Opinion of the court. contracts of the inhabitants of the former with the inhabitants of the latter were illegal and void. It was held that they conferred no rights which could be recognized. Such is the law of nations, flagrante bello, as administered by courts of justice.* While such was the law as to dealings between the inhabitants of the respective territories, contracts between the inhabitants of the rebel States not in aid of the rebellion were as valid as those between themselves of the inhabitants of the loyal States. Hence this case turns upon the point whether the appellant was domiciled in the Confederate States when he bought the cotton iu question. When he took his departure for the South he lived and was in business at Louisville. He returned thither when Savannah was captured and his cotton was seized. It is to the intervening tract of time we must look for the means of solving the question before us. There is nothing in the record which tends to show that when he left Louisville he did not intend to return, or that while in the South he had any purpose to remain, or that when he returned to Louisville he had any intent other than to live there as he had done before his departure. Domicile has been thus defined: "A residence at a particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there for an unlimited time." This definition is approved by Phillimore in his work on the subject. By the term domicile, in its ordinary acceptation, is meant the place where a person lives and has his home.§ The place where a person lives is taken to be his domicile until facts adduced establish the contrary. * Vattel, 220; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johnson, 438; Cooledge v. Guthrie, 8 American Law Register, N. S. 20; Coppel v. Hall, 7 Wallace, 542; United States v. Grossmayer, 9 Id. 72; Montgomery v. United States, 15 Id. 400; United States v. Lapene, 17 Id. 602; Cutner v. United States, Ib 516. † Guyer v. Daniel, 1 Binney, 349, note. Story's Conflict of Laws, 41. + Page 18. Bruce v. Bruce, 2 Bosanquet & Puller, 228, note; Bampde v. Johnstone, 8 Vesey, 201; Stanley v. Bernes, 3 Haggard's Ecclesiastical Reports, 874, 437; Best on Presumptions, 235. Opinion of the court. The proof of the domicile of the claimant at Louisville is sufficient. There is no controversy between the parties on that proposition. We need not, therefore, further consider the subject. A domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed.* Where a change of domicile is alleged the burden of proving it rests upon the person making the allegation. To constitute the new domicile two things are indispensable: First, residence in the new locality; and, second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made except facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. Either without the other is insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change. There must be the animus to change the prior domicile for another. Until the new one is acquired, the old one remains. These principles are axiomatic in the law upon the subject. When the claimant left Louisville it would have been illegal to take up his abode in the territory whither he was going. Such a purpose is not to be presumed. The presumption is the other way. To be established it must be proved.§ Among the circumstances usually relied upon to establish the animus manendi are: Declarations of the party; the exercise of political rights; the payment of personal taxes; a house of residence, and a place of business.|| All these indicia are wanting in the case of the claimant. The rules of law applied to the affirmative facts, without the aid of the negative considerations to which we have adverted, are conclusive against him. His purchase of the cotton involved the same legal consequences as if it had been made by an agent whom he sent to make it. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. * Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Vesey, 787; Harvard Coll. v. Gore, 5 Pickering, 870; Wharton's Conflict of Laws, & 55. † Crookenden v. Fuller, 1 Swabey & Tristam, 441; Hodgson v. De Bu chesne, 12 Moore's Privy Council, 288 (1858). Wharton's Conflict of Laws, 55, and the authorities there cited. || Phillimore, 100; Wharton, 62, and post. Statement of the case. HOTCHKISS V. NATIONAL BANKS. 1. In May, 1863, the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company issued coupon bonds, by each of which the company acknowledged its indebtedness to certain persons named, or bearer, in the sum of $1000, and promised to pay the amount to the bearer on the 1st day of January, 1893, at the office of the company in the city of New York, with semiannual interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, on the presentation and surrender of the coupons annexed as they severally became due. Immediately following this acknowledgment of indebtedness and promise of payment, there was in each of the instruments & further agreement of the company to make what was termed the scrip preferred stock," attached to the bond, full-paid stock at any time within ten days after any dividend should have been declared and become payable on such preferred stock, upon surrender, in the city of New York, of the bond and the unmatured interest warrants. To each of the bonds there was originally attached by a pin the certificate of scrip preferred stock thus referred to, which stated that the complainant was entitled to ten shares of the capital stock of the company, designated as "scrip preferred stock;" and that upon the surrender of the certificate and accompanying bond, and all unmatured coupons thereon, as provided in the agreement, he should be entitled to receive ten shares of full-paid preferred stock. Three of these bonds with certificates attached were stolen from the plaintiff, and were taken by the defendants as collateral security for notes discounted by them, without actual notice of any defect in the title of the holder; but the certificates were at the time detached from the bonds: Held, 1st, that the bonds were negotiable instruments notwithstanding the agreement respecting the scrip preferred stock contained in them, that agreement being independent of the pecuniary obligation of the company; and, 2d, that the absence of the certificates originally attached to the bonds, when the latter were taken by the defendants, was not of itself a circumstance sufficient to put the defendants upon inquiry as to the title of the holder. 2. The title of a person who takes negotiable paper before due for a valuable consideration can only be defeated by showing bad faith in him, which implies guilty knowledge or wilful ignorance of the facts impairing the title of the party from whom he received it; and the burden of proof lies on the assailant of the taker's title. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. This was a suit to compel the defendants to surrender to the complainant three coupon bonds of the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, each for $1000, of which he Statement of the case. professed to be owner, and which he alleged were received by the defendants in bad faith, with notice of his rights. The instruments were dated May 6th, 1863; by each of them the company acknowledges its indebtedness to certain persons named, or bearer, in the sum designated, and promises to pay the amount to the bearer on the 1st of January, 1893, at the office of the company in the city of New York, with semi-annual interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, on the presentation and surrender of the coupons annexed as they severally become due, with a provision that in case of non-payment of interest for six months the whole principal of the bond shall become due and payable. Immediately following this acknowledgment of the indebtedness of the company and its promise of payment, there was in each of these instruments a further agreement of the company to make what is termed "the scrip preferred stock," attached to the bond, full-paid stock at any time within ten days after any dividend shall have been declared and become payable on such preferred stock, upon surreuder, in the city of New York, of the bond and the unmatured interest warrants. The several instruments also stated that the bonds were parts of a series of bonds issued by the company, amounting to $2,200,000, and that upon the acquisition of certain other railroads the issue of bonds might be increased in certain designated amounts; that the bonds were executed and delivered in conformity with the laws of Wisconsin, the articles of association of the company, the vote of the stockholders, and resolution of the board of directors; and that the bearer of each bond was entitled to the security derived from a mortgage of the property and franchises of the company, executed to certain designated trustees, and to the benefits to be derived from a sinking fund, established by the mortgage, of all such sums of money as are received from the sales of lands granted to the company by the United States or by the State of Wisconsin. To each of these bonds there was originally attached by a pin the certificate of scrip preferred stock which is referred Opinion of the court. to in the body of the instrument. This certificate was to the effect that the complainant was entitled to ten shares of the capital stock of the company, designated as "scrip preferred stock ;" and that upon the surrender of the certificate and accompanying bond, and all unmatured coupons thereon, at any time within ten days after any dividends should have been declared and become payable on the full stock of the preferred stocks of the company, the complainant should be entitled to receive ten shares of such full-paid preferred stock, and that this scrip preferred stock was only transferable on the books of the company at their office in the city of New York, in person or by attorney, on the surrender of the certificate. In November, 1868, these bonds, with coupons and certificates attached, belonged to the complainant, and during that month were stolen from a bank in Bridgeport, Connecticut, together with a large amount of other property there on deposit. They were received in January and February, 1869, by the defendants, banking institutions in the city of New York, as collateral security for notes discounted by them, and were now held as such security for those notes, or new notes given in renewal of them, and they were received without actual notice of any defect in the holders' title. At that time the certificates of scrip preferred stock, originally pinned to the bonds, were detached from them. And the questions for determination were, whether the agreement in the instruments as to the scrip preferred stock affected their negotiability, and whether the absence of the certificates attached was a circumstance sufficient to put the banks upon inquiry as to the title of the holder. Mr. F. N. Bangs, for the appellant; Mr. J. S. Woodward, for the Tradesmen's National Bank, one of the appellces; and Mr. Henry N. Beach, for the National Shoe and Leather Bank of the City of New York, another. Mr. Justice FIELD, having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: |