"And insert the following as article 16, viz., Full faith and credit ought to be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every other state; and the legislature shall, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect which judgments, obtained in one state, shall have in another.'"

After receiving these reports, the House adjourned.

MONDAY, September 3.

In Convention. Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to amend the report concerning the respect to be paid to acts, records, &c., of one state in other states, (see the 1st of September,) by striking out "judgments obtained in one state shall have in another," and to insert the word "thereof," after the word "effect."

Col. MASON favored the motion, particularly if the "effect" was to be restrained to judgments and judicial proceedings.

Mr. WILSON remarked, that, if the legislature were not allowed to declare the effect, the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all independent nations.

Dr. JOHNSON thought the amendment, as worded, would authorize the general legislature to declare the effect of legislative acts of one state in another state.

Mr. RANDOLPH considered it as strengthening the general objection against the plan, that its definition of the powers of the government was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the state powers. He was for not going farther than the report, which enables the legislature to provide for the effect of judgments. On the amendment, as moved by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 6; Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no, 3.

On motion of Mr. MADISON, the words "ought to" were struck out, and "shall" inserted; and "shall," between "legislature" and "by general laws," struck out, and "may" inserted, nem. con.

On the question to agree to the report, as amended, viz.,

"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every other state; and the legislature may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect thereof,"

it was agreed to without a count of the states.250

The clause in the report, "To establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies," being taken up,

Mr. SHERMAN observed, that bankruptcies were, in some cases, punishable with death by the laws of England, and he did not choose to grant a power by which that might be done here.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS said, this was an extensive and delicate subject. He would agree to it, because he saw no danger of abuse of the power by the legislature of the United States.

On the question to agree to the clause, Connecticut alone was in the negative.

Mr. PINCKNEY moved to postpone the report of the committee

of eleven, (see the 1st of September,) in order to take up the following:

"The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States for which they, or any other for their benefit, receive any salary, fees, or emoluments, of any kind, and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively."

He was strenuously opposed to an ineligibility of members to office, and, therefore, wished to restrain the proposition to a mere incompatibility. He considered the eligibility of members of the legislature to the honorable offices of government as resembling the policy of the Romans, in making the temple of Virtue the road to the temple of Fame.

On this question,

Pennsylvania, North Carolina, ay, 2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8.

Mr. KING moved to insert the word "created" before the word "during," in the report of the committee. This, he said, would exclude the members of the first legislature under the Constitution, as most of the offices would then be created.

Mr. WILLIAMSON seconded the motion. He did not see why members of the legislature should be ineligible to vacancies happening during the term of their election.

Mr. SHERMAN was for entirely incapacitating members of the legislature. He thought their eligibility to offices would give too much influence to the executive. He said the incapacity ought, at least, to be extended to cases where salaries should be increased, as well as created, during the term of the member. He mentioned, also, the expedient by which the restriction could be evaded; to wit, an existing officer might be translated to an office created, and a member of the legislature be then put into the office vacated.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS contended that the eligibility of members to office would lessen the influence of the executive. If they cannot be appointed themselves, the executive will appoint their relations and friends, retaining the service and votes of the members for his purpose, in the legislature; whereas the appointment of the members deprives him of such an advantage.

Mr. GERRY thought the eligibility of members would have the effect of opening batteries against good officers, in order to drive them out and make way for members of the legislature.

Mr. GORHAM was in favor of the amendment. Without it, we go farther than has been done in any of the states, or, indeed, any other country. The experience of the state governments, where there was no such ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary; on the contrary, that the eligibility was among the inducements for fit men to enter into the legislative service.

Mr. RANDOLPH was inflexibly fixed against inviting men into. the legislature by the prospect of being appointed to offices.

Mr. BALDWIN remarked, that the example of the states was not

applicable. The legislatures there are so numerous, that an exclusion of their members would not leave proper men for offices. The case would be otherwise in the general government.

Col. MASON. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility will keep out corruption, by excluding office-hunters.

Mr. WILSON considered the exclusion of members of the legislature as increasing the influence of the executive, as observed by Mr. Gouverneur Morris; at the same time that it would diminish the general energy of the government. He said that the legal disqualification for office would be odious to those who did not wish for office, but did not wish either to be marked by so degrading a distinction.

Mr. PINCKNEY. The first legislature will be composed of the ablest men to be found. The states will select such to put the government into operation. Should the report of the committee, or even the amendment, be agreed to, the great offices, even those of the judiciary department, which are to continue for life, must be filled, while those most capable of filling them will be under a disqualification.

On the question on Mr. King's motion,

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 5.

