon the plighted faith of this nation, has gone on and agreed to loan out all this money to citizens throughout the State, giving to cach town and ward their ratable proportion. Bonds and mortgages have been taken for the whole amount; and the three-fourths which has been received by the State from this Government, has been paid over to the borrowers, and promised in the shape of certificates given to pay over the remaining fourth on the 1st of October. The State has relied upon the promises of this Government for the money to pay these certificates. Now, sir, unless the money can be raised in some other way by the State, if this be withheld, all these numerous borrowers must be disappointed. Those who have struggled from day to day, and from week to week, to bear up against the pressure of the times, until they could obtain this pittance of relief, are to sink down in utter despair.

But, sir, what is the difference between the promise on the part of the State to loan this money to individuals, and the promise on the part of this Government to deposite this money with the States? A deposite is a loan; and the person with whom the deposite is made becomes the borrower, liable to repay the money according to the terms agreed. This Government, then, has agreed to loan the money to the State of New York; and has taken the bond and mortgage of that State, in the shape of a solemn act of its Legislature, to repay it on certain terms. The State has agreed to loan the same sum to individuals, and has taken their bonds and mortgages for the repayment of the same. Then if this Government can be justified in breaking this agreement, much more will the State of New York be justified in the breach of the agreement to the individual borrowers. The State may not only plead the high example of this nation in the breach of its promise, but may urge, with perfect justice, that the breach of faith by the United States, on which the State had unfortunately relied, had prevented the State from fulfilling its engagements. Will any of my colleagues who now urge a breach of faith on the part of the United States, in withholding this instalment, say that they believe the State of New York will be guilty of a similar breach to the borrowers of this money? I know they will not stain her honor by such an insinua tion. Then how can they justify themselves to their God or their country, in lending their votes or their voices to dishonor this nation, in such a manner as would be regarded a reproach and disgrace to the State in which we live? I hope gentlemen will pause and reflect before they finally

act.

But, sir, one of my colleagues [Mr. PARKER] has at

[SEPT. 25, 1837.

tempted to justify this breach of faith on the part of this Government, by saying that the State of New York would sustain no damage, because there was a large amount of money belonging to the canal fund of that State, now on deposite in the banks, drawing an interest to the State of only four or five per cent., and this money could be taken to make up the fourth instalment of the loans to individuals; which would thereby be invested on interest at seven per cent., and the State, instead of being a loser, would be a gainer of two or three per cent. per annum on this money. Sir, this is not a question of damages. It is a question of national honor. It is a question of national faith. Can you measure the value of these by the base standard

of dollars and cents?

But, sir, if this statement be true, that this immense treasure belonging to the canal fund in our State has been for years loaned to the banks at four or five per cent. interest, when it could have been loaned to the people on bond and mortgage at seven per cent., then it does not reflect much credit upon the financial skill of those in our own State who have had charge of this fund. But, leav ing them to the tender mercies of their friends upon this floor, let us see whether my colleague is correct in his inferences. If his reasoning be correct, the whole sum that has been deposited with the State has been an injury instead of a benefit. This must appear a strange paradox indeed. The State had it from the United States without interest, and loaned it out at seven per cent., thereby making annually upon the whole sum of $5,352,694 the no less sum than $374,688 58, being nearly four times as much as is annually distributed from the State treasury for the support of common schools in that great State, where about 500,000 children are annually educated. I think my honorable colleague, on reviewing his calculation, will see that he has made a slight mistake in arriving at this result, and that it is somewhat better to have money for nothing, than to pay even four or five per cent. for it.

if

But, sir, if my colleague [Mr. FOSTER] is right in the construction which he gives to the deposite act of 1836, then it is equally clear, that in no event is this money, General Government. once deposited with the States, to be repaid again to the I believe that no one ever expected it would be recalled. The money was deemed the proper ty of the citizens of the several States. It had been collected from them in the shape of duties, or was the avails of the public lands. In either case, if not wanted for the uses of the Government, it was deemed just to return it to the people, to whom it belonged. To avoid constitutional objections, the law by which this return was made, was christened a deposite act," instead of "a distribution act." But, sir, I care not what form or shape it assumes, Do justice-restore the money to whom it belongs; and object dear to the heart of every patriot. If we use due let it be appropriated to the sacred object of education-an

economy here our revenue is abundant. If it is to be squandered, the less there is the better for the people.

