re-examined in a higher court, the judge and the jury shall be praised for executing the law faithfully, and yet the prosecutor condemned for violence and oppression.

There is a plain difference between the laws made for the public good and safety, and those introduced in favor of private persons; only with respect to the first-mentioned laws, it is often criminal to conceal offences committed against them, or to compound for them with the offenders. To conceal treason is an offence of a very high nature; for every man is concerned in the life and welfare of the king, and bound to defend him. To compound with thieves and robbers is criminal, for this plain reason among others, that whoever treats with a thief for his impunity, treats for a greater interest than he has a right to dispose of; for every man has an interest in bringing such offenders to justice; and therefore no man can remit the penalty but he who has a right to act for the public, that is, the king only.

But as to the laws introduced for the sake of private rights and properties, the case is otherwise. For as every man may dispose of his own rights and properties as he thinks fit, so he is at liberty to use the methods which the law has provided for the recovery of his rights, or not to use them, as he pleases. In all these cases therefore the law provides the remedy, and leaves the use of it to the conscience of the party concerned.

Since then men are to be governed by the rules of reason and conscience in the legal prosecution of their own rights, I desire you to consider with me what it is that reason and conscience and Christian charity require of us in the case now under consideration.

The words of the text are part of one of our Saviour's parables. They do not contain an historical account of a fact, supposed to have happened just as it is related; but here is a case stated by our blessed Lord, with such circumstances as he thought proper to support the inference to be drawn from it; and therefore the circumstances are to be considered as necessary ingredients in the judgment which he makes on this case. Observe then,

First, here is a debt supposed to be justly due. The poor man owed his fellow-servant an hundred pence.

Secondly, when the debt is demanded, he does not deny it, or refuse to pay it, but desires forbearance only till he could, by his labor and industry, raise enough to discharge the debt.

Thirdly, he asks even this as a favor, and with great submission: he fell down at his fellow-servant's feet and besought him. On the contrary,

Fourthly, the creditor comes with insolence and violence to demand his debt. 'He laid hands on his fellow-servant,' and took him by the throat, saying, Pay me that thou owest.' And when the poor man besought him to have patience, he regarded him not, but hurried him away to prison; and for this behavior he is called, ver. 32. Thou wicked servant.'

Some of these circumstances seem to be added, to aggravate the cruelty of this wicked servant; such are they which describe the violence used on one side, and the submission and intreaty offered on the other. And the case commonly falls out to be so. Men are apt to demand their debts, especially from their equals or inferiors, with a haughtiness and roughness hard to be borne; and yet the poor debtor is forced by necessity to take it patiently, and to be all submission.

But the circumstances on which the reason of the case depends, are principally these two: first, that the debtor was not able to discharge the debt at the time of the demand : secondly, that he was willing to do justice to his creditor, and to endeavor, by the best means he could use, to raise a sum sufficient to answer the demand. Therefore where either of these circumstances are wanting, the reason of the case ceases, and together with it all pleas for forbearance and compassion. Consequently every man is at liberty, in point of conscience, to use the method which the law of his country directs; to compel those to pay their debts who are able, but not willing to pay them. And in truth where this is the case, the creditor is so far from being justly chargeable with cruelty or oppression in making use of any legal method to recover his own, that the charge lies strongly against the other side. To delay poor traders or others in the payment of what is due to them, is always injustice, and sometimes very barbarous injustice. A poor man may perhaps lose his credit, which is the life of his business, or perhaps his liberty, which is the life

and maintenance of himself and family, for want of that very money which you detain from him: and when this happens, is it any compensation to pay the man at last what is owing to him? So far from it, that such a debtor, even when his debt is paid, may stand charged in conscience with the ruin of a poor family.

Another.circumstance on which the judgment of our Saviour in this case depends, is, that there be a readiness and willingness in the debtor to do justice whenever he is able, and to use his best endeavors to enable himself to do it. Consequently all such debtors are out of this case who deny their just debts, or any part of them; and all such as may be justly suspected to conceal their effects in order to defraud their creditors; and such also as live idly and profusely, squandering the estate which ought to be applied to do justice to those to whom it is due. The reason of these exceptions may be made plain in few words. The present inability of a debtor is the argument for the delay and the forbearance; but this inability comes not into question where the debt itself is denied. And since the circumstances of men change so fast as they do, the man who wants forbearance this year, may in a few more be better able to pay the debt than the other is to forgive it; and what reason can be given why he should not? Now he who denies the debt, declares an intention never to pay it; which certainly will justify the other in endeavoring, by a legal method, to maintain and ascertain his right; and till the right is cleared, there is no room for one side to plead, or the other side to consider the arguments for pity and compassion.

