Spanish Crown by the Treaty of Peace and Recognition between Venezuela and Spain in 1845 (V. C., vol. iii, pp. 48–49).

In 1801 the Dutch Council of the American Colonies, with the approval of the Government, secretly sent an envoy to the Congress of Amiens with confidential instructions to "try to have the limits between the Batavian [Dutch] and Spanish possessions in South America irrevocably defined." (V. C.-C., vol. ii, p. 189.)

In 1808, during the British occupation, the Secretary of Demerara, writing an official letter to Gerrit Timmerman, appointing him Protector of the Indians, names the district which is placed under his supervision as "the west coast of the aforesaid Colony from the Creek Supename right up to the Spanish boundary, the River Pomeroon being included therein." (B. C., V., p. 191.)

Finally, the proposition of Lord Salisbury with which the negotiations resulting in the present Treaty of Arbitration was begun is conclusive as to the position of the British Government that the territories of Spain and the Netherlands were coterminous in 1814, and that there was only a single boundary line between them. Lord Salisbury's proposition, made May 22, 1896, was that a mixed commission be appointed "to investigate and report upon the facts which affect the rights of the United Netherlands and of Spain, respectively, at the date of the acquisition of British Guiana by Great Britain.

"Upon the report of the above Commission being issued, the two Governments of Great Britain and Venezuela, respectively, shall endeavor to agree to a boundary line upon the basis of such report." (V. C., vol. iii, p. 305.)

Lord Salisbury then proposes that "failing agreement, the report, and every other matter concerning this controversy on which either Government desire to insist, shall be submitted to a tribunal which tribunal shall fix the boundary line upon the basis of such report, and the line so fixed shall be binding upon Great Britain and Venezuela."

Whatever inferences may be drawn from this proposition of Lord Salisbury in reference to other questions, one thing is certain: that it necessarily implied the existence of a single boundary line in 1814, and as necessarily excluded any possibility at that date of a 66 vacant" territory between the two countries. The principle advocated by Lord Salisbury was embodied in the Treaty, which, by providing for the ascertainment of the territorial limits in 1814 and by calling for the determination of "a boundary line" between the two countries, negatives the idea that either in 1814 or at the date of the Treaty of Arbitration any such intermediate belt could have been in existence.

From the earliest consideration of this question by Venezuela and Great Britain, no suggestion has ever been made of an intermediate territory between the two countries. Beginning with the earliest negotiations, in 1844, between Lord Aberdeen and Señor Fortique, every discussion has been on the basis of a single boundary line between the two countries. These negotiations negative the theory that any intermediate territory existed in the view of either of the parties to the dispute.

III. THE DATE AS OF WHICH THE BOUNDARY IS TO BE
ASCERTAINED.

The Treaty next fixes the date as of which the boundary is to be determined. It says (Article III):

"The Tribunal shall investigate and ascertain the extent of the territories belonging to, or that might lawfully be claimed by the United Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain respectively at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the Colony of British Guiana, and shall determine the boundary line between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela."

The first point necessarily to be defined by the Treaty was the scope of the inquiry to be made by the Tribunal in determining the question of boundary. The question here was upon what state of facts the Tribunal was to reach its decision. The history

of this territory from its first discovery to the Treaty of Arbitration covered a period of four hundred years. For two centuries and a half the Dutch or their grantees had been at Essequibo. During all this time a boundary line had existed, although it had never been laid down. The line was necessarily to be ascertained as of some specific date, and it was necessary that the date should be named in the Treaty.

It was contended by Venezuela that the question of title was finally settled in 1648; that the extent of the territories of both parties, and therefore the question of title had been finally ascertained at that date, and that the boundary should be ascertained as of that date.

It was contended by Great Britain, on the other hand, that as the question of territorial limits had been seriously affected by acts occurring subsequently to the Treaty of Munster, the boundary should be determined as of a later date, to wit, the date of the British acquisition of British Guiana, in 1814.

