pursue an object to a point which includes the absence of all Being, and consequently the absence of all power? If it can, we must suppose power to be, where we suppose power not to be, which every one must perceive is a contradiction:-If not, annihilation must be impossible. And whether we suppose power to be present or absent, at this given point, as the former includes a contradiction, and the latter precludes the possibility of annihilation; the decisive result is that the human soul must necessarily be immortal.

Against this mode of reasoning, I can conceive no objection more forcible than this-" that though "the annihilating power may be supposed to exist, (6 yet it does not follow, that the substance which is 66 supposed to be annihilated, must exist also." To this I reply that the point which admits the existence of the annihilating power, does not preclude the existence of that substance, which is supposed to be annihilated by it. For as neither power, nor an immaterial substance, can occupy space, the point which admits the existence of the former, cannot exclude the latter from Being. If power, which is supposed to annihilate, can exist, in this point of annihilation, why should we suppose-that the same given point, should refuse existence to that substance, which is supposed to be annihilated by it? Natural causes can never annihilate one substance, and yet permit another, under the same circumstances, to exist. I therefore finally observe,-the power which is supposed to reduce the soul to a point of annihilation, must either exist in this given point, or it must not :-If it exist, we are not yet arrived to that point, which describes a nonentity; (and where nonentity is not, annihilation can never BE) and if it exist not in this given point, the soul can never be annihilated by its influence; and in either case the soul must be immortal.

1

If the soul be annihilated, it must be either by something which is in existence, or something which is not. But that which is in existence can never produce what is physically contrary to itself; and that which has no existence, can never act.

A Being, which is in a state of positive existence, can never be annihilated while that existence continues; and a Being which is devoid of all existence, can never be a subject of it. That which is in existence, must be at an infinite distance from nonexistence; and that which is not in existence, is not the subject of our inquiry. Whatever is at an infinite distance from any given point, can never be brought nearer to that point, through the influence, either of time, circumstance, or power; and that which is removed from the influence of time, circumstance, and power, must necessarily be immortal.

Annihilation must either be the effect of power, or it must not. If of power, power must continue to operate upon a subject, until the subject itself, through the influence of that power, be reduced to a nonentity. But in admitting power to have an active operation, until it produces a nonentity, we admit a palpable contradiction. If it be not the effect of power, we must suppose annihilation to be produced, without admitting the existence of any cause sufficiently powerful to produce it, which is a contradiction also. If, therefore annihilation cannot be produced, either with power, or without it, the soul can never be a subject of it, and what cannot be a subject of it, must be immortal. The admission of a power, which is only known to exist, because it produces a nonentity, furnishes the mind with a chaos of contradictions-because that which produces a nonentity, is not power, but nothing.

SECTION VII.

That the Absence of the Divine Power is impossible.

IT may, perhaps, be said, that the annihilation of Being is not the effect of any power; but that as all positive Being is supported in existence by infinite power, the mere cessation of that power is of itself, sufficient to produce annihilation; so that annihilation cannot be said to be the effect of any active cause, because the absence of the cause of Being, is alone sufficient to produce the nonentity of a finite Being.

The objection which is here started, appears to involve two distinct points. The first is, that the absence of the divine power is possible; and the second is, that the absence of this power is of itself sufficient to annihilation, without admitting the existence of any active cause to produce it. But whether the former be possible, or whether the latter be sufficient to the annihilation of Being, I must confess I have some considerable doubts; and as this objection seems plausible, I will endeavour in these sections to examine its force, and give to each part an attentive.consideration.

If God be an omnipotent and an omnipresent Being, which I believe no one will deny, it is certain that no portion either of space or nature, of time or eternity, can exist where God is not. And it is equally certain, that the existence of the Divine Being cannot be partial any where, but must be perfect every where; this proposition is necessarily includ ed in our notion of his OMNIPRESENCE. And if God be an Omnipresent Being, it is also certain that every attribute essential to his existence, must be inseparable from his Being and nature. That God, from the very notion we have of Omnipotency, must be possessed of infinite power, cannot, I believe, he

denied by any who will admit of his existence; and as power is an essential attribute of Deity, it is certain, that its diffusiveness can be limited by nothing but the existence of God: it therefore, can neither be arbitrary, nor adventitious, since both the nature, and attributes of God, must be denominated from their necessary existence. The present, therefore, is not an inquiry into the nature of the moral attributes of God, but into the nature of that power which is essential to his Being, and without which, all our notions of God are at once banished from the world. For could we admit it possible, that God could withdraw from any given point, either of space or nature, of time or eternity, that power which is an essential attribute of his nature, and which from his Omnipotency must be admitted to be infinite; we must behold in that given point, a certain vacuum where the divine power is not; (because an immaterial substance is supposed to drop into annihilation through its total absence); and consequently, a point of duration, in which an infinite power is not infinite; and we must admit the Being of a God, even while we subtract from his Being that infinite diffusion of his power, the presence of which is absolutely necessary to our notions of his existence. And, consequently, we must admit the existence of an Omnipotent God, while we admit a point in which his Omnipotency has no existence. To admit, therefore, the absence of the divine power to be possible, will oblige us either to admit the Being of a God, abstracted from that power which is essential to his nature; or to admit an infinite power not to be infinite, both of which suppositions are plain and palpable contradictions.

If God could withdraw his power from any given portion, either of space or nature, of time or eternity, and yet remain infinite in his power, by the same modes of reasoning we must admit it possible, that

God could withdraw his power from other portions of space and nature also. And what has no necessary existence in one part, can have no necessary existence in any part; and what has no necessary ex-istence in all and every part, can have no kind of necessary existence whatever, and we may thus proceed until we totally deny the Being of a God.

If God withdraw his power from the support of any Being, and that Being fall into a nonentity. through its absence, it is certain, that this power cannot be so diffusive afterward as it was before, because that portion of energy which was necessary to support that Being in existence, which has perished through his absence, is now done away; and consequently we lessen the extent of that power which we admitted to be infinite, and which must, therefore, be without limits, which will conduct us to this contradiction-that infinite power is limited and illimitable, at the same time.

The supposition of the absence of an Omnipresent Being, is of itself a contradiction in terms :— And an Omnipotent power, which is capable of being withdrawn, is an absurdity equally gross; in either case, it totally denies the nature of necessary existence; and, by adopting the supposition-that the absence of the divine power is possible, we make the most essential attributes of Deity to be only arbitrary and adventitious. And what is only arbitrary and adventitious to any Being, may be totally done away, without affecting the nature of that Being to which it is thus arbitrary and adventitious; and we may thus admit the existence of God, after we have supposed his power and presence to be necessary neither in space nor nature, in time nor eternity. And as these contradictions cannot possibly be allowed in point of argument, nor rationally admitted in point of fact; it must evidently follow-that no portion, either of space or nature, of time or