Remember that this

Argus, listen to an extract which I will read from that pa Let my colleagues who believe in the infallibility of the per, and then vote against this bill. extract is the honest, unbiased opinion of that oracle of prejudice began to operate. It is as follows: wisdom, in view of an exhausted Treasury, before party

by Congress, by an issue of Treasury notes, or some other "A remedy for any such contingency may be provided expedient measure, that would be less objectionable than any interference with the arrangements made with the States for the disposition of the surplus."

Sir, we are told that this bill should pass, because there then, sir, is a distinct admission that your Treasury is is no money in the Treasury to make the payment. This, bankrupt. Yes, sir, in less than one short year from the time this Government, through all its official organs, aud

SEPT. 25, 1837.]

Fourth Instalment Bill.

(H. OF R.

now; or, at all events, we and the people may know whether this and the last administration have been economin the use of the people's money, or whether they have squandered it with a profusion and extravagance never before equalled.

There was received into the Treasury, during the years 1835 and 1836, together with what there was in the Treasury on the 1st day of January, 1835, $88,461,942 04 And during the first half of the present year

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13,687,182 00

And if we estimate the receipts of the present quarter, ending on the 1st of October, at one third of those for the first half of the present year, they are

its hundred presses, was boasting of its wealth and pros-
perity, with an overflowing Treasury, and no national debt,
it now comes like an humble suppliant to the representa-ical
tives of the people, and says it is bankrupt, and cannot
pay. If the Treasury be empty, why pass this law? Will
it withhold what you have not got? Will it postpone what
does not exist? Our legislation seems to be a work of su-
pererogation. It is making laws for nonenity. But some
say we should pass the law as a direction to the Secretary
of the Treasury. Why pass it for him? He is not bound
to furnish the money, if it does not exist. His duty is dis-
charged if he pays it over when we provide it. But, sir,
we have passed one law, distinctly appropriating this iden-
tical money then in the Treasury to this object, and di-
recting him to pay it over. Why has he not obeyed that
law, and kept the money to be applied to this object? He
had no authority to take this and apply it to any other pur-
pose. The act was imperative, that the identical money
in the Treasury on the first day of January last should be
deposited with the States. I think, sir, instead of attempt-
ing to legalize this breach of trust on the part of the Sec-
retary in using this money, not only without law, but
against law, we had better institute an inquiry into his
conduct for laying his hands upon this sacred treasure, and
see if he has any justification.

But is the pretence true, that the money is not in the Treasury? This seems to be a difficult question to answer. I shall not venture into that labyrinth of mysteriesthe Secretary's report. The bewildered senses and contradictory reports of those who have attempted to pass through its intricate windings and involutions, admonish me to beware how I venture. No two have been able to agree as to what they saw there. Some saw treasure; others saw nothing but "confusion worse confounded;" and in this state of doubt and uncertainty it becomes us to inquire if there be no collateral aid, by the light of which the mysteries of this report may be unravelled. In the absence of positive proof, let us look at probabilities. The last administration professed to be one of "retrenchment and reform;" and the present Executive has declared that he intends "to follow in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor." We have, therefore, a right to expect, and the people did expect, economy in both. Have they been deceived? Has this promise been made to the ear and broken to the hope?" Have these professions, that elevated the present dynasty to power, been hollow and hypocritical? Let us look at the facts, and see how the matter stands, if the Treasury be now bankrupt, as is alleged by those in this House who support the administration.

