by him, because he finds them agreeable to the light of his own reason and understanding.

The difference then between a true Deist and the Christian arises from the doctrine contained in the text. They both equally believe the being and providence of God: and the obligations of morality are equally admitted on both sides. The necessity of a virtuous life, in obedience to these obligations, is no matter of dispute: at least there is no reason why it should be matter of dispute between them. The Deist has no room to doubt in this case; for he has no other hope than in his obedience, which of necessity therefore must be so perfect as to render him acceptable in the sight of his equitable Judge: and if the Christian builds so far on other hopes as to neglect the weighty matters of the law, he deceives himself, and abuses the gospel of his Saviour.

But then in other respects they differ widely: the Deist reckons himself and the rest of mankind to be in that state of nature in which God created them, and therefore capable of obtaining, by the present powers of nature, the end designed by God for man. In consequence of this, as he owns the duty of obeying God, so in right of his obedience he claims his favor and protection. The Christian is persuaded that man has fallen from the state of innocence in which he was created; that being 、 a sinner, he has no claim on God by his obedience, but stands in need of pardon; and that being now weak, through sin, he stands in need of grace and assistance to enable him to perform the conditions on which the pardon of God is offered believes that God has indeed pardoned mankind, and granted them reconciliation, being thereunto moved by the obedience and sufferings of his Son Christ Jesus; and that he hath promised, and will surely give his grace and assistance to all true believers in Christ, to enable them to perform the conditions of his pardon.

and he

What the Christian thus believes, the gospel plainly teaches: and these are the great points to be made good; and they are briefly comprehended in the words of the text, 'That Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners.'

To illustrate and confirm this proposition, it will be proper to show,

First, what reason we have to believe that men were sinners, and stood in need of pardon and salvation.

Secondly, by what means Christ perfected their redemption and salvation.

The first question is, what reason have we to believe that men were sinners, and stood in need of pardon?

It is a saying of St. Austin's, Si non periisset homo, non venisset Christus; If man had not fallen, Christ had not come :' and our Lord speaks to the same sense when he tells us, 'The son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost:' and his answer to those who reproached him with conversing with publicans and sinners stands on the same ground: 'They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.' Had man continued in innocence, the religion of nature would have answered all the ends of his creation; he wanted no redeemer in his natural state; for it would be absurd to suppose that Christ came to redeem man from the state and condition in which God made him. After the works of the creation were finished, God liked them all, and saw every thing that he had made; and behold it was very good' in this state therefore nothing was wanting to the perfection of the creature: God was pleased with all his works, and with man especially, to whom he gave dominion over the rest of the world. In this state therefore there was no want of a reconciler between God and man; nor would there ever have been any such want, had this happy state continued.

That innocence and virtue shall be rewarded, guilt and iniquity punished, is no more than what natural sense and reason have always taught the considering part of mankind: for the voice of reason and of the law are in this respect the same, This do, and thou shalt live.' And though man is altered and changed, yet the nature of things is still the same; and he is no ill reasoner, who, from the abstracted consideration of virtue and vice, concludes that virtue has a just title to reward, and vice deserves punishment: and it is no wonder that they who argue on these general views only, should imagine that moral virtue may still exalt a man to all the degrees of happiness that his nature is capable of.

In the celebrated question concerning the merit of good works,

there has arose much confusion, for want of distinguishing between good works, simply and in their own nature considered, and considered as done or performed by the sons of men. The first is a single question: whether virtue in its own nature has a title to reward? And who will deny it? For as sure as God is just, as sure as there is a difference between good and evil, he will, he must reward the one, and punish the other. But when you ask, whether the good works of men deserve and merit reward? you strangely alter the state of the question; for here not only the nature of good works, but the nature and condition of man must be considered too. If he has already concluded himself, if sentence is gone out against him, and his case be irretrievable, your question must be impertinent; because you ask, whether he who is already under condemnation for his evil works, may be rewarded for his good works?

Put the case, that a man ten years ago committed a secret and barbarous murder: that since he has lived in an unblameable submission and obedience to the government; ask then the question, whether submission and obedience to the government have a right and title to protection and defence in life and fortune? Every man will answer, yes. But ask again, whether this man's obedience and submission have the same right and title? Every man will answer, no: because the villany committed long since puts him out of protection of the government, and justice is still indebted to him for the horrid fact; and whenever it meets him, will execute on him wrath and vengeance.

