producing it, for its support. This must either be matter or spirit. In supposing it to be matter, we must either suppose matter to be reasonable in itself, or to be capable of producing what it has no power to produce. The former case is contradicted by its physical divisibility, and inertness; and the latter includes a contradiction. It therefore follows, that reason cannot subsist of itself, nor be produced by matter; and therefore, from the certainty of its Being, it must result from spirit, it being the only member of the alternative. Thus, reason must be different in its original source from that of instinct; and if different in its source, it must be different in its nature also.

It is the nature of reason, not to be guided by the impulse of sensation, but to follow the direc tions of judgment. Judgment must be founded upon discrimination, for where there can be no discrimination, there can be no judgment; and where there is no judgment, there can be no reason. If reason be the active result of judgment, the idea of judgment is necessary to its Being. And if the idea of judgment be necessary to its Being, a discrimination between two or more objects must necessarily enter into our abstract idea of judgment, without which it can have no existence. If, then, the perception of difference, between two or more objects, which present themselves to the mind, be necessary to the idea of judgment, and the idea of judgment be necessary to the idea of reason, it. must follow-that reason and instinct must be to. tally distant in their natures from one another: the former striking its roots in an immaterial substance, and the latter in those sensations which are excited by animal impulses.

Nor does this difference terminate here. It is necessary to the nature of reason, not merely to follow the real or apparent good that is immediately presented to it; but to trace the object proposed,

through all its labyrinths, previous to its adoption of it. To reflect on the past, to investigate the present, and to calculate upon the future, are all necessary to the nature of reason. For could we suppose, that reason could adopt without reflecting, investigating, or calculating, we should make reason to exist without reason, which is a contradiction. And as neither of these ideas, can possibly be included in our idea of the abstract nature of instinct, we are here presented with a specific difference between the animal and the rational powers.

If, from this difference in nature, we turn to the operations of each, we shall find the same varia. tions. It is the province of instinct to gratify appetite, but the province of reason to lay it under restraint. If instinct be capable of restraining appetite, it must thus act either from necessity or choice. If from necessity, it must act in opposition to itself, and this will end in a contradiction; if from choice, it can no longer be under the dominion of sensation. A contradiction is inadmissible, and an abstraction of instinct from sensation is refuted by fact.-Instinct, therefore, cannot restrain that appetite, which its nature is to gratify. If instinct be at once capable of restraining and gratifying appetite, instead of acting under the direction of sensitive impulses, it must have an elective power; and what has an elective power, must derive its actions from itself. And to that which derives all its actions from itself, the impulses of sensation must be arbitrary and adventitious; and what is arbitrary and adventitious to any subject, or idea, may be abstracted from either; but to suppose a case, where instinct may survive its contact with sensitve impulses, is to suppose it to exist and not to exist at the same time.

But while, from the nature of its existence, the restraint of appetite must be necessarily excluded

from the idea of that which blindly gratifies it, we behold in reason an elective power.

To the existence of that faculty, which acts under the direction of an internal elective power, perception must be absolutely necessary; and where there is perception, there must be an object which is perceived. And it is equally certain, that where but one object is presented to the understanding, the only alternative is-either to adopt or to reject it. It is in this state, that nothing but an elective power can operate. And where but one object is presented to the mind, and this object (if congenial to it) be rejected, it is there we can discover an elective power, and be fully assured that reason there exists. It may indeed be asked-" If reason reject the only object which is presented to the "mind, and there be nothing in that object uncon"genial to its nature, on what principle is that ob

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ject rejected ?" I answer, because I conceive reason to be founded upon reflection, and because it examines deeper than the surfaces of things. The present good is but a part of her province; she reviews the past, anticipates the future, and forms her decisions from the estimate of all.

It must, however, appear very certain, that this can only be effected by abstraction; and by looking forward beyond the influence of present motives, to a certainty of conclusion, in which nothing but abstraction can become its guide. If, then, reason in its operations can calculate upon consequences, remote from that object which first excited its attention, and with which that object has no apparent connexion; it is certain, that reason must, in this case operate in a region, within the confines of which, instinct can never enter; and this leaves us in possession of a decisive difference between the operations of instinct and reason.

SECT. VII.

The Subject of Instinct and Reason continued.

THAT man is an animal, as well as a rational being, is a position which almost claims to be selfevident; but where the animal powers end, and where the rational begin, is a point which cannot be so easily ascertained. There are, however, many instances in which these powers differ from one another, both in their nature, and their operations, beside those already mentioned.

It is the province of reason, to examine abstract propositions ;-to ascertain the simple perceptions which are necessary to their existence ;-to travel through their various modes and relations, and to identify them by definition. But can any man suppose, that mere instinct can distinguish between goodness and mercy? Or that instinct can identify those simple perceptions, which are necessary to either of those abstract ideas? Can instinct distinguish between a simple and a complex idea? Or can it separate those ideas which have been uniformly associated together, though they have with each other no kind of physical relation? If instinct, by the locality of its existence, be unequal to that task which reason can accomplish, and which from mere instinct we could never learn; it is a decisive proof, that reason and instinct are as different in their operations, as they are distinct in their na. tures from one another.

Nor are there wanting, a variety of instances, in which reason and instinct are at variance with one another; in which there is an irreconcilable hostility subsisting between them; and which could have had no existence, if reason and instinct were the same, or originated in the same source. There

* On the future life of brutes, many things have been said, and much has been written; and both for

Rea

is not, perhaps, an instance, either of moral or retributive justice, where this is not the case. son and instinct are invariably at war with respect to distinctions in property; and those boundaries which are fixed by reason, may, and are considered by instinct, as an infringement upon natural

and against the subject, many forcible arguments have been employed. An attempt to decide on such an important point in a few straggling propositions,” or a solitary note, would be both immodest and indiscreet. The thoughts which I have offered on this subject, are perfectly new to me; but whether they be admitted as conclusive or not, the decision can in no way affect the main purport of this essay. For although it could be proved, that brutes have an immaterial principle, and though the immortality of their natures could be deduced therefrom, it will neither destroy nor lessen the proof of an immaterial and immortal spirit in man.

The acute reasonings drawn from the vis inertia of matter, by Mr. Baxter, together with the arguments advanced by Mr. Smith, are to me neither convincing nor conclusive. The heavy objections which may be advanced against the hypothesis of each, are to me more forcible than their arguments, however plausible they may appear.

How creatures, that are not subjected to any law here, can be made the subjects of rewards or punishments hereafter, I confess I do not perceive; neither can I discern how beings, that are incapable of intellectual enjoyments, can derive happiness from sources which they have no appetites to relish: but I would not urge either case as an argument against possibility. Yet I fear, that the admission of the belief of the immortality of brutes, will so far violate those distinctions which God has placed between the different orders of intelligent and animated beings, that we shall not be sufficiently guarded against the adoption of equivocal generation -a doctrine which has been justly exploded by Mr. Ray, in his book, entitled, "The Wisdom of God in the Creation."