The second exception relates to a case which is so manifestly fraudulent, that nothing can be said in its excuse. They who conceal their effects, and plead poverty deceitfully, are mere cheats, and deserve no compassion. To prevent such frauds, and to arm the creditor with power to compel a discovery, seems to me to be the chief view and design of the law, which puts the body of the debtor into the creditor's power; and so odious is this deceit, that the law, in some cases and circumstances, has annexed to it a far greater penalty.

The third exception relates to those who oftentimes are free enough of their promises to do justice, and yet by their actions

declare daily that they have nothing less at heart than to do justly by their creditors. Such are they who live idly and profusely, and are constantly diminishing what they have, and by so doing are rendering themselves less able every day to pay their just debts. Now what reason can you imagine, that is proper to be laid before an honest industrious man, to persuade him to be content that his own family should suffer, and his substance be wasted by the folly and extravagance of a stranger? Such a man would certainly punish and restrain a son of his own, were he idle and extravagant; and what kind of goodness or charity is it to maintain and support the like extravagance in another? Some wise commonwealths have debarred such persons from the management of their own estates: I am sure there is more reason to debar them from spending the estates of other men; and this is what every extravagant man does, whilst he consumes his substance, and leaves his debts unpaid.

In these cases, therefore, and in others of the like nature, every good man may, and every wise man will, make use (in a reasonable manner) of the power which the law gives him for the security of his property; and in so doing he stands clear of all offence against charity and good conscience.

But when the circumstances mentioned in the text meet together; when the debtor is chargeable with no fault or fraud, but is disabled by mere poverty to satisfy his debts; to use the extremity of the law against such a man is not only cruel and inhuman, but, as far as I can judge, contrary to the true meaning and design of the law itself. For the law which gives power over the body of the debtor, is not a criminal law, ordained for the punishment of offenders; but is a law made to secure men in their properties, and to guard them against the arts and contrivances of such as would injure them in their just demands. To use the law therefore, where it cannot possibly have any effect towards securing your property, but can serve only to harass and torment a poor unfortunate man, is perverting the law, and making it subservient to purposes very different from those for the sake of which it was ordained. The law does not intrust private men with the execution or relaxation of its penalties for crimes and offences; but in the present case

every man may imprison, or release from prison, his debtor, as he pleases; a plain evidence that this law was meant as a defence of private rights, and not as a punishment for criminals.

Is it then a general rule that the law can never with good conscience be executed against insolvent debtors? There may possibly be exceptions, and more than I can foresee; but I think they must all be attended with this circumstance, that there be a prospect of recovering the debt, though the debtor himself be insolvent. It may so happen that he who has nothing of his own, may have wealthy friends and relations; and though friends are not often willing, for the sake of justice, to pay the debts of a relation, yet for the honor of the family, or out of personal regard to the relation, they will pay the money as the price of his redemption from a jail. Many cases may be imagined, where a rich relation ought in reason to pay the debt, rather than the poor creditor to lose it. In such cases, there may be a reason to justify or excuse the proceeding.

Some think that no severity is too great to be used towards such as have spent their estates riotously, to the injury of their creditors. And indeed little is to be said in behalf of such persons. Yet still it is worth considering whether you would choose to be judge and executioner in your own cause. And if the case be really so desperate, that you can aim at nothing by the execution of the law but the punishment of the man who has wronged you, I am sure it is the safer way to leave the punishment to him who has said, Vengeance is mine, and I will, repay.'

But the case which I have principally in view stands clear of these exceptions. The unfortunate persons with whom the jails are crowded, are for the most part such as have neither money nor friends to assist them; such as have fallen into poverty by misfortunes, by a decay in their business, or perhaps by the largeness of a family, which their utmost diligence could not support. Were they at liberty, they might probably be of use to themselves and their poor families, and also to their creditors, by following their honest callings and employments. But now their strength consumes in vain, they starve in prison, and their children out of it, or are thrown on the parish for a