Mr. LANGDON was in favor of the proposition. He considered it as resolvable into the question, whether the extent of the national Constitution was to be judged of by the general or the state govern

ments.

On the question for commitment, it passed in the negative.

New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, ay, 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 6. Mr. PINCKNEY then withdrew his proposition.2

229

The first clause of article 7, sect. 1, being so amended as to read,

"The legislature shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts of the United States; and shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; "

was agreed to.

Mr. BUTLER expressed his dissatisfaction, lest it should compel payment, as well to the blood-suckers who had speculated on the distresses of others, as to those who had fought and bled for their country. He would be ready, he said, to-morrow, to vote for a discrimination between those classes of people; and gave notice that he would move for a reconsideration.

Article 9, sect. 1, being resumed, to wit,

"The Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint ambassadors and judges of the supreme court,

Mr. MADISON observed, that the Senate represented the states alone; and that for this, as well as other obvious reasons, it was proper that the President should be an agent in treaties.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS did not know that he should agree to refer the making of treaties to the Senate at all but for the present would move to add, as an amendment to the section, after "treaties," the following:

"But no treaty shall be binding on the United States which is not ratified by law."

Mr. MADISON suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of treaties of alliance, for the purposes of war, &c., &c.

Mr. GORHAM. Many other disadvantages must be experienced, if treaties of peace and all negotiations are to be previously ratified; and if not previously, the ministers would be at a loss how to proceed. What would be the case in Great Britain, if the king were to proceed in this manner? American ministers must go abroad not instructed by the same authority (as will be the case with other ministers) which is to ratify their proceedings.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. As to treaties of alliance, they will oblige foreign powers to send their ministers here, the very thing we should wish for. Such treaties could not be otherwise made, if his amendment should succeed. In general, he was not solicitous to multiply and facilitate treaties. He wished none to be made with Great Britain, till she should be at war. Then a good bargain might be made with her. So with other foreign powers. The more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set on them.

Mr. WILSON. In the most important treaties, the king of Great Britain, being obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of them, is under the same fetters as the amendment of Mr. Morris will impose on the Senate. It was refused yesterday to permit even the legislature to lay duties on exports. Under the clause without the amendment, the Senate alone can make a treaty requiring all the rice of South Carolina to be sent to some one particular port.

Mr. DICKINSON concurred in the amendment, as most safe and proper, though he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little states, which would otherwise have an equal share in making treaties.

Dr. JOHNSON thought there was something of solecism in saying that the acts of a minister with plenipotentiary powers from one body should depend for ratification on another body. The example of the king of Great Britain was not parallel. Full and complete power was vested in him. If the Parliament should fail to provide the necessary means of execution, the treaty would be violated.

Mr. GORHAM, in answer to Mr. Gouverneur Morris, said, that negotiations on the spot were not to be desired by us; especially, if the whole legislature is to have any thing to do with treaties. It will be generally influenced by two or three men, who will be corrupted by the ambassadors here. In such a government as ours, it is necessary to guard against the government itself being seduced.

Mr. RANDOLPH, observing that almost every speaker had made objections to the clause as it stood, moved, in order to a further consideration of the subject, that the motion of Mr. Gouverneur Morris should be postponed; and on this question, it was lost, the states being equally divided.

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, ay, 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 5.

On Mr. Gouverneur Morris's motion,

Pennsylvania, ay, 1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8; North Carolina, divided.

The several clauses of article 9, sect. 1, were then separately postponed, after inserting, "and other public ministers," next after "ambassadors."

Mr. MADISON hinted, for consideration, whether a distinction might not be made between different sorts of treaties; allowing the President and Senate to make treaties eventual, and of alliance for limited terms, and requiring the concurrence of the whole legislature in other treaties.230

The first section of article 9, was finally referred, nem. con., to the committee of five, and the House then adjourned.

FRIDAY, August 24.

In Convention. Gov. Livingston, from the committee of eleven, to whom were referred the two remaining clauses of the fourth section, and the fifth and sixth sections of the seventh article, delivered in the following report :

"Strike out so much of the fourth section as was referred to the committee, and insert 'The migration or importation of such persons as the several states, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the legislature prior to the year 1800; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such migration or importation, at a rate not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports.' "The fifth section to remain as in the report.

"The sixth section to be stricken out."

Mr. BUTLER, according to notice, moved that the first clause of article 7, sect. 1, as to the discharge of debts, be reconsidered tomorrow. He dwelt on the division of opinion concerning the domestic debts, and the different pretensions of the different classes of holders.

Gen. PINCKNEY seconded him.

Mr. RANDOLPH wished for a reconsideration, in order to better the expression, and to provide for the case of the state debts as is done by Congress.

On the question for reconsidering, –

Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 7; New Hampshire, Maryland, no, 2; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, absent.

And to-morrow assigned for the reconsideration.

