tradiction; it necessarily follows-that in either case, consciousness cannot be essential to any material substance.

It has been already proved, that matter is an extended substance; and if it be capable of thinking, consciousness must be either as extensive as its dimensions, or confined to some particular part. If the former, let us suppose any given portion of this extended substance to exist, throughout which we will admit consciousness to be diffused. In this case, if the volitions of this diffused consciousness, were to be at once directed to the central point of this extended substance, consciousness, must operate in opposite directions, which opposition in its directions will at once prove the diversity of its nature, and consequently destroy the identity of its existence. For if a simple action of the mind, can arise from principle which is necessarily extended and diffused; this action must derive its being, from an energy which cannot equally contribute to its existence. But if it be the latter, then it follows, that matter is different from itself, because one part is supposed to be capable of thinking, and the other parts not; which ends in this contradiction-that matter thinks, and does not think at the same time.

The former, supposes an action of the mind to arise from a cause which can give it no existence; and the latter,-that matter is capable of thinking, and incapable at the same time: the rational result therefore is,-that matter cannot think.

Nor can we suppose, that the refinement or subtilty of any substance, can give to itself a quality which it does not naturally possess. Matter under every modification, is but matter still. No matter, therefore, can be refined beyond the boundaries of its nature; it is a contradiction to suppose it. If, therefore, the soul be material, it must be formed of parts;-must be an extended substance, and capable of divisibility: and from hence it follows,

that there can be no distinction between soul and bo dy, except in modification; and what is divided by nothing but modification, must leave the natures physically alike. And if those essential properties which are applicable to the body, be alike applicable to the soul, all distinctions vanish in an instant, and the distinct identity of the soul is at once done away.

If thinking be essential to the nature of matter, thinking can assume no variety of modes. The essential properties of a material substance must be as permanent in their natures as the substance itself, with which its essential properties must be coessential; for certain it is, that nothing which includes mutability and diversity in its nature can be an essential property of a substance which is of itself restive and inert. The physical nature of all substances must be permanent and fixed, in order to the establishment of their Being and the preservation of their identity; and to make that which includes mutability and variableness, an essential property of a substance, to the very identity and existence of which permanency must be admitted to be absolutely necessary, we make that which is mutable and variable to be an essential property of that which is uniform and immutable. If, therefore thinking be an essential property of matter, either activity and variableness, must be excluded from its nature or with its activity and variableness, thinking must be an essential property of a substance from the permanency and stability of whose nature, activity and variableness must be excluded in the former case we must destroy every idea which we have of thinking, in order that we may establish its source, which is proving the existence of a substance, by the annihilation of what is supposed to be an essential property of its nature; and in the latter, in order to preserve its nature we make thinking itself (from the activity of its nature)

to destroy the permanency of that substance from whence we attempt to derive its existence. I therefore conclude, that thinking cannot be an essential property of any material substance.

To affirm the soul to be material, and yet to deny it those properties by which alone matter can be known; supposes it to be matter and not matter at the same time: but, if the soul have those properties which are inseparable from material substances, (which must be admitted if it be material) it then follows, that consciousness must be either extended through the whole soul, or it must not. If it be, then no part of the soul can possess consciousness; and what is not virtually included in every part, cannot possibly arise from a whole which is formed of those parts; if not-then the whole soul is not necessary to its own existence; and in either case the mind is conducted to a contradiction.

If matter be capable of thinking, and thinking be essential to its nature, (which is presumed under the present consideration) thinking must have been coeval with its existence, or it must not. If coeval, there could then have been no previous existence of a capacity in matter for thinking; and if there were no previous capacity in matter, we must suppose it capable of thinking without any capacity, or without being capable; which is a contradiction. But if we suppose in matter a previous capacity, thinking cannot be coeval with its exitence. It then follows, that matter can, and actually did, exist abstracted from, and previous to, thinking; that thinking is not necessary to its existence, and consequently-that thinking is not an essential property of matter. And whether we conceive thinking to be coeval with matter or not, the evidence is sufficiently clear to produce conviction, that mere matter, considered as such, cannot think.

If thinking be essential to matter, then matter must not only think always, but think always in the same direction. To suppose otherwise, is to suppose that matter is capable of producing effects, which are contrary to its own effects; or that the necessary effects of matter, are contrary to the necessary effects of matter, which is a contradiction. And to suppose the soul to think always in the same direction is to contradict what every man feels. To admit its uniformity, is to admit that to be which we know is not; and to admit the reverse, is a contradiction. And the certain conclusion from each side is-that matter cannot think. And should any one wish for another proof of this point, I think it may be found in this : -The human mind is conscious of the existence of matter, but it is self-evident, that matter must have existed prior to a consciousness of its own existence; and from hence it undeniably follows that consciousness cannot be essential to matter-and consequently that matter, merely considered as such, cannot think.*

* It may perhaps be objected to the force of this ar gument, that the same reasonings which I have employed to exclude consciousness from being an essential property of matter, will apply with equal force against its being essential to an immaterial substance. I wish it to be understood that in this place I am not speaking of any modification of matter, but of matter in its most simple state; and am contending that active consciousness cannot be an essential property of its nature. If the activity of consciousness be an essential property of matter, a consciousness of matter must have been coeval with the existence of matter itself, which supposition is refuted by the nature of existence itself. To admit in matter a capacity of consciousness which is called into action after its existence, is to make the activity of this consciousness not to be an essential property of, but to result from matter, which is not the case now under consideration, but which will

SECT. VI.

Consciousness cannot be the Result of Matter.

As consciousness, for reasons which I have already assigned, cannot be an essential property, so neither, for the reasons following, can it be the result of matter. The only possible ways in which consciousness can result from matter, must be from matter as a substance, or from some peculiar modification which it assumes. The influence of mat

ter can extend no farther than the contact of its surfaces; and under every form which it is capable of assuming, matter can be but matter still. If the mutual contact of material bodies be entirely annihilated, in that instant it is certain, that all influence must cease to exist. For could we suppose the influence of matter, to extend beyond the physical contact of material bodies, we must suppose it then to be where it is not; and to operate and produce effects, beyond those confines of nature which limits its existence.

If a ball shot from the mouth of a cannon, were to move onward with all its velocity to some destined object, it could produce no effect, but in proportion as its surfaces were brought into contact with the surfaces of other bodies: and though in the progress of its motion it might rouse from a state of mere passiveness, other portions of matter, and communicate to them a motion from its own impulse; yet it must be evident, that these portions of matter thus put in motion, could produce no effect, but by bringing their surfaces into contact also with those of other bodies on which the effect was to be produced. Such, therefore, is the uniform manner

be the subject of the next section, in which it will be considered whether or not consciousness can result from matter.