The Delta.

The testimony in preparatorio completely disproves this. The master swears, answering the 12th interrogatory: "The vessel touched at Grand Cayman, in the West India islands. We stopped there to get information; we wanted information as to the war in America. I heard that the parties were negotiating peace." The master is contradicted in this by the positive testimony of every other witness. Taylor, the supercargo, answering the same interrogatory, swears: "On the present voyage we stopped nowhere. We passed close to the island of Grand Cayman, but did not stop." And he says not a word as to any information got from the fruit boats which came off. Davidson, the mate, says, answering the same interrogatory: "We touched at no port or place after we left Liverpool before we were taken." He says nothing about Grand Cayman, or information there, or anywhere, received on the voyage, but, on the contrary, ignoring all this, he testifies as follows, when interrogated as to the alteration of the vessel's course: "The captain changed his mind. He called me and the supercargo into the cabin. They then made an entry in the captain's log-book to the effect that we would proceed to Galveston, and ascertain if that port was blockaded." Kent, the steward, in answering the 12th and 36th interrogatories, makes no mention of any stop made by the vessel on that voyage.

The log-book of the vessel, kept by the mate, contains careful daily entries of the vessel's course, distances, and position, and not only makes no mention of stopping at Grand Cayman, but shows the vessel to have been proceeding steadily on her way, day and night, at the very time fixed by the master as the time of her alleged stopping at Grand Cayman.

The captain's log-book is produced, containing the entry alluded to by the mate, and it is a notable circumstance that it is about the only entry contained in it. That it is a false entry is sufficiently established by the testimony before recited. It declares that the vessel stopped at Grand Cayman; that fruit boats came off; that they got no positive information, but were given to understand that peace was in negotiation. It further states that the alteration of the destination was "by direction of the supercargo."

It is impossible to consider the facts in proof, with all their attending incidents and circumstances, and arrive at any other conclusion than this: that the destination of the vessel declared by her papers was false and fraudulent, and that, from the beginning, she was bound to Galveston, not with any design of making honest inquiry before at

The Delta.

tempting to enter, but with the deliberate purpose, on the point of being accomplished, and which the capture alone defeated, of entering that port, in spite and in violation of the blockade.

But, again, as matter of law, the falsity of the destination of the vessel, as set forth in her papers, is established by the fact that she is documented for a voyage to Matamoras or Minatitlan, disclosing no contingent destination to Galveston. If, as is averred, the voyage was undertaken with instructions to go to Galveston-if, upon inquiry, it was found that the blockade of that port was raised-then the ship's papers are false, because they fraudulently conceal the fact of the contingent destination to Galveston, and represent the destination to be absolutely to Matamoras or Minatitlan.

The dishonesty of purpose in the approach to the harbor of Galveston, which is so clearly established by all the circumstances of the case, is confirmed by the fraudulent omission to state on the paper the intent to approach it at all. In The Carolina, (3 Ch. Rob., 75,) Sir William Scott says: "Had there been any fair contingent deliberative intention of going to Ostend, that ought to have appeared in the bills of lading; for it ought not to be an absolute destination to Hamburg, if it was at all a question whether the ship might not go to Ostend, a port of the enemy. There is, then, an undue and fraudulent concealment of an important circumstance which ought to have been disclosed." (See, also, The Margaretha Charlotte, 5 Ch. Rob., 78, note.) The same principle is laid down in the late case of The Union. (1 Spinks' Prize Cases, 164.)

The evidence in the case thus plainly indicates that the voyage of the Delta was conceived with the fraudulent design of violating the belligerent rights of the United States, and, by evading the blockade established by authority of the government, to give aid and assistance to the enemy. To accomplish this, she was furnished with a simulated, neutral ownership, and with papers concealing her true destination and proclaiming a false one. Being captured at the mouth of the blockaded port in the attempt to enter it, hundreds of miles away from her course to the port of her ostensible destination, a story is invented, by way of explanation, which turns out to be utterly false, a mere fabrication, and therefore tending only to cumulate the proof of culpability and dishonesty.

Upon the second and third points at issue, then, the court can entertain no doubt of the validity of the capture, and of the necessity of decreeing condemnation of both vessel and cargo.

The Delta.

4. Knowing of the effectual blockade of Galveston at and before the commencement of the voyage, could the vessel lawfully approach the very mouth of the blockaded port, even for the bona fide purpose of inquiry, and was not such approach, under the circumstances, an unlawful act, subjecting the captured property employed in it to capture and confiscation? This point is distinctly raised by the arguments of counsel in the cause, and is legitimately developed by the proofs and papers, as well as by the claims. It is, therefore, proper that it should be passed upon by the court, although its determination may not affect the result in this suit, by reason of the conclusion arrived at upon the previous points.

It is conceded-and if not, it is a part of the history of the case, and sworn to by all the witnesses-that all concerned in the adventure had knowledge, full and complete, of the actual effective blockade of the port of Galveston, at and prior to the commencement of the voyage in which the vessel was captured.