From a careful examination of the expenses of this Government, for twelve years, that is, from 1819, to 1833, exclusive of the national debt, I find that they averaged about $13,000,000 per year. 1 give them in tabular form as follows, from the best estimates I can make :

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Making a total amount of Deduct from this the amount deposited with the States, being the first three instalments

4,562,394 00

$106,711,518 04

28,101,644 90

$73,609,873 14

And it leaves no less than applicable to the ordinary expenses of Government, which has been poured into your Treasury within two years and three-fourths, averaging nearly $29,000,000 per year. Where is it, sir? The empty vaults of your Treasury echo, where? I will tell you, sir, where it is. It has been wasted, squandered, and profusely lavished upon party favorites and parasites; and the people, from whose hard earnings you collected it, are now to be cheated out of it. Sir, the people will look into this matter. They will scrutinize this unparalleled profligacy of their public servants; and, in making up their minds, they will not forget all that these extravagances have been the bitter fruits of an administration having a large majority in both Houses of Congress, and constantly uttering the hypocritical cry of “retrenchment and reform!"

Sir, there is one more proof that the money is in the Treasury, notwithstanding we are told it is not, by the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, [Mr. CAMBRELENG,] which I hope will be entirely satisfactory to him and the administration members of this committee, and that is, the statement of the President himself in his message. I will read it:

"There are now in the Treasury $9,367,214 directed by the act of 23d of June, 1836, to be deposited with the States in October next."

These, sir, are the words of the message itself. To those who credit the veracity of their author I hope they will be satisfactory. They are too explicit to admit of doubt or to require comment.

But, sir, my chief objection to this, and all the other measures recommended in the President's message, and proposed by the Committee of Ways and Means, is, that they hold out no prospect of permanent relief to the country. True, sir, the issuing of Treasury notes, on which you are to borrow money to replenish your exhausted Treasury, may afford a little temporary relief to those who owe the Government, and indirectly to the community; and the extension of time for the payment of the merchants' bonds to the Government will afford present relief to that class of citizens, or enable them "to put off the evil day" a little longer. But these are mere expedients, temporary and partial in their operation, and do not reach the seat of the disease that now afflicts the body politic. That disease, sir, had its origin in the derangement of our currency; and that derangement, in my opinion, was produced by the unwise conduct of this Government. I will not charge this administration with a design to bring all these evils upon

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institution all the feelings of rivalry and avarice on the part of the State banks, and of jealousy and distrust on the part of the people; and that a consequence of this war has been, all the evils of over-banking, over-trading, and ruinous and gambling speculation described in the message, and the final depreciation and derangement of our currency, and the bankruptcy of the Government and people.

Let me not be misunderstood in what I am about to say. I have never been a particular friend of the United States Bank. I regard it as I do all other banks, as a necessary evil. I have never been its advocate, and am not now. It has gone down to the tomb of the Capulets;" let it rest in peace. And I should have great doubts of the expediency of establishing a new United States Bank at this time for the relief of the community. I fear that an attempt to put it in operation would rather aggravate than mitigate our sufferings. But on this point it is not necessary to express an opinion. I only allude to it to prevent any improper inference, and that the committee may understand that all I have to say of the United States Bank is as matter of history, and not of opinion, as to its expediency or useful.. ness at this time. Times have essentially changed; and what might have been proper or useful then, may be wholly improper or uscless now. Then, such a bank, with the confidence of the Government and people, might be useful in regulating the currency. Since the war upon that institution, banks have multiplied beyond all former example. To add another at this time, and collect together the requisite specie to put it in operation, would, I fear, add greatly to our present embarrassment. People must learn from actual suffering that it is much more easy to tear down than to build up, to destroy than to create, and to derange than to restore. Ignorance and folly may accomplish the one; wisdom, prudence, and time can alone perform the other. But, sir, I said I was opposed to these measures because they promised no permanent relief to the country. Why has the President, after witnessing the suffering of this community-after calling us together, as every one supposed, to propose some measure of relief-turned thus coldly away, without recommending any thing to restore a uniform currency? Are the prayers, and tears, and groans, of a whole nation, suffering all the horrors of impending bankruptcy, not worthy of his consideration? Are menbers of the administration prepared to return and look their constituents in the face, without making one effort for the relief of the country? We of the minority can do nothing.

