and yet not altered at the same time; I therefore comlude, that consciousness must be essential to its nature.

If God were to create an immaterial substance, devoid of all consciousness, it is certain, that consciousness can be no way essential to its nature.And if this consciousness itself, cannot exist, abstracted from this immaterial substance; and this substance be naturally destitute of it, how can an union between this substance and quality, call into existence, an energy of which both are totally destitute? If it can, then both quality and substance must confer an energy which is possessed by neither, which is a contradiction; if not, consciousness must be essential to its existence. An immaterial substance, which has neither life nor consciousness, can have no known property, either of matter or spirit ; and to place it under the denomination of either, is an equal contradiction, with the supposition of its being removed from both.

SECTION IV.

The Soul is a simple Essence, and cannot perish; neither can its essential Properties-An Objection answered The Properties of Perception and Con sciousness are physically united with the Substance of the Soul-Even the physical Nature of Matter remains incorruptible and entire.

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THAT the human soul is a simple essence, been already proved; and if so, it must follow, that it cannot perish. A simple essence can be but one, and nothing but this can be a conscious Being. If an essence, which is in existence, be perishable in its own nature, it must be because it is defective; and an essence which is simple, and is supposed to

be defective in its own nature, seems to include this contradiction, that it is an essence, and not an essence at the same time. An essence, which is simple in its own nature, can include within it nothing but what is necessary to its own existence; for to admit any thing to be included in a simple essence, which is not necessary to the existence of that essence, is to annihilate its simplicity, in order to establish its nature, and does, in fact, destroy that very essence which is supposed to exist, abstracted from all extraneous properties. And if nothing can be included within this essence, but what is necessary to the existence of it; to suppose this essence, or any property of it, to be perishable in its nature, is to suppose that what is thus perishable, is necessary, and yet not necessary to the existence of the soul at the same time, which is a plain contradiction.

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As an exclusion of all foreign acquirements is cessary to our idea of the soul's simplicity, nothing that is either hostile or foreign to its nature, can ever have access unto it; and what possesses in itself no perishable quality, and through the pure simplicity of its nature excludes all diversity, must necessarily be immortal.

As no physical essence can be defective, and as one that is not defective, must necessarily exclude all diversity; as nothing but a simple substance like this can be capable of thinking, it is certain, that as man is a conscious Being, he must possess this physically pure and simple substance, which, in its own nature must be distinct from, and independent of, all corporeal Being; and with which, extension and figure can have no affinity or relation.

We have now before us, an essence which is physically simple, and which can include within it, noting but what is necessary to its own exist

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ence; and the great question is-Can such an essence be perishable in its nature ?

It is a self-evident proposition, that what is simple in its own nature, can have no parts; and what has no parts, can never lose them; and what has nothing which it can lose, can admit nothing to incorporate with its essence, while its simple nature remains; and what has nothing which it can either acquire or lose, can never be affected by modification. And to suppose an essence, which has nothing which it can either acquire or lose, to be capa-ble of perishing, we must first suppose an annihilation of its simplicity, previous to the annihilation of its Being, which includes this contradiction, that it is in existence, and is not in existence, at the same time. And as a contradiction cannot be admitted, the soul must be imperishable in its nature.

A Being, which continues simple, must be the same to-day that it was yesterday; and must be exactly the same to-morrow, for the same reason; and while this physical simplicity remains, it must continue the same forever. And to imagine the annihilation of its simplicity, as preparatory to the annihilation of its Being, is to imagine the annihilation of its identity, and not the annihilation of it, at the same time.

As the continuance of every property of a simple substance, is necessary to the duration of its Being, it is certain that none of these properties can be lost. The properties which such a simple nature possesses, are, and must be, necessary to its existence; and the separation of them from another, is the annihilation of its Being; but if the separation of these properties be impossible, it is certain, that this substance must remain perpetually the

same.

The common principle in which these properties inhere, must be a something distinct in idea and in

reality, from either of these properties, considered in themselves; which, taken in the aggregate, are essential to the existence of this substance. And though the idea which we form of this substance, be distinct from those which we form of the properties of this substance, yet the latter being necessarily included in the former, demonstratively precludes the possibility of their separation, and proves that union, without which, the idea of substance itself can have no kind of existence. If, then, the soul can perish, every property which is essential to its existence, must expire; and if each individual property expire, each individual property must be capable of perishing. But as it is a contradiction to suppose, that any essential property of any substance can perish, while that substance remains, so it is impossible that this substance can perish, unless its essential properties expire, to the existence of which these properties are necessary.

If the properties of the soul be imperishable in their own natures, because inseparable from one another, how can they acquire a perishing nature by inhering in one common principle? Can the whole of that substance perish, of which no property can expire? Or if the inhesion of these properties be necessary to their own existence, can mere inhesion destroy, what without inhesion can have no existence?

If inhesion be necessary to the existence of these properties, can it be made the vehicle of their annihilation? If it can, inhesion must be necessary, and yet not necessary to the existence of these properties; if not, the whole must necessarily be immortal.

It is a self-evident proposition, that no property which is essential to the existence of any substance, can perish while that substance remains and it is equally self-evident, that this substance, to the existence of which these properties are essential, can

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not perish unless these properties expire. If, then, this substance, and the properties of this substance, be alike necessary to the existenee of each other; if these properties cannot expire while the substance remains; and if the substance must remain until its essential properties perish,-it follows, that the human soul must be immortal.

I am well aware, that to the energy of this argument it will be objected, "that this is arguing in a "circle, that it is making two ideas mutually to depend for support on one another, while neither of "them, can communicate that assistance to each “other, which they mutually want." I have no doubt, that in all compounded bodies, this objection would be of force; but it must be remembered, that this is not a question about the identity and diversity of bodij, but about the entity and nonentity of Being. It has been abundantly proved, that the soul is a physically pure and uncompounded substance; and what is physically simple, can be (as to its essence) neither the subject of accidents nor modes :--And what is not the subject of either, precludes, through the very nature of its Being, that adventitious support, from which, if we separate compounded bodies, they can have no existence. The two faculties of perception and consciousness,* are necessary to our conception of that sub

* I think it necessary to inform the reader, that wherever the term " Consciousness" has occurred from page 182 to this place, I have used it to express that faculty which we possess, and which I have been endeavoring to prove to be an essential property of the soul: under this particular consideration, the activity of that faculty is quite remote from the point in hand. Whether this faculty be continually active, or whether its activity be occasionally suspended, is quite a distinct question, which I have considered in a former part of this Essay. All that I here contend for, is,-that an immaterial substance