the law operated hardly or unjustly upon the parties whose suits were then pending. That was a question for the consideration of the Legislature. They might have repealed the prior law altogether, and put an end to the jurisdiction of their courts in suits against the State, if they had thought proper to do so, or prescribe new conditions upon which the suits might still be allowed to proceed. In exercising this latter power, the State violated no contract with the parties; it merely regulated the proceedings in its own courts, and limited the jurisdiction it had before conferred in suits when the State consented to be a party defendant.

Nor has the State Court, in the judgment brought here for review, decided anything but a question of jurisdiction. It has given no decision in relation to the validity of the contract on which the suit is brought, nor the obligations it created, or the rights of parties under it. It has decided, merely, that it has no right under the laws of the State to try these questions, unless the bonds given by the State are filed. The plaintiff refused to file them pursuant to the order of the court, and the case was thereupon dismissed, for want of jurisdiction in the court to proceed further in the suit. There is evidently nothing in the decision, nor in the Act of Assembly under which it was made, which in any degree impairs the obliga

tion of the contract, and nothing which will authorize this court to reverse the judgment of the State Court.

The writ of error must, therefore, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this court.

The two cases of William A. Platenius, Administrator of James Holford, against The State of Arkansas, in covenant, are the same in all respects with the one above decided, and must also, for the same reasons, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Cited-McAll., 321.

Tennessee, 101 U. S., 337; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 101 U. S., 182; U. S. v. Lee, 106, U. S., 196; Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. R. Co., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 292.

But a suit by a citizen of one State against another State in the courts of the United States, is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and one State cannot create a controversy with another State within the meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other States to its citizens. State v. State, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 176.

Nor can this amendment be so construed as to allow the property of a State to be alienated or conveyed in a suit in equity against a subordinate official of the State. Preston v. Walsh, 13 Fed. Rep. 328.

As the State cannot be sued directly, the public funds cannot be reached indirectly in the hands of its officers by attachment or garnishment at the instance of the creditors of its employees. Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How., 20; Averill v. Tucker, 2 Cranch, C. C., 544; Providence & S. S. Co. v. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co., 11 Fed. Rep., 287; Schillman v. Isham, 11 Conn,. 124; McMeekin v. State, 4 Eng. (Ark.), 553; Wild v. Ferguson, 23 La. Ann., 752; Tracy v. Hornbuckle, 8 Bush., 336; Rollo v. Andes Ins. Co., 23 Gratt., 509; Bank v. Debrill, 3 Snead (Tenn.), 378; Bank v. Hodge, 3 Rob. (La.), 373; Spaulding v. Imlay, 1 Root, 551; Wicks v. Bank, 12 Ala., 584: Dobbins v. Railroad Co., 37 Ga., 240; Mayor, &c., of Baltimore v. Root, 8 Md., 95.

When an officer of the State exceeds the authority

THE BANK OF WASHINGTON, AND HENRY S. AND FREDERICK S. HOLFORD, Administrators of JAS. HOLFORD, Deceased, Piff. in Er.,

v.

THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, AND HENRY L. BRISCOE, SANDFORD C. FAULKNER AND JAMES H. WALKER.

(See S. C., 20 How., 530-532).

Persons not defendants, cannot file cross-bill---judgment of State Court not reviewed-holders of state bonds must rely on good faith of Statethey cannot be enforced in court.

the words; the complainants were not defendants This is not a cross-bill in the chancery sense of in the suit brought by the State. They cannot, therefore, file a cross-bill.

this case, is not open to revision here. Judgment of State Court dismissing the bill in

Those who deal in the bonds and obligations of a sovereign State, must rely on the sense of justice and good faith of the State.

The judiciary of the State cannot interfere to enforce these contracts without the consent of the State, and the courts of the United States are expressly prohibited from exercising such a jurisdiction.

Argued Apr. 20, 1858. Decided May 14, 1858. INERROR to the Supreme Court of the State

of Arkansas.