We are powerless. But you have all power. Then why

not exert it to bring back the days of prosperity and sunshine that existed before this fatal war upon the currency, and commerce, and business of our country?

Sir, do the President and those who support him, expect to find a justification for the apathy they manifest towards a suffering country, by charging all our distresses to the follies and extravagance of the community, and by carefully concealing every thing which shows that those very follies and that very extravagance, which are held up for universal reprobation in the President's message, had their origin in the wickedness or folly of this Government? So it would seem. The President, after adverting to the distresses and embarrassments of the country in his message, says:

"The history of trade in the United States for the last three or four years affords the most convincing evidence that our present condition is chiefly to be attributed to over-action in all the departments of business-an over-action deriving, perhaps, its first impulses from antecedent causes, but stimulated to its destructive consequences by excessive issues of bank paper, and by other facilities for the acquisition and enlargement of credit."

Sir, I agree with him, that excessive issues of bank paper have stimulated to destructive consequences. Of this fact there can be no doubt; and it is a precious confession

[SEPT. 25, 1837.

from the head of that party that for years past has wielded the legislative power of this nation, and also the legislative power of most of the States in this Union, and constantly charged their opponents with being the bank party. I say, sir, this is a precious confession from the head of that party, that banks have been multiplied by this no-bank party, unul their "excessive issues have produced destructive conse quences." But, sir, if it were decorous to the Chief Magistrate, I would ask if ever such shameless hypocrisy, when exposed, was met by such unblushing impudence.

But, sir, what are those "antecedent causes" that gave the first impulse to this over-action?" Why are they concealed from the people? They are the true causes of all our sufferings; and, sir, let me tell you, that they had their origin in the war against the United States Bank. That was to be put down; and, to effect that object, and reward the pure patriotism of this no-bank party, new State banks were chartered. Let us look at facts. In 1830, all the banks in the United States were only 320. They have been increased in seven years to 677, and 146 branches, making in all 823 banks!

The capital of all the banks (January 1, 1830) was

$145,192,268 It has been increased in seven years to 378,719,168 Add to this the $40,000,000 of surplus revenue that has been bestowed on the pet banks since 1833, when the de posites were removed from the United States Bank, and you have the antecedent causes that stimulated to that overaction, and those destructive consequences, mentioned by the President. And all these, sir, are chiefly chargeable to the dominant party in these United States. They removed these deposites without law, and gave them to the pet banks. They invited these pet banks to extend their accommodations. They have created nearly three times as much banking capital, in the United States, since General Jackson came into office, as all that existed before. Yes, sir, as strange as it may appear, this no-bank party, that has for seven years cried out against the bank monster, until the people trembled for their liberties, have, within the same time, created near three times as much bank capital as all that existed in the United States before. Was there ever such unparalleled hypocrisy ?

But, sir, this war against the United States Bank, got up for political effect, regardless of the peace of society or the interests of the country, was made to unite the extremes of society. The more intelligent of the middle class never engaged in it, or were drawn into it, from political associ ations, with reluctance. It was really a war of the State banks against the United States Bank, got up by artful politicians to elevate Mr. Van Buren to the presidency. They tempted the cupidity of the thousand officers and stockholders interested in these banks, with the bribe of the public deposites and the prospect of destroying a hated rival that kept them in check, and loaned money at six per cent. It was a Shylock feeling of avarice and revenge. On the other hand, all the affiliated presses connected with these State banks cried out against the monster, until the more ignorant part of the community thought their liberties in danger, and joined the strong bank party against the weaker, to put down the United States Bank. Having effected this, and brought the country to the verge of ruin, and overwhelmed these State banks with infamy and disgrace, is it strange that the same unprincipled course should be pursued against them, that has been pursued against the United States Bank? It is what they had a right to expect. It is but "commending the poisoned chalice to their own lips." We may pity their folly; we may condemn the heartless perfidy that first seduced them from their duty, and prostituted them to the vilest purposes of partisan warfare, until their infamy has rendered them useless, and now casts them aside; but we cannot deny that the retributive hand of justice is seen in their sufferings.

