to convince us of the beauty of virtue and the desirability of perfection. It is better that men should be virtuous and nations just; but when we have learned this, we have not learned how to make them so. No philosophy has yet invented the method to prevent force from governing, or to establish government on any other foundation than force. It is called by many other names, and attempted to be disguised, both by governors and governed; but they all amount to the same thing in the end. Whether known as paternal authority, or as existing by consent of the people, government without power is nothing; and power, whether recognized or not, is the government. This does not refer to brute force alone, or to the mere visible machinery of government; for these are only a part of the means by which those governments which are most dependent on them are supported; but we include all those tendencies and elements of combination and influence existing in every society. These, although they do not always affect its political complexion, are still its moral and intellectual law, and determine its spiritual condition and direction. The more unconscious they are in their operation, the more effective they frequently are; and although this is only another way of saying that, in politics also, persuasion is better than force, we venture to repeat the lesson, because, under any form of government, however often repeated, it is still oftener forgotten. The forces upon which the march of communities depends have their own life, and subsist by their own strength, and are amenable to no judgment but that of reality. How they succeed and supplant each other, how one is developed from obscurity and another falls from power, is the problem of society and the secret of history. As they do not originate in human calculation, they continually stretch beyond its reach. For politics is not philosophy, and although Mr. Burke is against us, we believe politicians have something else to do than to reduce philosophy to practice. Among these political elements, we are afraid that ignorance holds as high a place as knowledge, and that it is as capable of maintaining its ancient rank, and as much disposed to do it. It is far too important a power to be suffered to die out of politics. Rather than that such a fate should befall them, ignorance and dul

ness may call in aid from the highest quarters of intelligence. For so far as knowledge is a political instrument, it is taken hold of and employed, like other such instruments, for political purposes. It is not strong enough to defend itself, nor can any thing else protect it, as long as courage, will, and energy bear sway in human affairs. These are the qualities which finally determine the position of individuals and nations. Power is their birthright, and it is the burden of history, that neither private knowledge nor public opinion has been able to extend or allowed to flourish, when opposed to their domination. If not able to prevent the spread of knowledge and the existence of public opinion, these are inevitably moulded to their purposes.

The political education of a people is always in the interest of its most powerful element—always tends to the strengthening of the strongest. Emancipation is impossible. The well of political truth is never undefiled. No despotism is so hopeless and unrelenting as the despotism of intelligence; and it is only through the operation of secret and unfathomable instincts of humanity, leading mysteriously towards freedom and light, that mankind are ever able to break loose from this formidable oppression. There are periods when the destiny of nations seems to hang in suspense, and the wheels of their progress to stop. Lord Bolingbroke quotes from Davila the maxim that, in order to insure the duration of governments, it is necessary for them, from time to time, to return to the original principles of their constitution. He does not, indeed, tell us how it is to be done; and although this is an omission, we should not think of finding fault with Lord Bolingbroke for so small a matter. But we refer to it to show that it has been observed that, at intervals, the fate of nations seems to be deliberately submitted to their own choice. The present seems to be one of those occasions with us. The dogs of party are hushed for the moment, apparently because they are so completely at fault that none dare open the mouth for fear they will be found baying at the wrong quarry; and the time is favorable to the expression of some ideas which, we hope, are applicable to the present state of our affairs, and which, at least, have been excited by them.

In the region where we expect to maintain ourselves, we have no fear that the first one of our flights will be impeded by party network or popular breezes. The study of politics, which Lord Brougham represents as so attractive, is, in this country deprived of half its legitimate interest, and even of its natural field of inquiry, because there is among us no question of the fundamental principles of government. We are so imbued with the liberty of republicanism, and so much accustomed to its operation, that it has come to be regarded as an element of human nature, like liberty of thought or conscience. Our institutions are so firmly fixed in the traditions, habits, and opinions of the whole nation, that any other form of government seems like a violation of our social instincts, and as the necessary accompaniment of force and fear.