conferred by law (Dabney v. State Bank, 3 S. C., 167; Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch., 463; see Spring Valley Water-works v. Bartlett, 16 Fed. Rep.; Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. R. Co., 3 Sup.Ct. Rep., 292), or is proceeding under an unconstitutional law, he may be liable to suit (State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Woods, 323; Claybrook v. Owensbor, 16 Fed. Rep.. 297; Hancock v. Walsh, 3 Woods, 360: Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea. (Tenn.), 131; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall., 203; Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. R. Co., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 292), but when acting under a valid law, or the property sought to be reached in his hands is the lawful property of the State, he is exempt from suit, to the same extent that the State itself would be. Queen v. Powell, 1 O. B., 352; S. C., 4 Perry & D., 719 Queen v. Comrs. of Treasury, L. R., 7 O. B., 387-399; State v. Burke, 33 La. Ann., 498: Tate v. Salmon, 13 Reporter, 144; Preston v. Walsh, 10 Fed. Rep., 315-328; McCauley v. Kellogg, 2 Woods, 13, 22, 23; Governer v. Madrazo, 1 Pet., 110; Er parte Madrazo, 7 Pet., 627: U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheaton, 738; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall., 203; Carr v. U. S., 98 U. S., 433; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S., 531; Chaffraix v. Bd. of Liquidation, 11 Fed. Rep., 638; Providence & S. S. Co. v. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co., 11 Fed. Rep., 287; U. S. v. Lee, 106 U. S., 196, and cases cited; Antoni v. Greenhow, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 91; State v. Jumel, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 128.

No judgment can be rendered against the United States for balance found due defendant on sctoff. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U. S. (11 How.), 272.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a bill in equity, brought in the Chancery Court of the State of Arkansas, to recover the money due or on which had arisen from, certain bonds issued by the State, to which the complainants claimed to be entitled. The bill is drawn out very much at length, and states particularly the bonds and contracts on which the complainants are proceeding, and also certain laws and Acts of the State, which the bill alleges impaired the obligation of these contracts and were forbidden by the Constitution of the United States.

It is unnecessary, however, to state at large the contents of the bill, or the particular con tracts and bonds to which it refers, because the decision of the State Court dismissing the bill has no relation to the validity of these contracts, or to the rights and obligations which they created. The bill was dismissed by the State Court upon the same ground with the commonlaw actions above mentioned; and the appeal to this court must be disposed of upon the principles upon which we have dismissed the writs of error.

The bill was filed in November, 1854, and in February, 1855, the attorney for the State

moved the court to dismiss it, unless the bonds upon which the complainants were proceeding were forthwith filed according to the provisions of the Act of December, 1854. The complain ants put in written objections to the motion, and finally refused to file the bonds. The court overruled the objections as insufficient, and dismissed the bill.

The complainants call their bill a cross-bill. The bill filed by the State, and which gave rise to this, is not set forth in full in the transcript. The appellants in their bill refer to it, and state that it was filed by the State for itself and in behalf of all the creditors of the Real Estate Bank; and that it claims for the State a right to share with other creditors of the Bank in certain assets of the Bank in the hands of trustees, although the bonds issued by the State which furnished the capital for the Bank, had not been paid; and many of these bonds were held by the appellants, who were creditors to the Bank as well as of the State.

But this is not a cross-bill in the chancery sense of the words; the complainants, according to their own statement, were not defend ants in the suit brought by the State. They cannot, therefore, file a cross bill, nor be re garded as defending themselves in that form of proceeding against the suit of the State. Their bill is evidently a suit against the State and others, to enforce the payment of money due on certain contracts made by the State, and the State is made a party defendant in the suit.

And for the reasons assigned in the aforegoing cases at common law, the judgment of the State court dismissing the bill is not open to revision here. Like the cases at common law, it was dismissed by the State Court for want of juris diction to proceed further, after the passage of the Act of December, 1854.

Nor, indeed, could they do so upon the allegations made in their bill; for they do not claim a common interest with the State in the fund they are pursuing, but an adverse interest, and deny the right of the State to share in it, and could not, therefore, come in and associate themselves as complainants with the State in its creditor's bill, when they denied that the State was a creditor of the fund.

The laws and proceedings on the part of the State may have operated harshly and unjustly upon the appellants. But it is not the province of this court to decide that question. Those who deal in the bonds and obligations of a sovereign State are aware that they must rely altogether on the sense of justice and good faith of the State; and that the judiciary of the State cannot interfere to enforce these contracts without the consent of the State, and the courts of the United States are expressly prohibited from exercising such a jurisdiction.

The case must be dismissed for want of juris diction in this court.

The case of The Bank of Washington et al. against The State of Arkansas and the Bank of Arkansas, being confessedly an original bill, must be disposed of in like manner.

(See S. C., 20 How., 558-571.) Lands in Territories belong to U. S.-to be dis posed of by their laws-agent, obtaining patent for land, is trustee for principal-practice of Department cannot control court.

All the lands in the Territories, not appropriated by competent authority before they were acquired. are in the first instance the exclusive property of the United States, to be disposed of to such persons, at such times, and in such modes, and by such titles, as the government may deem most advantageous.