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Sir, in corroboration of what I have said about this being a war of the State banks against the United States Bank, got up by designing politicians, I will mention a few facts connected with a little secret history on this subject in my own State.

[II. OF R.

bank. I believe the very day on which the report was made, it showed such abominable corruption and abuses, that a bill was introduced to repeal its charter, and, within one or two days, passed through all the forms of legislation in the popular branch without a dissenting vote; and also passed the Senate with but three or four votes against it. Does my honorable colleague think that a system which produces banks like this, works like a charm? But, sir, I perceive that this incestuous connexion between the politics and banks of that State has been festering and corrupting until it is about to fall asunder from its own rottenness. I, for one, have no tears to shed at the dissolution. I only regret that many of these banks, since they were chartered, have passed into the hands of honest and honorable men. I fear that the odium which rests upon this corrupt system, and which, in my opinion, is nowise necessarily connected with banking, will sink the whole, without discrimination. The vengeance of an insulted and oppressed community is terrible and overwhelming in its course. It stops not always to discriminate between the just and the unjust, between the proper use and improper abuse of a particular system; but, in the wild madness of popular fury, they hurl the whole to destruction. I warn them to stay their desolating hands. All sudden changes are dangerous. Let us not destroy, but purify, this odious system. We cannot live without banks and banking. Credit in some shape is indispensable to our now proposed by the President, property would not be worth twenty-five per cent. what it now is, and would soon be wholly absorbed by the wealthy capitalists of our country. The debtor part of the community would be ut terly ruined. Then let us purge this vile system of its corruptions and abuses, and strip it of its odious monopoly, and open the privilege of banking to all who comply with such prescribed rules of the legislature as secure the billholder and public generally from fraud and imposition. I hope, sir, to live to see the day when this shall be done, and the moral pestilence of political banks and banking shall be unknown.

It is known, sir, that we have a peculiar system of banking in the State of New York, called the safety-fund system. It had its origin with Mr. Van Buren, when Governor of that State in 1829. Although he did not claim the merit of an original inventor, yet he adopted it as his own, and recommended it to the Legislature. This system, sir, establishing a community of interest between the banks, and being under the immediate supervision of three bank commissioners, is admirably well calculated for use as a political engine. It was no sooner put in operation, than it was brought to bear upon the Legislature of that State. In 1830 or 1331, while I was honored with a seat in the Legislature of that State, resolutions were introduced into that body against a recharter of the United States Bank. These resolutions, sir, originated with the banks in that State. Not one solitary petition from the people on that subject had been presented to the Legislature. The bank then had three branches in that State : one at New York, one at Utica, and one at Buffalo; and the people were contented with the currency which they furnished. No murmur, no complaint, was heard from the people. But, sir, day by day, as these resolutions were under discussion in that Legislature, the birds of ill-prosperity. Were we reduced to a specie circulation, as omen, that deal in bank stock, hovered round that hall, and watched the progress of this unholy proceeding with an intense anxiety. But no farmers, no mechanics, were there. They had not been consulted; they took no interest in the proceeding. They had no share at that in this conspiracy of the State banks against their interest. They were delving at their labor, and slumbering in security, while these banks were forging the chains with which they have since bound them. Yes, sir, I was informed, and I believe it, that nightly, during the discussion of those resolutions, their supporters in the Legislature met in conclave, in one of the principal banks in that city, to devise ways and means to carry them through. They were carried. These banks, with the aid of the party screws, proved too powerful for the independence and honesty of that body; and the result was proclaimed as the sense of the people of that great State against the United States Bank. This State bank, sir, had its reward-it shared the spoils. But, sir, my colleague [Mr. FoSTER] has taken occasion to eulogize this safety-fund system. He says it works like a charm. I shall not deny, sir, that it has some good qualities; but I am far from thinking it so charming as my honorable colleague. I doubt not it appears so, sir, to many who share in its golden harvests, and enjoy its exclusive privileges; but to the great majority of the people, who, like myself, deal not in bank stock, but occasionally see or feel the tyranny of these little monsters, the working of this political engine is any thing but charming. Sir, I conceive it had its origin in the foul embraces of political ambition, and cunning, heartless avarice. "It was conceived in sin, and brought forth in iniquity." It has spread its baleful influence over that State, corrupting the fountains of power, and demoralizing the whole community, by the manner in which its privileges have been granted and its stocks distributed. Banks have been granted, and the stocks distributed, to party favorites, as a reward for party services. They have been the mercenary bribe offered to the community to sap the foundations of moral honesty and political integrity. But I will not enter into the disgusting details. As to those who wish to see the workings of this charming system of my colleague, I will refer them to an examination of our State Legislature last winter, and the proceedings of that body upon the report of their committee upon a single

