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force of acting, for it cannot retain any figure, form or difpofition; which effect, nevertheless, whilft they com. monly attribute to matter, they confound by a manifeft error, the effence and effect of the Creator, and created things. We will fuppofe a beast to have done fome damage, or by mifchance to have killed a man, whether or not will it be that God did it by his providence, and may be faid to be the chief caufe of this lofs? I having weighed all things and arguments relative to this fubject, have made this the fum of my thoughts.

(To be continued.)

ONE of the greateft obftacles to the fpreading ufeful knowledge, and receiving information from each other, is owing to a fault which most people are apt to flide into, of looking at themfelves, not thofe they converfe with. When we hear any thing propofed, we confider whether it be agreeable to our own prior fentiments, not whether it be right or wrong; by this means, not judging of it by its evidence, but comparing it with those notions we have already imbibed. If I would fee an object in the light another doth, I must put myself in the fame line he ftands in, or elfe it is impoffible I fhould fee it in the fame point of view, without which it is impoffible I fhould judge whether his obfervations on it are right or wrong. We should, therefore, place ourselves in the line we are directed, though at the fame time we may be perfuaded that our own point of view is the belt; by which means we fhall be able to judge whether it is fo or no.

So to give another's argument its due weight, we ought to lay afide all

we think ourselves on the subject, and confine our views intirely to what is before us; not to difcard our own opinion, which is neither better nor worse, nor any ways affected by this seeming preference which is given to the new gueft, but only that we may be able to judge whether it be worth receiving or no. In short, every man whilst he is hearing another man explain his fentiments, or reading his writings, fhould act the school-boy, implicitly for the time acquiefce, as if he knew nothing of the fubject he is upon; then he will fee the whole of what is laid before him, and may afterwards call over again every particular, and try it by his own præcognita, fet the old evidence against the new, and give it a fair trial.

This is what I would defire of the reader, to lay afide felf, and confider and view things in the light I have put them, without rejecting what I lay, merely because it may not be the fame, or because it may contradict what he thought before.

Philofophy is a thing of confequence, becaufe

of nature are performed by fecond caufes; we fee not indeed the mechan. ifm by which they are performed; and what authority have we to fay those agents, thofe caufes, do not the work without an immediate application of him who made them? Do they fee the hand of God upon them? No. That is not pretended to. Has he told them fo? No. Why then is this afferted to prove the divine pory er? Either way of acting proves that. To prove the divine wisdom. Where is the wisdom in making and employ ing fervants who cannot do the work they are fet about? A beautiful contrivance or concatenation of caufes would be a far more illuftrious proof of knowledge, far more befitting the divine goodness, than either to work by occult qualities, or by an invifible hand; in both which cafes man would be deprived of the most convincing evidence, fenfible ocular proof, of the contrivance and wisdom of God; nay, would want proof that thefe things were dependant creatures. But it is furprifing that they should appeal to nature for proofs of wifdom in the Creator, who allow him lefs fkill than to any common mechanick. Man can make a machine to go regularly, and methodically perform what he framed it for; but the wheels of God's machine cannot go unless his finger be continually upon them. That matter is capable of mechanifm needs no proof, and the Creator could want neither power nor fkill; and why then may not things act mechanically? God has affirmed they do, and the reafon of the thing fpeaks the fame language.

If then the creators do not act immediately by themselves, we are to af cribe the economy to fecondary caufes, leaving the great originals no other bufinefs in the material world, than to overlook, and occafionally, when they fee proper, over-rule the na

tural agents.

The next queftion then is, which part of the creation hath the power

lodged in it-folid, or fluid matter? The orbs, or that fluid in which they are placed? Or, in other words, is motion performed by impulfe, or a power inherent in the atoms of matter, continually and neceffarily exerting its virtue, and fo producing the effects we are enquiring after? To fay the latter, is to affirm without knowledge; becaufe the parts or atoms of matter are too fmall to be the object of our senses; nor are they any ways capable of being brought under obfervation, so as to give us an opportunity of judging whether they have fuch qualities or not. Befides, a power acting invifibly, or a virtue which is immaterial, is not an object of the fenfes, and confequently not the fubject of our knowledge. They fay, however, such power is adherent to matter; but he that created matter hath not, that they pretend to, given them any authority for fuch an affertion.