A Territory cannot, by its law, interpose and dietate to the United States, to whom, and in what mode, and by what title, the public lands shall be conveyed, or denounce a forfeiture.

and obtained a patent in his own name, becomes a The agent who has entered the land for himself, trustee for his principal, and cannot hold the land under such entry, otherwise than as such trustee. Federal, is whether a title to land which was once Whenever the question in any court, State or the property of the United States has passed, that question must be solved by the laws of the United

States.

The practice or the opinion of the officers of the Land Department cannot control the action or the opinion of this court in expounding the law with reference to the rights of parties litigant before

them.

ritory of Minnesota.

Ch. 44, R. S. Minn., secs. 5 and 9, pp. 202, | 203; Ch. 62, secs. 6 and 7, p. 267; 2 Atk., 248; 3 Binn., 302-305; 2 Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 1201; 4 Kent's Com., 505; Jackson v. Feller, 2 Wend., 465; Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns., 91; Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves.. 50; Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch., 582; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves., 360 (a).

An agent authorized to purchase an estate for his principal, but who purchases it for himself, will be held a trustee for his principal. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., secs., 252, 316, 395; 2 Story, Eq. Jur., secs. 1211 (a), 1196, 1197, 759, 760, 768; 2 Atk., 99; 3 Wood. Lec., 57, p. 429; Kisler v. Kisler, 2 Watts, 324; Peebles v. Read ing. 8 S. & R., 492.

The Statute of Minnesota (R. S., ch. 62, secs. 6 and 7), in relation to fraudulent conveyances, being substantially similar to 29 Charles II., ch. 3. The case at bar is not within its operation, especially as the defendants have confessed by their demurrer the facts set forth in the complaint, without pleading or otherwise insisting on the Statute as a defense or bar.

6 Ves., 12, 37, 548, 555; 2 Story, Eq. Jur., 755-757.

Moreover, the Statutes of Minnesota do not refer to, and cannot affect, sales under the authority of the laws of the United States. The certificate of purchase given to Marshall by the officer who made the sale, was not a deed or devise within the meaning of the Statute. Further, a court of equity will not permit a Statute to prevent frauds, even where it would be otherwise applicable, to be used as an instrument to aid in the protection of fraud, or as a shield to protect it.

1 Story, Eq. Jur., 330, 439; 2 Id., 759, 761; 2 Atk., 100; 1 P. Wms., 618.

Messrs. John B. Brisbin, H. L. Stevens and J. H. Bradley, for appellee:

The Revised Statutes of Minnesota have abolished resulting trusts of the character set forth in the complaint.

Rev. Stat., ch. 44, pp. 202, 203, secs. 1, 7, 8. 9.

These provisions are substantially copied from the Revised Statutes of New York, which have been construed by the courts of that State to cover cases like the present.

Norton v. Stone. 8 Paige, 222; Watson v. LeRow, 6 Barb., 481; Jencks v. Alexander, 11 Paige, 619; Lounsbury v. Purdy, 16 Barb.,

380.

As to the necessity of pleading a Statute, the rule has always been that where a Statute makes a deed, or agreement, or other act void, the plaintiff must show that the circumstances existed under which alone it can have validity. Williams v. Ins. Co., of N. A., 9 How. Pr.,

365.

Mr. Justice Daniel delivered the opinion of the court:

eral affirmance, by what is styled the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory, of the decision of the District Court.

The appellant, in his complaint in the District Court of the Territory, alleges, that at a sale of public lands which occurred on the 11th day of September, in the year 1854, at the Land Office at Stillwater, in the Territory of Minnesota, in pursuance of the proclamation of the President of the United States, the appellee, Marshall, as the agent, and with the funds and under the authority of the complainant, and of the appellee, Barton, purchased for them the southwest quarter of section number seven, in township number twenty-eight north, of range twenty-three west, in the County of Ramsey, containing one hundred and sixty acres, at the price of $1.25 per acre, making an aggregate of $200 for the entire purchase; the certificate for which purchase was, with the assent of the complainant and Barton, issued in the name of their said agent, Marshall. That notwithstanding the equality of interest in the land in the complainant and Barton, and the fact that the price was furnished by them in equal portions, viz: $100 by each of these parties, the appellee, Barton, has claimed the entire tract of land; and the agent, Marshall, in consequence, or under the pretext of this pretension, refuses to convey to the complainant his rightful portion, viz.: one full undivided moiety of these lands.

