are not going extensively into a discussion of this subject. It is enough to refer to a single instance mentioned by the British Case, where the chiefs were summoned "in March, 1778, to Fort Zeelandia and entertained there." This was the occasion on which the chiefs were given their hats and sticks "as a token that they are recognized as such by the Government." The nature of this proceeding is disclosed by a letter from the Manager of the Duynenberg Estates (B. C. IV, 188), in which he said that orders had been given to the Postholders and Interpreters and those in communication with the different nations that they should attend at the Fortress of Zeelandia,

"that a joeling (revel), or festival as it is called, might be given them, and presents distributed to them from your Honours." "Some of them have attended and received their revels and presents with protestations of the greatest friendship. having regard to the great profit which, in the interest of your Honours (as I hope), the land stood to reap therefrom, I did not dare to hesitate, requesting that your Honours will be good enough to approve favorably of my conduct,—and, at the same time, cause to be given your Honours' orders how the Keltum used by me for this festivity . . shall be accounted for."

The account for the "keltum" is given in B. C. VII, 182:

"1778. From plantation Duynenburg:

August 8. To the Indians in their revels, by order of the

Director-General.....

176 gallons."

With such a supply as this of "keltum" to facilitate negotiations, it would not be remarkable if the Indians had consented to anything; and it certainly justified on their part "protestations of the greatest friendship."

This act bears strong indications of a deliberate and systematic purpose to debauch the Indians by wholesale, and its natural result is to be found in steadily diminishing numbers of the tribesmen.

In 1784 the Company devised an elaborate plan (referred to in the British Case, p. 91) for distributing grants of land to the Indians. There is no evidence that this was ever carried out. All

that can be found is that the Indians assisted the colonists in their wars with the revolting slaves, and that they came to the posts to get presents whenever they were distributed.

It is a singular fact that the British Case apparently takes the view that the receiving of presents is an indication of servitude. If the giving of a subsidy is obligatory, the servitude is on the other side. Tributary States or peoples are those who pay tribute, not those to whom tribute is paid; and it was in view of this fact that Governor Codd, in a passage already quoted, in 1813, said of the Dutch-British colonies that they were "tributaries" to the Indians.

All the other acts which are referred to by the British Case in reference to employment of Indians, in the recapture of slaves, to the military services rendered by Indians, and to the industrial employment of Indians, are simply reducible to a mere question of rendering services for pay. Thus, it is stated (p. 92), that "it was customary to pay rewards for each slave recaptured." Of course, the Indians, under these circumstances, were ready to undertake the recapture of fugitives.

In October, 1785 (B. C. V, 38), the Director-General, speaking of the parties he had sent out into the forest to recapture runaway slaves, said:

"These Commandos cost certainly much, through the manifold presents which we must (give) to the Indians, without which they will not move a step, and especially when we must here purchase goods therefor (as has happened on this occasion), but the entire welfare of the Colony depends thereon."

There was here no levying of forces for the sovereign, no assembling of the posse comitatus, but the hiring of tribesmen who did not recognize Dutch sovereignty, and who were moved, not by Dutch command, but by subsidies.

So with military services. The Indians rendered such services to the Dutch in putting down the slave insurrections, and they were paid for their services. But there is no evidence that this

military service was anything more than the service of ordinary mercenaries. There is nothing to show that the Indians were called out as a matter of right, or that the employment of them was regarded on either side as an employment of subjects; on the contrary, the evidence contradicts any such proposition; nor does the British Case assert that it was ever otherwise than an entirely voluntary service, which the Indians regarded as being in their own interest and for which they received an equivalent that made it worth their while.

So with the industrial employment of the Indians. The British Case says (p. 95):

"The Indians, however, acted not only as the allies and soldiers of the Dutch, but also as their servants,"

and it instances such acts as carrying timber, field labor on the plantations, services as boatmen, pilots and guides, and making roads and paths in the neighborhood of the post. It also refers (p. 96) to their preparing annatto and other products, and “in bringing these to the Post to be forwarded to the Dutch markets." It also refers to their employment in the fisheries.

That the Indians were employed somewhat, although not extensively, by the Dutch is true; but that it has any significance in the matter of political control is difficult to perceive. As to employment at their own homes in preparing annatto, this was simply what they did in preparing their merchandise for sale to the Spanish, Dutch, and other white traders. The fact that they caught fish and sold the fish to the Spaniards and Dutch is equally unimportant.

The employment of Indians at the post of Moruca is equally without significance. None of these things have anything to do with political control. Had the Dutch, as did the Spaniards, gathered together twenty thousand Indians in settlements, where they remained continuously under a civilized and orderly government, devoting themselves in these settlements to tilling of the soil and to useful arts, it might be said to be a step, and a long

step, towards establishing political control over the Indians so employed, but the difference consists in the fact that the political relation which was established by the Spaniards with the Indians never was established by the Dutch.

We think that we can affirm with confidence that up to the time of Lord Palmerston's reference to the tribes living near the fort as "independent Indian tribes," there had been no pretence, either on the part of the Dutch or of the English, that the limits of Dutch Guiana had been extended by reason of any control, political or otherwise, exercised over the Indian tribes. Schomburgk did not allude to it. He was not, according to his own statements, in any way influenced by it in fixing the boundaries he proposed. He based them wholly upon what he claimed were traces of actual occupation by the Dutch and upon considerations as to natural boundaries. It remained for the makers of affidavits in British Guiana, after the adoption of the Treaty, to discover innumerable "Indian traditions" as to the supremacy of the Dutch over the tribes. It is a curious commentary upon the case of these Indian affidavits, taken before Mr. McTurk and other British officials, to prove Indian "traditions" before this solemn tribunal, that it was a common thing, both in Dutch and British practice, for a case to be thrown out of court because the Indian testimony on which it rested was deemed worthless.

CHAPTER XVI.

ADVERSE HOLDING--MISCELLANEOUS ACTS.

It has been shown by the evidence that, notwithstanding the claims made by the British Case, there was no settlement whatever, during the history of the Dutch colony of Essequibo, west of the falls of the Cuyuni, in the interior, or west of Moruca, on the coast.

It has been shown also that, in so far as political control is to be considered a determining factor in the question of adverse holding, no political control was exercised by the Dutch in that territory, but that it was maintained by the Spanish; that the control so maintained by the Spanish included numerous acts of territorial dominion, implying the exercise of the highest rights of territorial sovereignty, and that it were exerted not alone upon subjects, but upon foreigners in the territory, and particularly upon the Dutch; and, finally, that it extended over the whole period of Dutch rule.

Nor is it claimed by the British Case that political control, in any ordinary meaning of that term, was exercised by the Dutch in the territory in dispute, or that anything resembling the exercise of sovereignty by the agency of political government was to be found there or was even thought of by the Dutch colonial authorities. It is not suggested that any territorial jurisdiction was exercised over all persons, as being in a territory subject to such jurisdiction. It is not intimated that a Spaniard, a Frenchman, or even an inhabitant of Surinam, was ever apprehended in this district, or tried at Essequibo for an offense committed there. It is not pretended that a single grant of land was made by the Dutch either west of Moruca or of the falls of Cuyuni. It is not pretended that any right of exclusion was ever exercised by the Dutch over the territory, although such a right was constantly asserted by the Spaniards, both in the interior and the coast.