The amendment being thus lost, by the equal division of the states, Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert the words "created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased," before the word "during," in the report of the committee.

Mr. KING seconded the motion, and on the question,

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 5: Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina, no, 4; Georgia, divided.

The last clause, rendering a seat in the legislature, and an office, incompatible, was agreed to, nem. con.

The report, as amended and agreed to, is as follows:

"The members of each House shall be ineligible to any civil office under the authority of the United States, created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected. And no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.251

Adjourned.

In Convention.

TUESDAY, September 4.

Mr. BREARLY, from the committee of eleven,

made a further partial report, as follows:

"The committee of eleven, to whom sundry resolutions, &c., were referred on the 31st of August, report that, in their opinion, the following additions and alterations should be made to the report before the Convention, viz. :

"1. The first clause of article 7, sect. 1, to read as follows: 'the legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.'

This is an exact copy.

The variations in that in the printed Journal are occasioned by its incorporation of subsequent amendments. This remark is applicable to other cases.

"2. At the end of the second clause of article 7, sect. 1, add, and with the Indian tribes.'

"3. In the place of the 9th article, sect. 1, to be inserted: The Senate of the United States shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.'

"4. After the word 'excellency,' in sect. 1, article 10, to be inserted: He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the sune term, be elected in the following manner, viz.: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as its legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the who e number of senators and members of the House of Representatives to which the state may be entitled in the legislature. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two per ons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign, and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the seat of the general government, directed to the president of the Senite. The president of the Senate shall, in that house, open all the certificates, and the votes shall be then and there counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose, by ballot. one of the n for President; but if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose, by ballot, the President; and in every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be Vice-President; but if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Site shall choose from them the Vice-President. The legislature may determine the time of choosing and assembling the electors, and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes.

6

5. Sect. 2. No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; nor shall any person be elected to that office who shall be under the age of thirty-five years, and who has not been, in the whole, at least fourteen years a resident within the United States.'

6. Sect. 3. The Vice-President shall be er officio president of the Senate; except when they sit to try the impeachment of the President; in which case the chief justice hall preside, and excepting, also, when he shall exercise the powers and duties of President; in which case, and in ease of his absence, the Senate shall choose a president pro tempore. The Vice-President, when acting as president of the Senate, shall not have a vote unless the House be equally divided,'

"7. Sect 4. The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have power to make treaties; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, and other publie ministers, judges of the Supre.ne Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appoint nents are not otherwise herein provided for. But no treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.'

"8. After the words into the service of the United States,' in sect. 2, article 10, add and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.'

9. The latter part of sect. 2, article 10, to read as follows: He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Sonite, for treason or bribery; and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office, the Vice-President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed."

The first clause of the report was agreed to, nem. con.

The second clause was also agreed to, nem. con.

The third clause was postponed, in order to decide previously on the mode of electing the President.

The fourth clause was accordingly taken up.

Mr. GORHAM disapproved of making the next highest after the

President the Vice-President, without referring the decision to the Senate, in case the next highest should have less than a majority of votes. As the regulation stands, a very obscure man, with very few votes, may arrive at that appointment.

Mr. SHERMAN said the object of this clause of the report of the committee was, to get rid of the ineligibility which was attached to the mode of election by the legislature, and to render the executive independent of the legislature. As the choice of the President was to be made out of the five highest, obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring the Vice-President to be chosen in like manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the first instance.

Mr. MADISON was apprehensive that. by requiring both the President and Vice-President to be chosen out of the five highest candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much to making candidates, instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given to the business, the election would, in fact, be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the effect, at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest states.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS concurred in, and enforced, the remarks of Mr. Madison.

Mr. RANDOLPH and Mr. PINCKNEY wished for a particular explanation, and discussion, of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the executive.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS said, he would give the reasons of the committee, and his own. The first was, the danger of intrigue and faction, if the appointment should be made by the legislature. The next was, the inconvenience of an ineligibility required by that mode, in order to lessen its evils. The third was, the difficulty of establishing a court of impeachments, other than the Senate, which would not be so proper for the trial, nor the other branch, for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the legislature. In the fourth place, nobody had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the legislature. In the fifth place, many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people, And finally, the sixth reason was, the indispensable necessity of making the executive independent of the legislature. As the electors would vote at the same time throughout the United States, and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible, also, to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate, instead of the Supreme Court, the judge of impeachments, was, that the latter was to try the President, after the trial of the impeachment.

Col. MASON confessed that the plan of the committee had removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable, however, to this strong objection, that, nineteen times in twenty, the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose.