THE DECISIONS OF THE Supreme Court of the United States, AT DECEMBER TERM, 1857. AUGUSTUS HEMMENWAY, Claimant of the Ship INDEPENDENCE, Appt., v. (See S. C., 20 How., 255–260.) Mr.Dehon, for appellant Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opin WILLIAM B. FISHER, Master of the Steam-ion of the court: The 18th rule never applied to admiralty cases. By the Judiciary Act of 1789, decrees in chancery and admiralty, as well as judgments at common law in the Circuit Courts, were removable to this court by writ of error, and not in any other manner. This provision in the Act of 1789 was repealed by the Act of March 2, 1803, and the ordinary mode of appeal substituted in the place of the writ of error. 18th and 20th rules have been superseded and annulled by the 62d rule, adopted in 1851. By this last mentioned rule,judgments at common law and decrees in chancery, upon affirmance in this court, carry interest until paid, according to the rate in the State in which the judgment or decree of the court below was given. Cases in admiralty, however, are not embraced in the 62d rule. No rule, fixing any certain rate of interest upon decrees in admiralty, whenever the decree is affirmed, could be adopted with justice to the parties. And a discretionary power is reserved, to add to the damages awarded by the court below, further damages by way of interest, in cases where, in the opinion of this court, the appellee, upon the proofs, is justly entitled to such additional damages. This allowance of interest, pro tanto, is a new Argued Dec. 11, 1857. Decided Dec. 24, 1857. States for the District of Massachusetts. The case is stated by the court. This case was decided at the last term. It Court for the District of Massachusetts, sitting was an appeal from the decree of the Circuit as a Court of Admiralty. The decree was affirmed here by an equal division of the Justices of this court; and the decree of affirmance was entered by the Clerk for the sum awarded by the Circuit Court and costs, and did not give interest on the amount decreed by the court below. The mandate was issued according to the decree; but was not filed or proceeded on by the appellee, because he supposed that, under the 18th rule of this court, he was entitled to interest upon the amount recovered in the Circuit Court, from the date of the decree, and that its omission was a clerical error. And he has now moved the court to correct it by amending the decree and mandate. If an error has been committed by the Clerk, it is, without doubt, in the power of the court to correct it at the present term. But the judgment is correctly entered, and the mandate conforms to it. And the mistake on the part of the appellee has arisen from supposing the 18th rule to be still in force, and to be applicable to cases in admiralty. But it never applied to admiralty cases. It will be observed by reference to the 17th rule, to which the 18th refers, that these rules are in express terms confined to cases brought here by writ of error. And it is true that, by the original Judiciary Act of 1789, decrees in chancery and admiralty, as well as judgments at common law, in the Circuit Courts, were removable to this court by writ of error-and were not made removable in any other manner. And if that provision in the Act of 1789 was still in force, and the rule unrepealed, the appellee would be entitled to the interest he claims, of the affirmance of the decree. to be calculated under the 20th rule, to the day But the writ of error, from its form, and the principles which govern it, is peculiarly appropriate to judgments at common law, and is inconvenient and embarrassing when used as process to remove decrees in chancery and admiralty to a superior court. The ordinary and uniform mode of removing such decrees to the appellate and revising court, wherever such jurisdictions have been established, has been by appeal, with the single exception of this Act of Congress. And in order to remove the incon venience and embarrassment which this provision in the Act of 1789 created, it was repealed by the Act of March 2, 1803, and the ordinary mode of appeal substituted in the place of the writ of error. And as this case came up by ap peal, the rules of this court referred to in the argument do not apply to it. Nor indeed were they intended to apply to chancery or admiralty decrees. They were adopted at February Term, 1803, and that term continued until the 2d of March. It was on that day that the Act of Congress changing the provision in the Act of 1789 was approved by the President. And it appears by the minutes of the court that the rules in question were adopted on the same day, that is, March 2d. This Act of Congress had, therefore, undoubt edly, passed both Houses of Congress before these rules were adopted, and it is evident that they were carefully framed with reference to to this change in the law, so as to exclude from their operation admiralty and chancery appeals. taken here, in an admiralty case, and a new aspect given to it. No rule, therefore, fixing any certain rate of interest