The second and third sections of article 9, being taken up,

Mr. RUTLEDGE said, this provision for deciding controversies between the states was necessary under the Confederation, but will be rendered unnecessary by the national judiciary now to be established; and moved to strike it out.

Dr. JOHNSON seconded the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN concurred. So did Mr. DAYTON.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for postponing instead of striking out, in order to consider whether this might not be a good provision, in cases where the judiciary were interested, or too closely connected with the parties.

Mr. GORHAM had doubts as to striking out. The judges might be connected with the states being parties. He was inclined to think the mode proposed in the clause would be more satisfactory than to refer such cases to the judiciary.

On the question for postponing the second and third sections, it passed in the negative,

New Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia, ay, 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no, 7; Pennsylvania, absent.

Mr. WILSON urged the striking out, the judiciary being a better provision.

On the question for striking out the second and third sections of article 9,

New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, ay, 8; North Carolina, Georgia, no, 2; Pennsylvania, absent.231

Article 10, sect. 1.

"The executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His style shall be 'The President of the United States of America,' and his title

shall be His Excellency.' He shall be elected by ballot by the legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time."

On the question for vesting the power in a single person,—it was agreed to, nem. con. So also on the style and title.

Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to insert "joint" before the word "ballot," as the most convenient mode of electing.

Mr. SHERMAN objected to it, as depriving the states, represented in the Senate, of the negative intended them in that House.

Mr. GORHAM said it was wrong to be considering, at every turn, whom the Senate would represent. The public good was the true object to be kept in view. Great delay and confusion would ensue, if the two Houses should vote separately, each having a negative on the choice of the other.

Mr. DAYTON. It might be well for those not to consider how the Senate was constituted, whose interest it was to keep it out of sight. If the amendment should be agreed to, a joint ballot would in fact give the appointment to one House. He could never agree to the clause with such an amendment. There could be no doubt of the two Houses separately concurring in the same person for President. The importance and necessity of the case would insure a con

currence.

Mr. CARROLL moved to strike out, "by the legislature," and insert" by the people." Mr. WILSON seconded him; and on the question,

Pennsylvania, Delaware, ay, 2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 9.

Mr. BREARLY was opposed to inserting the word "joint." The argument, that the small states should not put their hands into the pockets of the large ones, did not apply in this case.

Mr. WILSON urged the reasonableness of giving the larger states a larger share of the appointment, and the danger of delay from a disagreement of the two Houses. He remarked, also, that the Senate had peculiar powers, balancing the advantage given by a joint ballot in this case to the other branch of the legislature.

Mr. LANGDON. This general officer ought to be elected by the joint and general voice. In New Hampshire, the mode of separate votes by the two Houses was productive of great difficulties. The negative of the Senate would hurt the feelings of the man elected by the votes of the other branch. He was for inserting "joint," though unfavorable to New Hampshire as a small state.

Mr. WILSON remarked that, as the president of the Senate was to be the President of the United States, that body, in cases of vacancy, might have an interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way, if its separate concurrence should be required.

Mr. MADISON. If the amendment be agreed to, the rule of voting will give to the largest state, compared with the smallest, an influence as four to one only, although the population is as ten to

one.

This surely cannot be unreasonable, as the President is to act

for the people, not for the states. The president of the Senate also is to be occasionally President of the United States, and by his negative alone can make three fourths of the other branch necessary to the passage of a law. This is another advantage enjoyed by the Senate. On the question for inserting "joint," it passed in the affirmative,

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Georgia, no, 4. Mr. DAYTON then moved to insert, after the word "legislature," the words, "each state having one vote."

Mr. BREARLY seconded him; and, on the question, it passed in the negative.

Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, ay, 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 6.

Mr. PINCKNEY moved to insert, after the word "legislature," the words,

"to which election a majority of the votes of the members present shall be required."

And, on this question, it passed in the affirmative.

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 10; New Jersey, no, 1.

Mr. READ moved that,

"in case the numbers for the two highest in votes should be equal, then the president of the Senate shall have an additional casting vote,"

which was disagreed to by a general negative.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS opposed the election of the President by the legislature. He dwelt on the danger of rendering the executive uninterested in maintaining the rights of his station, as leading to legislative tyranny. If the legislature have the executive dependent on them, they can perpetuate and support their usurpations by the influence of tax-gatherers and other officers, by fleets, armies, &c. Cabal and corruption are attached to that mode of election. So is ineligibility a second time. Hence the executive is interested in courting popularity in the legislature, by sacrificing his executive rights; and then he can go into that body, after the expiration of his executive office, and enjoy there the fruits of his policy. To these considerations he added, that rivals would be continually intriguing to oust the President from his place. To guard against all these evils, he moved that the President

"shall be chosen by electors to be chosen by the people of the several states." Mr. CARROLL seconded him; and, on the question, it passed in the negative.

Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, ay, 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 6.

Mr. DAYTON moved to postpone the consideration of the two last clauses of article 10, sect. 1, which was disagreed to without a count of the states.