[Mr. F. here went into an examination to show that the pretence in the message, that there had been the same over-banking and over-trading in England as in this country, was not true. He exhibited tables that show the following results:

October 1, 1833, circulation of the Bank of
England,

December 27, 1836, do. 'do.

December 28, 1833, circulation of all the
banks in England and Wales,
June 25, 1836, circulation of all the banks
in England and Wales,

.

£19,800,000 17,300,000

£27,621,104

29,386, 196

Mr. F. then spoke of the hostility of the administration to the deposite law, and its attempts, by means of the specie circular and transfer drafts, to oppress the banks, and, through them, the people, and render the law odious; and that the last effort was to declare the Treasury bankrupt, and withhold the funds.

in the State of New York had on
He then exhibited a statement showing that the banks

Jan. 1, 1837,
Sept. 1, 1837,

In circulation. Specie.

Discounts. $24,198,000 $6,557,020 $79,313,188 13,740,318 2,747,642 59,367,815 Reduc'd in 8 mo. $10,457,682 $3,809,378 $19,945,373

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Sept. 1, 1837, S United States deposites $728,571
Individual deposites -$15,134,968]

Now, sir, it appears from these facts that the banks in the State of New York, in eight months, have reduced

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their discounts one-fourth; their circulation near one-half; and their specie almost two-thirds. The people of that State are literally gasping for breath, like an animal under the exhausted receiver of the experimentalist. And if you pass this bill, you authorize the United States to take all but $2,000,000 of the specie now remaining in that great State, and lock it up in your vaults of this new subTreasury system. And you leave the bill-holders and individual depositors of that State with upwards of $25,000,000 due them from the banks, and only $2,000,000 of specie to pay them with.

Sir, however solvent these banks may be, it is impossible that they should ever resume specie payments under circumstances like these. This sub-Treasury scheme, which I regard as the germ of a Treasury bank, will draw the specie from our banks faster than they can collect it. The Post office now acts as an absorbent of all the small change in the country. Where the edict of the officer at the head of that Department is faithfully executed, all the specie is gathered into the Post-office, paid out to the mail contractors, and by them sold to the brokers, by whom it is sold as a commodity, and shipped out of the country. In this way it daily grows more and more scarce, and has almost ceased to be used as a circulating medium among the people. This sub-Treasury system is calculated to carry out this infamous distinction between the Government and the people-to absorb all the specie for the use of the Government and its favorites, and leave the people to irredeemable bank paper; and this bill, with the bankrupt law recommended by the President, is calculated to take, "peaceably if they can, but forcibly if they must," all the specie from the banks, and hoard it up for the use of the officeholders under this Government. Sir, there are evils between which a man is not bound to choose; he may reject both. And I regard this sub-Treasury system, and the union of the Government with the State banks, as evils of this character. I will not choose; I am opposed to both. But have my colleagues, who profess to be the guardians of these State banks, who call themselves "conservatives,' duly considered the awful precipice upon which we stand in the State of New York? Are you willing, instead of adding $1,300,000 to our circulation in this time of distress, to pass this bill, and thereby not only withhold that, but take from us the $700,000 now there in specie? Recollect that all our safety-fund banks are incorporated under a law that declares that they shall be deemed insolvent, and their charters dissolved by the court of chancery, if they neglect, for ninety days after demand, to redeem any evidence of debt issued by them in specie. The effect of that law has been suspended for one year, and for one year only, from the 11th day of May last. It will then expire by its own limitation, and can then only be renewed by the concurrence of each branch of the Legislature. Is there not much reason to doubt whether this law will be extended? It was passed in a moment of alarm, when the cry of bankruptcy and ruin broke upon the astonished ear of the Legislature like a peal of thunder from a cloudless sky. But they and the people have since had time to reflect. This is a state of things that cannot be endured, and most of the measures here recommended are calculated