I intend not to press this instance to a parallel with our case : but thus much at least it shows, that virtue and morality may, in their own nature, and in themselves considered, deserve reward from a just and righteous Being; and yet the virtue and morality of man may not deserve it. And this is the parting point between the patrons of natural and revealed religion; the not considering which has made some imagine that, whilst we defend the authority of revelation, we give up the principles of reason and nature. Is there not, say they, an essential difference between virtue and vice? True, there is. Is not justice the attribute of God? and must not a just God reward virtue and punish vice? True still. Is not this then, say they, a suf

ficient foundation for religion, without recurring to grace and faith, or miracles, or mysteries? True, it is, where native innocence is preserved, where religion is res integra: but what will you say of those who have already offended? Consult your principles of reason; the voice of nature is, that vice must be punished; if so, all that offenders, all that sinners can expect from natural religion is the just reward of their sins and offences: and whether these are such terms and conditions as should endear natural religion to sinners, common sense shall judge.

Were Christianity to be preached to a new race of men, created without spot of sin, or stain of guilt, they might well wonder at the condition of faith and repentance; at the doctrine of salvation by the righteousness of Christ, and not by their own; and that their happiness should depend not on their own works, but on the free grace and promise of God: they might well ask, why should God make that a matter of free grace and promise, which must be the necessary effect and consequence of his justice? Why may we not be saved by our own righteousness, since righteousness has a natural claim to happiness? What should we repent of, who have done no harm? or what other object have we for faith than the justice of God, which is the foundation on which religion stands? But should this new race fall from innocence, and stand liable to the punishments of vice; should you then ask them where their hopes were, they would not answer, I presume, in the justice of God, or argue on the right that virtue has to reward; but could they express any hope, it would be in the mercy and forgiveness of God. And whence must this forgiveness come? Is it the gift of God, or is it the reward of sin? If it is the gift of God, then it is free grace: if it be the gift of God, then he alone can tell whether he will give it or no; and you cannot know it unless he declares it: what God declares is a revelation; and all the assurance you can have that he will be as good as his word is, that you believe and depend on his truth for the performance of what he has promised. From whence it evidently follows, that the religion of a sinner must be a revealed religion, and the principle of it must be faith.

Some, I know, contend that it may be proved, from the

mercies and goodness of God, that he will forgive sinners. If so, there can be no such thing as natural religion : for it is demonstrable, from the justice of God, that he must reward virtue and punish vice; and if it be demonstrable too from his mercy that he must forgive sin, then natural religion includes the greatest contradiction in nature, that sin necessarily must, and necessarily must not, be punished. If you say only that it is probable that a merciful God will pity the folly and weakness of human kind, and recede from the strictness of justice in his dealings with them; so say we too: but probability cannot infer necessity; and if it be not necessary that he should do it, it must then depend on his will whether he will do it or no; and your hopes and your religion must be resolved, not into the evidence of nature, but into the evidence of free grace; which evidence can be no other than revelation; for the Spirit only searcheth the deep things of God, and the Spirit only can bring them to light.

Would you then disprove revelation, and discard the religion of Christ? For once you must prove mankind to be in a state of innocence and purity; and then it will be senseless to talk of redemption; for what should innocence be redeemed from? You must show that nature is not vitiated or corrupted, that the flesh does not lust against the mind; but that there is a mutual agreement, and the flesh obeys the mind, and the mind obeys God: then may you at once reject the doctrine of repentance, of free grace, of justification through the blood of Christ. But whilst you endeavor to prove this, try at least to be an instance of it yourself; let innocence be your outward garment, and purity your inward: let your hands be void of evil: let not your eye glance on the large possessions of your neighbor, nor so much as one thought wander towards his wife or daughter: let your heart be the fountain of unbounded love and good will, and the grave of malice and revenge, where all injuries and affronts, all resentments shall lie buried and inactive, and be as though they were not: and when you have gained this experimental evidence from yourself, of the innocence and goodness of Nature, it will then be time enough to set up for a patron of her cause, and to assert her right to heaven on the foot of native righteousness; till then at least, how

SHERL.

VOL. III.

B