The British contention prevailed, and the date was so fixed by the Treaty. Clearly the rights of Great Britain, while extending, under this provision of the Treaty, to the territory belonging to or that might lawfully be claimed by the Netherlands at the later date, were limited to such territory, and could not be extended by subsequent British encroachments. Such is the plain and obvious reading of the Treaty.

Nothing could be clearer from a mere inspection of the Treaty than the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal is to determine the true boundary line by ascertaining the extent of the Spanish and Dutch territories at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the colony of British Guiana; that the facts which it is to consider are facts bearing upon the conditions existing in 1814; and that, in considering the territorial rights and claims of the respective parties, either as arising under law in general or under the specific rules subsequently prescribed in the Treaty, no question can arise in reference to encroachments since 1814 upon Spanish or Venez

uelan territory of which the Dutch were not in possession at that date.

The Treaty recognizes the fact that a line existed as of right in 1814, which determined the possessions of the two contending parties at that date, and it is the extent of the territories at that date which the Tribunal is instructed to investigate and ascertain.

Although this proposition is so plain that an extended argument of it could hardly be required, it would appear to be disputed in the British Case.

It has, therefore, been deemed best at the outset to point out that the proposition here contended for is established not only by the language of the Treaty, but also by the equities of the case and the history of the controversy; that this treaty provision was adopted at the instance and upon the proposal of Great Britain herself and against the contention of Venezuela, as shown not only by the negotiations which led up to the Treaty, but, finally, by the position taken in the British Counter-Case itself.

1. THE LANGUAGE OF THE TREATY.

The Treaty in express terms fixes the date as of which the extent of the territories of the two contending parties shall be ascertained. That date is the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the colony of British Guiana, namely, the date of the signing of the Treaty of London, in 1814. This date is actually prescribed as the date as of which the territorial limits on each side are to be ascertained and determined, and the fixing of the limits as of this date is the duty imposed upon the Arbitrators by the Treaty. Such being the case, no acts of Great Britain either in the nature of settlement or of control over territory of which the Dutch had no possession in 1814 can affect the question before the Tribunal.

This is the plain reading of the Treaty. If it is not, for what purpose and to what end was the Tribunal expressly directed to ascertain the extent of the territories of Spain and the Nether.

lands respectively at the date in question? The Tribunal is not here to engage in an academic discussion; it is constituted to determine the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. By the agreement of the contending parties, its inquiry is to be directed to investigating and ascertaining the extent of the territories of each as they existed at the date when Great Britain acquired British Guiana. It surely could not be the intention of the Treaty that the Arbitrators, having solemnly reached a true line upon the basis laid down by the Treaty for the determination of a boundary, namely, the extent of the respective territories in 1814, were thereupon to cast aside the result of their deliberations, to reject the true line so ascertained, and to make a fresh start on the basis of some other date which is nowhere suggested by the Treaty. To hold otherwise would be to contend that this august Tribunal was directed in terms by the Treaty constituting it to reach an express conclusion which was not to be a conclusion; to determine a true boundary line which was not to be a boundary line; to consider, by "investigating and ascertaining," a state of facts expressly defined, which had been no sooner considered than it was to be thrown aside as unworthy of consideration.

Notwithstanding this provision, formulated in language as plain as could be devised, the British Counter-Case takes the position (pp. 107--8) that, under Rule (a) of the Treaty, which provides that adverse holding for fifty years may make a good title,

"Great Britain is entitled to retain whatever territory has been held by her, or has been subject to her exclusive political control, for a period of fifty years, although the result might be to give to Great Britain territory which had never been Dutch, and might even conceivably have at one time. been Spanish."

In support of this claim the British Case has offered an immense mass of evidence, comprising an entire volume of its Appendix, covering the history of the British colony since 1814, and has devoted Part II of the chapter on political control to "British Administration." (B. C., pp. 99–112.)