66

It is well established by repeated decisions of Sir William Scott, the great master of British prize law, that a neutral trader cannot, with knowledge of a blockade, lawfully go to the station of a blockading force under the pretence of obtaining information as to its continuance. The inquiry must be made elsewhere, not there. The merchant," says the learned judge, "is not to send his vessel to the mouth of the river, and say, 'If you don't meet a blockading force, enter; if you do, ask a warning and proceed elsewhere.' Who does not at once perceive the frauds to which such a rule would be introductory? The true rule is, that after knowledge of the existing blockade, you are not to go to the very station of the blockade upon pretence of inquiry." (The Spes and The Irene, 5 Ch. Rob., 76; The Betsey, 1 Ch. Rob., 334; The Neptunus, 2 Ch. Rob., 110; The Little William, 1 Acton, 141, 161.)

The reason and necessity of the rule, as laid down by Sir William Scott, is too obvious to require argument in its support. Were it once relaxed, so as to allow the approach of neutral traders to the mouth of a blockaded port for the purpose of inquiry, the blockade of the ports of the insurgent States could not be made effective by the combined naval forces of all nations. Such a relaxation would operate as a universal license to the merchant vessels of the world to attempt to enter a blockaded port, for a failure to do so would be attended with no hazard.

The soundness of this principle has not been called in question by

The Advocate.

any decision of the courts of this country, and its wisdom will probably be approved so long as a belligerent blockade is recognized in international law as a legitimate and efficient method of prosecuting a public war.

THE SLOOP ADVOCATE AND CARGO.

Where a vessel captured as prize is appraised by a naval survey, and appropriated to the use of the United States, and her papers and crew are, with the appraisal, sent to this court, proceedings against her in prize are regular, although she is not brought before the court. Vessel condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.

(Before BETTS, J., April, 1862.)

BETTS, J.: This vessel, with her lading, was captured December 1, 1861, in Mississippi sound, off the coast of Mississippi, by the United States ship-of-war New London, and taken to Ship island, where, on appraisal by a naval survey, she was appropriated by the United States flag officer at that port to the military use of the United States, as necessary for that service. The appraisal, with the papers, the master, and part of the crew of the vessel, were sent to this port, and she was here libelled, in this suit, March 3, 1862.

The vessel belonged to her master, John Fallon, an Englishman, but a citizen of Louisiana, who has resided in New Orleans since 1857, but is not a married man. He regards Long Island, New York, as his real home. The vessel sailed from New Orleans, a blockaded port, under the rebel flag, and with a fishing license from the Confederate States, and was seized with these evidences upon her. She was engaged in fishing, and had no cargo on board when arrested, except the fish intended for sale on her return to New Orleans. The capture was about sixty miles east of New Orleans, and the master knew of the war, and that the southern ports were under blockade when he went out. The vessel had, in May previously, been warned, off Pensacola, of the blockade of the southern ports, and the master knew that New Orleans was blockaded when he went out of that port. The register and license under which the vessel was sailing when captured were issued under the rebel or Confederate States authority.

Upon these facts, the vessel and her equipments were enemy property, and had also been used to evade the blockade of the port of New Orleans, in her egress therefrom, on the adventure upon which

* This decree was affirmed, on appeal, by the circuit court, July 17, 1863.

The A. J. View.

she was seized. The proceedings against the property as prize are regular, without its being brought before the court, (Proceeds of Prizes of War, 1 Abbott's Adm. R., 495,) being in conformity with the mode of procedure in admiralty in seizures for forfeitures under the revenue laws. (Prize Rule, No. 24; District Court Admiralty Rule, No. 184; Supreme Court Admiralty Rule, No. 39.)

Judgment of condemnation and forfeiture will be entered, accordingly, with costs; and that the appraised value of the vessel be paid into court, in satisfaction thereof.

THE SCHOONER A. J. VIEW AND CARGO.

Cargo and appraised valuation of vessel condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.

(Before BETTS, J., April, 1862.)

BETTS, J.: The above vessel, owned by a citizen of New Orleans, and registered there by authority of the Confederate States, on the 20th of November, 1861, was captured by the United States public ship New London, on the 28th of November, 1861, in Mississippi sound, laden with a cargo of turpentine and tar. The cargo was the property of Black, the supercargo. Neither the manifest nor any other papers on board the vessel designate the voyage contemplated to be made; but it appears, from the testimony of the master and the mate, on their examination, and by the written parole given by the supercargo on the arrest of the vessel, that the cargo and vessel were destined for Balize, in Honduras. The evidence in the case is unequivocal that the voyage was undertaken by the mutual concurrence of the owner of the vessel and the owner of the cargo, to evade the blockade at the port of New Orleans, and that they were both of them, at the time, residents of that place, and well aware of the existence of the blockade. The supercargo was an Englishman by birth, but had been, for many years prior to the seizure of the cargo, residing with his family at New Orleans, and doing business there. The owner of the vessel, though a native of the State of New York, had been for many years settled in business in New Orleans, and a resident there with his family. He purchased the vessel, and had her registered to him in his own name, and on his oath that he was a citizen of the Confederate States, on the 20th of November, 1861. (Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How., 498; S. C., 18 Id., 110; Fay v. Montgomery, 1 Curtis C. C. R., 266.)