upon decrees in admiralty, whenever the decree is affirmed, could be adopted with justice to the parties. And a discretionary power is reserved, to add to the damages awarded by the court below, further damages by way of interest, in cases where, in the opinion of this court, the appellee, upon the proofs, is justly entitled to such additional damages. But this allowance of interest is not an incident to the affirmance affixed to it by law or by rule of court. If given by this court, it must be in the exercise of its discretionary power, and pro tanto, is a new judgment. In the case before us, no new judgment could be given in this court, because, upon the question of affirming or reversing the decree of the Circuit Court, the Justices of this Court were equally divided; and the judgment was affirmed by operation of law, which from necessity affirms the judgment of the inferior tribunal when the judges of the appellate court are equally divided. Upon such an affirmance, the appellee was entitled to the full benefit of the decree of the Circuit Court, but nothing more. The court, being equally divided, could not change the decree of the Circuit Court, nor exercise its discretionary power to allow interest on the decree; for this would have been a new decree. And those Justices who were of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court ought to be reversed because the damages were too high, were of course opposed to making it still higher by the addition of interest. It may be proper to add, that the 18th and 20th rules are no longer in force, even in common law cases. They have been superseded and annulled by the 62d rule, adopted in 1851. By this last mentioned rule, judgments at common law and decrees in chancery, upon affirmance in this court, carry interest until paid; and the interest is to be calculated according to the rate of interest allowed in the State in which the judgment or decree of the court below was given. The object in changing the rule in this respect was to place the suitors in the courts of the United States upon the same footing with the suitors in the State courts in like cases. For the interest allowed in the several States On consideration of the motion made in this differs, and in many of them it is higher than six cause on a prior day of the present term of this per cent., and in most if not all of them a judg-court, to wit: on Friday, the 11th inst., by Mr. ment or decree in a court of the State carries interest until it is paid. Cases in admiralty, however, are not embraced in the 62d rule. It applies to cases of law and equity only. And, indeed, cases in admiralty could not have been justly in cluded. For there could be no reason for giving one rate of interest where a case of collision or salvage was in the first instance tried and decided in Louisiana, and another rate of interest where it was tried and decided in New York, or in any other State where the interest allowed by the state laws was different. Moreover, in cases of collision and salvage, and more especially in the latter, it is impossible to fix the sum that ought to be awarded with absolute certainty by any rule of calculation. It must depend mainly upon estimates, and the opinions of persons acquainted with the subject; and acting upon mere estimates and opinions, different minds unavoidably come to different conclusions as to the amount proper to be allowed. And it will sometimes happen in an admiralty case, that this court will think that the damages estimated and allowed in the Circuit Court are too high; and yet the opinion here may approximate so nearly to that of the court below, that this court would not feel justified in reversing its judgment. Besides, new testimony may be The motion to amend the decree and mandate, and give interest on the amount awarded by the Circuit Court, must, therefore, be overruled. ORDER. Bartlett, of counsel for the appellee, to amend Cited 2 Wall., 550; 7 Ben., 136. ROBERT H. WYNN, Executor and Devisee of WILLIAM WYNN, Deceased, Piff. in Er., v. CHESLEY B. MORRIS, MARTHA MOR- Jurisdiction-court has none, no U. S. statute Where complainant has no interest in land, but a naked possession not protected by an Act of Congress, this court has no jurisdicition to review a destatute of the United States being drawn in quescision of a State Court adverse to such title, no tion. Submitted Dec. 10, 1857. Decided Dec. 30, 1857. come here under the 25th section of the Ju IN ERROR to the The case is fully stated by the court. Mr. Albert Pike, for the plaintiff in error. Messrs. A. H. Lawrence, Geo. C. Watkins and J. H. Bradley, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Catron delivered the opinion of the court: The complainant filed his bill in a state cir cuit court in Arkansas, to enjoin Morris from executing a writ of possession founded on a recovery by an action of ejectment for the northwest quarter of section 18, in township 16, south of Red River. Wynn alleges that the whole of the quarter section was cultivated by him, and had been for years before the inception of Morris' title, and that he, Wynn, claimed title to the land through the State of Arkansas, and that Morris had obtained a legal title in fraud by Wynn's superior right in equity. Morris claims through Keziah Taylor. In 1829 and in 1830, when the Occupant Law of that year passed, she was a widow, and cultivated a small farm on the land in dispute; she sold out her possessions there in the latter part of 1830, left the country secretly, and settled permanently in the Mexican Province of the decree which dismissed his bill. To this effect are the cases of Owings v. Nor wood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344; Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How., 311. Wynn sets up a pretension of claim to the land in dispute through the State of Arkansas, which State was authorized to locate 500,000 acres of land by Acts of Congress passed in 1841 and 1842, and the complainant insists that he had made a contract with the State, through her locating agent, Charles E. Moore, who was acting under instructions from the Governor of said State, to the effect that he, the complainant, should be allowed to purchase the land from the State at $2 per acre. But the State did not locate this quarter section, nor had it an interest in it at any time; so that the title was outstanding in the United States till Keziah Taylor made her entry. in the land but a naked possession, not protected The complainant, Wynn, having no interest by an Act of Congress, we order that his writ of error be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. JOSIAH GARLAND, Piff. in Error. v. WM. WYNN, Deceased. (See S. C., 20 How., 6-8.) Coahuila and Texas, and there she remained ROBT. H. WYNN, Executor and Devisee of without returning to Arkansas until December. 1842, when she made her appearace, proved her cultivation in 1829, and her continuing pos session in May, 1830, in the form prescribed by the Act of that year, had her pre-emption allowed, entered the land, and sold it to Morris. She got a patent in 1844. The reason why Mrs. Taylor did not enter the land at an earlier day was, that the township No. 16 was not surveyed until 1841, and within one year before the date of her entry. Wynn seeks a decree on the ground that Morris procured Mrs. Taylor to enter the land for Morris's benefit, when she had no right of pre-emption, because of the abandonment of her possession for more than ten years. The Register and Receiver held that a prefcrence of entry was vested by the Act of 1830, and they refused to investigate the fact of abandonment. This opinion was concurred in by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. And, to correct this alleged error, the bill was filed. The State Circuit Court refused the relief prayed; adjudged that Mrs. Taylor obtained a valid title to the land, and decreed damages against Wynn for detaining the possession. From this decree he appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, where the decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed, and to that decree Wynn prosecutes his writ of error out of this court: and the first question here is, whether we have jurisdiction to re-examine and reverse or affirm the decree of the State Courts. This can only be done in a case where is drawn in question the construction of a statute of the United States, &c., and the decision is against the title set up or claimed under the Statute by the losing party. If Wynn had no title, of course he could not claim under a law of the United States, and cannot Pre-emption laws-courts have power to decide upon priority of entry, and overrule Register and Commissioner. Where several parties set up conflicting claims to property, with which a special tribunal may deal, as between one party and the Government, regardless of the rights of others, the latter may come into the ordinary courts of justice, and litígate the conflicting claims. Nor do the regulations of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, whereby a party may be heard to prove his better claim to enter land, oust the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. tested claim to a right of entry under the pre-emption laws, and to overrule the decision of the Register and Receiver, confirmed by the Commissioner, in a case where they have been imposed upon. Submitted Dec. 10, 1857. Decided Dec. 30, 1857 Courts of justice have power to examine a con IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Circuit Court, State of Arkansas, by William This action was begun in Lafayette County Wynn against John Garland. The Circuit Court found that the defendant, Garland, was the absolute owner of the tract of land mentioned in the bill. of the State of Arkansas, which reversed the The case was appealed to the Supreme Court decrce of the Circuit Court. Writ of error was sued out upon this judgment. are stated in the opinion of the court. The facts upon which the action was brought Messrs. J. H. Bradley, A. H. Lawrence and George C. Watkins, for plaint iff in error. Mr. Albert Pike, for defendant in error. |