The bill next charges, that Marshall is about to convey the whole of the land to Barton, in fraud of the complainant's rights, and concludes with a prayer that Marshall may be enjoined from executing such a conveyance to Barton, and may be compelled to convey to the complainant his full undivded half part of the land, in conformity with the terms and objects of the purchase; it contains also a prayer for general relief. To this complaint there was no answer; but the record of the District Court discloses the following entries:

66

Territory of Minnesota, County of Ramsey. District Court, 2d district. John R. Irvine against William R. Marshall and Thomas Barton. Then came the defendants, by their attorney, and demur to the complaint of the plaintiff herein, and specify the following grounds of demurrer:

First. The complaint does not state on its face facts sufficient to constitute a cause of

action.

Second, The complaint alleges that the defendant, Marshall, purchased the land mentioned therein, in trust for the plaintiff and the defendant, Barton. No trust arises or can grow out of the facts stated.

Third. Admitting that a trust could arise upon the facts, the complaint does not show the plaintiff entitled to the relief sought, inasmuch as it does not specify the nature of the

trust.

ant, Barton, has any interest in the event of the action. It does not appear that the defendant, Barton, has any interest in the event of the suit, adverse to the plaintiff.'

There having been no amendment of the pleadings in the District Court, either proposed or allowed, the decision of that court must be regarded as final between the parties upon the case, as disclosed on the face of the record; and that decision having been taken by appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory, the following transcript is certified as containing the proceedings of the latter tribunal in this cause: "JOHN R. IRVINE, Appt,

Respondents, This cause having been argued and submitted, after due consideration of the matters at issue herein, it appears to the court that in the order and judgment thereon in the court below, there is no error. It is therefore ordered that said judgment be in all things affirmed, with costs to respondents."

The omission in this latter decision of any statement of the particular grounds on which it has been placed, and the general reference made by it to the opinion of the District Court not showing the principles and the authority on which the judgment of affirmance has been rested, lead necessarily to an examination of the opinion of the District Court as the true test of conclusions, adopting that opinion and relying upon it for their support. In such an examination, it would be unnecessary, and even irregular, to consider any points not ruled by the inferior court; as whatever has not been adjudged or passed upon by an inferior tribunal cannot be embraced in a general judgment, either of affirmance or reversal, upon an appeal from its opinion.

The points intended to be ruled by the District Court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, if sought for solely upon the face of the judgments of those courts, or even with the aid of the references to the Territorial Statute furnished by the former judgment, it might be difficult to discover. Connecting those references, however, with the 7th and 8th sections of the Statutes of Minnesota (Rev. Stat., pp. 202, 203), we may perceive in the decisions of these Territorial courts the design to assert and establish the following positions, viz.: That in every instance of a grant or purchase, or of an agreement for the purchase of lands for a valuable consideration, in which the price or consideration shall be paid by one person, and the conveyance or the contract for title shall be to another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the person by whom such payment shall be made, but the title and possession shall vest exclusively in the person named as the alienee in such conveyance or agreement. The position asserted by the court of Minnesota, in

The authority and effect of the Territorial laws of Minnesota upon subjects within the legitimate bounds or cognizance of that Territorial Government, no person, it is presumed, will be disposed to question; but it seems equally clear that to respect the rights and interests which come not within the scope of that authority, but which are created by the Constitution and laws of the United States, imposes a duty as sacred as any which enjoins upon a State or Territory the obligation to protect and maintain whatever of power may justly belong to it. And it cannot without extravagance be supposed, that to secure these proper and necessary ends, the Territory should assume the power to control the acquisition or transmission of property never belonging to, and not acquired from, herself; to which, therefore, she could annex no conditions, much less conditions which might impair the interests of the citizens of every State, and of every State collectively in the Confederacy, and even of the United States, and render utterly worthless, and incapable of being disposed of, subjects in which the Territory has no legal right or property whatsoever. It cannot be denied that all the lands in the Territories, not appropriated by competent authority before they were acquired, are in the first instance the exclusive property of the United States, to be disposed of to such persons, at such times, and in such modes, and by such titles, as the government may deem most advantageous to the public fisc, or in other respects most politic. right has been uniformly reserved by solemn compacts upon the admission of new States, and has heretofore been recognized and scrupulously respected by sovereign States within which large portions of the public lands have been comprised, and within which much of those lands is still remaining. Can this right co-exist with a power in a Territory (itself the property of the United States) to interpose and to dictate to the United States to whom, and in what mode, and by what title, the public lands shall be conveyed? If a person desirous of purchasing shall depute an agent to attend a sale of public lands, and if at such sale payment be made by the agent with the funds of his principal, and both agent and principal shall present themselves at the General Land Office, and mutually request a patent to be issued to the true owner, can it possibly be thought within the competency of a Territorial Legislature, either upon the suggestion, or upon proof of the fact, that a certificate of purchase was given to the agent in his own name, to interpose, and say to the Federal Government, you shall not make a title to this person whom

This