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to aggravate it in a tenfold degree. Men become desperate, and already the deep sea of popular commotion begins to heave its rising billows. I confess I watch its motions with solicitude and alarm. And I have been surprised to find, in the papers of the day, a letter from General Jackson,

the former patron and eulogist of these pet banks, speak

ing of them in the following language:

"The history of the world has never recorded such base treachery and perfidy as has been committed by the deposite banks against the Government, and purely with the view of gratifying Biddle and the Barings, and, by the suspension of specie payments, degrade, embarrass, and ruin, if

[SEPT. 25, 1837.

they could, their own country, for the selfish views of making large profits by throwing out millions of depreciated paper upon the people, selling their specie at large premiums, and buying up their own paper at discounts of from twenty-five to thirty per cent, and now looking forward to be indulged in these speculations for years to come, before they resume specie payments."

But, sir, although I have been surprised to see the foregoing charge, I must confess that I have been more sur prised to see it published to the world week after week, and meet with no response or denial from any man on this floor or elsewhere. Are gentlemen conservatives aware of the effect of such a publication upon the popular mind? Let me tell them it bears upon its tainted breath, if false, a charge too foul for honest and honorable men to submit to in silence. It distils into the ignorant and credulous mind a poison more dangerous to the peace of society than foreign invasion or individual treason. And is there no honorable man connected with these institutions, or who stands upon this floor as their guardian, that will deny the foul charge of treachery and perfidy thus made against them? Why this unaccountable silence under a charge so infamous and revolting? Is it the deep contrition of guilt and merited condemnation that has sealed your mouths? or are you transfixed with superstitious horror, and struck with silent awe at the Greatest and Best, who uttered the anathema? Then prostrate yourselves in the dust, and let this mighty Juggernaut roll over you without a groan or a tear. But if there be one independent and honorable man-as I trust in God there are many-let him stand forth and deny this base charge. Let this little band of conservatives upon this floor, if they are fighting for principles, and not for spoils, raise the banner of independence, and meet their destiny like men; otherwise they must soon sink into utter oblivion and merited contempt. Already a black cloud hangs im pending over your heads, and its sulphurous fires, lighted up by the midnight torch of locofocoism, will soon burst upon you, more terrible than that storm of fire and brimstone that overwhelmed the devoted cities of Sodom and Gomorrah; and, without independence and firmness, you will go down to your political graves

"Unwept, unhonored, and unsung."

Mr. FILLMORE having concluded his remarksMr. BRONSON obtained the floor. He said he was in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from South Carolina, as presenting the bill in a less ocjectionable shape: but he should most assuredly protest most sincerely and heartily against the amendment (notice of which had been given by Mr. MARTIN) which went to strip the bill of the only palatable feature about it.

Mr. B. was assured, from the proof adduced, that there were not available means in the Treasury to meet its liabilities. He also controverted the position of the payment of deposite partaking of the character of a contract be tween private individuals; there might be some plausibility in the argument, but it was not the proper and right ground to put it upon.

Was there any common ground on which they could meet? He thought there was. That common ground was to take the bill as it originally was, with the amend ment of the gentleman from South Carolina, but without the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama. Adopting this, there was a guarantee offered that no portion of the three instalments should be called in till after the expi ration of twelve months. The United States said to the States, give up your claim for the fourth instalment, and

we will not call back any of the others.

Mr. MARTIN said he should not trouble the committee with the remarks which he had desired to submit upon the bill under consideration, but for the denouncement as "extraordinary" by the gentleman from New York [Mr. BRONSON] of the amendment which he had given notice

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