Because these institutions exhibit only one fundamental political idea in operation, we are in haste to conclude that there is no foundation in reason for any other, and no field for its exercise. In this our happy condition, not only our annals are likely to be tiresome, but our politics are certainly so. There is neither temptation nor opportunity to diversify them by the study of different forms or principles of government, when only one is possible. The most important measures are considered in regard to their consequences, more or less immediate, and hardly at all in relation to the principles of government which they indicate, or in which they originated. In Europe it is all different; there, all political principles are in conflict; there is as much variety in their development and application, and the question of superiority between them is still as vital and undecided, as among the towns of Greece, when Aristotle described their hundred constitutions. It is impossible to withhold the imagination from the contemplation of remote and original principles of society and government, when they are constantly appealed to in support or attack of political measures, and when they are sufficiently alive to preside over the composition of parties.

All the necessary elements of any of the principal forms of government exist in society, and a favorable chance may, at any moment, set either of them in operation. There is none of them which is not particularly adapted to make head

against some of the evils that oppress European society. Aristocracy is insolent and defiant; but it is energetic and compact, and is still a power over the people. Democracy is encroaching and dangerous; but it is strong in numbers, and it has abuses to assail which deserve no quarter; while despotism is a still harbor of retreat, which offers a shelter not unacceptable to many from the storms of life. When all these elements are fermenting, political speculation becomes interesting, vigorous, and profound; but its most devoted admirer would hardly think it worth paying such a price. It is vain to suppose that our country is to be forever out of the reach of vicissitude, and the experience of the rest of the world without any application to ourselves. When the impending alteration of our foreign policy has brought us into close connection with other nations, it will be necessary for us to know something about their condition, and upon what elements their governments repose, and what sort of opposition they have to contend with; as we act upon them, they will be sure to react upon us. The human heart, which has been hitherto so variable, has not exhausted all its variety. As long as government, at the best, is so imperfect an instrument for the establishment of the right, which is the ultimate object of human effort, it is to be expected that changes will be made in it and experiments tried. The business of government, however carried on, does not satisfy our best impulses and affections, or fulfil the destiny of the highest order of minds. These desire neither to govern nor to be governed. Their spirit demands unlimited expansion; and although the field which government opens to the exercise of their powers is wide, it cannot fill the place in the soul of God, duty, or art. They are never entirely at peace with government, because they continually struggle and rebel against its limitations; nor can the society in which they are disquieted, be ever at peace. On the other hand, the first desire of the people is for justice between man and man. While this is secured to them, they are satisfied with the form of government through which it is administrated; as justice is a gift of that character which can be accepted from any hand. Popular caprice or oppression is not a whit more palatable than royal. It is proper for us to

remember, that, as long as the Institutes and the Code remain not only monuments of imperial power, but also the highest expression of practical morality which mankind has been found capable of producing, there is an argument in favor of that constitution of government and society out of which they arose, and evidence of its adaptation to indestructible elements of human nature. And the establishment, among a population taken from our own bosom, of the oldest forgotten form of absolutism the sacerdotal as among the Mormons at the Salt Lake, and its eminent success in promoting at least their material prosperity, and in a situation which promises the experiment a full trial — ought to make us aware of capacities not provided for in our government, and tendencies which it cannot satisfy. It appears to us to indicate the possibility of future changes in our political condition not usually contemplated.

Our first difficulty, however, proceeds from an opposite tendency. The unrestricted influence of the single political idea of representative democracy naturally exposes it to exaggeration; and we apprehend that a confusion is gaining ground among us in regard to the true relations of government and people. That government is instituted for the sake of the people, that it is responsible to them, and that they exercise a rightful control over it, are the cardinal points of our system. But it is a step further to suppose that the distinction between them can be obliterated, and their parts and characters interchanged or blended into one. Yet something like this appears to be the drift of the popular theories and the tendency of opinion. We are mistaken if the constitutions of some of the States of this Union have not been remodelled under the idea that the more immediately the whole body of the people can be admitted into the administration of the government, the better will be the provision, and the greater the certainty, that it is to be conducted to the general advantage. With this view, offices are multiplied, and the terms are shortened; means are taken to make them be regarded more and more as sources of livelihood or profit, and less and less in the light of duty or honor; and, generally, the business of government is put on a level, as far as possible,

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