And with fubmiffion, it is unfaying what they lay down, with regard to the inactivity of matter; for when they make matter incapable of moving itself, it is fo a fortiori, of moving any thing elfe. If it be naturally paffive, it hath no active power in it. Nor are they at all helped out of the difficulty by allowing that fuch power was not originally in it; but fuper-induced, or added to it by the creator, a law, as they term it, impreffed on all matter, for the leffer quantity to tend towards the greater; because even fo matter would act without means, and exert a power, though it be allowed that fuch power was given it. If it cannot act of itself, it cannot receive a power of acting of itself. If an incapacity of acting be an attribute or quality naturally belonging to matter, (which your very conceffion of attraction, or any other of the powers they talk of, being fuperinduced doth fuppofe,) fuch quality cannot be taken from it, and a contrary one given it. So their folution of the difficulty fails them. Omitting that they have no authority for faying matter has fuch any. hath God power,

told

told them fo? Do they fee fuch laws adhering to matter? No. They fee that things move, and conclude that every effect hath a caufe. They fee that a ftone tends to the earth; that the earth encircles the fun, and the moon the earth. All this is right enough, but this brings us not to the point we aim at Because we do not fee the earth act upon the ftone, the fun upon the earth, or the earth upon the moon. To believe this or that thing moves another, when we fee it is not in the place it is faid to act in, is to be more credulous than the most fuperftitious of the papifts. To affirm it acts by a virtue invisible, and confefs we can neither fee how, nor by deductions reach the manner of its fuppofed operation, is to rest on occult qualities. To fay the weight or force with which a ftone defcends to the earth is owing to its gravity, is faying no more nor lefs, than that the weight of a body is owing to its weight. To offer to explain this, by faying the earth attracts or draws it, is doubling the cheat, because the horfe cannot draw, unless he is fastened to the cart; and they have not, nor do they offer to fhew us, the chain which faftens the ftone to the earth, or iron to the loadstone.

Befides, in fact, there is no law of this nature in or on matter. The heaviest bodies do not attract each other, as by such a rule they ought, with the greateft force. Nor is the adhefion of fuch bodies the ftrongest. Many fluids are heavier than many folids; their adhesion it is plain infinitely lefs. The loadstone attracts ftrongly, quickfilver not at all: a diamond adheres ftrongly, and yet has lefs matter in it, if we judge by weight. If attraction were a general law, all bodies fhould attract each other, according to the quantity of matter in them. The loadstone ought to have no more of this virtue in it than a diamond, or than lead hath: nor ought the virtue in it to be more iné clined to draw iron, than to pull a feather to it.

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I do not fay that our philofophers affert, that all bodies attract alike, be cause they cannot help feeing the contrary; but if all matter be alike,' the fame as to the form and fize of the conftituent atoms, and this power be either connate to matter, or fuper-added to it, the heaviest bodies would attract the strongeft, which fince they do not, I conclude that attraction is not a law of nature, but performed by fomething diftinct from the, as they term it, attracting body.

And if gravity or attraction, (and fo we may fay of all the other nicknames they have blinded philofophy with) confidered as a quality inherent in, or fuper-added to matter, be in itfelf irrational, unphilofophical, as well as unproved, and alfo contrary to the most common obfervations, our philofophers are ftript of their agent, and we must look farther than they have done for the cause of motion.

If then the creators neither act immediately by themfelves, nor have, that we know of, nay, as far as we know, cannot give a flock or a stone, or one atom power to move another, but by impulfe; nor that impel, unlefs it be firft impelled itself; we must look out to fee what doth impel, and whence its power arifes.

This power cannot be in the folid orbs, because they cannot act, or exert any active power, where their substance is prefent; much lefs can they act, where they are not prefent; or, which is the fame thing, cannot impel without touching. So the earth tends to the fun, a ftone to the earth, and iron to a loadstone, by fome other means. The creator then doth not move things himself, and folids cannot.

It remains therefore that we afcribe the cause of motion to the air, or that fluid ftate of matter in which we breathe, in which birds fly, and in which he who made all things, tells us the fun, moon, and ftars are pla ced.